En las breves notas conocidas más tarde como Tesis sobre Feuerbach (1845), Marx apuntó algunas ideas importantes, la mayoría de las cuales empezaría a desarrollar durante el mismo año en La ideología alemana. Lamentablemente, estas dos obras no se hicieron públicas al mismo tiempo, porque cuando Engels decidió publicar las Tesis, en 1888, descartó la edición de La ideología alemana. Así, la lectura de las sucintas y a veces equívocas Tesis sin la posibilidad de compararlas con ese otro texto importante, (...) escrito en el mismo año y con el mismo espíritu (especialmente su primera parte, titulada “Feuerbach. Oposición entre las concepciones materialistas e idealistas”), produjo malos entendidos graves. Uno de ellos se refiere a la definición marxiana de la praxis como “actividad humana sensible” (sinnlich menschliche Tätigkeit). Muchos autores, y en particular quienes no pudieron leer La ideología alemana, interpretaron erróneamente esa expresión, como si significase que el punto de vista filosófico de Marx era un subjetivismo sensualista, contrapuesto a todo tipo de materialismo. El presente artículo aspira a contribuir al esclarecimiento de ese problema suscitado por aquella desafortunada fórmula utilizada por Marx para caracterizar la praxis. (shrink)

En 1845 Marx escribió las Tesis sobre Feuerbach, donde subrayaba de manera explícita el lugar fundamental que ocupa la Praxis en su nueva concepción del mundo; y durante el mismo año comenzó la redacción de la parte de La ideología alemana donde también se critica a Feuerbach. Se trata de dos textos de contenido similar, pero que –por la azarosa historia de su respectiva publicación– no pudieron ser cotejados hasta los años veinte del siglo pasado, cuando finalmente vio la luz (...) el segundo de ellos. A partir de esta constatación histórica, el presente artículo se propone mostrar la existencia de una lectura intelectualista de los ambiguos términos que Marx utilizó en las Tesis para definir la Praxis. Las consideraciones históricas serán complementadas, pues, con un exhaustivo análisis filológico de tales equívocos, y con una reflexión sobre sus consecuencias ético-políticas. (shrink)

In Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung Habermas presents a re-elaboration of the idea of truth, in which he points out the shortage of a conception within the limits set by a discursive framework and brings up his intention of articulating the pragmatic-transcendental perspective to a weakened conception of naturalism. The article analyzes the scope of the Kant-based "pragmatic realism" with which Habermas intends to reinforce the differences with the contextualized positions, giving predominance to the processes of correction and adjustment. In this sense, (...) H. Putnam's incidence on Habermas' thought is taken into consideration, especially concerning a conception of language which allows for the restitution of its referential function, and a new comprehension of experience as linguistically mediated. Finally, a revision is presented of the implications of this idea of truth, in the cognitive field as much as in that of practical discourse, and of the way in which the relations between truth and justice come up in the framework of this issue.En Verdad y Justificación Habermas presenta una reelaboración de la idea de verdad, señalando la insuficiencia de una concepción limitada a lo discursivo y expresa su intención de articular la perspectiva pragmático-trascendental con un naturalismo débil. El artículo analiza el alcance del "realismo pragmático" de base kantiana con el que Habermas intenta reforzar la diferencia respecto a las posiciones contextualistas, dando un lugar preponderante a los procesos de corrección y ajuste. En este sentido, se considera la incidencia de H. Putnam en el pensamiento habermasiano, especialmente en lo que concierne a una concepción del lenguaje que permite restituir a éste su función referencial, y a una nueva comprensión de la experiencia en cuanto lingüísticamente mediada. Finalmente se precisan las implicaciones de esta revisión de la idea de verdad tanto en el orden cognitivo como en el orden del discurso práctico y el modo en que quedan planteadas a partir de allí las relaciones entre verdad y justicia. (shrink)

