Philosophical Topics 40 (2):155-177 (2012)

Miguel Angel Sebastian
National Autonomous University of Mexico
In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access to become a plausible alternative. My aim in this paper is twofold. In the first place, I wish to widen the logical space of the discussion among theories of consciousness by offering a distinction, orthogonal to that between F/SO and HO theories, between what I will call 'Self-Involving' (SI) and 'Mental-State-Involving' (MSI) theories and argue in favor of the former one. In the second place, I will present the basics of a characterization of such a Self-Involving theory in Same-Order terms.
Keywords Consciousness  Prereflective self consciousness  Self-Involving Representationalism  De Se Content  Higher-Order Theories  Proto-self
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0276-2080
DOI 10.5840/philtopics201240218
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Myth of Phenomenological Overflow.Richard Brown - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):599-604.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The HOROR Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.Richard Brown - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1783-1794.
Are There Degreess of Self-Consciousness?R. Milliere - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (3-4):252-282.

View all 19 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Are Any of Our Beliefs About Ourselves Non-Inferential or Infallible?John-Michael Kuczynski - 2001 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):20-45.
Team Preferences.Robert Sugden - 2000 - Economics and Philosophy 16 (2):175-204.
Recognition Memory and Awareness: An Experiential Approach.John M. Gardiner - 1993 - European Journal of Cognitive Psychology 5:337-46.
Morally, We Should Prefer to Exist: A Response to Smilansky.Sean Johnson - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):817-821.
A Direct Realist Account of Perceptual Awareness.Michael Huemer - 1998 - Dissertation, Rutgers University
Why We Should Prefer Knowledge.Steven L. Reynolds - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):79-93.
Embodied Simulation: From Neurons to Phenomenal Experience. [REVIEW]Vittorio Gallese - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):23-48.


Added to PP index

Total views
1,186 ( #4,728 of 2,498,790 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
51 ( #16,344 of 2,498,790 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes