This paper presents an analysis of the reasoning of two 5-year old children’s use of argument from definition. The author uses the Argumentum Model of Topics to accomplish this task. A brief history of the “locus of definition” is presented, as well as a description of how and where the data were collected. More specifically, the data come from a study of students conducted for over 30 years in Switzerland. Two examples are discussed where an adult experimenter examined these children’s (...) responses to conservation of liquid and number tasks. The two examples of children’s responses were analyzed using the locus from definition. Results show that children are capable of providing responses indicating their beliefs and support for them that are beyond Piaget’s description of a preoperational child’s reasoning abilities. (shrink)

Dialectical fallacies are typically defined as breaches of the rules of a regulated discussion between two participants. What if discussions become more complex and involve multiple parties with distinct positions to argue for? Are there distinct argumentation norms of polylogues? If so, can their violations be conceptualized as polylogical fallacies? I will argue for such an approach and analyze two candidates for argumentative breaches of multi-party rationality: false dilemma and collateral straw man.

Jan Albert van Laar and Erik Krabbe’s paper “Splitting a difference of opinion” studies an important type of dialogue shift, namely that from a deliberation dialogue over action or policy options where critical and persuasive argumentation is exchanged about the rational acceptability of the policy options proposed by various parties, to a negotiation dialogue where agreement is reached by a series of compromises, or trade-offs, on the part of each side in the disagreement.

Since the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon presidential debates, interest in the impact of televised debates on political campaigns has grown steadily among scholars of argumentation and rhetorical communication. In addition to communicating policy positions of a candidate, televised debates provide the voting public one of the few opportunities to build or solidify impressions of candidates based on a spontaneous social performance in which candidates meet face-to-face to discuss their differences. The strategies candidates use to communicate their policies and their desired image during (...) a debate can influence the direction of public opinion toward them. We claim in this essay that arguments candidates make nonverbally in televised debates are significant in creating and sustaining their image as presidential candidates. (shrink)

Fallacy theory has not been my particular concern until now – even if I spoke here and there about fallacies; mainly about the two specimens which I consider to be of the highest importance for argumentation theory. I mean “Ad baculum” and “Begging the question”. In fact I was not aware that a defense of fallacy theory was necessary because I had taken the criticisms of late to be mainly relying on a lack of clarity, confusion and exaggeration. Despite this (...) estimation I will begin with stating that I agree with most of Aikin’s well minded proposals and solutions. Nevertheless I will provide some comments which hopefully can contribute to a fruitful discussion. They follow the sections of the paper. (shrink)

The brain is composed of mutually inconsistent modules that contain contradictory beliefs. What consequences could this view have on argumentation? In order to sketch an answer, first the family of concepts of what is called generalized deception is discussed; then, this discussion is applied to the problem of the social influence bias to observe both how the mind works strategically wrong and what kind of arguments are used within this mental design in a social argumentative context.

The conference theme invites contrasts between objectivity and bias, since the two are commonly considered contraries. But there are a variety of meanings of the two and a corresponding variety of contraries. Thus there is a problem for any attempt to discuss bias and objectivity in relation to argument as a contrasting pair. Still, several senses of both terms relate to argumentation. I offer an inventory of them.

This essay explores ways arguers can afford potentially unsympathetic addressees good reason to empathetically entertain exhortative discourse. First, we illuminate the essential structure and underlying constitutive pragmatics of exhortation. Second, we show that the persuasive force of Lincoln’s Cooper Union Address derives from his use of exhortation. By doing so we add to recent scholarship that accounts for the persuasive force of civically significant speech acts.

I would first like to congratulate Harald Wohlrapp on the substantial success of his book on the philosophy of argument. The learning, originality, and energetic dedication shown in this work are impressive indeed. Concerning Harald Wohlrapp’s theories, many fascinating issues arise, as we will be hearing today and in further conversations. In this presentation I shall concentrate on two aspects especially relevant to the treatment of pro and con argumentation; as will be apparent, even on this single topic more could (...) be said. What I will discuss today are the themes of logicism and objectivity. (shrink)

This paper addresses the relationship between norms of reasoning and norms of politeness: To what extend can one be polite and reasonable at the same time? For this purpose, a normative system of reasoning is contrasted with a normative system of politeness. If and when they are in conflict: How can the communicator solve this tension?

This paper will describe what happened to the community of informal logicians between 1983 and 1987, when they started to interact with communication scholars, rhetoricians and Pragma-Dialecticians. Special attention will be paid to key events, such as the Second International Symposiums on Informal Logic, the founding of AILACT in 1983, the start of journal Informal logic in 1984, and the international conference on argumentation held at Amsterdam in 1986.