Las dificultades que aún presenta la epistemología de las cienciashumanas requiere se investiguen los modos de construcción de sus objetos espcíficos, como un paso previo a las cuestiones metodológicas. A través de las investigaciones de A. Schütz -quien apoyándose en el proyecto weberiano pretende encontrarle una fundamentación epistemológica integrando esquemas conceptuales de la fenomenología y del pragmatismo-, se analiza la posibilidad de una comprensión de las acciones humanas en cuanto intencionales, y que responda a la vez a las exigencias de (...) objetividd de la ciencia.El punto de partida es la comprensión que en el mundo cotidiano hace posible las interacciones sociales, para determinar -tomando como instrumento de análisis el esquema temporal de los procesos de tipificación- cuáles son las condiciones que la hacen posible. Precisadas éstas, se examina el nivel teórico, edificado sobre esta instancia primaria.Son los mismos procesos constructivos de la significación del mundosocial los que dan lugar a la organización del orden científico: aunque se da en continuidad con el mundo cotidiano e integrando las significaciones allí conformadas, responde sin embargo a sus propias coordenadas temporales. El campo de la teoría tiene también una forma de pasado, convalidada socialmente, y una forma de futuro que determina la orientación y relevancia de susconstrucciones. Es esta estructura temporal la que permite clarificar las condiciones específicas de la comprensión científica del mundo social, como así también las de su validez objetiva. (shrink)

El trabajo analiza el alcance del proyecto husseliano de fundamentar la objetividad del mundo y de la ciencia en la intersubjetividad trascendental. A las dificultades de precisar el sentido de esta intersubjetividad trascendental y cómo comprenderla en relación a la comunidad humana, se suman las tensiones internas de la fenomenología acerca del conocimiento y del lenguaje. La constitución del mundo socio-cultural requiere dar cuenta de los actos comunicativos y de los procesos comprensivos implícitos, y por tanto, dar una respuesta a (...) las posibilidades de convergencia de perspectivas dadas por los diversos “mundos circundantes”. La articulación husserliana en una única comunidad de mónadas fundamentada en el tiempo intersubjetivo y originario, y el recurso a la “univocidad” del significado, no resultan soluciones satisfactorias. Suponen una idea de racionalidad que exige ser revisada, y un replanteo de la idea de significado desde marcos más amplios que los definidos por una filosofía de la conciencia. (shrink)

Se analiza los que se ha considerado un "descentramiento" del sujeto a partir de la crítica a la racionalidad tal como la concibió la modernidad. Se considera especialmente el impacto del giro lingüístico, sus aportes y también sus consecuencias negativas. Se realiza un análisis crítico de las posiciones contextualistas, sus consecuencias escépticas y las derivaciones en el orden de la acción. Se plantea finalmente el tema del sujeto y sus posibilidades, destacando especialmente su capacidad para configurar nuevos sentidos y crear (...) nuevos lenguajes, pero también en su capacidad de discernir y de posicionarse en el juicio. The work analizes what has been considered a "decentration" of the subject, starting from the critique of rationality such as it was conceived by modernity. The impact of the linguistic turn is especially taken into consideration, as well as its contributions and its negative influences. A critical analysis of contextualist positions, its sceptical consequences and derivations as regards action is dealt with. Finally, the theme of the subject and its possibilities is raised, pointing out especially its capacity to bring about new senses and to create new languages, but also its capacity to discern and take positions in judgement. (shrink)

