This thought-provoking book discusses the concept of progress in economics and investigates whether any advance has been made in its different spheres of research. The authors look back at the history, successes and failures of their respective fields and thoroughly examine the notion of progress from an epistemological and methodological perspective. The idea of progress is particularly significant as the authors regard it as an essentially contested concept which can be defined in many ways – theoretically or empirically; locally or (...) globally; or as encouraging or impeding the existence of other research traditions. The authors discuss the idea that for progress to make any sense there must be an accumulation of knowledge built up over time rather than the replacement of ideas by each successive generation. Accordingly, they are not concerned with estimating the price of progress, reminiscing in the past, or assessing what has been lost. Instead they apply the complex mechanisms and machinery of the discipline to sub-fields such as normative economics, monetary economics, trade and location theory, Austrian economics and classical economics to critically assess whether progress has been made in these areas of research. -/- Bringing together authoritative and wide-ranging contributions by leading scholars, this book will challenge and engage those interested in philosophy, economic methodology and the history of economic thought. It will also appeal to economists in general who are interested in the advancement of their profession. (shrink)

Two‐ and 3‐year‐old children (N = 96) were tested in an object‐choice task with video presentations of peer and adult partners. An immersive, semi‐interactive procedure enabled both the close matching of adult and peer conditions and the combination of participants’ choice behavior with looking time measures. Children were more likely to use information provided by adults. As the effect was more pronounced in the younger age‐group, the observed bias may fade during toddlerhood. As there were no differences in children’s propensity (...) to follow peer and adult gestures with their gaze, these findings provide some of the earliest evidence to date that young children take an interlocutor’s age into account when judging ostensively communicated testimony. (shrink)

In the current study, 24- to 27-month-old children (N = 37) used pointing gestures in a cooperative object choice task with either peer or adult partners. When indicating the location of a hidden toy, children pointed equally accurately for adult and peer partners but more often for adult partners. When choosing from one of three hiding places, children used adults’ pointing to find a hidden toy significantly more often than they used peers’. In interaction with peers, children’s choice behavior was (...) at chance level. These results suggest that toddlers ascribe informative value to adults’ but not peers’ pointing gestures, and highlight the role of children’s social expecta- tions in their communicative development. (shrink)

This edition of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s “De ente et uno” (“On being and the one”) offers for the first time a key text for the reformation of metaphysics in Renaissance philosophy in German translation. The Latin text is added. The detailed introduction and careful commentary reveal the guiding points Pico has set with this work.

This article aims to adapt to Spanish the Relational Needs Satisfaction Scale and to test the factor structure with a clinical and a non-clinical sample. A total of 459 individuals completed the RNSS, a measure of life satisfaction and of psychological wellbeing. Results showed that the translation was adequate. An exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis was conducted followed by the test of three models that confirmed the five-factor structure and the second-order global factor proposed in the original study, and in (...) adaptations to other languages. The advantages and disadvantages of these models are discussed. Correlations of the RNSS with life satisfaction and psychological wellbeing measures were in the expected direction, providing evidence of convergent validity. The Spanish version of the RNSS is a valid and reliable measure of the construct it was intended to measure, though some improvements in item wording could be incorporated and tested. (shrink)

The so-called ”argument from religious experience’ plays a prominent role in today’s analytical philosophy of religion. It is also of considerable importance to richard Swinburne’s apologetic project. However, rather than joining the polyphonic debate around this argument, the present paper examines the fundamental concept of religious experience. The upshot is that Swinburne neither develops a convincing concept of experience nor explains what makes a religious experience religious. The first section examines some problems resulting mainly from terminology, specifically Swinburne’s use (...) of appear-words as success-verbs. While these problems might be resolved by a recurrence to the observer, the second and third part of our paper present problems not so easily resolved: namely, that Swinburne’s concept of experience as conscious mental events is too broad and inaccurate for its role in the argument given ; and that Swinburne does not even attempt to figure out which features of an experience, when present, turn an experience simpliciter into a distinctly religious experience. Section 4, in conclusion, outlines possible reasons for this unusual and remarkable inaccuracy in conceptualisation. (shrink)

The late Gregor Sebba was fond of describing his monumental Bibliographia Cartesiana: A Critical Guide to the Descartes Literature, 1800–1960 as a by-product of his research begun in 1949 for an article he had in mind titled The Dream of Descartes. The bibliography has been indispensable to Descartes scholars since its appearance in 1964. When Sebba died in 1985, his manuscript for The Dream of Descartes was still unfinished. Here, with materials provided by Aníbal A. Bueño, Richard H. (...) Popkin, and Helen Sebba, Richard A. Watson presents the completed work based on a 1973 draft, letters, outlines, and other manuscript material. The result is a fascinating analysis of Descartes’ dreams as seminal in the creative process of genius. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:258 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY and diversity"-- ("it is useless to deny or even minimize the incongruities and the contradictions" in Rousseau's statements, as Burgelin says in another book). Instead he puts the finger on the one trait that sets this piece of rationalism (or anti-rationalism, as some would say) apart from all others: not sentiment verging on the mystical, but egocentrism, existentially founded and unique. Rousseau, taking a stand (...) outside the battling parties, outside his own religion, becomes more and more "une existence solitaire en face d'une autre existence, qui le regarde," that "other existence" which he calls God. Alas, the descent from such existential heights is swift. Soon the solitary thinker will be enmeshed again in unsolitary speculations about those very issues he had left behind in his flight into the self. Where will this strange pilgrim's progress end? In 1769, seven years before his death and feeling the cold breath of old age upon him, Jean-Jacques wrote: "In my childhood I believed by authority, in my youth by feeling, in my mature age by reason; now I believe because I have always believed." Burgelin cites this as proof that Rousseau never ceased to believe. Maybe so. But is this the point? What the passage defines is the pilgrim's irreversible religious itinerary. On cannot but ask what the next inevitable stop on the road would have been. Waiting for Godot? "Whoever makes an effort to find in Rousseau's work an explicit philosophy... runs into a very peculiar difficulty, for a philosophy is defined above all by its coherence, and [Rousseau] himself warns us against his own methods." With these words Pierre Burgelin opened his monumental work, La philosophic de l'existence de ].-]. Rousseau (1952). It is in the several pertinent chapters of this earlier work that the reader will find what the present book withholds: a philosophical analysis as rigorous as it is profound and comprehensive, the best analysis we have to Rousseau's religious thought. Professor Burgelin's new book merely proves that not even he can do justice to Jean-Jacques without explaining him. GREGORSEBBA Emory University l~mile ou de l'dducation. Par Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Introduction, bibliographic, notes, et index analytique par Francois et Pierre Richard. gdition illustr~e. (Paris: ~ditions Garnier Fr~res, 1962. Pp. 1 + 664 [1].) While the new Pldiade edition of Rousseau, a model of contemporary French scholarship, makes its slow, stately way towards completion, the well-known yellow Classiques Garnier keep coming out in new editions or simply in new dress. This 12mile is a handsomely produced, very readable BOOK REVIEWS 259 reissue of the 1939 Garnier edition, with reproductions of eighteenthcentury engravings on themes of Rousseau. They add rich period flavor to this strange work in which a hypermodern intelligence talks the language of three centuries ago. There are useful notes, the detailed subject index is exceptionally well laid out, the spacious bibliography is ample for Rousseau 's sources and influence, but its meager twentieth-century section should have been reworked and brought up to date. The Introduction, too, can still be read with much profit, even though its critical standpoint is now antiquated, eloquent proof of the effectiveness of Rousseau scholarship in the last two decades. For its price this is a very handy, serviceable edition to have until the Biblioth~que de la PMiade catches up with Garnier Fr~res. Emory University GREGOR SEBBA Kant's Theory o[ Knowledge. By Graham Bird. (New York: The Humanities Press, 1962. Pp. x + 210. ~5.50.) In the Preface the author states that he has two main objectives in his book: To pursue one central argument through the Critique of Pure Reason and to discuss Kant's views in terms of a modern philosophical idiom. Bird follows this programme out through most of the book, departing from it on only one occasion, in Chapter 11 (pp. 181-188) in which he discusses and criticizes Strawson's theory of personality (as presented in his book Individuals, chap. 3). The space given to Strawson does not, however, constitute a serious digression from the main argument because it comes at the end of a chapter devoted... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:258 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY and diversity"-- ("it is useless to deny or even minimize the incongruities and the contradictions" in Rousseau's statements, as Burgelin says in another book). Instead he puts the finger on the one trait that sets this piece of rationalism (or anti-rationalism, as some would say) apart from all others: not sentiment verging on the mystical, but egocentrism, existentially founded and unique. Rousseau, taking a stand (...) outside the battling parties, outside his own religion, becomes more and more "une existence solitaire en face d'une autre existence, qui le regarde," that "other existence" which he calls God. Alas, the descent from such existential heights is swift. Soon the solitary thinker will be enmeshed again in unsolitary speculations about those very issues he had left behind in his flight into the self. Where will this strange pilgrim's progress end? In 1769, seven years before his death and feeling the cold breath of old age upon him, Jean-Jacques wrote: "In my childhood I believed by authority, in my youth by feeling, in my mature age by reason; now I believe because I have always believed." Burgelin cites this as proof that Rousseau never ceased to believe. Maybe so. But is this the point? What the passage defines is the pilgrim's irreversible religious itinerary. On cannot but ask what the next inevitable stop on the road would have been. Waiting for Godot? "Whoever makes an effort to find in Rousseau's work an explicit philosophy... runs into a very peculiar difficulty, for a philosophy is defined above all by its coherence, and [Rousseau] himself warns us against his own methods." With these words Pierre Burgelin opened his monumental work, La philosophic de l'existence de ].-]. Rousseau (1952). It is in the several pertinent chapters of this earlier work that the reader will find what the present book withholds: a philosophical analysis as rigorous as it is profound and comprehensive, the best analysis we have to Rousseau's religious thought. Professor Burgelin's new book merely proves that not even he can do justice to Jean-Jacques without explaining him. GREGORSEBBA Emory University l~mile ou de l'dducation. Par Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Introduction, bibliographic, notes, et index analytique par Francois et Pierre Richard. gdition illustr~e. (Paris: ~ditions Garnier Fr~res, 1962. Pp. 1 + 664 [1].) While the new Pldiade edition of Rousseau, a model of contemporary French scholarship, makes its slow, stately way towards completion, the well-known yellow Classiques Garnier keep coming out in new editions or simply in new dress. This 12mile is a handsomely produced, very readable BOOK REVIEWS 259 reissue of the 1939 Garnier edition, with reproductions of eighteenthcentury engravings on themes of Rousseau. They add rich period flavor to this strange work in which a hypermodern intelligence talks the language of three centuries ago. There are useful notes, the detailed subject index is exceptionally well laid out, the spacious bibliography is ample for Rousseau 's sources and influence, but its meager twentieth-century section should have been reworked and brought up to date. The Introduction, too, can still be read with much profit, even though its critical standpoint is now antiquated, eloquent proof of the effectiveness of Rousseau scholarship in the last two decades. For its price this is a very handy, serviceable edition to have until the Biblioth~que de la PMiade catches up with Garnier Fr~res. Emory University GREGOR SEBBA Kant's Theory o[ Knowledge. By Graham Bird. (New York: The Humanities Press, 1962. Pp. x + 210. ~5.50.) In the Preface the author states that he has two main objectives in his book: To pursue one central argument through the Critique of Pure Reason and to discuss Kant's views in terms of a modern philosophical idiom. Bird follows this programme out through most of the book, departing from it on only one occasion, in Chapter 11 (pp. 181-188) in which he discusses and criticizes Strawson's theory of personality (as presented in his book Individuals, chap. 3). The space given to Strawson does not, however, constitute a serious digression from the main argument because it comes at the end of a chapter devoted... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:258 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY and diversity"-- ("it is useless to deny or even minimize the incongruities and the contradictions" in Rousseau's statements, as Burgelin says in another book). Instead he puts the finger on the one trait that sets this piece of rationalism (or anti-rationalism, as some would say) apart from all others: not sentiment verging on the mystical, but egocentrism, existentially founded and unique. Rousseau, taking a stand (...) outside the battling parties, outside his own religion, becomes more and more "une existence solitaire en face d'une autre existence, qui le regarde," that "other existence" which he calls God. Alas, the descent from such existential heights is swift. Soon the solitary thinker will be enmeshed again in unsolitary speculations about those very issues he had left behind in his flight into the self. Where will this strange pilgrim's progress end? In 1769, seven years before his death and feeling the cold breath of old age upon him, Jean-Jacques wrote: "In my childhood I believed by authority, in my youth by feeling, in my mature age by reason; now I believe because I have always believed." Burgelin cites this as proof that Rousseau never ceased to believe. Maybe so. But is this the point? What the passage defines is the pilgrim's irreversible religious itinerary. On cannot but ask what the next inevitable stop on the road would have been. Waiting for Godot? "Whoever makes an effort to find in Rousseau's work an explicit philosophy... runs into a very peculiar difficulty, for a philosophy is defined above all by its coherence, and [Rousseau] himself warns us against his own methods." With these words Pierre Burgelin opened his monumental work, La philosophic de l'existence de ].-]. Rousseau (1952). It is in the several pertinent chapters of this earlier work that the reader will find what the present book withholds: a philosophical analysis as rigorous as it is profound and comprehensive, the best analysis we have to Rousseau's religious thought. Professor Burgelin's new book merely proves that not even he can do justice to Jean-Jacques without explaining him. GREGORSEBBA Emory University l~mile ou de l'dducation. Par Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Introduction, bibliographic, notes, et index analytique par Francois et Pierre Richard. gdition illustr~e. (Paris: ~ditions Garnier Fr~res, 1962. Pp. 1 + 664 [1].) While the new Pldiade edition of Rousseau, a model of contemporary French scholarship, makes its slow, stately way towards completion, the well-known yellow Classiques Garnier keep coming out in new editions or simply in new dress. This 12mile is a handsomely produced, very readable BOOK REVIEWS 259 reissue of the 1939 Garnier edition, with reproductions of eighteenthcentury engravings on themes of Rousseau. They add rich period flavor to this strange work in which a hypermodern intelligence talks the language of three centuries ago. There are useful notes, the detailed subject index is exceptionally well laid out, the spacious bibliography is ample for Rousseau 's sources and influence, but its meager twentieth-century section should have been reworked and brought up to date. The Introduction, too, can still be read with much profit, even though its critical standpoint is now antiquated, eloquent proof of the effectiveness of Rousseau scholarship in the last two decades. For its price this is a very handy, serviceable edition to have until the Biblioth~que de la PMiade catches up with Garnier Fr~res. Emory University GREGOR SEBBA Kant's Theory o[ Knowledge. By Graham Bird. (New York: The Humanities Press, 1962. Pp. x + 210. ~5.50.) In the Preface the author states that he has two main objectives in his book: To pursue one central argument through the Critique of Pure Reason and to discuss Kant's views in terms of a modern philosophical idiom. Bird follows this programme out through most of the book, departing from it on only one occasion, in Chapter 11 (pp. 181-188) in which he discusses and criticizes Strawson's theory of personality (as presented in his book Individuals, chap. 3). The space given to Strawson does not, however, constitute a serious digression from the main argument because it comes at the end of a chapter devoted... (shrink)