This paper deals with the argumentative biases Conspiracy Theories typically suffer from and pursues two goals: the identification of recurring argumentative and rhetorical features of conspiracy theories, which translates into an attempt to elaborate their argumentative profile ; the elaboration of a cognitively-grounded account of CTs in terms of their persuasiveness. To fulfil goal, I examine online instances of different cases of CTs. Building on the general rhetorical features of CTs identified by Byford, I elaborate a first argumentative profile surveying (...) types of arguments and argument schemes CTs are likely to rely on to specify how these “crippled epistemologies” are argumentatively biased. To fulfil goal, I use the Context Selection Constraint model, originally designed to capture deception. I examine the cognitive counterpart of the – most often fallacious – arguments found in CTs and advance cognitively motivated reasons why CTs have some prospect of being argumentatively effective. This provides an account of why CTs, while biased, can manage to persuade, that is, precisely by downplaying – or obfuscating – their bias. (shrink)

How to provide, in only 10 minutes, a kind of insight into the conception of argument that I have displayed in my book? This book has 500 pages and is the result of more than 25 years of work with my research group in Hamburg. Therefore it is a delicate task to give a substantive information about it in just some minutes. Despite this, I will start with something outside that task: I will deeply thank my commentators to have studied (...) my book and have made up their minds about it. In particular I thank David Hitchcock who has initiated this panel and even takes the pain to chair it now. To all of you I gladly confess that I very much enjoy the opportunity to make our Hamburgian view a bit more understandable to the argumentation scholars of North America. I understand my task here like this: I am confronted with comments that have three differ­ent backgrounds, namely Informal Logic, Rhetorical argumentation theory and epistemic argumentation theory. In my answer after the fourth comment I will try to make the differ­ences between those and my view visible and show why I keep being convinced of my own theories. As an entrance I will now very shortly deploy some of the specific concepts and distinctions which are essential for our approach and I will do that in a way which should be informative in particular for these three schools. (shrink)

The government took Apple to court to demand decryption of a terrorist cell phone. The warrant issued rested on the assumption that law enforcement should be able to do its work through extension of “access” across the population of encrypted iphones. Each phone exists as a defeasible site whose cooperation is assumed to be opened by the the manufacturer if directed to do so by government, unless cause can be shown otherwise. Defeasible argument couples rhetorically with metonymic force as a (...) powerful argument trajectory. The reversal of burden of proof, now placed on the company to defend its encryption, permits the government to extend the scope of its power by turning cell phone companies into its helpers. This is the manner in which a government would "commandeer innocent third parties into becoming its undercover agents, its spies, or its hackers". The test case was crucial for Apple, but it was resolved by the discovery of a third-party who could gather the information without the manufacturers complicity. (shrink)

This paper responds to Professor Martha Cheng’s standpoint analysis of transgression and apologia in three twenty first century media-promoted controversies: Tiger Woods, Paula Deen, and Bryan Williams. Argument strategies are differentiated by genres that aim at justice, publicity, and drama. Forensics, public relations, and entertainment mix across media apparatus. I emphasize the disjunctures among these acts of argument and thereby provide an alternative to analysis and synthesis of the argumentation as discourse.

In this paper, I argue that there is objectivity in the international human rights law, against which the justifiability of arguments can be determined and the universality vs. relativity of human rights debate could be taken a step further. I propose an optimising approach for treaty interpretation, point out that there is epistemic objectivity residing in this approach, and analyse China’s relativism arguments on Article 1 of the Convention against Torture to elaborate above points.

This paper addresses the question of how to evaluate narrative arguments. I will be discussing how to evaluate narrative arguments as process as opposed to arguments as product, as with dominant accounts of argument appraisal such as informal logic. The first part of this paper will show that dominant accounts of argument evaluation are not fit for narrative arguments because they focus on the product of argument. The second part of the paper will develop an account of argument evaluation for (...) arguments as process, that is the virtuous audience, which will combine the rhetorical understanding of audience with virtue argumentation. (shrink)

I will analyze the role of ostension in argumentation. Ostension involves gestures, bearing, postures, facial expressions, etc.; thus it can be argued that ostension can introduce non-verbal modes of argument, giving rise to multimodal arguments. Acts of ostension can be considered as a kind of speech acts according to the account in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations §27. As such they can provide the premises of a certain sort of arguments. We have to distinguish the proper act of ostension from both its (...) content and the object of ostension. While the latter can serve as evidence, as support for a linguistic claim without being part of it, as Dove points out, the act of ostension is a genuine act of arguing since to argue is to present something as a reason for something else. Acts of ostension are not assertive but directive acts, and so their content is not a statement but what I call an imperative. Thus I contend that imperatives can act as premises in some kind of arguments. Finally I will discuss whether arguments by ostension may be taken to be a kind of multimodal arguments. (shrink)

