In this classic work, often described as "The History of the Rise, Decline, and Fall of the Love Affair," Denis de Rougemont explores the psychology of love from the legend of Tristan and Isolde to Hollywood.

Introduction.--1. ptie. Primauté du spirituel?--2. ptie. Principes dúne politique du pessimisme actif.--3. ptie. Idoles.--4. ptie. Problèmes de la révolution personnaliste.--Appendice.

One of the principal reasons for the confusion in which recent technological developments, and developments in the physical, chemical and biological sciences generally, have plunged us, consists in our inability to harmonise our means and our ends, to subordinate the former to the latter, to verify constantly their appropriateness or their incompatibility, and to evaluate their overall relation to man's final ends.

The question of whether the phenomenon of passionate love is a natural phenomenon, as for naturalist psychologists, or rather a cultural product of Western civilization, was asked already by Nietzsche. This article deals with Denis de Rougemont’s essay L’amour et l’occident, in which the Swiss French intellectual answers the question decidedly in the sense of the second alternative. According to Rougement, passionate love finds its source in the movement of Catharism, which developed in Southern France in the 12th (...) and 13th centuries. Courtois love is expression of a transfigured love towards God combined with a gnostic disdain of the created world. The article also discusses the critiques that have been raised against Rougemont’s thesis, but emphasizes that Rougemont’s thesis has to be read at a higher level of explanatory abstraction than that of its critiques. (shrink)

Qu'ont en commun Cioran, Simone Weil, Curzio Malaparte, Denis de Rougemont et les autres intellectuels et écrivains dont l'oeuvre et la vie sont évoquées dans ces pages? Il apparaît que, pour la plupart, ce sont des témoins d'une époque à bien des égards exceptionnelle, ne serait-ce que par la profondeur et l'intensité des malheurs qui y ont connu les hommes et les femmes. Mais alors pourquoi avoir choisi parmi tous les témoins possibles ceux qui, sans être inconnus dans (...) les cercles savants, ne le sont pas moins aujourd'hui du grand public? Peut-être s'agit-il de faire oeuvre d'éducation en permettant aux lecteurs d'accéder à la connaissance de ces témoins peu connus? Peut-être s'agit-il plutôt, à terme, de simplement rappeler ces existences marquées, au milieu de la tourmente, par la lucidité et le courage? Une telle entreprise peut paraître suspecte à une époque qui se targue d'avoir aboli toutes les idoles. Que vaut, en somme, ce type de célébration posthume dès lors que chaque existence, même la plus noble, porte en elle une part d'obscurité si déterminante? A cela s'ajoute que l'histoire, du moins celle que nourrit la recherche et que l'on enseigne dans les universités et les collèges, n'offre plus de modèles de vie, mais bien des faits, des explications et des interprétations que l'on souhaite les plus objectifs possible. Et pourtant, à cette époque que l'on dit de toutes les fins, de l'Art, de l'Histoire, de l'Homme, il a semblé nécessaire de renouer avec l'esprit de la tradition humaniste. Un jardin en soi, aurait pu écrire Montaigne, qu'on ne peut cultiver pour le mieux, car c'est là un art incertain, qu'en ayant à l'esprit un certain idéal. Or, renouer ainsi le fil rompu de la transmission de l'Idéal, tel était, et tel demeure encore aujourd'hui, notre volonté en publiant ces figures de pensée. (shrink)