The late Gregor Sebba was fond of describing his monumental _Bibliographia Cartesiana: A Critical Guide to the Descartes Literature, 1800–1960 _as a by-product of his research begun in 1949 for an article he had in mind titled _The Dream of Descartes._ The bibliography has been indispensable to Descartes scholars since its appearance in 1964. When Sebba died in 1985, his manuscript for _The Dream of Descartes _was still unfinished. Here, with materials provided by Aníbal A. Bueño, Richard H. (...) Popkin, and Helen Sebba, Richard A. Watson presents the completed work based on a 1973 draft, letters, outlines, and other manuscript material. The result is a fascinating analysis of Descartes’ dreams as seminal in the creative process of genius. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS Shadow History tl9 Richard Watson's essay looks as if it is breaking new ground, but on re-re-reading it, it seems to me that several incommensurable and unrelated problems and phenomena are being treated together. If separated into constituent parts, there may be less here than meets the eye. First of all, the phenomenon of "shadow history," and its role as foundation for a philosophy or (...) a philosophical position goes back, I think, at least to Aristotle's account of his predecessors, especially of his teacher, and beyond that perhaps to Plato's account of the Sophists. It appears in Maimonides's account of Arabic occasionalism, which was used to justify medieval Aristotelianism (and this account was accepted uncritically by Leibniz, Malebranche, and others in the seventeenth century). Bacon's, Descartes's, and Locke's presentation of Scholasticism is definitely "shadow history" that was used as the start of the "new" way of ideas, and as its justification.. Hegel's view of the history of philosophy is another major "shadow history." Hence the fact that Russell, Ayer, Ryle and Rorty adopted similar strategies of using a spurious or dubious history of their predecessors is not so strange. Any historian of philosophy worth her or his salt is aware that historical philosophical personnages have used their own views of their predecessors' philosophies as ways of making their own "original" philosophical views more exciting or important or credible. We have learned long ago how to separate the alleged past from the historical past, and even to see that the alleged past plays a significant role in the writings of various philosophers. Watson has put it neatly in his four examples, but these are only intriguing because so litde history of analytic philosophy has been written up to this time. We have much, maybe too much, literature about how Kant misrepresented Hume, Hume misrepresented Berkeley, etc. In the decades to come we may have much about Russell, Ayer, Ryle and Rorty as misrepresenters. Then, Watson's point can help separate the charge that they were poor historians from the realization that they used history creatively as "shadow history." And we may even have historical evidence from the Russell papers and other archives that they knew full well what they were doing, and were not pretending to be good historians, or, on the other hand, that they themselves did not realize they were writing "shadow history," but thought they were actually real historians. Watson tries to make the activity of creating "shadow history" a challenge to historians of philosophy, and a plus for the creative philosophers. In the cases he discusses the "shadow histories" have had great influence on the development of twentiethcentury philosophy in England and America. Even though I am a sceptic, I have no doubt that historians of Anglo-American philosophy will explore his points, and distinguish the "shadow histories" from the best available historical interpretations of what previous philosophers said and meant. Both interpreting and understanding the "shadow histories" and the best available histories will change and develop depending on future interests and information. Watson uses "historians" without really making clear who he is talking about. Only three people are mentioned: Gregor Sebba, Etienne Gilson and Paul Oskar Kristeller. 120 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 31 : 1 JANUARY 1993 There are many others who consider themselves historians of philosophy, or are considered as such in the profession; I doubt that they are all as objectivist as Watson thinks, believing that they can ascertain exactly what happened in the past. But I think most of us share a view that we can do better or worse at this, depending on materials and techniques used, perspectives employed, etc. Almost all of us would contend that being able to read the basic source material in the original language and being able to understand it in context, yields a better understanding of what a historical philosopher said and meant. Watson appears to agree, but then says this does not matter, because a "shadow history" may be longer remembered and used in creative philosophy than a historian's history. The example he offers is that of Yolton's Locke... (shrink)