The idea of ontological/logical pluralism raises an interesting question about the objectivity of arguments and argument forms: Are all arguments and argument forms domain dependent? In his recent work Bruno Latour outlines a radical form of ontological pluralism in which each domain or “mode of existence” has its own set of “felicity conditions” that serve as “veridiction” conditions unique to that mode. To “speak well” requires that one speak in the “interpretive key” proper to each mode. Since there is no (...) “meta-language” that crosses all modes, then all modes must be assessed using the felicity or veridiction conditions peculiar to that mode. Included among the various modes of existence are: Science, Politics, Law, Fiction, Technology, and others, with each mode having its own felicity conditions. This raises interesting questions about the status of arguments across modes. Do arguments that work in Science or Law, for example, have equal applicability within Politics or Technology? I want to suggest that arguments and arguments forms can extend across multiple modes as long as they do not serve as infelicity conditions within those modes. This means that arguments must always be sensitive to the felicity conditions of the mode in which they are employed. (shrink)

The literature on argumentation and education often conveys that children’s argumentation skills are not well developed; therefore, it would be difficult to find argumentation in small children, as well as in primary school classrooms. However, studies focusing on argumentation in less formal contexts show that there is no need to depart from such a negative stance. If children are given room to pursue their lines of thought, they often produce sophisticated spontaneous argumentation. In this paper I consider arguments from definition (...) introduced by children as a case in point. To do so, I use a corpus of data, in which small children under the age of six years, discuss with an adult and with peers. Results show two uses of arguments from definition by children: on the one hand, children may introduce a new issue and their standpoint supported by an argument from definition; on the other hand, children may contest or refute an issue that was proposed by an adult and put forward an argument from definition. (shrink)

An agnostic pluralist approaches inquiry with the assumption that it is possible for more than one account of the phenomenon in question to be correct. A monist approaches inquiry with the assumption that only one account of the phenomenon in question is correct. The purpose of my paper is to support the claim that agnostic pluralists are less susceptible to a sort of bias that I call dialectical bias than monists.

Some decisions involve the use of a variety forms of arguments in order to balance different alternatives before getting a choice which is expected to be the better to solve the problem at issue. By doing this, there are some cases where people are able to or urge moving towards the choice that is most advantageous, probable or acceptable, and at other times towards a choice that is less negative or adverse than the others. Both alternatives depict different ways of (...) searching for the stronger reason at stake. This means that the a fortiori argument is being used as a deliberative tool to reach a choice in a decision making process. I assume that such usage helps to show how the use of arguments a fortiori can be a very effective movement for designing an argumentation strategy to gain unbiased decisions, agreements or outcomes. However, it is the case that some biased uses may arise as well. For example, by appeal to one authority or status as a means to impose an idea or force a particular decision. This has a direct effect on objectivity and impartiality in decision making. In this paper I will present an analysis on how a fortiori arguments work either in personal or group processes of decision making, and when they are being used in biased or unbiased ways. This will provide some clues for a better understanding about the pragmatic conditions for applying correctly this kind of argument. (shrink)

Some normative problems are difficult because of the number and complexity of the issues they involve. Rational resolution might be hard but it seems at least possible. Other problems are not merely complex and multi-faceted but ‘deep’. They have a logical structure that precludes rational resolution. Treatments of deep disagreement often hint at sinister implications. If doubt is cast on our 'final vocabulary', writes Richard Rorty, we are left with "no noncircular argumentative recourse.... [B]eyond them there is only helpless passivity (...) or a resort to force.” I will argue that some normative problems are deep, but that we need not accept these pessimistic consequences. Settling disagreements by way of rhetoric or incentive, for instance, may fall short of ideals of rational argumentation, but the moral issues raised by such strategies are different from those raised by compulsion, and realising that a disagreement is deep might have positive implications. More generally, appreciating that a disagreement is deep and hence that rational resolution is off the table may provide an incentive to seek other defensible strategies rather than returning to the frustrating and fruitless paths of a stalled debate. (shrink)

While, in common usage, objectivity is usually regarded as a virtue, and failures to be objective as vices, this concept tends to be absent in argumentation theory. This paper will explore the possibility of taking objectivity as an argumentative virtue. Several problems immediately arise: could objectivity be understood in positive terms— not only as mere absence of bias? Is it an attainable ideal? Or perhaps objectivity could be explained as a combination of other virtues?

Since everyday abductive arguments convey the arguer’s individual interpretation of reality, they often exhibit a weak relationship between the premise and the conclusion. After all, what seems obvious to the arguer may appear far-fetched to an opponent. This paper examines some presentational devices that contribute to an arguer’s rhetorical goal of presenting the argument in such a way that the conclusion is suggested to be the result of a thorough investigative procedure.

Interdisciplinary inquiry hinges upon abductive arguments that integrate various kinds of information to identify explanations worthy of future study or use. Integrative abduction poses unique challenges, including different kinds of data, too many patterns, too many explanations, mistaken meanings across disciplinary lines, and cognitive, pragmatic, and social biases. Argumentation tools can help explicate and negotiate bias as interdisciplinary investigators sift and winnow candidate patterns and processes in search of the best explanation.

This paper attempts to integrate an agnotological taxonomy of “not-knowing” with argumentation theory. Given rhetoric’s emphasis on what arguers choose to make present for their audience, it is argued that the rhetorical approach is best suited to accommodate the proposed taxonomy. In doing so we can improve the capacities of both arguers and audiences to detect adverse elements such as prejudices, implicit biases, and ideologies, which can restrict an argument’s claim to objectivity.

