Translation into French of Rudolf Carnap's Testability and Meaning (1936-1937): Carnap, Rudolf. "Testability and meaning." Philosophy of science 3.4 (1936): 419-471 and Carnap, Rudolf. "Testability and meaning—continued." Philosophy of science 4.1 (1937): 1-40. Introduction by Pierre Wagner; translation by Yann Benétreau-Dupin and Delphine Chapuis-Schmitz. Testabilité et signification est un classique de la philosophie des sciences dont aucune traduction n’avait jusqu’alors été offerte au public francophone. L’auteur y expose sa célèbre analyse des termes dispositionnels (« soluble dans l’eau (...) », « fragile », etc.) en montrant quelles difficultés soulève leur définition. Carnap livre également ici ses réflexions sur la nature de l’empirisme et sur le rapport du langage à la philosophie, offrant ainsi, dans ce texte, l’une des premières expositions du problème contemporain de la confirmation, soigneusement distinguée de la vérification et du test. Historiquement, l’ouvrage est aussi marqué par un mouvement de transition : celle de la langue allemande à l’anglais d’adoption (il s’agit du premier texte d’envergure que Carnap rédige en anglais), celle de l’émigration de son auteur, de Prague à Chicago, celle d’une pensée d’origine européenne venue, sur le chemin de l’exil, à la rencontre de la philosophie américaine. (shrink)

We prove that there exists no sentence F of the language of rings with an extra binary predicat I2 satisfying the following property: for every definable set X ⊆ ℂ2, X is connected if and only if ⊧ F, where I2 is interpreted by X. We conjecture that the same result holds for closed subset of ℂ2. We prove some results motivated by this conjecture.

Ce dossier interroge la question des temporalités articulée à celle des migrations. Nous faisons le constat que si le « temps » est fréquemment mobilisé dans les titres d’articles ou d’ouvrages sur les migrations, force est de constater que ce concept reste souvent à l’état d’illustration. Le dernier ouvrage sur les migrations qui a utilisé le terme « temporalités » faisait ainsi part du constat suivant : « les temporalités constituent une entrée courante de l’approche des migrations internat...

In this paper I propose three steps to overcome the force-content dichotomy and dispel the Frege point. First, we should ascribe content to force indicators. Through basic assertoric and directive force indicators such as intonation, word order and mood, a subject presents its position of theoretical or practical knowledge of a state of affairs as a fact, as something that is the case, or as a goal, as something to do. Force indicators do not operate on truth- or satisfaction evaluable (...) entities as on the traditional view, but complete and unify them. Second, higher-level acts such as interrogative, logical and fictional acts create higher-level unities that may suspend commitment to the assertions and directions they operate on. But they do not cancel their force, but transfer the meaning of force indicators into the new unities they create. For example, in the context of asking a theoretical or practical question, the assertoric or directive force indicator now presents the kind of knowledge the subject is seeking. Third, the Frege point conflates different varieties of force. We neither need Frege’s assertion sign, nor Hare’s neustic, nor Hanks’s cancellation sign, but only ordinary force indicators and interrogative, logical and fictional markers. Propositions are not forceless contents to which a subject commits by forceful acts, but forceful acts put forward by higher-level acts which may suspend commitment to them. (shrink)

Along with Machiavelli, Hobbes is usually regarded as the pre-eminent representative of the ‘power-politics’ school of classical realism. He is frequently quoted for his pessimistic depiction of the state of nature that he so famously described as a brutal and anarchic arena in which each individual seeks his own advantage to the detriment of all other individuals, in a perpetual struggle for power. As reflective of this, political realism is sometimes even named the ‘Hobbesian tradition’. Yet there is reason to (...) question whether the standard characterization of realism as a form of moral scepticism which ‘resists the application of morality to war’ provides an accurate description of Hobbes’s political philosophy. In this essay I examine Hobbes’s conception of war, in order to show how, in some fundamental respects, it deviates from this ‘realism’. (shrink)

