ABSTRACTThis article examines the relationship between political myth and sacrifice. In recent years, as a result of theoretical advances as well as practical concern to understand the rapidly changing landscape of contemporary politics, the phenomenon of political myth has attracted increasing scholarly attention. This has led to a refined and robust theory of political myth, with a sharp analytical edge and relevant practical applications. The relationship between political myth and sacrifice, however, has not been convincingly addressed so far. Gathering insights (...) from the works of Hannah Arendt and Hans Blumenberg, it is argued here that while political myths succeed in providing guidance and orientation to people in a world that is significant to them, they may also involve a loss of sense of reality and produce a dangerous logic of sacrifice. (shrink)

Young Hegelianism has often been identified as a crucial element in the reorientation of Western philosophy during the mid-nineteenth century. Due to its substantial contribution to the ‘revolutionary rupture’ between Hegel and Nietzsche, it is even said to have had a direct and lasting influence on the identity of philosophy today. This article attempts to shed a new light on the Young Hegelians’ radical critique of traditional philosophy by focusing on their existential condition as youngphilosophers. More particularly, it attempts to (...) see their revolutionary philosophical project from the perspective of a generation conflict. In order to underline the validity of this perspective, three specific arguments are elaborated and brought together. The first draws attention to the fact that the emergence of an independent youth generation was a totally new phenomenon in European civilization at that time. By demonstrating its intrinsic relationship with rebellious youth movements such as Young Italy, Young Europe and Young Germany, Young Hegelianism is situated in the social and political context of a wide-ranginggeneration conflict in European culture. The second argument establishes that the name ‘Jung-Hegelianer’ was anything but an external or superficial indication since, by the end of the 1830ies, it became the consciously preferred self-identification of the radical fraction within the Hegelian school. Hence, the use of the prefix ‘young’ should be associated with the then prevailing subversive meaning of the term, expressing the belief in a whole-sale cultural renewal by the young generation. The third and final argument reveals how the philosophical revolution of the Young Hegelians is fundamentally linked with Hegel’s dialectical understanding of the different stages of life. In that respect, their name also expresses a well-considered philosophical choice for the stage of youth and accordingly determines a specific way of philosophizing. (shrink)

Examination of contemporary debates on metaphysics and its critique yields the conclusion that there is an overall tendency to defend an inextricable bond between them. According to the vast majority of participants in these debates, any reaction against metaphysics, however powerful or radical, is bound to remain trapped in the metaphysical tradition. The dominant view is that criticism either remains tied to or eventually returns to forms of metaphysics, if it does not in fact remain metaphysical in itself. This view (...) confirms the persistence of a typical pattern, namely, that of a circular relationship between metaphysics and its critique. Conspicuous by its absence is the idea of a critique of metaphysics that is not caught up in this vicious metaphysical circle. Moreover, the alleged self-defeating and counterproductive character of critique has become so widely and uncritically accepted—even among opponents of metaphysics—that strong and well-founded objections to metaphysics have largely disappeared from philosophical discourse. Contrary to the conventional idea of a crisis of metaphysics, there appears to be a crisis of the critique of metaphysics. This paper attempts to turn the tide of this crisis. It demonstrates that the categorical assertion of a circular relationship between metaphysics and its critique cannot be logically justified. Furthermore, it presents three different forms of criticism that cannot be metaphysically recuperated. It therefore concludes that the wide acceptance of the idea of an inescapable metaphysical circle, instead of being inspired by sound and irrefutable arguments, is essentially based on a myth. (shrink)

Offers a philosophical appraisal of secularization in light of re-emergence of religion in the past several decades. This book explores the adequacy of classical theories of secularization, as well as what might be offered in their place. It asks the question to what extent philosophy itself has nourished and inspired these kinds of prophecies.