Computer tools are increasingly used to support the analysis of argumentative texts. Generic support for argumentation analysis is helpful, but catering to the requirements of specific theoretical approaches has additional advantages. Although the pragma-dialectical method of analyzing argumentative texts is widely used, no dedicated computational support tools exist. An outline is presented for the development of such tools, that starts with the formal approximation of the pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical discussion.

Walton has distinguished among several sorts of argumentative dialogues. This paper continues the project of measuring individuals’ self-reported preferences for each dialogue type. In this study, long-term romantic couples were surveyed to examine if their dialogue preferences matched, and whether their preferences were, in turn, related to their relational satisfaction.

This paper presents what we call with Plantin an argumentative cell as an unit which is inspired by Toulmin’s layout of arguments, in order to analyse two major effects of pseudo-objectivity in argumentation. Four problems of Toulmin's layout will be tackled: Data are only described as facts, the definition of Backing is blurred, but it may be linked with sources of information and extended to Data, the dialectical component of the Rebuttal needs to be extended to concessions, and dealing with (...) complex argumentation within such a model is quite difficult. Treating these problems will highlight the rhetorical possibility of a "bias of objectivity": numerous arguments that use starting points which may appear to be objective or shared in order to impose a standpoint to the addressee. This bias can be seen in at least two rhetorical strategies: the first one is using facts as arguments without signs of evidentiality in grounds for the argument. The second one is delivering opinions as apparently collectively shared. (shrink)

In this paper I develop and defend a form of argumentative normativity that is not based on fundamental principles. I first argue that research agendas that aim to discover fundamental principles of ‘good’ argumentative discourse share one crucial weak spot, viz. circularity. I then argue that this weak spot can be avoided in a pancritical view of normativity.

Negotiation is not only used to settle differences of interest but also to settle differences of opinion. Discussants who are unable to resolve their difference about the objective worth of a policy or action proposal may be willing to abandon their attempts to convince the other and search instead for a compromise that would, for each of them, though only a second choice yet be preferable to a lasting conflict. Our questions are: First, when is it sensible to enter into (...) negotiations and when would this be unwarranted or even fallacious? Second, what is the nature of a compromise? What does it mean to settle instead of resolve a difference of opinion, and what might be the dialectical consequences of mistaking a compromise for a substantial resolution? Our main aim is to contribute to the theory of argumentation within the context of negotiation and compromise formation and to show how arguing disputants can shift to negotiation in a dialectically virtuous way. (shrink)

Objectivity is a key concept in journalism studies, yet a controversial one. Scholars disagree on what it precisely implies and on how strictly journalists should stick to it. I claim that adopting an argumentative perspective enables to see how journalists deal with objectivity in everyday work. In fact, the objectivity requirement plays the role of endoxical premise in argumentative reasoning that takes place during newsroom decision-making. In the present paper, this is shown by analyzing argumentative discussions in two television newsrooms (...) of the Swiss public service broadcaster. The case studies shed light on what objectivity means for these two newsrooms, as well as on how the goal of being objective intermingles with that of telling a story. Methodologically, argumentation is reconstructed employing Pragma-Dialectics, while endoxical premises and inferential patterns supporting standpoints are traced out applying the Argumentum Model of Topics. The examples are taken from a corpus collected during the Swiss National Science Foundation project “Idée suisse”. (shrink)

Within the epistemological approach to Argumentation Theory, there are two opposing views on what a theory of argumentation should look like. On the one hand, there are those interested in providing epistemological criteria for good argumentation. For these theorists, the main question is "should we accept this claim on the basis of those reasons?". On the other hand, there are those interested in “characterizing” what is good argumentation. For them, the main question is: "does this piece of argumentation count as (...) good argumentation, taking into account the conception of good argumentation that underlies the practice of arguing?". Both accounts assimilate the goals of a normative theory of argumentation to the goals of a theory of justification, but the former focuses on the conditions for considering that a target-claim is justified, whereas the latter tries to characterize the very concept of justification from the point of view of the practice of arguing. In this paper, I analyze the rewards and shortcomings of both epistemological conceptions of Argumentation Theory and their corresponding criteriological and transcendental accounts of the sort of objectivity that good argumentation is able to provide. (shrink)

L. J. Cohen has presented an understanding of appraising argument strength which applies to a variety of types of defeasible reasoning. This method can be used to explicate how a body of information may back a warrant and to rank different bodies of evidence on strength of backing. We shall argue that this method allows backing warrants objectively, whether they are inductive warrants backed by observation or moral warrants backed in part a priori. The method also suggests where arguments employing (...) these warrants may be vulnerable to bias bias but need not be infected by it. (shrink)

There is a mounting case to be made for not teaching critical thinking. Given recent evidence suggesting that cognitive biases are intractable, that students who receive comprehensive, long term, explicit instruction for critical thinking “across the curriculum” reap negligible benefits, and meta-analyses that suggest only certain limited approaches to critical thinking instruction produce meaningful gains, this paper offers a critical challenge to teaching critical thinking, especially as a general education requirement for a baccalaureate degree.