The Oxford English Dictionary says that a rite is ‘a formal procedure or act in a religious or other solemn observance’. The word comes into English through the French rite from the Latin ritus . Its original meaning escapes etymologists; and this is a mixed blessing, for we neither can nor must attempt a retrieval of its hidden roots. We are told by respectable etymologists that the word is associated from earliest times with Latin religious usage, but that even in (...) the early Latin it was already extended to ‘custom, usage, manner or way’ of a non-religious sort. [Lewis and Short, A Latin Dictionary .] So, too, in modern languages the terms ‘rite’ and ‘ritual’ have specifically religious meaning, but they are also used in social and cultural settings that we would not call religious. What first strikes us about the terms ’ and ‘ritual’ is an emphasis upon a certain formality, upon a regular and stable way in which an action or set of actions is to be performed. A ritual is more than a formalism, however, since there are formalisms that are not rites, such as the logical rules for making a valid argument. Moreover, the term is frequently associated with the terms ‘myth’, ‘symbol’ and ‘faith’. These, too, are primarily religious, but are also extended to non-religious contexts. Indeed, there seems to be a network of such terms whose usage touches upon some extraordinary quality in things. Like them, the term ‘ritual’ shares both a wide variety of meanings and a certain hint of impropriety. The variety of ritual forms is notorious, ranging from the most sacred religious liturgies to the absurdities of a fraternity initiation; and the impropriety of the term breaks out whenever we brand a certain action ‘ritualistic’, just as we sometimes refer slightingly to an assertion, saying it is ‘mythical’, ‘merely symbolic’ or ‘credulous’. (shrink)

Parmi les différentes conceptualisations dont le phénomène de la guerre a pu faire l'objet, l'oeuvre de Thomas Hobbes et celle de Cari von Clausewitz se sont souvent trouvées rangées, depuis le développement du champ disciplinaire des relations internationales en particulier, parmi des auteurs dits " réalistes " tels que Thucydide ou Machiavel notamment. Or leur pensée respective semble échapper à toutes les formes de catégorisation : ni pur " réalisme ", ni bellicisme, ni pensée de la " raison d'Etat ", (...) d'une part, ni idéalisme, "pacifisme ", ou pensée de la guerre juste, d'autre part, l'oeuvre de Hobbes et celle de Clausewitz occupent une place à part parmi ceux qui, semblablement à eux, ont pris la guerre pour objet de leur réflexion. Malgré les deux siècles et bien d'autres choses qui les séparent, une pensée hétérodoxe de la guerre se fait ainsi écho à travers elles. Hobbes comme Clausewitz s'efforcent en effet d'appréhender la guerre, non point en juristes, tel Hugo Grotius, ni même en spécialistes de l'art de la guerre, comme Machiavel, ou bien encore en moralistes, tel Juste Lipse, mais bel et bien en tant que théoriciens soucieux de saisir la logique présidant aux rapports conflictuels entre les êtres humains, c'est-à-dire à la fois la suite des causes et des effets conduisant à la guerre et l'ensemble des règles commandant le déroulement de cette dernière une fois enclenchée. Le tableau de la guerre qu'offrent par conséquent Hobbes et Clausewitz à leurs lecteurs, bien qu'il puisse paraître sombre ou cynique, n'est pas celui de la déraison ou d'une hybris totalement déchaînée : loin de présenter la guerre comme un phénomène inextricable, chacun s'efforce, à sa façon, de rendre intelligible le phénomène guerrier, d'en mettre à nu les principes et les ressorts à la fois passionnels et rationnels, nécessaires et contingents. (shrink)

First of all, this paper aims at a clarification of Wittgenstein's conception of grammatical propositions. Their essential characteristics will be developed and some of the central questions concerning their status will be discussed: Should grammatical propositions be seen as arbitrary conventions? How do they work in practices? And how do they relate to natural facts? Later on, the two propositions "Every rod has a length" and "Sensations are private" will be discussed in more detail, for both fulfil three important features (...) of grammatical propositions: They are not empirical descriptions, they are rules of a practice, and they are not knowledge-claims but express insights. Focussing on the grammar of pain language, it will be shown what kind of interdependency exists between grammar and natural facts. It will also turn out that some grammatical propositions are closely connected to our understanding of living a human form of life. (shrink)