The ideal of value free science states that the justification of scientific findings should not be based on non-epistemic (e.g. moral or political) values. It has been criticized on the grounds that scientists have to employ moral judgements in managing inductive risks. The paper seeks to defuse this methodological critique. Allegedly value-laden decisions can be systematically avoided, it argues, by making uncertainties explicit and articulating findings carefully. Such careful uncertainty articulation, understood as a methodological strategy, is exemplified by the current (...) practice of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). (shrink)

"The ancient and modern question of what is the nature of man and his activity and what ought to be the directions pursued in this activity is once again being ...

Die Traume und Visionen aus der antiken Literatur, die die romischen Kaiser und ihr Umfeld betreffen, wurden bislang noch nicht auf ihre Bedeutung hin untersucht. Die vorliegende Arbeit schliesst diese Lucke, indem sie das Material von Caesar bis Maurikios analysiert. Dabei ergeben sich spezifische Motive, die besonders mit Traumen und Visionen verbunden sind: Geburt und Kindheit, Verheissung der Herrschaft, Erringung eines Sieges und gottliches Eingreifen, Ausubung der Herrschaft, besondere Befahigung und gottliche Begunstigung, nahendes Ende. Durch den breiten zeitlichen Ansatz gelingt (...) es, fur die Motive unterschiedliche Schwerpunkte auszumachen: Sie stehen alle in der Spannung zwischen einer gezielten Verbreitung zur Schaffung von Akzeptanz und der Literarisierung durch die antiken Autoren. Fur die Behandlung der Thematik waren nicht nur definitorische Vorarbeiten notwendig, sondern auch der mentale Horizont moglicher Rezipienten musste durch die Interpretation von Inschriften, Papyri und Selbstaussagen antiker Autoren in den Blick genommen werden. (shrink)

The last few decades have witnessed intense debates in Hume scholarship concerning Hume’s account of causation. At the core of the “old–new Hume” debate is the question of whether causation for Hume is more than mere regularity, in particular, whether Hume countenances necessary connections in mind-independent nature. This chapter assesses this debate against the background of Hume’s “foundational project” in the Treatise. The question of the role and import of Hume’s account of the idea of cause is examined and compared (...) with Hume’s treatment of other ideas. (shrink)

I. The framework. 1, Aristotle's project and methods. 2, The perceptual capacity of the soul. 3, The sensory apparatus. 4, The common sense and the related capacities -- II. The terminology. 1, Overlooked occurrences of the phrase 'common sense'. 2, De anima III.1 425a27. 3, De partibus animalium IV.10 686a31. 4, De memoria et reminiscentia 1 450a10. 5, De anima III.7 431b5. 6, Conclusions on the terminology -- III. Functions of the common sense. 1, Simultaneous perception and cross-modal binding. 2, (...) Perceptual discrimination. 3, Waking, sleep, and control of the senses. 4, Perceiving that what we see and hear, and monitoring of the senses. 5, Other roles of the common sense -- Conclusion. (shrink)

Examining developments in two of the central traditions of social and political theory - Marxism and pluralism, this work investigates whether the relation between them is one of progressive convergence.

Eine weit verbreitete Auffassung über die wissenschaftlichen Naturverständnisse besagt, dass ihre historische Entwicklung von einer zunehmenden Abgrenzung gegenüber der Magie begleitet gewesen sei. Ursprünglich eng mit der Magie verbunden, hätten sich die wissenschaftlichen Naturverständnisse in einem langwierigen Prozess immer weiter von der Magie entfernt, bis sie ihre heutige amagische Gestalt erhalten hätten. Mein Beitrag diskutiert einige Argumente zur Stützung dieser, wie ich meine, plausiblen Auffassung. / A whitespread view of the natural sciences holds that their historical development was accompanied by (...) a constantly widening gap between them and magic. Originally closely bound up with magic, the sciences are supposed to have distanced itself from it in a long-drawn-out process, until they attained their present magic-free form. This essay discusses some arguments in support of this plausible view. (shrink)