Tout au long des années trente, un groupe de jeunes intellectuels non conformistes réunis dans le mouvement " Ordre Nouveau " ont lancé dans le débat une pensée radicalement nouvelle en rupture avec les idées dominantes du collectivisme conquérant et du capitalisme traditionnel. Ils avaient nom Denis de Rougemont, Robert Aron, Arnaud Dandieu, Daniel-Rops, Emmanuel Mounier. Alexandre Marc, philosophe jeté hors de sa Russie natale par la victoire des bolcheviques, était leur fédérateur et animateur principal.0De ces idées, il (...) fit une doctrine, le fédéralisme personnaliste, à l'approfondissement et à la diffusion de laquelle il consacra toute sa vie. On pourrait la croire aujourd'hui oubliée. Et pourtant, c'est en elle qu'ont germé des réalisations et des propositions, révolutionnaires en ces temps et très présentes dans les débats actuels : fédéralisme européen, crise de civilisation, allocation universelle, subsidiarité et régionalisme, etc.0Il en est jusqu'à la pensée dialectique du " en même temps ", chère au macronisme, qui apparaît comme une transposition hasardeuse de la dialectique inclusive, théorisée par Alexandre Marc. Sa disparition, voilà vingt ans, appelle une évaluation de cette doctrine et une tentative d'appréciation critique de sa pertinence. Ce livre s'efforce d'illustrer cette ambition au travers des réflexions des auteurs sur certains de ses aspects névralgiques comme le personnalisme, la crise, la dialectique ou l'action politique.0Certains ont été des élèves et des proches collaborateurs d'Alexandre Marc ; d'autres ne l'ont connu qu'au travers de ses écrits ou de ses conférences. Tous se reconnaissent dans le personnalisme, fondement de cette doctrine méconnue et pourtant, étonnamment actuelle. (shrink)

- La bibliographie de l'auteur - Les protagonistes du dialogue de Diderot, A et B, discutent du Voyage autour du monde du navigateur français Louis Antoine de Bougainville récemment paru (en 1771). B propose de parcourir un prétendu Supplément qui en remet en question certaines soi-disant évidences énoncées par Bougainville. Deux passages de ce supplément sont enchâssés dans la discussion: Les adieux du vieillard, et le long Entretien de l'aumônier et d'Orou.

Le discrédit tenace dont souffre le Moyen Âge laisse apparaître dans son tissu les grandes trouées d'un intérêt presque exalté focalisé essentiellement sur une invention médiévale inouïe, celle de l'amour passion. Depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, plusieurs auteurs ont attiré l'attention sur cette question de l'amour dans la pensée médiévale, question qui avait pourtant jusqu'alors peu retenu les spécialistes de cette période. Les lectures depuis se multiplient. Il y a eu, entre autres, les trois grandes lectures de l'abbé Pierre Rousselot, (...) d'Anders Nygren et de Denis de Rougemont; il y a eu le Séminaire que Lacan a consacré à cette «affaire» médiévale de l'amour en 1973 et qui s'appuyait précisément sur les trois commentaires précédemment cités, et cela de préférence à des textes plus traditionnels tels que La Nouvelle Héloïse ou les Lettres de la religieuse portugaise; il y a eu aussi les commentaires de Georges Duby et d'Ivos Margoni; il y a, enfin, la belle et forte lecture de Charles Baladier dont il est ici rendu compte. (shrink)

Cet article cherche à déterminer les usages de l’expression « corps politique » dans L’Esprit des lois, pour préciser le regard que Montesquieu porte sur la réalité politique, et comment il entend poser son questionnement par rapport à la tradition contractualiste et jusnaturaliste. Dans les rapports qui existent entre les différents « corps politiques », se joue l’unité du « corps politique ».La monarchie modérée ne saurait exister sans une bonne composition des puissances.