Delphine Abadie Malgré une historiographie riche de plusieurs orientations, les imaginaires, la recherche et les débats académiques semblent parfois demeurer enfermés dans l’exigence d’un devoir-être de la philosophie africaine tout à fait caractéristique du seul moment ethnophilosophique. Pourtant, les avenues les plus récentes en philosophie africaine partagent un ensemble de présupposés qui rendent inopérante cette confrontation stérile entre un type de philosophie qui désignerait la « véritable » manière de décoloniser les épistémologies africaines, et toutes les autres formes de (...) la philosophie en Afrique. Depuis les années 1980, on doit constater pourtant que la plupart des philosophes du continent ont emprunté des avenues qui nous éloignent de ce premier moment décolonial de l’« authenticité africaine » en internalisant les critiques développées durant les plusieurs décennies qu’a duré la fameuse querelle de la philosophie africaine. Éclairé par la distinction entre approche décoloniale et approche postcoloniale, cet article propose une relecture des chemins parcourus, des détours et des mutations opérées par la philosophie africaine telle qu’elle s’est développée dans l’espace francophone depuis les années 1940 jusqu’à nos jours. (shrink)

BackgroundThe theory and practice of ethics consultations (ECs) in health care are still characterized by many controversies, including, for example, the practice of giving recommendations. These controversies are complicated by an astonishing lack of evidence in the whole field. It is not clear how often a recommendation is issued in ethics consultations and when and why this step is taken. Especially in a facilitation model in which giving recommendations is optional, more data would be helpful to evaluate daily practice, ensure (...) that this practice is in line with the overarching goals of this approach and support the development of standards.MethodsWe analyzed all consultations requested from an EC service working under a facilitation approach at a maximum-care university hospital in Germany over a period of more than 10 years. Our aim was to better understand why—and under what circumstances—some consultation requests result in a recommendation, whereas others can be sufficiently addressed solely by facilitated meetings. We especially wanted to know when and why clients felt the need for clear advice from the EC service while in other cases they did not. We compared ethics consultations in terms of the differences between cases with and without recommendations issued by the ethics consultants using χ2 difference tests and Welch’s t-test.ResultsA total of 243 ECs were carried out between September 2008 and December 2019. In approximately half of the cases, a recommendation was given. All recommendations were issued upon the request of clients. When physicians asked for an EC, the consultation was significantly more likely to result in a recommendation than when the EC was requested by any other party. ECs in cases on wards with ethics rounds resulted in comparably fewer recommendations than those in wards without ethics rounds. When interpersonal conflicts were part of the problem or relatives were present in the meeting, clients less frequently asked for a recommendation.ConclusionFrom the client’s point of view, there does not seem to be only one “right” way to provide ethics consultations, but rather several. While facilitated meetings are obviously appreciated by clients, there also seem to be situations in which a recommendation is desired (especially by physicians). Further empirical and theoretical research is needed to validate our single-center results and re-evaluate the role of recommendations in ethics consultations. (shrink)

The following text is the first ever translation into English of a writing by German phenomenologist Hermann Schmitz (*1928). In it, Schmitz outlines and defends a non-mentalistic view of emotions as phenomena in interpersonal space in conjunction with a theory of the felt body’s constitutive involvement in human experience. In the first part of the text, Schmitz gives an overview covering some central pieces of his theory as developed, for the most part, in his massive System of (...) Philosophy, published in German in a series of volumes between 1964 and 1980. Schmitz’s System is centred on the claim that the contemporary view of the human subject is the result of a consequential historical process: A reductionist and ‘introjectionist’ objectification of lived experience culminating in the ‘invention’ of the mind (or ‘soul’) as a private, inner realm of subjective experience and in a corresponding ‘grinding down’ of the world of lived experienced to a meagre, value-neutral ‘objective reality’. To counter this intellectualist trend, Schmitz puts to use his approach to phenomenology with the aim of regaining a sensibility for the nuanced realities of lived experience—hoping to make up for what was lost during the development of Western intellectual culture. Since both this text and the overall style of Schmitz’s philosophising are in several ways unusual for a contemporary readership, a brief introduction is provided by philosophers Jan Slaby and Rudolf Owen Müllan, the latter of whom translated Schmitz’s text into English. The introduction emphasises aspects of Schmitz’s philosophy that are likely to be of relevance to contemporary scholars of phenomenological philosophy and to its potential applications in science and society. (shrink)

