In this article, I defend the idea that Bentham's international political theory entails a cosmopolitan dimension. First, I explain that Bentham rejects two pillars of internationalism, namely, the sovereign's unconstrained autonomous power and authority in international politics, and the legal and moral personality of the state in the international realm. This critique leads Bentham to construct a complex international political theory which places the issue of states’ responsibility at its centre. Bentham's international theory articulates a minimalist international system of cooperation (...) between states and an institutional model of public officials’ responsibilities that together play the crucial role in securing the greatest happiness of the greatest number in the world. In this last part, I explain how Bentham's international political theory relies heavily on the responsibilities of states, a set of responsibilities that encompasses both national and cosmopolitan responsibilities that public officials in each state hold. (shrink)

In “Wheeler and Thompson’s Appeal: refounding utilitarianism through equality between men and women?”, Benjamin Bourcier studies this Appeal in which, in response to James Mill’s article On Government, Anna Wheeler and William Thompson offer a radical critique of utilitarian thought, but also of Mill’s political exclusion of women and legitimization of patriarchy. In contrast to Mill, they defend the political inclusion and equality of women, in order to meet the aspirations of a society of equals and the greatest (...) happiness for all. (shrink)

In this chapter, Benjamin Bourcier argues that Bentham’s politics of global commerce evolved from enlightenment cosmopolitanism aspirations to gradually integrate several features of an economic imperialist model. Bentham’s series of writings on colonial and commercial projects share a relative similarity with the British imperial ideology of his time. Observing that Bentham’s politics of global commerce is not perfectly coherent, Bourcier interrogates how these changes reveal a close historical and conceptual relation between enlightenment cosmopolitan ideas on commerce and (...) the burgeoning development of British imperial ideology. (shrink)

Alors que plus d’un siècle sépare Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) et Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), leurs philosophies respectives entretiennent des rapports étroits qui, bien qu’ils aient souvent retenu l’attention des historiens de la philosophie et commentateurs, n’ont jamais été étudiés spécifiquement. On cherche ici à pallier ce manque par une étude des rapports entre Hobbes et Bentham dans le champ de la philosophie politique, juridique et morale. On espère ainsi expliquer les points communs, influences, réappropriations, différences et oppositions existant entre ces deux (...) pensées et contribuer par là à faire mieux comprendre leur rôle dans l’histoire de la philosophie moderne anglaise. (shrink)

Souvent délaissée, la pensée politique de l’international chez Hobbes et Bentham recèle plus de points communs qu’on ne pourrait le penser. Pour reconstruire philosophiquement cette pensée, en s’attachant plus spécifiquement au rapport entre économie et politique, on explique d’abord leur commune opposition aux colonies et aux politiques étrangères bellicistes. On montre ensuite comment ils comprennent le commerce international, l’économie et le marché en relation avec l’État, et enfin qu’on ne saurait constituer une théorie politique internationale assurant la sécurité, la paix (...) et la prospérité qui soit autonome et séparée de la théorie de l’État. (shrink)

This book articulates international political theory in dialogue with economics on several questions. It asks: how has modern international theory been adjusted and nourished by economic ideas, theories and practices? How far has the distinctive contribution of some theorists to international theory been informed by their views on economy? What has been the impact of the theory of the state for economic and international theory? What sort of economic thinking has led to revise the debates constitutive for the modern international (...) realm? How have economic debates been rhetorically connected to political debates in the field of international relations? (shrink)

Imaginez un homme ou une femme du futur, étudiant(e) en philosophie et assistant à ses premiers cours de philosophie morale et politique. Imaginez ce cours donné par un(e) professeur(e), les remarques des étudiant(e)s à propos de telle thèse, tel argument. Imaginez leurs sourires, leurs réactions de stupéfaction ou de scandale, leurs blagues… Imaginez à présent que ces réactions expriment aussi le fait qu’ils étudient ceux-là même qui ont ruiné leur monde, c’est-à-dire ceux qui ont causé un c..

The contributions made by British intellectuals to modern internationalInternational political thought have been at the centre of several debates in recent decades in disciplines such as international relations.

