Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):137-160 (2018)

Authors
Michael Schmitz
University of Vienna
Abstract
In this paper I want to introduce and defend what I call the "subject mode account" of collective intentionality. I propose to understand collectives from joint attention dyads over small informal groups of various types to organizations, institutions and political entities such as nation states, in terms of their self-awareness. On the subject mode account, the self-consciousness of such collectives is constitutive for their being. More precisely, their self-representation as subjects of joint theoretical and practical positions towards the world – rather than as objects of such positions – makes them what they are. Members of such collectives represent each other as co-subjects of such positions and thus represent the world from the point of view of the collective.
Keywords Collective Intentionality  Joint Attention  Propositional attitudes  We-mode  Common knowledge  Co-subjects  Self-awareness
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DOI 10.1111/josp.12228
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References found in this work BETA

Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

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Citations of this work BETA

Force, Content and the Varieties of Unity.Michael Schmitz - 2022 - In Gabriele Mras & Michael Schmitz (eds.), Force, content and the unity of the proposition. New York: Routledge. pp. 71-90.
Towards Collective Self-Knowledge.Lukas Schwengerer - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1153-1173.
Foundations of a We-Perspective.Katja Crone - 2020 - Synthese (12):1-18.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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