To test whether mental activities collected from non-REM sleep are influenced by REM sleep, we suppressed REM sleep using clomipramine 50 mg or placebo in the evening, in a double blind cross-over design, in 11 healthy young men. Subjects were awakened every hour and asked about their mental activity. The marked REM-sleep suppression induced by clomipramine did not substantially affect any aspects of dream recall . Since long, complex and bizarre dreams persist even after suppressing REM sleep either partially or (...) totally, it suggests that the generation of mental activity during sleep is independent of sleep stage. (shrink)

Frege argued for the force-content distinction not only by appealing to the logical and fictional contexts which are most closely associated with the “Frege point", but also based on the fact that an affirmative answer to a yes-no question constitutes an assertion. Supposedly this is only intelligible if the question contains a forceless thought or proposition which an affirmative answer then asserts. Against this I argue that this fact more readily supports the view that questions operate on assertions and other (...) forceful acts themselves. Force is neither added to propositions as on the traditional view, nor is it cancelled as has recently been proposed. Rather higher-level acts such as questioning, but also e.g. conditionalizing, embed and present assertoric or directive acts that are forceful and committal, while suspending commitment to them. The Frege point confounds different varieties of force and the question whether something is merely presented for consideration with the question what is so presented. Force is representational: through assertoric and directive force indicators subjects non-conceptually present positions of theoretical or practical knowledge, while interrogative acts indicate positions of wondering which strive for such knowledge. (shrink)

La question de l’innéisme reste un sujet de débat actuel dans le domaine des sciences cognitives. Cela vient du fait non seulement que les thèses innéistes restent controversées, mais aussi de ce que, à un niveau conceptuel, la manière dont la notion d’innéité doit être définie n’est pas claire. Le programme de recherche de Chomsky a joué un rôle fondateur, en montrant la portée méthodologique que pouvait avoir une perspective innéiste pour l’étude des facultés mentales et en particulier du langage. (...) Le but de cet article est de clarifier la signification qu’on peut attribuer à l’innéité de la faculté de langage dans la théorie de Chomsky, et de montrer que cela éclaire plus généralement l’usage de cette notion dans le champ des sciences cognitives. (shrink)

La question de l’innéisme reste un sujet de débat actuel dans le domaine des sciences cognitives. Cela vient du fait non seulement que les thèses innéistes restent controversées, mais aussi de ce que, à un niveau conceptuel, la manière dont la notion d’innéité doit être définie n’est pas claire. Le programme de recherche de Chomsky a joué un rôle fondateur, en montrant la portée méthodologique que pouvait avoir une perspective innéiste pour l’étude des facultés mentales et en particulier du langage. (...) Le but de cet article est de clarifier la signification qu’on peut attribuer à l’innéité de la faculté de langage dans la théorie de Chomsky, et de montrer que cela éclaire plus généralement l’usage de cette notion dans le champ des sciences cognitives. (shrink)

This paper was motivated by the following two questions which arise in the theory of complexity for computation over ordered rings in the now famous computational model introduced by Blum, Shub and Smale: 1. is the answer to the question P = ?NP the same in every real-closed field?2. if P ≠ NP for , does there exist a problem of which is NP but neither P nor NP-complete ?Some unclassical complexity classes arise naturally in the study of these questions. (...) They are still open, but we could obtain unconditional results of independent interest.Michaux introduced/const complexity classes in an effort to attack question . We show that , answering a question of his. Here A is the class of real problems which are algorithmic in bounded time. We also prove the stronger result: , where PAR stands for parallel polynomial time. In our terminology, we say that is A-saturated and PAR-saturated. We also prove, at the nonuniform level, the above results for every real-closed field. It is not known whether is P-saturated. In the case of the reals with addition and order we obtain P-saturation ). More generally, we show that an ordered -vector space is P-saturated at the nonuniform level ).We also study a stronger notion that we call P-stability. Blum, Cucker, Shub and Smale have shown that fields of characteristic 0 are P-stable. We show that the reals with addition and order are P-stable, but real-closed fields are not.Questions and and the/const complexity classes have some model theoretic flavor. This leads to the theory of complexity over “arbitrary” structures as introduced by Poizat. We give a summary of this theory with a special emphasis on the connections with model theory and we study/const complexity classes from this point of view. Note also that our proof of the PAR-saturation of shows that an o-minimal structure which admits quantifier elimination is A-saturated at the nonuniform level. (shrink)

« Je suis Norvégien, dit le Norvégien, et quand je dis que je suis Norvégien, je pense en avoir assez dit. Je suis aussi solide sur mes fondations que les antiques montagnes de la Norvège. Ce pays a une Constitution, comme l’Amérique libre. Penser à ce que je suis me fait trembler jusqu’aux moelles et donne à mes pensées la sonorité de paroles de granit. »À l’extrême ouest du..