Ma première rencontre avec David Lieberman date de 2014. A l’initiative de mon co-directeur de thèse Malik Bozzo-Rey, David Lieberman avait été invité à participer à mon comité de suivi de thèse. Il avait lu les quelques pages présentant les avancées de mes recherches et sa participation à ce comité comme ses commentaires avaient été très soutenant et généreux. La suite de ma recherche doctorale a largement été nourrie par ses travaux et n’ont pas cessé de l’être depuis. La grande (...) force et l'originalité de David a été l'inflexion qu'il a porté à la division entre ce qui relève de la philosophie politique et de la philosophie du droit chez Bentham. Il développe une interprétation ‘politique’ de la philosophie de Bentham en se concentrant sur l’idéal de codification et il voit dans ce thème et cet objet ce qui orchestre la continuité des écrits de Bentham des années 1780 à ceux de 1832. Avec cette interprétation, David Lieberman marquait ses distances avec la lecture si importante de... (shrink)

La notion de « peuple » n’est pas un vain mot en philosophie politique. Elle fait l’objet d’une réflexion qui a, depuis un point de vue moderne, un double horizon ; d’une part, les deux Révolutions du XVIIIème siècle qui voient l’entrée du peuple sur la scène de l’Histoire ; d’autre part, J.-J. Rousseau et l’idée de « peuple autolégislateur » condition et principe de l’autonomie du peuple. Suivant cette compréhension classique, non seulement le « peuple » renvoie f...

Deux livres récents d’introduction à la pensée de Jeremy Bentham, ceux de Michael Quinn et de Jean-Pierre Cléro, font apparaître des pistes nouvelles (autour de la théorie du gouvernement pour le premier, du langage et des fictions pour le second) pour découvrir l’actualité de cette pensée.

« L’anarchie », comme en témoigne l’omniprésence du qualificatif « anarchique » dans De l’absurdité sur des échasses, est essentielle pour comprendre le chemin argumentatif développé dans la critique benthamienne des droits de l’homme. C’est seulement à partir d’elle qu’apparaissent clairement les différents pans de cette critique, mais surtout son ordre et son sens déterminés par ce qui vaut comme le fondement de toute la critique, la théorie des fictions. Une fois reconnue l’importance de ce fondement, alors la continuité et (...) la systématicité de la critique comme la propension dévastatrice de cette argumentation se déploient entièrement, et devient cette « machine de guerre » contre les droits de l’homme. « L’anarchie » est bien le fil directeur de la critique, en tant qu’elle est le moyen et la fin même de la Déclaration des droits de l’homme pour Bentham. (shrink)

Examines the development of the philosophy, culture, and civilization of ancient China and discusses the history of Taoism and Confucianism.

This chapter offers a proceduralist argument against capital punishment. More specifically, it contends that the possibility of irrevocable mistakes precludes the just administration of the death penalty. At stake is a principle of political morality: legal institutions must strive to remedy their mistakes and to compensate those who suffer from wrongful sanctions. The incompatibility of remedy and execution is the crux of the irrevocability argument: because the wrongly executed cannot enjoy the morally required compensation, execution is impermissible. Along with defending (...) his key premises, Yost explains the complicated role that sentencing uncertainty plays in the argument. He concludes by noting some of the flaws in substantive consequentialist and retributivist justifications of capital punishment. (shrink)

This chapter offers non-retributive, broadly Kantian justifications of punishment and remorse which can be endorsed by free will skeptics. We lose our grip on some Kantian ideas if we become skeptical about free will, but we can preserve some important ones which can do valuable work for free will skeptics. The justification of punishment presented here has consequentialist features but is deontologically constrained by our duty to avoid using others as mere means. It draws on a modified Rawlsian original position (...) in which we assume we are just as likely to be among the punished when the veil of ignorance is raised as we are to be among those protected by the institution of punishment. The justification of remorse presented here is care-based, and draws on the value of sympathizing with people we have wronged, which has a Kantian ground in the duty to take others’ ends as our own. (shrink)

We are immersed within an odorous sea of chemical currents that we parse into individual odors with complex structures. Odors have been posited as determined by the structural relation between the molecules that compose the chemical compounds and their interactions with the receptor site. But, naturally occurring smells are parsed from gaseous odor plumes. To give a comprehensive account of the nature of odors the chemosciences must account for these large distributed entities as well. We offer a focused review of (...) what is known about the perception of odor plumes for olfactory navigation and tracking, which we then connect to what is known about the role odorants play as properties of the plume in determining odor identity with respect to odor quality. We end by motivating our central claim that more research needs to be conducted on the role that odorants play within the odor plume in determining odor identity. (shrink)