The question of 'the end of metaphysics' is generally considered as a central issue concerning the nature and significance of philosophy as such, and, accordingly, as belonging to the realm of 'pure' or 'fundamental' philosophy. By contrast, this book investigates to what extent the end of metaphysics might be related to specific influences from outside philosophy. Focusing on the period between 1830 and 1848, it argues that metaphysics was not so much challenged by internal philosophical argument, but rather by a (...) transformation of Western culture in its entirety. Metaphysics was overtaken by the modern spirit of the age. In consequence, this book approaches 'the end of metaphysics' as a problem of the philosophy of culture. Three historians of culture provide an overview and analysis of the 'Age of Revolution' by focusing upon the political revolution in France, the industrial revolution in England and the intellectual revolution in Germany respectively. The proclamations of the end of metaphysics by Auguste Comte, Friedrich Engels and Otto Friedrich Gruppe are shown to mirror this threefold cultural transformation. Against this backdrop, the idea of the end of metaphysics is brought into relief as a historical reality during the years 1830 to 1848. The editors are members of the Centre for Metaphysics and Culture at the University of Antwerp. (shrink)

This book presents a philosophical study of the idea of reenchantment and its merits in the interrelated fields of philosophical anthropology, ethics, and ontology. It features chapters from leading contributors to the debate about reenchantment, including Charles Taylor, John Cottingham, Akeel Bilgrami, and Jane Bennett. The chapters examine neglected and contested notions such as enchantment, transcendence, interpretation, attention, resonance, and the sacred or reverence-worthy-notions that are crucial to human self-understanding but have no place in a scientific worldview. They also explore (...) the significance of adopting a reenchanting perspective for debates on major concepts such as nature, naturalism, God, ontology, and disenchantment. Taken together, they demonstrate that there is much to be gained from working with a more substantial and affirmative concept of reenchantment, understood as a fundamental existential orientation towards what is seen as meaningful and of value. The Philosophy of Reenchantment will be of interest to scholars and advanced students in philosophy-especially those working in moral philosophy, metaphysics, philosophy of religion, theology, religious studies, and sociology. (shrink)

This book pursues the need for philosophical responses attuned to the complexity of terrorism.

In the course of Western history, philosophy has proven to be an active participant in the process of secularization. This article seeks to examine that philosophical role more closely. The central question is how the role of philosophy must be rethought in light of the contemporary critique of classical secularization theory. The first part of the article sheds light on the current crisis of secularization theory. Drawing on recent scholarship in the social sciences, it explains why the classical tenets and (...) assumptions of secularization theory are no longer being considered as plausible and empirically grounded hypotheses. Against that background, the second part turns to philosophy. It examines the implications for a philosophical tradition of religious criticism that has consciously operated within this once-undisputed model of secularization. The question is how this critique of religion must be rethought, if its prominent role in the history of modern philosophy can no longer be ascribed to a general secularization of the Western mind. The third and final part attempts to answer this question by focusing on one of the most frequently overlooked, yet most significant and crucial elements in the history of philosophical secularization: the intrinsic intellectual attraction of religious disenchantment. (shrink)

In this brief response to Herbert De Vriese’s The Charm of Disenchantment, his attempt to link secularism and modernity is questioned. Criticism is leveled at De Vriese’s use of the correspondence between Voltaire and Frederick the Great without reference to the historical context, notably the confessional states that existed between roughly 1650 and 1800 in Europe. De Vriese’s apology for disenchantment and modernity is also questioned in the light of both modern religious and secular responses to (...) modernity as exemplified by the Dalai Lama and Bernard Stiegler. (shrink)

This article examines the different avenues to protect animals globally under (a zoological perspective on) international law. A first approach is to use existing organizations, which are limited in scope but through which it is easier to find common ground. The second approach is to use a global existing and overarching organization. The Organization for Animal Health has the advantage of having quasi-universal membership and of issuing science-based and objective reports. However, its powers are currently quite weak. This article suggests (...) that the best avenue would be a third approach: the establishment of a new international organization, preferably under the U.N. umbrella. (shrink)