Despite the emergence of computer games as a dominant cultural industry, we know little or nothing about the ethics of computer games. Considerations of the morality of computer games seldom go beyond intermittent portrayals of them in the mass media as training devices for teenage serial killers. In this first scholarly exploration of the subject, Miguel Sicart addresses broader issues about the ethics of games, the ethics of playing the games, and the ethical responsibilities of game designers. He argues (...) that computer games are ethical objects, that computer game players are ethical agents, and that the ethics of computer games should be seen as a complex network of responsibilities and moral duties. Players should not be considered passive amoral creatures; they reflect, relate, and create with ethical minds. The games they play are ethical systems, with rules that create gameworlds with values at play. Drawing on concepts from philosophy and game studies, Sicart proposes a framework for analyzing the ethics of computer games as both designed objects and player experiences. After presenting his core theoretical arguments and offering a general theory for understanding computer game ethics, Sicart offers case studies examining single-player games, multiplayer games, and online gameworlds from an ethical perspective. He explores issues raised by unethical content in computer games and its possible effect on players and offers a synthesis of design theory and ethics that could be used as both analytical tool and inspiration in the creation of ethical gameplay. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the semantics of bare plural I-generics such as ‘Tigers are striped’, ‘Chickens lay eggs’, and ‘Kangaroos live in Australia’. In a series of recent papers, Bernhard Nickel has developed a comprehensive view of a certain class of bare plural I-generics, which he calls characterizing sentences :629–648, 2009. doi:10.1007/s10988-008-9049-7; Linguist Philos 33:479–512, 2010a. doi:10.1007/s10988-011-9087-4; Philos Impr 10:1–25, 2010b). Nickel’s ambitious proposal includes a detailed account of their truth-conditions, an account of certain pragmatic phenomena that they give (...) rise to, a metaphysical picture of their truth-makers in terms of mechanisms, and an epistemological story connecting characterizing sentences to such concepts as induction and explanation. This paper offers an extended critique of the central truth-conditional component of Nickel’s proposal. In a nutshell, his account has it that ‘Tigers are striped’ is true iff, for tigers, there is a way of being normal with respect to fur-pattern such that all tigers that are normal that way are striped. I begin by explaining what characterizing sentences are and distinguish several readings that are available for sentences with bare plurals in subject position. I then introduce Nickel’s account and discuss some of its predictions which, in my view, seem highly problematic. Moreover, I argue that Nickel’s principle of Homogeneity does not go together well with his proposed truth-conditions, and that his truth-conditional account violates a plausible principle about the logic of generics, a principle I call generic non-contradiction. (shrink)

Philosophers of mathematics commonly distinguish between explanatory and non-explanatory proofs. An important subclass of mathematical proofs are proofs by induction. Are they explanatory? This paper addresses the question, based on general principles about explanation. First, a recent argument for a negative answer is discussed and rebutted. Second, a case is made for a qualified positive take on the issue.

Why computer games can be ethical, how players use their ethical values in gameplay, and the implications for game design.

The fundamental problem proponents of truth conditional semantics must face is to specify what role a truth theory is supposed to play within a meaning theory. The most detailed proposal for tackling this problem is the account developed by Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig. However, as I will show in this paper, theories along the lines of Lepore and Ludwig do not suffice to put someone into the position to understand the objectlanguage. The fundamental problem of truth conditional semantics thus (...) remains unsolved. (shrink)

Recent experimental studies indicate that epistemically irrelevant factors can skew our intuitions, and that some degree of scepticism about appealing to intuition in philosophy is warranted. In response, some have claimed that philosophers are experts in such a way as to vindicate their reliance on intuitions—this has become known as the ‘expertise defence’. This paper explores the viability of the expertise defence, and suggests that it can be partially vindicated. Arguing that extant discussion is problematically imprecise, we will finesse the (...) notion of ‘philosophical expertise’ in order to better reflect the complex reality of the different practices involved in philosophical inquiry. On this basis, we offer a new version of the expertise defence that allows for distinct types of philosophical expertise. The upshot of our approach is that wholesale vindications or rejections of the expertise defence are shown to be unwarranted; we must instead turn to local, piecemeal investigations of philosophical expertise. Lastly, in the spirit of taking our own advice, we exemplify how recent developments from experimental philosophy lend themselves to this approach, and can empirically support one instance of a successful expertise defence. (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo pretende abordar aspectos esenciales del pensamiento de Henri Bergson en la dimensión de las prácticas políticas. Específicamente, esta indagación se centrará en un análisis del sentido de la democracia en Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion, en las escuetas, pero decisivas porciones de texto donde esta es abordada. Bajo este objetivo, se podrá extender una discusión de fondo, de carácter ontológico, en torno al rendimiento de una noción de Acontecimiento que pretende servir de (...) reflexión basal en torno al dominio de un concepto de lo político atribuible a este filósofo francés.: This article aims to address essential aspects of Henri Bergson’s thought in the dimension of political practices. Specifically, this inquiry will focus on an analysis of the meaning of democracy in Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion, in the succinct, but decisive portions of the text where it is focussed. Under this point, it will be possible to extend a substantive discussion, of an ontological nature, around the performance of a notion of Event that aims to serve as a basal reflection on the domain of a concept of the political attributable to this French philosopher. (shrink)

This essay offers only a broad description of a possible comparison between 'savage democracy' in the terms of Claude Lefort and the 'principle of anarchy' according to Reiner Schurmann. First, I shall try to define savage democracy. Then, in a second move, after having clarified Schurmann's principle of anarchy, I shall outline the terms for a possible confrontation of their respective views. The point here is to show the extent to which the contextualization of democracy with anarchy, considered as principle, (...) is of a nature to bring out democracy's most 'savage' characteristics - but without for all that concealing the difficulties that this perspective provokes or reveals. Indeed, it is precisely by returning to and excavating the gap between anarchy and principle that one most closely approaches the 'savage essence' of democracy. Key Words: anarchy • democracy • domination • Heidegger • Lefort • Machiavelli • politics • savage democracy • Schurmann • totalitarianism. (shrink)

Donald Davidson suggested that, in attempting to give meaning theories, we should proceed via giving truth theories. For the programme of truth-theoretic semantics to be successful, two tasks need to be accomplished. First, it has to be shown that natural languages are actually amendable to truth theoretic treatment. The second task is to show how we can bridge the gap between a truth theory and a genuine meaning theory. This second task is necessitated by the simple fact that truth theories (...) by themselves are too weak to satisfy the central desideratum for a meaning theory. In a recent paper, Greg Ray suggests that the goal of giving meaning theories can easily be achieved, not by supplementing the truth-theoretic apparatus, but by doing away with it altogether. In particular, he proposes that what he calls means-that theories meet all the desiderata on meaning theories, and that ‘anyone with basically Davidsonian commitments must accept the means-that approach as viable and that it has certain evident virtues’. This paper argues that theories along Ray's lines do not satisfy the central desideratum for meaning theories. Ray's belief to the contrary rests on a common misunderstanding of what this desideratum amounts to. As I indicate in the final section of the paper, there perhaps is a way of substantially amending Ray's approach in order to meet the central desideratum. However, in an ironic twist, this will require giving a full-fledged truth theory for the metalanguage, including its intensional constructions like ‘means that’ – precisely the project Ray attempted to avoid. (shrink)

It can be thought that Gorgias’ argument on the non-existence consists of three sentences, the first one being an asseveration and the other two being conditionals. However, this paper is intended to show that there is no conditional in the argument, and that the second and third sentences only appear to be so. To do that, a methodology drawn from the framework of the mental models theory is used, which seems to lead to the true logical forms of these last (...) sentences as well. (shrink)

Baratgin and colleagues have questioned certain aspects of the mental models theory related to disjunction. It is truth that, from this last theory, the paper authored by Baratgin et al. has already been responded. However, I try to further develop that response here by insisting in two important points of the theory: the role that modulation plays in it and the clear differences between its framework and standard logic. In this way, my main aim is to support to a larger (...) extent, by means of theoretical arguments based on its general approach, the idea that the objections presented in the mentioned paper do not really impact the mental models theory. (shrink)