From the Introduction: This inquiry is concerned with the themes of praxis and action in four philosophic movements: Marxism, existentialism, pragmatism, and analytic philosophy. It is rare that these four movements are considered in a single inquiry, for there are profound differences of emphasis, focus, terminology, and approach represented by these styles of thought. Many philosophers believe that similarities among these movements are superficial and that a close examination of them will reveal only hopelessly unbridgeable cleavages. While respecting the genuine (...) fundamental differences of these movements, this inquiry is undertaken in the spirit of showing that there are important common themes and motifs in what first appears to be a chaotic babble of voices. I intend to show that the concern with man as an agent has been a primary focal point of each of these movements and further that each contributes something permanent and important to our understanding of the nature and context of human activity. (shrink)

I will offer a conceptual analysis of different notions of structure and function of viral immunogens and of different structure-function relationships. My focus will then be on the mechanisms by which the desired immune response is induced and why strategies based on three-dimensional molecular antigen structures and their rational design are limited in their ability to induce the desired immunogenicity. I will look at the mechanisms of action of adjuvants (thus the wordplay with Janeway's "immunologist's dirty little secret"). Strategies involving (...) adjuvants and other (more successful) vaccination strategies rely on taking into account activities and functions ("what is going on"), and not just the structures involved ("who is there"), in binding in a "lock and key" fashion. Functional patterns as well as other organizational and temporal patterns, I will argue, are crucial for inducing the desired immune response and immunogenicity. The 3D structural approach by itself has its benefitsand its limits, which I want to highlight by this philosophical analysis, pointing out the importance of structure-function relationships. Different functional aspects such as antigenicity, immunogenicity, and immunity need to be kept separate and cannot be reduced to three-dimensional structures of vaccines. Taking into account different notions of structure and function and their relationships might thus advance our understanding of the immune system and rational HIV vaccine design, to which end philosophy can provide useful tools. (shrink)

Bei den korpuskulartheoretischen Erklärungen von Naturphänomenen, wie sie Descartes in den Principia philosophiae vornimmt und im Discours de la methode anspricht, lassen sich zwei verschiedene und nur teilweise miteinander vereinbare Bedeutungsgruppen des Hypothesenbegriffs nachweisen. Sie verbinden sich mit unterschiedlichen Bewertungen des Status von Hypothesen im wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisprozeß. Einerseits findet man eine Verwandtschaft zum heute wissenschaftstheoretisch verbreiteten Verständnis von Hypothesen als positivem und integralem Bestandteil der Naturerkenntnis. Typischer für Descartes' Naturphilosophie ist jedoch die andererseits von ihm vertretene Vorstellung, daß der Umfang (...) des bloß hypothetischen Wissens im Fortgang der Naturerkenntnis zu minimieren sei. Mit dieser Forderung erweist sich Descartes als Vertreter einer neuzeitlichen Wissenschaftsauffassung, die deutlich vom modernen Verzicht auf ein ausschließlich geltendes System der Naturerkenntnis abgehoben ist. (shrink)

"A fascinating and timely treatment of the objectivism versus relativism debates occurring in philosophy of science, literary theory, the social sciences, ...

This book offers students a philosophical introduction to the ethical foundations of business management. It combines lessons from Kant with virtue ethics and also touches upon additional approaches such as utilitarianism. At the core of the book lies the concept of the nexus of imperfect managerial duty: building and reinforcing the virtuous managerial team, engaging in reasoned discourse among all stakeholders, and diligently pursuing business responsibilities, including the creative efforts necessary for modern organizations. Case illustrations of these applications are presented (...) throughout the book, including chapter appendices. Ancillary videos, test and answer banks and sample syllabi are available online via the author’s website. (shrink)