L’auteur cherche, au moyen d’une analyse de la théorie totalitaire de l’État et de la société, à décrire les fonctions idéologiques de cette conception. Après avoir esquissé les différentes sources de cette théorie et le développement économique qui a précédé l’état autoritaire total qu’elle préconise, il expose ses principaux éléments : l’universalisme, l’organicisme, le „réalisme héroïque44 et l’existencialisme politique (Carl Schmitt). Cette théorie combat le libéralisme comme son grand adversaire. On voit toutefois nettement que son anti-libéralisme cache sa position effective (...) dans la situation actuelle : les bases économiques du libéralisme subsistent comme telles et ne sont qu’adaptées aux nécessités nouvelles de la société monopolo- capitaliste ; l’état autoritaire total organise la société sans modifier sa base d’une manière décisive ; il n’est qu’une auto-transformation de l’état libéral. La théorie de l’état autoritaire total n’est toutefois pas uniquement le résultat d’une manoeuvre idéologique. Par l’état autoritaire et par les pensées qu’il suscite dans un but propagandiste, se développent des forces qui dépassent ses propres formes politiques et tendent vers un autre état de choses.The author attempts by means of an interpretation of the historical and social theory of the totalitarian state to demonstrate its social functions. After sketching the various sources of the new world-outlook and of the economic developments preceding the totalitarian state, the author presents the main points of his analysis : popular universalism, irrational orga- nicism, „heroic realism44 and political existencialism (Carl Schmitt). Liberalism is the great antagonist of this political and social theory. It is clear, however, that the anti-liberalism of the latter conceals the actual attitude in the present situation ; the economic foundations of liberalism remain as they were and are merely adapted to the changed needs of the monopolistic capitalistic society. The totalitarian state organizes society without any real change in its basis ; it is only a self-transformation of the libera- listic state. The totalitarian state is however not merely an ideological adaptation. The dialectics of an historical process emerge within it, and unchain forces which point to something beyond the political forms by which the totalitarian state stabilises social conditions. (shrink)

|347| Introduction À titre provisoire, commençons par déterminer l’objet de notre enquête, en le prenant tel qu’il nous est donné. Le matérialisme historique intervient dans le contexte gnoséologique du marxisme ; or ce dernier n’apparaît pas comme une théorie scientifique, comme un système de vérités dont le sens résiderait uniquement dans leur exactitude en tant que connaissances, mais comme une théorie de l’agir social, de l’acte historique. Le marxisme est la théorie de la révolution prol...

Existential-Ontologie und historischer Materialismus bei Herbert Marcuse, von A. Schmidt.--Das Ganze und das ganz Andere; zur Kritik der reinen revolutionären Transzendenz, von W.F. Haug.--Technik und Eindimensionalität; eine Version der Technokratiethese? Von C. Offe.--Technologische Rationalität und spätkapitalistische ökonomie, von J. Bergmann.--Die geschichtliche Dimension des Realitätsprinzips, von H. Berndt und R. Reiche.--Marcuse and the New Left in America, by P. Breines.--Ausgewählte Bibliographie der Schriften Herbert Marcuses (p. 155-[161]).