The traditional approach in cognitive sciences holds that cognition is a matter of manipulating abstract symbols followingcertain rules. According to this view, the body is merely an input/output device, which allows the computationalsystem—the brain—to acquire new input data by means of the senses and to act in the environment following its com-mands. In opposition to this classical view, defenders of embodied cognition (EC) stress the relevance of the body inwhich the cognitive agent is embedded in their explanation of cognitive processes. (...) From a representationalist frameworkregarding our conscious experience, in this article, I will offer a novel argument in favor of EC and show that cognitionconstitutively—and no merely causally—depends upon body activity beyond that in the brain. In particular, I will arguethat in order to solve the problem derived from the empirical evidence in favor of the possibility of shifted spectrum,representationalist should endorse the view that experiences concern its subject: the content of experience isde se.Ishow that this claim perfectly matches the phenomenological observation and helps explaining the subjective characterof the experience. Furthermore, I argue that entertaining this kind of representation constitutively depends on bodilyactivity. Consequently, insofar as cognition depends on consciousness, it is embodied. (shrink)

Phenomenology in medicine’s main contribution is to present a first-person narrative of illness, in an effort to aid medicine in reaching an accurate disease diagnosis and establishing a personal relationship with patients whose lived experience changes dramatically when severe disease and disabling condition is confirmed. Once disease is diagnosed, the lived experience of illness is reconstructed into a living-with-disease narrative that medicine’s biological approach has widely neglected. Key concepts like health, sickness, illness, disease and the clinical encounter are being diversely (...) and ambiguously used, leading to distortions in socio-medical practices such as medicalization, pharmaceuticalization, emphasis on surveillance medicine. Current definitions of these concepts as employed in phenomenology of medicine are revised, concluding that more stringent semantics ought to reinforce an empirical phenomenological or postphenomenological approach. (shrink)

In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access to (...) become a plausible alternative. My aim in this paper is twofold. In the first place, I wish to widen the logical space of the discussion among theories of consciousness by offering a distinction, orthogonal to that between F/SO and HO theories, between what I will call 'Self-Involving' (SI) and 'Mental-State-Involving' (MSI) theories and argue in favor of the former one. In the second place, I will present the basics of a characterization of such a Self-Involving theory in Same-Order terms. (shrink)

Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness maintain that the kind of awareness necessary for phenomenal consciousness depends on the cognitive accessibility that underlies reporting. -/- There is empirical evidence strongly suggesting that the cognitive accessibility that underlies the ability to report visual experiences depends on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). This area, however, is highly deactivated during the conscious experiences we have during sleep: dreams. HOT theories are jeopardized, as I will argue. I will briefly present HOT (...) theories in the first section. Section 2 offers empirical evidence to the effect that the cognitive accessibility that underlies the ability to report depends on the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex: dlPFC is the neural correlate of HOTs. Section 3 shows the evidence we have of the deactivation of this brain area during dreams and, in section 4, I present my argument. Finally, I consider and rejoin two possible replies that my opponent can offer: the possibility of an alternative neural correlate of HOTs during dreams and the denial that we have phenomenally conscious experiences during sleep. (shrink)

Derived measurements involve problems of coordination. Conducting them often requires detailed theoretical assumptions about their target, while such assumptions can lack sources of evidence that are independent from these very measurements. In this paper, I defend two claims about problems of coordination. I motivate both by a novel case study on a central measurement problem in the history of physical geodesy: the determination of the earth's ellipticity. First, I argue that the severity of problems of coordination varies according to scientists' (...) predictive and experimental control over perturbations of the measurement process. Second, I identify a methodology by which scientists can solve hard problems of coordination and gradually increase their predictive control over perturbations. I dub this methodology ‘operational pluralism’ since it is driven by the introduction of alternative measurement operations that involve different physical indicators. (shrink)

Une époque obscure : cette époque individualiste et économiste, qui voudrait nous faire croire que chacun de nous est « un petit entrepreneur de soi ». Et pourtant, le sujet de l’agir est-il vraiment comme on le croit l’individu? Ni le militant ni l’individu de bonne volonté, ne sont en mesure d’assumer les défis de l’époque. Le sujet de l’agir n’est donc pas l’individu, mais une multiplicité de situations. Miguel Benasayag et Angélique Del Rey nous invitent à comprendre ce (...) qui peut vraiment changer le monde aujourd’hui. Ce qu’ils nous proposent, c’est l’engagement recherche, l’engagement immanent, expression d’un désir vital, qui revendique la lutte radicale, dans ce monde-ci, sans « machines à espoir ». Mobilisant des réflexions aussi diverses que celles de La Boétie, Marx, Foucault, Spinoza, Gramsci ; s’appuyant sur des expériences politiques concrètes comme celle des Tupamaros uruguayens, puisant aussi bien ses métaphores explicatives dans le cinéma de David Lean que dans les « lieux communs » du langage quotidien, ce livre est une invitation stimulante à repenser les fondements de nos aliénations et une définition de l’engagement comme acte créateur en soi. (shrink)