The history of fallacy theory is long, distinguished and, admittedly, checkered. I offer a bird eye view on it, with the aim of contrasting the standard conception of fallacies as attractive and universal errors that are hard to eradicate with the contemporary preoccupation with “non-fallacious fallacies”, that is, arguments that fit the bill of one of the traditional fallacies but are actually respectable enough to be used in appropriate contexts. Godden and Zenker have recently argued that reinterpreting alleged fallacies as (...) non-fallacious arguments requires supplementing the textual material with something else, e.g. probability distributions, pragmatic considerations, dialogical context. Thus fallacies remain gappy on all accounts, and this is the hallmark of their failure. However, I argue that such gappiness is typically unproblematic, and thus no more flawed than enthymematic argumentation in general. This, in turn, calls into question the usefulness of the very notion of fallacy. (shrink)

How can the objectivity of an argument’s conclusion be determined? To propose an answer, this paper builds on Betz’s view of premises as hedged hypotheses. If an argument’s premises are hedged, its conclusion must be hedged as well. But how? The paper first introduces a two-dimensional critical grid. The grid’s vertical dimension is inductive, reflecting the argument’s downward flow from premises to conclusion. It specifies the inductive probability of the conclusion given the premises. The grid’s horizontal dimension is epistemic, focusing (...) on the premises without dropping down to the conclusion. It evaluates the epistemic probability of the premises when conjoined. This two-dimensional grid is then applied to three kinds of cases: vertical and horizontal evaluations rely on point-valued probabilities; vertical and horizontal evaluations rely on interval probabilities; vertical and horizontal evaluations rely on non-numeric plausibilities. The result is that, in each case, the argument’s conclusion can be assigned a credence tag, as it were, that reflects a critical appraisal of its objectivity. Reference Betz, Gregor. 2013. “In defence of the value free ideal.” European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3, 207–220. (shrink)

Is bias an obstacle to a virtue theory of argumentation? Virtue theories seem vulnerable to a situationist challenge, analogous to similar challenges in virtue ethics and epistemology, that behavioural dispositions are too situation-specific for virtues to be psychologically plausible. This paper argues that virtue argumentation may respond to this challenge by combining a defence of the virtue of humility with a demonstration of the role of attitude strength, as exhibited by deep-seated virtues.

I consider several outstanding questions about analogies. These include the following: issues of interpretation especially with regard to whether an analogy should be considered argumentative, as distinct from serving as an illustration, explanation, or matter of rhetorical interest; whether and how to draw a distinction between inductive analogies and a priori analogies; and whether a priori analogies should be reconstructed as deductively valid arguments. The discussion will explore broader themes such as the distinction between the a priori and the deductive, (...) and whether a priori analogies offer reasons for a choice, as distinct from a basis for inferring an inference. Referring to the recent work of Harald Wolhrapp, I will explore the allegation that a faulty logicism is involved when argument analysis is based on an explicit statement of premises and conclusion. In developing this account, reference will also be made to the work of Douglas Walton, Marcello Guarini, Trudy Govier, and Lilian Bermejo-Luque. (shrink)

Recent work on multimodal argumentation has explored facets of argumentation which have no obvious analogue in the written arguments which were emphasized in traditional accounts of argument. One of these facets is prosody: the structure and quality of the sound of spoken language. Prosodic features include pitch, temporal structure, pronunciation, loudness and voice quality, rhythm, emphasis and accent. In this paper, we explore the ways that prosodic features may be invoked in arguing.

The paper offers a theoretical investigation regarding the sources of normativity in practical argument from the following perspective: Do we need objectively-minded, unbiased arguers or can we count on “good” argumentative processes in which individual biases cancel each other out? I will address this problem by analysing a detailed structure of practical argument and its varieties. I will argue that given the structure proposed, biased advocacy upholds reasonableness whenever the argumentative activity is adequately designed.

The contribution critically discusses Walton's argumentation scheme approach. On the one hand, its enormous richness and closeness to the empirical argumentation material is appreciated, but, on the other, fundamental conceptual weaknesses are revealed. Although the approach more recently has been declared to strive for “true beliefs and correct choices” it has not systematically developed the proposed schemes in a way that these goals are reached. Accordingly, many proposed schemes are fallacious from an epistemological standpoint.