Dans les tentatives pour donner à la philosophie un fondement nouveau, le concept d’essence constitue le point central de la discussion, La phénoménologie de Husserl aussi bien que Feidétique de Scheler et de ses successeurs avait pour but de fonder, grâce à la doctrine de l’essence, une connaissance absolument certaine des vérités intemporelles. Cette prétention montre que la doctrine moderne de l’essence est la dernière étape de la pensée bourgeoise dont l’origine est la philosophie de Descartes. L’article se propose d’interpréter (...) les différentes conceptions de l’essence en tant que moments de l’évolution historique de cette pensée bourgeoise. La bourgeoisie dans sa période ascendante exigeait des vérités essentielles qu’elles fussent capables de se justifier devant la raison critique autonome de l’individu : au contraire la philosophie moderne fait de l’essence l’objet d’une intuition que la raison doit accepter telle quelle. Les tendances rationnelles de la doctrine de l’essence sont refoulées : la raison devient réceptrice, hétéronome. Cette démission de la raison critique reflète l’adaptation de la philosophie à l’idéologie antirationaliste des systèmes nouveaux d’autorité : dans la dernière phase de l’évolution, la doctrine de l’essence devient mythologie politique. Le positivisme représente l’opposition non dialectique à cette doctrine de l’essence : il veut entièrement chasser de la science le concept d’essence, mais du même coup il tombe dans le défaut de rabaisser tous les faits sur le même plan, sans établir entre eux de différences. Dans l’idée d’essence opposée au phénomène sont contenus des éléments positifs, critique de la réalité « mauvaise », processus de réalisation des possibilités aflxthentiques de l’homme et des choses. Ces éléments positifs, la doctrine dialectique de l’essence les conserve. — La deuxième partie du travail cherche à montrer la formation du concept d’essence dans la philosophie dialectique qui, grâce à ce concept, surmonte le relativisme sans retomber dans la métaphysique dogmatique. L’opposition de l’essence et du phénomène est conçue ici comme une relation historique, et dans la constitution de celle-ci les intérêts sociaux de la théorie pénètrent à titre d’élément constitutif. La praxis historique à laquelle la théorie est liée et qui doit supprimer (aufheben) l’opposition, rend les intérêts particuliers vraiment généraux et fonde un type nouveau de vérité universelle. Le concept d'essence qui est au centre de la doctrine dialectique et qui détermine tous les autres concepts est le concept de l’homme. Le souci d’atteindre l’homme véritable remplace le souci de connaissance absolument certaine qui caractérise la philosophie idéaliste. De même que les formes phénoménales de l’henime et des choses ont leur origine dans la structure sociale présente, ainsi cette structure dessine à l’avance l’image de l’essence et des possibilités humaines que l’homme doit comprendre comme des tâches historiques, dont la voie de réalisation est marquée par la réalité elle-même.During the last decades the concept of essence has been widely discussed in the various attempts to seek a new foundation for philosophy. Both the phenomenology of E. Husserl and the theory of essence of M. Scheler and his followers were devoted to discovering through their theories of reality the unconditioned and exact knowledge of eternal verities. This attempt characterizes modern theory of reality as the last stage of bourgeois thought which began with Descartes. — The article endeavors to interpret the various conceptions of essence as specific stages of the historical development of that thought. With the rise of modern society the demand was made that the essential verities justify themselves before the critical and autonomous reason of the individual, whereas contemporary theory regards them as objects of an intuition and believes that reason has to accept them in the way in which they manifest themselves. The critical and rational tendencies in the theory of reality are abandoned, reason becomes receptive and heteronomous. This abdication of autonomous critical reason mirrors the adjustment of philosophy to the anti-rational ideology of the new form of authoritarian state. In the last phase of development the theory of reality turns out to be political mythology. — Positivism represents the undialectical opposition to this theory of reality. It wishes to remove completely the concept of essence from science, but thereby arrives only at an indifferent levelling of all facts. The idea of reality as opposed to appearance contains the positive elements of a critique of reality and of the process of realization of the essential potentialities of man and things. They are preserved in the dialectical conception of reality. — The second part of the essay attempts to point out the function of the concept of reality in dialectical philosophy, with the help of which it overcomes relativism. The opposition between appearance and reality is here conceived as a historical relationship, in the determination of which enter as integral elements the social interests of the theory. In the course of the historical trend, with which the theory is bound up and which is supposed to abolish the opposition between appearance and reality, the particular interests become truly general, and a new kind of universally valid truth arises. Reality which stands at the center of the dialectical theory and determines all other concepts, refers primarily to the essence of man. Concern about concrete man is taking the place of concern about the unconditioned exact truth of idealist philosophy. In the same way as man’s (and thing’s) forms of appearance is grounded in the present social structure, likewise the idea of his essence and the process of its realization arise out of this structure, and its realization must be conceived as a historical task. (shrink)