" L'étude historique de Michel Despland sur la religion en Occident revêt une importance tout à fait unique. Je ne lui connais pas d'équivalent en langue française. Il a fait pour l'histoire de l'idée de religion en Occident ce que Denis de Rougemont a fait pour celle d'amour. C'est pourquoi je crois pouvoir dire que son immense travail deviendra un classique qu'aucun historien, aucun théologien ne pourra ignorer. Suivre patiemment le destin du mot et du concept de religion, (...) c'est une manière d'écrire l'histoire de l'Occident. ". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Petrarchan Love and the Pleasures of FrustrationAldo Scaglione—Think you, if Laura had been Petrarch’s wife, He would have written sonnets all his life?Lord Byron, Don Juan, canto III, st. 7As Byron ironically intimated, there is a behavioral connection between much of the literature of love and sexual frustration. What is known as medieval “courtly love” was an epiphany of idealized love. Whether self-imposed or forced restraint, it infused much (...) of Arthurian lore, the troubadours’ and then Petrarch’s lyric, and later partly merged with the Renaissance phenomenon of Platonic love. 1 But we wonder about possible historical derivation both on the cultural (literary) level and on the level of practical behavior. In other words, if taken case by case, is the similarity among cultural patterns and between literary phenomena and behavioral patterns a consequence of: 1) intertextual connections with courtly love and Petrarchism; 2) ideological circumstances similar to those which produced “courtly love”; or, inversely, 3) a broader human need that also lies in the background of courtly love? Where and how did frustration, denial, or sublimation acquire a deeper and greater value than consummation and satisfaction? Was it through religion, myth, morality, psychology, or a combination of these factors? Is this essentially an anthropological or rather a psycho-moral question? Does it originate in our perennial “nature” or in our time-bound mores?It seems safe to assume a combination of these factors. Ideals of psychologically sublimated, hence physiologically frustrated, love have an anthropological foundation and are inherent in any sophisticated cultural form. At the [End Page 557] same time, in the Western tradition they owe much to the persistence of the specific historical phenomena of courtly love and its Petrarchistic variations.Of course the folklore of love includes both satisfied and unfulfilled sorts. Jean Hagstrum’s Esteem Enlivened by Desire (1992) deals with the conjugal sort, implying consummation. He distinguishes his theme from “long-term relations that remain unconsummated, valorizing delayed or obviated climax, prolonged foreplay, ascetic discipline, traditional Platonic or Petrarchan love, or various forms of sublimation.” 2 Yet “this last... is dialectically and psychologically tied to [Hagstrum’s] main theme: it is one kind of long-term love relationship with often more than a tinge of the erotic.” 3 For Hagstrum these behavioral variations are determined by culture, since purely “natural” behavior would be more uniform and “unhistorically” steady. 4The notion that idealized desire is culture-bound finds support in Denis de Rougemont’s well-known thesis, that chivalry and courtesy are inventions of medieval Europe with no equivalent at other times and places except by direct influence or imitation: the behavior of an ancient Greek lover or a modern Japanese lover does not involve “chivalry” toward the woman. 5 For de Rouge-mont, ideal love came under the spell of what he called eros, defined as infatuation with desire itself rather than love for its natural end. Difficulties and obstacles became more meaningful than success, even to the point that, as in the story of Tristan and, differently and uniquely, in Dante’s poetry, the death of the beloved marked the culmination of eros. This eros postulates self-denial and sublimation for the sake of a higher achievement.Regardless of chivalry’s roots in medieval Europe, frustration can be a powerful ideal in non-Western cultures, too. One signal example might suffice. The Chinese literary classic, The Dream of the Red Chamber by Chan T’sao (ca. 1717–63), is the life story or Bildungsroman of a high prince who, after a [End Page 558] life of indulgence, decides to renounce the world and become an ascetic monk. 6 This problematic main character, Pao Yu, moves in the framework of Taoist and Confucian ideals, with the addition of some Buddhist religious traits. His final withdrawal from the world, however, which appears to family and society as a disappointing betrayal, obeys a psychological need for a frustration that represents a nobler achievement than the satisfaction of worldly ambition.The point of this essay is to sample a few cases of literary representations of idealized love while underlining their ideal and, at times, literal interconnections. I also mean to suggest... (shrink)

Dans son œuvre L’Amour et L’Occident, Denis de Rougemont a pris pour thème l’amour courtois tel qu’il s’exprime dans la poésie des troubadours du XIIe siècle et dans le roman courtois du XIIIe siècle. Cette définition de l’amour, nouvelle et d’influence majeure, découle selon lui d’une dissidence religieuse, le catharisme, dont elle transpose les contours au vécu de l’amoureux face à sa Dame. Rougemont fait remonter à cette création médiévale beaucoup de facettes de la « passion » (...) telle que la connaissent les temps plus récents. L’article documente à ses débuts la polémique suscitée par le livre, en utilisant des documents restés longtemps inédits (Marrou, Gilson, Massignon). Il met en place les deux niveaux du débat, portant l’un sur la méthode historique, l’autre sur la perméabilité des strates religieuse et profane dans la réalité sociale. (shrink)