« Je suis Norvégien, dit le Norvégien, et quand je dis que je suis Norvégien, je pense en avoir assez dit. Je suis aussi solide sur mes fondations que les antiques montagnes de la Norvège. Ce pays a une Constitution, comme l’Amérique libre. Penser à ce que je suis me fait trembler jusqu’aux moelles et donne à mes pensées la sonorité de paroles de granit. »À l’extrême ouest du..

"L'ouvrage que nous propose aujourd'hui Mme Delphine Espagno est peut-être la plus belle des invitations qui ait été écrite afin d'inciter le lecteur, citoyen et/ou juriste, à comprendre la pensée du doyen de Bordeaux. Léon Duguit méritait effectivement le présent ouvrage et hommage car le doyen, comme Jean-Jacques Rousseau avant lui, a longtemps été et est encore souvent présenté soit comme un marginal de la pensée juridique, soit est même dédaigné de façon méprisante comme si sa qualité de juriste (...) lui était déniée. Hauriou, nous rappelle l'auteure, ira même ainsi jusqu'à affubler Duguit d'être un "anarchiste de la chaire" ce qui n'avait manifestement pas totalement déplu à ce dernier! Car, ce que rappelle Mme Espagno dès son introduction, c'est bien une nouvelle manière de penser et de réinventer le Droit dans son ensemble que nous invite à accomplir Léon Duguit. Il n'est pas qu'un faiseur de théorie(s) (comme celles du service public, des agents publics ou encore de l'Etat), il est - pour reprendre l'expression de Chenot désormais consacrée - un véritable "faiseur de système dans son sens le plus noble et mélioratif. Duguit assume en effet son rôle de guide et nous a donné à voir une nouvelle façon d'appréhender le Droit non pas tel qu'il est mais tel qu'il devrait être. Un Droit qu'il a comme réinventé en chaussant de nouvelles lunettes tel le spectateur qui verrait en deux dimensions et désormais en découvrirait - grâce à lui - une troisième. Après Léon Duguit, les juristes n'ont ainsi pu feindre de ne concevoir le Droit qu'à l'instar d'un artifice fictif, technique et juridique : le Droit est devenu indissociable de la sociologie. Ce "droit duguiste" nous offre alors grâce à la lumière qu'y dépose avec délicatesse Mme Delphine Espagno la vision renouvelée des relations existantes entre Droit, individu et collégialité ou société. En outre, ce que va construire le doyen de Bordeaux n'est pas - comme on le lit encore souvent - une "simple" théorie du service public mais une théorie réaliste de l'Etat par le service public", Mathieu Touzeil-Divina. (shrink)

Une affirmation récurrente parcourt les travaux récents consacrés à Georges Canguilhem : l’essor des études canguilhémiennes aurait avant tout permis de prendre conscience du caractère pleinement philosophique de cette œuvre, laquelle aurait été indûment considérée comme relevant avant tout de l’histoire des sciences ou de l’épistémologie. On s’interroge ici sur le sens de cette redécouverte. Comment la philosophie canguilhémienne aurait-elle pu être oubliée? On montrera dans cet article que cette affirmation surprenante doit être resituée dans un contexte de débats académiques, (...) en France et à l’étranger, concernant la nature de la philosophie des sciences. (shrink)