This chapter offers non-retributive, broadly Kantian justifications of punishment and remorse that can be endorsed by free will skeptics. We lose our grip on some Kantian ideas if we become skeptical about free will, but we can preserve some important ones that can do valuable work for free will skeptics. The justification of punishment presented here has consequentialist features but is deontologically constrained by our duty to avoid using others as mere means. It draws on a modified Rawlsian original position (...) in which we assume we are just as likely to be among the punished when the veil of ignorance is raised as we are to be among those protected by the institution of punishment. The justification of remorse presented here is care-based and draws on the value of sympathizing with people we have wronged, which has a Kantian ground in the duty to take others’ ends as our own. (shrink)

Sells encourages a radical departure from the usual introspection and self-centeredness of psychology in our time. By placing style first, Sells argues that we must turn our eyes and minds outward to the greater world. Emphasizing beauty over emotion and appreciation over feeling, he attempts to break the stranglehold of the self so as to reconstitute our proper place among the many things of the world.

v. 1. Charmides. Lysis. Laches. Protagoras. Euthydemus. Cratylus. Phaedrus. Ion. Symposium.--v. 2. Meno. Euthyphro. Apology. Crito. Phaedo. Georgias. Appendix I: Lesser Hippias. Alcibiades I. Menexenus. Appenddix II: Alcibiades II. Eryxias.--v. 3. Republic. Timaeus. Critias.--v. 4. Pharmenides. Theaetetus. Sophist. Statesman. Philebus.--v. 5 Laws. Index to the writings of Plato.

We perceive smells as perduring complex entities within a distal array that might be conceived of as smellscapes. However, the philosophical orthodoxy of Odor Theories has been to deny that smells are perceived as having a distal location. Recent challenges have been mounted to Odor Theories’ veracity in handling the timescale of olfactory perception, how it individuates odors as a distal entities, and their claim that olfactory perception is not spatial. The paper does not aim to dispute these criticisms. Rather, (...) what will be shown is that Molecular Structure Theory, a refinement of Odor Theory, can be further developed to handle these challenges. The theory is further refined by focusing on distal perception that requires considering the perceptual object as mereologically complex persisting odor against a background scene conceived of as a smellscape. What will be offered is an expansion of Molecular Structure Theory to account for distal smell perception within natural environments. (shrink)

I defend a deontological social contract justification of punishment for philosophers who deny free will and moral responsibility (FW/MR). Even if nobody has FW/MR, a criminal justice system is fair to the people it targets if we would consent to it in a version of original position deliberation where we assumed that we would be targeted by the justice system when the veil is raised. Even if we assumed we would be convicted of a crime, we would consent to the (...) imprisonment of violent criminals if prison conditions were better than the state of nature but deterring enough to prevent the state of nature. (shrink)

Environmental ethicists often make claims about the intrinsic value of nature or parts thereof. Advances in intrinsic value theory, most notably Ben Bradley’s ‘Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value,’ successfully cleave the concept of intrinsic value into two: a Moorean and Kantian variety. This paper seeks to classify and organize different environmental theorists within a Bradley-inspired framework, helping to bring clarity and charity to the claims of older and newer environmental ethicists. These two types of intrinsic value help explain why different (...) thinkers have differing intuitions on e.g., culling cases. As well as valuing nature suis generis, the paper considers the value that might accrue from other relational properties in nature, such as beauty, biodiversity, and rarity. (shrink)

This book has been considered by academicians and scholars of great significance and value to literature. This forms a part of the knowledge base for future generations. So that the book is never forgotten we have represented this book in a print format as the same form as it was originally first published. Hence any marks or annotations seen are left intentionally to preserve its true nature.

Identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for individuating and classifying diseases is a matter of great importance in the fields of law, ethics, epidemiology, and of course, medicine. In this paper, I first propose a means of achieving this goal, ensuring that no two distinct disease-types could correctly be ascribed to the same disease-token. I then posit a metaphysical ontology of diseases—that is, I give an account of what a disease is. This is essential to providing the most effective means (...) of interfering with disease processes. Following existing work in the philosophy of medicine and epidemiology (primarily Christopher Boorse; Caroline Whitbeck; Alexander Broadbent), philosophy of biology (Joseph LaPorte; D.L. Hull), conditional analyses of causation (J.L. Mackie; David Lewis), and recent literature on dispositional essentialism (Stephen Mumford and Rani Anjum; Alexander Bird), I endorse a dispositional conception of disease. Following discussion of various conceptions of disease-identity, their relations to the clinical and pathological effects of the diseases in question, and how diseases are treated, I conclude (i) that diseases should be individuated by their causes, and (ii) that diseases are causal processes best seen as simultaneously acting sequences of mutually manifesting dispositions. (shrink)