In the Thirties, European personalism was an inspirational philosophical movement, with its birthplace in France, but with proponents and sympathizers in many other countries as well. Following the Second World War, Christian-Democratic politicians translated personalistic ideas into a political doctrine. Sometimes they still refer to personalism, but most often this reference is little more than a nostalgic salute. In the mainstream of Anglo-Saxon political philosophy, there are practically no references to personalistic philosophers. Is personalism exhausted as a philosophy or political (...) ideology? Yes and no. Paul Ricoeur, writing in Esprit , summed up the situation like this: “personalism is dead”, but he was careful to mention a “return of the person”. Indeed, no tradition or movement can simply perpetuate itself. It must, in order to continue making history, always abolish itself as a `system' so as to make room for the unsaid and the unthought in its tradition, an idea that Mounier also fervently believed in.To better situate the current discussion of personalism, however, it is necessary to look back to the original characteristics of personalism in the Thirties. As a response to the crisis provoked by the economic depression, failing democracy and existential uncertainty, there arose in France a number of `non-conformist movements' who labelled themselves personalistic. They did not constitute a unified movement with a commonly shared theory. It was rather a collection of `personalisms'. The article by the historian Christian Roy about the ecological personalism of Bernard Charbonneau and Jacques Ellul sheds interesting light on the multiple origins of French personalism, which is all too easily identified with the work of Maritain and Mounier alone. The work of Jacques Maritain, and the network of writers and artists surrounding him, undoubtedly remains a significant historical reference point when speaking of personalism.Another group was formed around Alexandre Marc who, along with Raymond Aron, Arnaud Dandieu, Daniel-Rops and Denis de Rougemont, kept the journal Ordre Nouveau alive for five years . They elaborated the idea of federalism as a way out of liberalism and totalitarianism. The most important and durable group, however, was formed by the movement and journal Esprit, founded in 1932 by Emmanuel Mounier and George Izard. In order to stress the historical importance of Esprit, we are including here a testimony from 1982, written by Paulette Mounier, the founder's wife, in which she looks back on 50 years of Esprit. After the war, some new and related groups formed, such as Economy and Humanism around Louis-Joseph Lebret. An historical survey of the dissemination of personalistic centres and movements, not only in France but over all of Europe, would be material for a stimulating historical research project. In this issue, there will also be mention of, among others, the Prague personalism of Jan Patocka and Vaclav Havel, the Leuven personalism of Louis Janssens, and the Polish personalism of Tadeusz Mazowiecki and others. But this list is far from exhaustive.What unites these various branches of the personalistic tree? It is a certain conception — or better perhaps: a certain attitude to the human person. Personalists were not seeking in the first instance a new academic theory about the person, but rather a practical philosophy of engagement. In the Thirties, quite a few personalists finished their university studies and chose not for an academic career but for non-conformist, demanding and vulnerable commitments with limited financial means. What motivated them? Primarily a strong sense that the time in which they were living was a turning point, one which was being ignored by the academic world. They interpreted the diverse economic, political and cultural crisis phenomena as symptoms of a more global crisis of civilization which demanded a response through radical change.Hence a certain rhetoric of a `new order', `spiritual revolution', `radical reform' and `rebirth'. But the rhetoric was supported by innovative ideas regarding political federalism, the third way economy and human alienation. The motivation for all this derived from a strong commitment to defend the concrete human person against the arrogance of systems, bureaucracies and ideologies, while at the same time avoiding the pitfalls of individualism — the reason why some personalists always qualified personalism as `communitarian'.In fact, much of what presents itself as communitarian philosophy today is a retrieval of personalistic themes from the Thirties applied to the current situation, a situation which is also interpreted by communitarians as a global cultural crisis. One should not forget, however, that alongside and sometimes opposed to the communitarian theme with its call to bring people back to their communitarian roots, personalists underscored the priority of metaphysics over politics, a theme that can likewise be found in the writings of personalistic dissidents in Eastern Europe. In the words of Mounier in Qu'est-ce que le personnalisme : “personalism combines faith in a certain human absolute with a progressive historical experience”.To what extent is personalistic thinking still relevant today? Its current relevance will be examined in three ways. In the first section, a number of articles are presented which illustrate the active presence of personalistic thought in the domains of politics and applied ethics. Vaclav Havel sent one of his recent addresses in which he links the theme of human rights with that of a world spirituality. His article is preceded by an introduction by Guido Van Heeswijck, situating Prague personalism.The need for an orientational philosophy of the person is not only manifest today in the political arena. Developments in economics, ecology, health care, the media, technology and in the world of the professions have had an extraordinarily large impact on the human person's lifeworld. The whole area of applied ethics requires a dynamic and orientational concept of the person. The contributions by Paul Schotsmans and Luk Bouckaert are seeking a personalistic point of departure for applied ethics. The more historical article by Christian Roy on ecological personalism has been included in the first section because it can be inspiring for an environmental ethics.The second section is more philosophical. To what extent does the `personalistic' conception of the person put forward in the Thirties still have any relevance today, following the waves of structuralism, post-structuralism and postmodernism? Paul Ricoeur's article, Approaching the Human Person — originally published in Esprit in 1990 and now translated for the first time — can be seen as a reference text. Ricoeur shows in what sense the concept of the person must be broadened in order to continue functioning. The person as `narrative identity' can only write history through the medium of language and institutions. Starting from very different assumptions, the articles by Louis Janssens & Joseph Selling and the analysis of Roland Breeur also explore the idea that a person is what he is only when his identity is opened up, touched by an exteriority or conceived as a focal point . It is this radical openness and vulnerability that gives the person its historical and transcendent dynamic, and prevents us from encapsulating it in existing systems, theories and power relations. The connection with Emmanuel Levinas and his hermeneutic of the idea of the infinite is an obvious one to draw.The third section contains a historical survey in which a number of active `personalistic' centres and journals are presented.Various European centres that appeal explicitly to some form of personalistic thinking were posed the following questions: What is the main historical reference to personalism at your centre? and How do you implement, today, a personalist credo in your work? John Dick organized the responses to these questions under a number of headings. This survey aims to provide not so much an exhaustive but a representative picture of the ways in which European personalism lives on as a mosaic of centres engaged in everyday history. (shrink)