The development of nineteenth-century geodetic measurement challenges the dominant coherentist account of measurement success. Coherentists argue that measurements of a quantity are epistemically successful if their numerical outcomes converge across varying contextual constraints. Aiming at numerical convergence, in turn, offers an operational aim for scientists to solve problems of coordination. Geodesists faced such a problem of coordination between two indicators of the earth’s ellipticity, which were both based on imperfect ellipsoid models. While not achieving numerical convergence, their measurements produced novel (...) data that grounded valuable theoretical hypotheses. Consequently, they ought to be regarded as epistemically successful. This insight warrants a dynamic revision of coherentism, allowing to judge the success of a metric based on both its coherence and fruitfulness. On that view, scientific measurement aims to coordinate theoretical definitions and produce novel data and theoretical insights. (shrink)

How computer games can be designed to create ethically relevant experiences for players. Today's blockbuster video games—and their never-ending sequels, sagas, and reboots—provide plenty of excitement in high-resolution but for the most part fail to engage a player's moral imagination. In Beyond Choices, Miguel Sicart calls for a new generation of video and computer games that are ethically relevant by design. In the 1970s, mainstream films—including The Godfather, Apocalypse Now, Raging Bull, and Taxi Driver—filled theaters but also treated their (...) audiences as thinking beings. Why can't mainstream video games have the same moral and aesthetic impact? Sicart argues that it is time for games to claim their place in the cultural landscape as vehicles for ethical reflection. Sicart looks at games in many manifestations: toys, analog games, computer and video games, interactive fictions, commercial entertainments, and independent releases. Drawing on philosophy, design theory, literary studies, aesthetics, and interviews with game developers, Sicart provides a systematic account of how games can be designed to challenge and enrich our moral lives. After discussing such topics as definition of ethical gameplay and the structure of the game as a designed object, Sicart offers a theory of the design of ethical game play. He also analyzes the ethical aspects of game play in a number of current games, including Spec Ops: The Line, Beautiful Escape: Dungeoneer, Fallout New Vegas, and Anna Anthropy's Dys4Ia. Games are designed to evoke specific emotions; games that engage players ethically, Sicart argues, enable us to explore and express our values through play. (shrink)

This essay offers only a broad description of a possible comparison between ‘savage democracy’ in the terms of Claude Lefort and the ‘principle of anarchy’ according to Reiner Schurmann. First, I shall try to define savage democracy. Then, in a second move, after having clarified Schurmann's principle of anarchy, I shall outline the terms for a possible confrontation of their respective views. The point here is to show the extent to which the contextualization of democracy with anarchy, considered as principle, (...) is of a nature to bring out democracy's most ‘savage’ characteristics – but without for all that concealing the difficulties that this perspective provokes or reveals. Indeed, it is precisely by returning to and excavating the gap between anarchy and principle that one most closely approaches the ‘savage essence’ of democracy. (shrink)