Much attention has been paid in the literature to the deleterious effects of errors in diagnostic reasoning due to underlying cognitive biases. This is an important topic since people’s lives and well-being are at stake. Empirical studies cited by Chapman et al. corroborate the view that gender, racial, or age biases exist in a significant number of clinicians, thereby limiting objective diagnosis. Croskerry endorses a so-called metacognitive approach to achieve de-biasing in clinicians, a key component of which is critical self-reflection (...) on one’s own diagnostic reasoning. However, the first empirical study of its kind found cognitive forcing to be relatively ineffective in reducing biases in clinicians. It is the thesis of this paper that a more effective approach to achieve de-biasing in clinicians involves group assessments of colleagues’ diagnostic reasoning, since biases often resist critical self-reflection owing in part to the fact that many of them are unconscious. Objectivity has its roots in ideally diverse group-based critiques of medical decisions where others may be able to expose biases of which the person is unaware, which Epstein refers to as the ‘shared mind’ approach. (shrink)

What counts as a good defence of the conduct of a political agent? I formulate an answer combining insights from argumentation scholarship on the different types of standpoints and the schemes suitable to defend them with insights from philosophical literature. The goal is to make a proposal that is best suitable for examining the type of evaluative claims that is typically discussed in accountability practices.

Arguments sometimes appeal to sex by invoking the sexuality of a model or a person or the promise of sexual gratification. When sexual gratification is not a relevant consideration, the appeal seems to be fallacious. We will address when this may be an appropriate line of reasoning -- there is such a thing as “sex appeal”--and when it may be biased to assume the relevance of sexuality. Advertising, which provides infinite examples of appeal to sex, may be questionable as a (...) case of argumentation, as opposed to some other sort of negotiation or communication, especially perhaps in its reliance on visual imagery. Yet, more classic textual cases of appeal to sex can be found, as well as what may be reasonable enough practical advice about making oneself sexually attractive. Its appropriate role sometimes as a practical consideration suggests that appeal to sex is analogous to appeal to force, or ad baculum, which can be relevant in a negotiation dialogue, Douglas Walton argues. So, it deserves at least the same attention from argumentation scholars, and perhaps even more from critical thinking educators in cultures more saturated with sexuality than with threats. (shrink)

The concept of deep disagreement was introduced by Richard Fogelin in a 1985 paper published in Critical Thinking. Since then, about 12 papers have been published in journals or presented in conferences on argumentation theory. All these papers relate back to the initial Fogelin paper. Andrew Lugg’s 1986 critical response to Fogelin introduces significant questions concerning his views. Peter Davson-Galle in 1992, takes a more positive approach to them. The more extensive publication on deep disagreement can be found in a (...) 2005 issue of Critical Thinking dedicated entirely to this topic. Most of the 5 papers found here take a positive approach and introduce a challenging set of issues. Two papers presented later on, one in the 2007 OSSA Conference by Vesel Memedi, and the other one by David Zarefsky in the 2010 ISSA Conference, discuss the question of resolving deep disagreement. This proposed paper intends to draw specifically from the last two papers mentioned above, especially the one by Zarefsky, in order to introduce the notion of “levels of depth” in deep disagreement. Since Fogelin’s 1985 paper, deep disagreement seems to have been understood in rather absolute terms not allowing for differences in “depth” in cases of deep disagreement. (shrink)

This essay presents a three-dimensional analysis of definition with application to making and evaluating definitions; teaching how to define; avoiding equivocation with "argument" and "bias"; and, using the concept-conception distinction, avoiding being deterred by the many definitions of "critical thinking", and seeing the usefulness of objectivity in everyday arguments in spite of existing conflict and confusion about aspects of objectivity.

: Our study of public argumentation surrounding iPhone encryption addresses the argumentative function of the metonym. Metonyms accomplish general and specific argumentative purposes. Generally, metonyms help define and redefine the argumentative framework for a dispute. Within a controversy, metonyms operate as inference generators. We isolate and analyze several metonyms and elaborate their warrant-generating valences. Metonyms are inference generating tools capable of instantiating normative frameworks, invoking flexible and indeterminate senses of causality.

The existing classifications of arguments are unsatisfying in a number of ways. This paper proposes an alternative in the form of a Periodic Table of Arguments. The newly developed table can be used as a systematic and comprehensive point of reference for the analysis, evaluation and production of argumentative discourse as well as for various kinds of empirical and computational research in the field of argumentation theory.

We present a series of realistic examples of deliberation and discuss how they can form the basis for building a typology of deliberation dialogues. The observations from our examples are used to suggest that argumentation researchers and philosophers have been thinking about deliberation in overly simplistic ways. We argue that to include all the kinds of argumentation that make up realistic deliberations, it is necessary to distinguish between different kinds of deliberations. We propose a model including a problem-solving type of (...) deliberation based on practical reasoning, characterised by revisions of the initial issue made necessary by the agents’ increased knowledge of new circumstances. (shrink)