At least some of your beliefs are commitments. When you believe that P as a commitment, your stance on P is such that you believe it on the basis of your considered judgement. Sometimes, you also believe that you believe P. Such self‐beliefs can also be commissive in a sense, as when they are reflective endorsements of your lower‐order commissive beliefs. In this paper I argue that one's commissive self‐beliefs ontologically constitute one's lower‐order commissive beliefs because one's commissive self‐beliefs instantiate (...) the same inferential dispositions that are constitutive of one's lower‐order commissive beliefs. Constitutive relations between commissive self‐beliefs and first‐order commissive beliefs are maximally epistemically secure because they do not result from any epistemic procedure by which one must try (and possibly fail) to detect one's first‐order commissive beliefs. This maximal epistemic security suffices to warrant one's commissive self‐beliefs, such that one possesses commissive self‐knowledge of an especially privileged sort. (shrink)

This volume contains fifteen essays in honour of Wolfgang Künne. The essays deal with issues from the philosophy of language and logic, broadly conceived. They cover topics ranging from truth, reference, and the ontology of abstract objects, to action, intentionality, and speech acts. By taking into account the works of early analytic philosophers—including Bolzano, Frege, Peirce, Husserl, and Wittgenstein—they foster our understanding of the history of the ideas discussed, while at the same time contributing to the systematic debate. The collection (...) also includes an up-to-date bibliography of Künne’s published work. (shrink)

There is a theorem that shows that it is impossible for an algorithm to jointly satisfy the statistical fairness criteria of Calibration and Equalised Odds non-trivially. But what about the recently advocated alternative to Calibration, Base Rate Tracking? Here, we show that Base Rate Tracking is strictly weaker than Calibration, and then take up the question of whether it is possible to jointly satisfy Base Rate Tracking and Equalised Odds in non-trivial scenarios. We show that it is not, thereby establishing (...) an even more general impossibility theorem. (shrink)

Much of the debate about identity in recent decades has been about personal identity, and specifically about personal identity over time, but identity generally, and the identity of things of other kinds, have also attracted attention. Various interrelated problems have been at the centre of discussion, but it is fair to say that recent work has focussed particularly on the following areas: the notion of a criterion of identity; the correct analysis of identity over time, and, in particular, the disagreement (...) between advocates of perdurance and advocates of endurance as analyses of identity over time; the notion of identity across possible worlds and the question of its relevance to the correct analysis of de re modal discourse; the notion of contingent identity; the question of whether the identity relation is, or is similar to, the composition relation; and the notion of vague identity. A radical position, advocated by Peter Geach, is that these debates, as usually conducted, are void for lack of a subject matter: the notion of absolute identity they presuppose has no application; there is only relative identity. Another increasingly popular view is the one advocated by Lewis: although the debates make sense they cannot genuinely be debates about identity, since there are no philosophical problems about identity. Identity is an utterly unproblematic notion. What there are, are genuine problems which can be stated using the language of identity. But since these can be restated without the language of identity they are not problems about identity. (For example, it is a puzzle, an aspect of the so-called “problem of personal identity”, whether the same person can have different bodies at different times. But this is just the puzzle whether a person can have different bodies at different times. So since it can be stated without the language of personal “identity”, it is not a problem about identity, but about personhood.) This article provides an overview of the topics indicated above, some assessment of the debates and suggestions for further reading. (shrink)

Presents a novel interpretation of Schelling's philosophy by way of his reading and critique of Spinoza.