Although religious belief is often claimed to help with physical ailments including pain, it is unclear what psychological and neural mechanisms underlie the influence of religious belief on pain. By analogy to other top-down processes of pain modulation we hypothesized that religious belief helps believers reinterpret the emotional significance of pain, leading to emotional detachment from it. Recent findings on emotion regulation support a role for the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, a region also important for driving top-down pain inhibitory circuits. (...) Using functional magnetic resonance imaging in practicing Catholics and avowed atheists and agnostics during painful stimulation, here we show the existence of a context-dependent form of analgesia that was triggered by the presentation of an image with a religious content but not by the presentation of a non-religious image. As confirmed by behavioral data, contemplation of the religious image eneabled the religious group to detach themselves from the experience of pain. Critically, this context-dependent modulation of pain specifically engaged the right VLPFC, whereas group-specific preferential liking of one of the pictures was associated with activation in the ventral midbrain. We suggest that religious belief might provide a framework that allows individuals to engage known pain-regulatory brain processes. (shrink)

This essay proposes a new reading of Cohen’s polemical text, Germanism and Judaism. It argues that the development of Cohen’s late philosophy reveals him not as a helpless philosopher overwhelmed by the maelstrom of a world war, but as an “engaged” thinker who carries forward what he takes to be philosophy’s duty to struggle against war by going to “war” in the space of theory and culture. Cohen’s text needs to be placed in the context of his other wartime writings (...) which, on the one hand, assigned a new and more radical function to messianic Judaism within his ethics, and simultaneously transplanted his neo-Kantianism into the more “realistic” political philosophies of Plato and of Spinoza, respectively. This essay argues that the thought of the later Cohen does not break with his previous commitments to cosmopolitanism and social democracy, as much as it tries to confront the harsh realities of European nationalist and anti-Semitic politics by articulating the roles of philosophy and of Judaism in modernity no longer through a strictly idealistic and cosmopolitan optic. (shrink)

Quaestio, Volume 20, Issue, Page 534-538, January 2020.

In this study we expose and develop the core and principal themes of the philosophy of the last God in Martin Heidegger’s treatises written between 1930 and 1940. With this historical reconstruction it’s possible to observe and determine how his ontological research involves the subject of Godhood and how they evolve together in the period of time in which being is discovered and interpreted as Ereignis and as Anfang, but most importantly, when this idea becomes the object of an insistent (...) philosophical work that advances towards a more precise formulation and completion of the horizon of its problems, in a group of initially secret writings that aimed to provide an answer to the “question of being”. (shrink)

Using evidence from experimental psychology, some social psychologists, moral philosophers and organizational scholars claim that character traits do not exist and, hence, that the philosophical tradition of virtue ethics is empirically inadequate and should dispose of the notion of character to accommodate the empirical evidence. In this paper, I systematically address the debate between dispositionalists and situationists about the existence, status and properties of character traits and their manifestations in human behavior, with the ultimate goal of responding to the question (...) whether virtue ethicists need to abandon the very enterprise of building a character-based moral theory in business ethics and organizational behavior. In the course of this paper, I shall defend the claim that the situationist argument relies on a misinterpretation of the experimental evidence. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:To have a virtue is to possess a certain kind of trait of character that is appropriate in pursuing the moral good at which the virtue aims. Human beings are assumed to be capable of attaining those traits. Yet, a number of scholars are skeptical about the very existence of such character traits. They claim a sizable amount of empirical evidence in their support. This article is concerned with the existence and explanatory power of character as a way to assess (...) the possibility of achieving moral virtue, with particular attention paid to business context. I aim to unsettle the so-called situationist challenge to virtue ethics. In the course of this article, I shall defend four claims, namely, that virtues are more than just behavioral dispositions, that at least some virtues may not be unitary traits, that psychologists cannot infer virtues from overt behavior, and that the situationist data do not account for the observational equivalence of traits. Since it rests on a misconception of what virtue is, the situationist objection remains unconvincing. (shrink)

El libro de María González Navarro se presenta a sí mismo como una “nueva hermenéutica” (23). La novedad involucra dos aspectos: uno que llamaremos metateórico y otro hermenéutico en propiedad. Hablando metateóricamente, el libro presenta una hermenéutica gadameriana vigorizada y robustecida por las teorías pragma-dialécticas de la argumentación. Desde el punto de vista hermenéutico propiamente dicho, la novedad reposa en que se considera que la interpretación correcta está indesligablemente vinculada a la argumentación abductiva.