This paper discusses Raimo Tuomela's we-mode account in his recent book "Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents" and develops the idea that mode should be thought of as representational. I argue that in any posture – intentional state or speech act – we do not merely represent a state of affairs as what we believe, or intend etc. – as the received view of 'propositional attitudes' has it –, but our position relative to that state of affairs and thus (...) ourselves. That is, we represent the subject through what I call "subject mode" and its position through what I call "position mode". I argue that the key to understanding collective intentionality is to understand how we represent others as co-subjects of positions rather than as their objects. This is shown on various levels of collective intentionality. On the non-conceptual level of joint attention we experience others as co-subjects who we attend with rather than to and who we are at least also disposed to act jointly with. On the conceptual level of the we-mode we represent others as co-subjects of positions of knowledge, intention, belief and shared values. Organizations and thus group agents in Tuomela's sense I propose to understand in terms of what I call "role mode", that is, in terms of the positions individuals and groups take as occupants of certain roles, for example, as committee members, or as chancellor of Germany. I try to show how this account, while very much in the spirit of Tuomela's, can avoid his fictionalism about group agents and some other problems of his account, while steering between the Scylla of excessive individualism and the Charybdis of extreme collectivism. (shrink)

In this paper I want to introduce and defend what I call the "subject mode account" of collective intentionality. I propose to understand collectives from joint attention dyads over small informal groups of various types to organizations, institutions and political entities such as nation states, in terms of their self-awareness. On the subject mode account, the self-consciousness of such collectives is constitutive for their being. More precisely, their self-representation as subjects of joint theoretical and practical positions towards the world – (...) rather than as objects of such positions – makes them what they are. Members of such collectives represent each other as co-subjects of such positions and thus represent the world from the point of view of the collective. (shrink)

This article focuses on a project of « predictive medicine » elaborated in the late 1960s by an American dentist, Emanuel Cheraskin. In his views, this new label was meant to name a preventive medicine based on the knowledge of individual pecularities. The analysis of this unknown episode of medical history allows to uncover the prospective dimension of this medicine, and also the ambiguities which are linked to the idea that understanding individual peculiarities could help rethink the preventive approach. Through (...) the study of Cheraskin’s propositions, I want to show that the ambition of providing a new basis to prevention, namely a science of individuals, casts a light on the predictive project. While paying attention to this ambition, rather than to genomic techniques, I hope to open new paths in our understanding of various aspects of contemporary predictive medicine. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to investigate the level of specificity of the different regulation types described by Self-Determination Theory, and to evaluate its impact on the links with its antecedents and consequences, in an academic context. In line with the school-subject-specificity hypothesis, we postulated that autonomous motivation types would be more specific to the situational level than controlled motivation types. Moreover, we hypothesized that AM types would be, at this level, more strongly associated with its antecedents and consequences (...) than CM types. Three hundred fourteen university students were asked to complete online questionnaires assessing their motivation, motivational antecedents and consequences in various courses. As expected, results from structural equation modeling confirmed that AM types were more specific to the situational level than CM types. Moreover, a higher number of significant correlations were found between motivation and its antecedents and consequences in the corresponding course for AM than for CM types. Educational implications and directions for future research are discussed. (shrink)

While nanosciences and nanotechnologies appear as new concepts developed at the end of the twentieth century, we show that metallic nanoparticles have already been used since ancient times, in particular as colorant in the glass and ceramic industries. Moreover, a lot of natural nanomaterials are also present in the mineral, vegetal and animal worlds. Nevertheless, the breakthrough of nanotechnology has been permitted in the past few decades by the advent of apparatus allowing the manipulation and observation of the nanoworld. Indeed, (...) nowadays, nanomaterials and nanoparticles are used for many applications in our daily life, such as in the fields of electronics, catalysis, optics, biology, and medicine. This article presents an overview about nanotechnologies, with applications from ancient times till the present. (shrink)

In the philosophical literature, self-deception is mainly approached through the analysis of paradoxes. Yet, it is agreed that self-deception is motivated by protection from distress. In this paper, we argue, with the help of findings from cognitive neuroscience and psychology, that self-deception is a type of affective coping. First, we criticize the main solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception. We then present a new approach to self-deception. Self-deception, we argue, involves three appraisals of the distressing evidence: (a) appraisal of the (...) strength of evidence as uncertain, (b) low coping potential and (c) negative anticipation along the lines of Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis. At the same time, desire impacts the treatment of flattering evidence via dopamine. Our main proposal is that self-deception involves emotional mechanisms provoking a preference for immediate reward despite possible long-term negative repercussions. In the last part, we use this emotional model to revisit the philosophical paradoxes. (shrink)