Benedito Nunes é uma das maiores referências intelectuais paraenses. Atuou em vários campos da linguagem, sempre no exercício crítico da arte, da literatura e da filosofia. Além dessas áreas de atuação, consolidadas em sua trajetória profissional, trazemos para nossa análise suas reflexões e engajamento com o setor da produção cultural amazônica das décadas de 1950 e 1960, através de textos sobre o contexto sociocultural paraense do período. Além disso, investigamos sua participação como docente no curso de Formação de Ator da (...) Escola de Teatro da Universidade Federal do Pará nos anos 1960 e a relação de sua prática pedagógica no contexto de elaboração de sua teoria filosófica da arte. (shrink)

In this classic work, often described as "The History of the Rise, Decline, and Fall of the Love Affair," Denis de Rougemont explores the psychology of love from the legend of Tristan and Isolde to Hollywood. At the heart of his ever-relevant inquiry is the inescapable conflict in the West between marriage and passion--the first associated with social and religious responsiblity and the second with anarchic, unappeasable love as celebrated by the troubadours of medieval Provence. These early poets, (...) according to de Rougemont, spoke the words of an Eros-centered theology, and it was through this "heresy" that a European vocabulary of mysticism flourished and that Western literature took on a new direction.Bringing together historical, religious, philosophical, and cultural dimensions, the author traces the evolution of Western romantic love from its literary beginnings as an awe-inspiring secret to its commercialization in the cinema. He seeks to restore the myth of love to its original integrity and concludes with a philosophical perspective on modern marriage. (shrink)