Idealism has always struggled against the hedonistic trends in philosophy which see the goal of existence in the happiness of the individual and which identify happiness with pleasure. Idealism insists that happiness is a subjective concept which makes man dependent upon chance and accident. Happiness, it holds, does not lead beyond the particular interests of the individual, whereas the progress of mankind, reason in history, demands the subordination of particular interests to the whole. So long as happiness is defined as (...) the state of satisfaction of the isolated individual, it must remain an abstract concept. It expresses the condition that the satisfaction of one individual within an antagonistic society is only possible at the expense of another. The essential relationships between men cannot be permeated with happiness when the life process of society is driven on by work for the sake of profit and mere self-preservation» when the destiny of the individual is shaped by the blind mechanism of the market. Only brief moments of immediate pleasure are possible. To the extent that hedonism holds firmly to the subjective demand for happiness in the face of the demands of a reified world, it expresses a materialist protest. This protest, however, is itself imprisoned within the antagonistic society, in that it is concerned with the satisfaction of the isolated individual.But the concept of happiness points beyond the isolation of the subject. His personal pleasure and satisfaction is not necessarily happiness, his immediate interest is not necessarily his real interest. The content of happiness is to be approached through a consideration of its truth. The needs and satisfactions of the individual are not given once and for all, but are determined by the social relationships in which they arise. Until now they have borne the stigma of universal injustice and lack of freedom. The disciplining of the masses for the modern labor process has brought with it corporal and spiritual atrophy, suppression, and incapacity for happiness. Real happiness presupposes a transformed organization of society, in which the realization of individual potentialities will no longer be diverted by internalization and no longer made meaningless by competition. In its real form, happiness is identical with freedom. It ceases to be merely a subjective feeling and becomes the real constitution of mankind.Les doctrines hédonistes de la philosophie, qui voyaient dans le bonheur le but de l’existence individuelle et qui confondaient le bonheur avec le plaisir, ont toujours été combattues par l’idéalisme. On leur opposait que le bonheur est un principe subjectif, qui soumet les hommes à l’arbitraire et au hasard. Le bonheur ne saurait être l’essentiel, car le bonheur ne mène pas au delà des intérêts particuliers des individus. Le progrès de l’humanité, la raison dans l’histoire exigent la subordination des intérêts particuliers à l’universel. Si longtemps que le bonheur est déterminé comme l’état de satisfaction de l’individu isolé, il reste un concept abstrait. Il dénote un état de fait : dans la société antagoniste, la satisfaction de l’individu n’est possible qu’aux dépens des autres. Le travail en vue du profit et de l’intérêt strictement personnel est constitutif du procès social, la destinée de l’individu dépend des mécanismes aveugles du marché : dans ces conditions toutes les relations entre les hommes ne peuvent être fondées sur le bonheur. Pour celui-ci ne subsistent que le loisir et la jouissance immédiate. Dans la mesure où l’hédonisme maintient la prétention subjective au bonheur, face aux exigences de l’universalité devenue chose, il représente une protestation matérialiste. Mais la protestation reste elle-même liée à la société contradictoire dès lors qu’elle s’arrête à la satisfaction de l’individu isolé. Le concept de bonheur dépasse l’isolement du sujet. La joie, le consentement de celui-ci n’est pas encore bonheur, son intérêt immédiat n’est pas encore son intérêt authentique. Il est légitime de poser à propos du contenu du bonheur la question de vérité. Besoins et satisfactions des individus ne sont point encore données ultimes, ils sont constitués par les rapports sociaux dans lesquels ils apparaissent. Jusqu’à ce jour dans l’histoire, les besoins portent la marque de la non-liberté et de l’injustice générales. Pour former les masses à la discipline moderne du travail, on les a mutilées physiquement et psychiquement, on les a condamnées à refouler leurs désirs. Onlesarendues dans une large mesure incapables de jouissance. Le bonheur réel suppose une forme autre de la société dans laquelle l’accomplissement des possibilités individuelles ne sera plus détourné par l’intériorisation, ni privé de sens par la concurrence. En sa figure véritable, le bonheur est identique à la liberté, il cesse d’être un état affectif purement subjectif et devient la constitution réelle de l’humanité. (shrink)