Personal apology can be understood as self-defense—a response to an actual, implied, or anticipated accusation against one’s character. Within argumentation studies, scholars have investigated how public apologies are constructed to repair a speaker’s image and/or repair the speaker’s relationship with others through specific strategies. This paper broadens the study of apology by employing the sociolinguistic concept of stance, understood as the ways in which a speaker orients herself in relation to sociocultural values, other persons, actions, events, and, especially in the (...) case of apology, another version of herself. In addition to explicit claims, stance can also be interpreted through subtle linguistic options such as metadiscourse, modality, representations, and evaluative moves. This paper investigates apologetic stance through an analysis of three U.S. celebrity apologies: Tiger Woods's apology for extra-marital affairs, chef and TV personality Paula Deen's apology for using a racial epithet, and news anchor Brian Williams's apology for repeatedly telling a false story. The analysis suggests a definition of apologetic stance based upon alignments between speaker and audience with regard to the objects of stance: the transgression, the speaker's prior self, and the victim. The paper also discusses successful apology as expressing appropriate bias while unsuccessful apologies fail due to inappropriate bias. (shrink)

Objectivity, Autonomy, and the use of Arguments from Authority Starting in the early modern era, the use of arguments from authority to support important factual claims began to be heavily criticized. Recent investigations into the nature of testimony, however, suggest that such criticisms are factually and normatively problematic. In this paper, the author argues for a model of testimonial authority that corrects this earlier, unrealistically individualistic picture of how person bear their burdens in the search for a common reality.

One way in which the arguer can satisfy the demands of objectivity is by taking into account appropriate dialectical material such as objections, criticisms, counterarguments, alternative positions etc. In this paper, I will argue that there are important differences between a criticism and an objection; that is to say, we should make a distinction between them. In the paper, I will do the following. First, I will review some pertinent literature. Second, I will give my reasons for thinking there is (...) a distinction. Here I will be relying on insights from J. L. Austin and L. Wittgenstein. Third, I will make the distinction between an objection and a criticism by providing a definition of each term with appropriate supporting considerations. Finally, I will give my reasons for believing that the distinction is an important one by showing its utility in argumentation theory. (shrink)

I will connect the literature on deep disagreements with the literature on trust to construct a two-dimensional picture of the limits of argument. Argumentation and trust are important to the functioning of society, but each sets different expectations for when arguments can and should be used to resolve disagreements. When trust is factored in, we see a more nuanced picture of which disagreements will remain too deep for objective argument. Affective and social aspects of argument are not independent of procedure (...) and content. (shrink)

Zero tolerance policies are often mistakenly thought to be the best way to deal with pressing social problems. However, most arguments for zero tolerance policies are either based on inaccurate premises or they commit the zero tolerance fallacy. This paper explores ways that we might counteract the bias in favor of zero tolerance policies by adding a query list to the choice architecture.

This introductory paper explores a new perspective on argumentation that draws upon the resources of ludology – the critical and academic of study of games qua games. In the Philosophical Investigations, one of the later Wittgenstein’s more mysterious suggestions is that if one understands how games work, then one would be able to understand how natural language works. Similarly, it will be argued that if we look to how games function as games, we will be able to understand how the (...) ‘argument-game’ functions. The epistemic importance of rhetorical argumentation rather than analytic demonstration becomes apparent if we consider ‘argument’ as the communicative interaction in which arguers attempt to improve the cognitive attitudes of a real or potential audience. The activity of arguing is crafted – but not scripted – by the formal aspects of a complex system of interacting elements that give rise to an emergent field of ‘possibility-space’ in which arguments take place. In recognizing how we indirectly craft second-order fields through our first-order design choices, we gain a new perspective and a new set of tools with which to reflect upon the relation between bias, fairness and objectivity in argumentation. Keywords: argumentation theory, language-game, ludology, philosophy, rhetoric. (shrink)

We intend to examine ways that emotions may be intertwined within argumentative legal discourses. From the transcript of a brief trial in a Court of Appeal in Brazil we have the opportunity to observe how the emotional and rational reasoning live together in a deliberation among magistrates. “The leg broken case” allow us to examine how judges define the value of compensation to be paid in cases of moral damage. We show that not only technical arguments are the compounds of (...) one decision; subjectivity is also important in that legal context. We would yet confirm what jurists and philosophers of the argumentation fields, such as G. Cornu, E. Feteris, A. Garapon, J. J. Robrieux, C. Perelman, C. M. Stamakis, among others, had already emphasized: judges are not cold machines in the moments of a judging. The analysis may show that a sentence is a mix of legal rules and magistrates’ personal experience, in some extent. (shrink)

This paper presents an overview of several years of my research into individuals’ reasoning, argumentation, and bias when addressing problems, scenarios, and symbols related to mathematical infinity. There is a long history of debate around what constitutes “objective truth” in the realm of mathematical infinity, dating back to ancient Greece. Modes of argumentation, hindrances, and intuitions have been largely consistent over the years and across levels of expertise. This presentation examines the interrelated complexities of notions of objectivity, bias, and argumentation (...) as manifested in different presentations and normative interpretations or resolutions of well-known paradoxes of infinity. Paradoxes have been described as occasioning major epistemological reconstructions, and I highlight such occasions as they emerged for both novices and experts with connection to current conceptualisations of objectivity. Of interest is the perception that one single objective truth about “actual” mathematical infinity exists – indeed, this is brought to question at an axiomatic level with both theoretical and empirical research implications. (shrink)

Fallacy theory has three significant challenges to it: the generality, scope, and negativity problems. To the generality problem, the connection between general types of bad arguments and tokens is a matter of refining the use of the vocabulary. To the scope problem, the breadth of fallacy’s instances is cause for development. To the negativity problem, fallacy theory must be coordinated with a program of adversariality-management.