Pornography has been defined as sex separated from personality. In other words, life’s deepest need to express desire and affection and perpetuate the species is reduced to appetite and the satisfaction of appetite. War in many ways does the same. It depersonalizes killing by pitting stranger against stranger—uniformed or otherwise. Fatalities are reduced to numbers. Such killings are dignified by slogans (“Vietnamizing the Vietnamese” or “Operation Iraqi Freedom”),. Preparing troops for the killings in war is everything from oratory to close (...) order drill, parades and honors. Denis de Rougemont in LOVE IIN THE WESTERN WORLD has even traced this to the legend of Tristan and Isolde in which Tristan chooses a military life to define his manhood after leaving Isolde. All of these manifestation and pretenses gloss over the brutality of war just as films, photographs and other promotions disguise pornography as mere excitement. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:M. C. Dillon LOVE IN WOMEN IN LOVE: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS Despite his sexism, his turgid prose, and his antiquated social conscience, Lawrence is on every bookshelf. This is not merely because of the vicarious erotic entertainment to be found in the saga of John Thomas and Lady Jane, but because Lawrence remains a major guru of romance. We take him seriously, look to him for guidance, measure ourselves (...) against Ursula and Birkin. If he is on our shelves—and his thoughts not far from our pillows—then his ideas starid in need of scrutiny. Women in Love is as much a treatise as a novel: we witness more talking about than making of love. The agon of ideas engulfs the agon of flesh. Hence, the book suits the present purpose. It cannot be taken as Lawrence's definitive statement on love—later works, notably Lady Chatterly's Lover, move in different directions—but it is his most philosophical treatment and, I think, most clearly expresses his conceptual framework, the parameters which define and limit his thinking. What he says about love in Women in Love may therefore illumine his depictions of the behavior of lovers in other works. Lawrence is a romantic. In the popular sense of the word he is one who makes of romance or erotic adventure a dominant life value. Lawrence is also a romantic in another sense insofar as he takes the transcendence or unattainability of the other as essential to the project of loving. These two senses are conceptually compatible but existentially in conflict. That is, if one's major undertaking in life is to seek erotic satisfaction, and if one desires only so long as the object is beyond reach, then one has established the groundwork for continual frustration. This, I will try to show, is what Lawrence has done. I Many writers have tried to bring the ideas implicitly present in and constitutive of romantic love to the level of explicit reflective awareness. 190 M.C.Dillon191 The most successful treatment I know is given by a writer who did not know—or at least did not say—that he was writing about romantic love. Sartre purports to reveal the inner structures of love itself—the unqualified, unrestricted essence of love. As I have tried to show elsewhere,1 he fails at this. But he succeeds admirably in unveiling the inner contradictions of romantic love. Our project here is to draw upon Sartre's insights: first, to develop a conception of romantic love, and then to discern the model of Eros which informs Women in Love. The key idea in romantic love is transcendence. Something is transcendent when it is beyond me, when I cannot adequately prehend it conceptually or master it with my will. The role of transcendence in romantic love is demonstrated clearly in Denis de Rougemont's book on Love in the Western World.2 There he shows that Tristan's passion for Iseult is directly proportional to her distance from him: he is increasingly attracted as she becomes further removed. On the other hand, when through various deeds of gallantry and subterfuge, he succeeds in winning her to his side, he loses interest and must create circumstances which put her again beyond his reach. The culmination of romantic love, according to de Rougemont, is death—it sets the other absolutely beyond reach. It also arrests and preserves at their apices the youth and beauty of the lovers and the intensity of the erotic relationship. It is, I believe, this complex of ideas that led Kierkegaard to this cynical reflection on the nature of romantic love: "When two beings fall in love with one another and begin to suspect that they were made for each other, it is time to have the courage to break it off; for by going on they have everything to lose and nothing to gain."3 The same idea, qualified by increased optimism, underlies Stendhal's notion of crystallization in his book On Love.* Love is predicated on the attribution of perfection to the beloved. Just as a plain bough emerges from the salt-saturated waters of the Salzburg mines encrusted with beautiful crystals... (shrink)

Dans L’Esprit des lois, la question de la nature de l’homme n’est pas prise en charge dans un cadre jusnaturaliste. Les considérations physiologiques du Livre XIV, l’étude du mouvement des fibres, révèlent un « être flexible ». Montesquieu s’efforce de constituer un savoir anthropologique qui s’accorde avec le projet d’étude des institutions humaines. Ce savoir ne se donne pas comme un préalable à l’enquête politique, il lui est inséparable et apparaît comme une anthropologie des différences.