Certains physiciens modernes ont cru pouvoir tirer, de leurs recherches sur la structure de l’atome, la négation du déterminisme universel. Mais ils confondent, dans leurs déductions, l'indétermination avec le hasard ; et ils acceptent l’existence réelle du hasard. D’ailleurs Max Planck, qui a découvert les quanta, n’accepte pas l'indéterminisme, non plus que le professeur Einstein.

Der akademischen Philosophie wird manchmal nachgesagt, sie suche Antworten auf Fragen, die außer Philosophen niemanden umtreiben. In diesem Band sind »zwölf philosophische Antworten« auf Fragen versammelt, die sich jeder irgendwann einmal stellt und über die professionelle Philosophen lediglich etwas schärfer und gründlicher nachdenken. Die Autoren dieses Bandes greifen pointiert, allgemeinverständlich und mit philosophischem Vertiefungsanspruch aktuelle Kontroversen auf. Sie erheben dabei den Anspruch, philosophisch argumentativ sowohl dem Zeitgeistrelativismus als auch der Dominanz empirischer Wissenschaften entgegenzutreten. Es ist keineswegs „alles bloß Ansichtssache“; denn (...) Toleranz ist nicht einfach nur achselzuckendes Wegschauen. Um zu einer klugen und begründeten Orientierung zu kommen, bedarf es auch nicht der einseitigen Zuflucht zu heute populären Antwortinstanzen wie der Religion, der Neurobiologie oder der Ökonomie. In der Tradition der philosophischen Aufklärung ist weiterhin auf den nachdenkenden Menschen zu setzen, der in der Philosophie vertiefende Anregungen erhält, um sich zu aktuellen Kontroversen ein begründetetes Urteil zu bilden. Über das Handwerk des Philosophen – Meinen, Glauben und Wissen – Rechte und Pflichten, Werte und Normen – Fairness als Prinzip – Zur Verteidigung der Freiheit als Dilemma – Zum Streit über das Lebewesen Mensch – Das Geist-Körper-Problem und die Hirnforschung – Das Schuldprinzip und die Willensfreiheit – Die Wissenschaft zwischen Natur und Kultur – Grenzen des wirtschaftlichen Denkens – Das Wahrheitsproblem in der Mediengesellschaft – Religion im Streit der Meinungen Mit Beiträgen von Simone Dietz, Heiner Hastedt, Detlef Horster, Peter Janich, Geert Keil, Corinna Mieth, Herbert Schnädelbach und Anke Thyen. (shrink)

In his “Logic of Scientific Discovery” and also in “Conjectures and Refutations” Karl Popper laid down methodological rules. They were to secure severe tests of our theories so that we might at least prove our false theories to be false, if we cannot prove our true theories to be true. But falsification turned out to be as impossible as verification. What is more, the rules, which are here examined, do not even advance criticism of theories. Either they are trivial or (...) not applicable or even untenable or they refer to problems, which do not exist. There is no reason to expect that those rules, which we could not here examine, are essentially different. Hence applying the methodological rules of critical rationalism in empirical sciences seems out of the question. (shrink)

In his “Logic of Scientific Discovery” and also in “Conjectures and Refutations” Karl Popper laid down methodological rules. They were to secure severe tests of our theories so that we might at least prove our false theories to be false, if we cannot prove our true theories to be true. But falsification turned out to be as impossible as verification. What is more, the rules, which are here examined, do not even advance criticism of theories. Either they are trivial or (...) not applicable or even untenable or they refer to problems, which do not exist. There is no reason to expect that those rules, which we could not here examine, are essentially different. Hence applying the methodological rules of critical rationalism in empirical sciences seems out of the question. (shrink)