Nietzsche distinguished between two forces in art: Apollonian, which represents order and reason, and Dionysian, which represents chaos and energy. Economists, Ward argues, have operated for too long under the assumption that their work reflects the scientific, Apollonian principals that inform physics when they simply do not apply to economics: 'constants' in economics stand in for variables, and the core scientific principles of prediction and replication are all but ignored by economists. Ward encourages economists to reintegrate the standard rigor of (...) the scientific method into their work while embracing the fact of the shape-shifting changeability of human beings. Economists can still aspire to scientific standards, as is demonstrated by the success of biology, in which there is considerable Dionysian variability. Economists must avoid the temptation to wish away dynamic complexity and diversity and must recognize, among other things, that the desire to take risks is fundamentally human. The second half of the book takes some first steps toward creating this new Dionysian Economics. (shrink)

Hardly anyone disputes that discrimination can be a grave moral wrong. Yet this consensus masks fundamental disagreements about what makes something discrimination, as well as precisely why acts of discrimination are wrong. Benjamin Eidelson develops systematic answers to those two questions. He claims that discrimination is a form of differential treatment distinguished by its special connection to the differential ascription of some property to different people, and goes on to argue that what makes some cases of discrimination intrinsically wrongful (...) is that they manifest an attitude of disrespect for the personhood of those who are disfavored. He endeavors to specify what this attitude consists in, and to demonstrate how attending to its character can help us to better understand the moral dimensions of different forms of wrongful discrimination. The book concludes with an extended discussion of racial profiling in law enforcement. (shrink)

What does the law want? -- How the law thinks -- How the law works -- The litigious mind -- Tyranny of the mind -- Lawyers in love -- Staying and going -- Soul values.

Kiesewetter defends the normativity of rationality by presenting a new solution to the problems that arise from the common assumption that we ought to be rational. He provides a defence of a reason-response conception of rationality, an evidence-relative account of reason, and an explanation of structural irrationality in relation to these accounts.

Pharmaceutical industry marketers are confronted with specific ethical issues linked to the tension between the economic interest being pursued and the health mission of this sector. Indeed this dual mission could be problematic for them when the two objectives contradict each other. We use the concept of moral dissonance to examine how marketers in the pharmaceutical industry perceive the profit/health tension inherent in their sector and how they deal with it. Based on narratives of 18 marketers working in the pharmaceutical (...) sector, our qualitative study identifies ethical conflicts of varying intensity that generate differing degrees of moral dissonance among marketers. To cope with this moral dissonance, they use the following strategies: (1) minimize the sensitivity of their activity; (2) invoke the benefits to patients; and (3) avoid behaviors that conflict with their values. (shrink)

Capital punishment—the legally authorized killing of a criminal offender by an agent of the state for the commission of a crime—stands in special need of moral justification. This is because execution is a particularly severe punishment. Execution is different in kind from monetary and custodial penalties in an obvious way: execution causes the death of an offender. While fines and incarceration set back some of one’s interests, death eliminates the possibility of setting and pursuing ends. While fines and incarceration narrow (...) one’s routes to happiness, death eliminates its possibility. Not surprisingly, there is much debate about the moral permissibility of capital punishment. This entry maps the terrain of this debate. The first section discusses justifications of the death penalty as they appear in major theories of punishment. The second section surveys moral objections to execution that apply to most justifications. The third addresses procedural criticisms, which do not target the morality of execution so much as the justice of its implementation. (shrink)

This is the first book to explore the role of quotation in modern Jewish thought. It shows how quotation is the binding tissue that links language and thought, modernity and tradition, religion and secularism as a way of being in the world.

Sometimes our intentions and beliefs exhibit a structure that proves us to be irrational. This dissertation is concerned with the question of whether we ought (or have at least good reason) to avoid such irrationality. The thesis defends the normativity of rationality by presenting a new solution to the problems that arise from the common assumption that we ought to be rational. The argument touches upon many other topics in the theory of normativity, such as the form and the content (...) of rational standards or requirements, the preconditions of criti¬cism, and the function of reasons in deliberation and advice. Over and above an exten¬sive assessment of the problems discussed in the literature, the thesis provides a detailed defence of a reason-response conception of rationality, a novel, evidence-relative account of reasons, and an explanation of structural irrationality in terms of these accounts. (shrink)

An English language translation accompanies the original Greek text of Aristotle's book about the nature of the state, constitutions, revolutions, democracy, and oligarchy.

Apology -- Crito -- Phaedo -- Symposium -- Republic.

This article takes issue vigorously with what it argues are the disempowering effects of Judith Butler's more recent work, for transgendered people in particular and accordingly for the queer movement in general. In so doing it contests the way in which the reception of Butler's work in France has been mediated by a transphobic psychoanalytic establishment and attacks Butler for playing along with their self-interested political agenda by retelling, in Paris, for their ears, an anecdote of a savoury encounter with (...) a transgendered interlocutor in a subcultural queer space in San Francisco. (shrink)