The intention of the present paper is to resettle the importance of the Comte’s thought to the philosophy of science. To do so, we discard certain prejudices about positivism and reassess certain comtean’s concepts, such as the three states law, the science’s classification and the role of hypotheses in order to restore its relevance in the background of the history of the philosophy.

Does DBS change a patient’s personality? This is one of the central questions in the debate on the ethics of treatment with Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS). At the moment, however, this important debate is hampered by the fact that there is relatively little data available concerning what patients actually experience following DBS treatment. There are a few qualitative studies with patients with Parkinson’s disease and Primary Dystonia and some case reports, but there has been no qualitative study yet with patients (...) suffering from psychiatric disorders. In this paper, we present the experiences of 18 patients with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) who are undergoing treatment with DBS. We will also discuss the inherent difficulties of how to define and assess changes in personality, in particular for patients with psychiatric disorders. We end with a discussion of the data and how these shed new light on the conceptual debate about how to define personality. (shrink)

People suffering from Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) do things they do not want to do, and/or they think things they do not want to think. In about 10 percent of OCD patients, none of the available treatment options is effective. A small group of these patients is currently being treated with deep brain stimulation (DBS). Deep brain stimulation involves the implantation of electrodes in the brain. These electrodes give a continuous electrical pulse to the brain area in which they are implanted. (...) It turns out that patients may experience profound changes as a result of DBS treatment. It is not just the symptoms that change; patients rather seem to experience a different way of being in the world. These global effects are insufficiently captured by traditional psychiatric scales, which mainly consist of behavioural measures of the severity of the symptoms. In this article we aim to capture the changes in the patients’ phenomenology and make sense of the broad range of changes they report. For that we introduce an enactive, affordance-based model that fleshes out the dynamic interactions between person and world in four aspects. The first aspect is the patients’ experience of the world. We propose to specify the patients’ world in terms of a field of affordances, with the three dimensions of broadness of scope (‘width’ of the field), temporal horizon (‘depth’), and relevance of the perceived affordances (‘height’). The second aspect is the person-side of the interaction, that is, the patients’ self-experience, notably their moods and feelings. Thirdly, we point to the different characteristics of the way in which patients relate to the world. And lastly, the existential stance refers to the stance that patients take towards the changes they experience: the second-order evaluative relation to their interactions and themselves. With our model we intend to specify the notion of being in the world in order to do justice to the phenomenological effects of DBS treatment. (shrink)

According to the traditional Western concept of freedom, the ability to exercise free will depends on the availability of options and the possibility to consciously decide which one to choose. Since neuroscientific research increasingly shows the limits of what we in fact consciously control, it seems that our belief in free will and hence in personal autonomy is in trouble. -/- A closer look at the phenomenology of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) gives us reason to doubt the traditional concept of freedom (...) in terms of conscious control. Patients suffering from OCD experience themselves as unfree. The question is whether their lack of freedom is due to a lack of will power. Do they have too little conscious control over their thoughts and actions? Or could it be the opposite: are they exerting too much conscious control over their thoughts and actions? -/- In this chapter, we will argue that OCD patients testify to the general condition that exercising an increased conscious control over actions can in fact diminish the sense of agency rather than increase the experience of freedom. The experiences of these patients show that the traditional conception of freedom in terms of ‘free will’ has major shortcomings. There is an alternative, however, to be found in the work of Hannah Arendt. She advocates a conception of freedom as freedom in action. Combined with phenomenological insights on action, Arendt’s account of freedom helps us to get a more adequate understanding of the role of deliberation in the experience of freedom. We argue that the experience of freedom depends on the right balance between deliberate control and unreflective actions. (shrink)