Logos, generally regarded as the basic principle of the operating world, seems to be closely tied up with development of human being. With the evolutionary history of human, logos evolves into three different dimensional expressions, namely reason, rationality, and reasonableness. In different historical periods, each expression of logos has their own glory days respectively. In the age of ancient Greek sages, reason referred to the whole range of subjects from geometry argumentation to rhetoric. Later on, there emerged a superiority on (...) theoretical abstraction and logical deduction, which was called the dictatorship of rationality. Yet it was found that the bureaucratization of learning had created as many problems as it solved. In recent decades, the years had seen a revived interest in substantial arguments in medical ethics, ecology, and other practical fields. However, we are not inclined to regard reasonableness as a way that it can cure once and for all the crisis of our times. Based on the imperfection of each variant and indeterminacy of the topic, we attempt to track back to logos in a more comprehensive perspective, corresponding to diversity of human activities and modern social production way of life. (shrink)

In his paper, “Missed Opportunities in Argument Evaluation,” Daniel Cohen has in his sights a “curious” asymmetry in how we evaluate arguments: while we criticize arguments for failing to point out obvious objections to the proposed line of reasoning, we do not consider it critically culpable to fail to take into account arguments for the position. Cohen views this omission as a missed opportunity, for which he lays the blame largely at the metaphorical feet of the “Dominant Adversarial Model” of (...) argumentation – the DAM account. We argue here that, while Cohen criticizes the DAM account for conceptualizing arguments as essentially agonistic, he accepts its basic framing and does not follow his critique where it leads. In so doing, he misses the opportunity to develop an alternative, non-adversarial account of argumentation which would avoid his criticism of how we evaluate arguments. (shrink)

This paper is about bias and ad hominem arguments. It will begin by rehearsing some reasons for thinking that there are both legitimate and illegitimate ad hominems, as well as reasons for thinking that biases can be both justified and unjustified. It will explain that justified biases about people with certain social identities can give rise to both legitimate and illegitimate ad hominem attacks, while unjustified biases only give rise to illegitimate ad hominems. The paper will then describe Audrey Yap’s (...) view that even when an unjustified bias is made explicit and shown to be unjustified, it can still make certain fallacious ad hominem arguments seem persuasive. Finally, it will set out the opposite sort of problem: just as unjustified biases can make fallacious ad hominems seem persuasive even when the bias is made explicit, so too can unjustified biases make legitimate ad hominem arguments seem unpersuasive, even when the bias is made explicit. (shrink)

Dewey defines open-mindedness as “freedom from prejudice, partisanship, and other such habits as close the mind and make it unwilling to consider new problems and entertain new ideas". It is commonly included in lists of epistemic and argumentative virtues. We begin this paper with brief discussion of various accounts of open-mindedness. Our principle interest is in what it is to behave as an open-minded enquirer. Drawing on two cases, we consider whether open-minded behaviour varies between the contexts of solitary and (...) community enquiry and whether inquirers face different challenges to behaving open-mindedly in each of these contexts. We conclude that although group deliberation introduces some extra barriers to open-mindedness, it can also make it easier to achieve by providing an external check that is absent in solitary inquiry. (shrink)

Woods and Walton deserve credit for including a discussion of “economic reasoning” and its susceptibility to the “fallacy of composition.” Unfortunately, they did not sufficiently pursue the topic, and argumentation scholars have apparently ignored their pioneering effort. Yet, obviously, economic argumentation is extremely important, and economists constantly harp on this fallacy. This paper calls attention to this problem, elaborating my own approach, which is empirical, historical, and meta-argumentational.

An enthymeme is often defined as an argument with a missing component or an argument with an unexpressed component. Roy Sorensen, in “Are Enthymemes Arguments?”, argues against the possibility of enthymemes being arguments at all, but he assumes that arguments are abstract objects. I shall present and explore some more metaphysically neutral arguments against enthymemes as arguments and ultimately conclude that while not conclusive, the most viable option is Sorensen’s—enthymemes are not arguments.

There are some beliefs that are difficult to think critically about, even for those who have critical thinking skills and are committed to applying them to their own beliefs. These resistant beliefs are not all of a kind, and so a range of different strategies may be needed to get ourselves and others to think critically about them. In this paper we suggest some such strategies.

This paper extends Pinto’s “Emotions and Reasons” by exploring relationships between emotions-as-reasons and in conceptualizing objectivity as naturalized to address the evaluative dimension. The paper addresses the emotional character of reason with respect to subjective and normative validity by shifting analysis to socially situated practices.

The topic of conductive argument has attracted much attention in recent argumentation studies, but most of the existing discussions are centered on a logical or epistemological perspective. This paper is to argue that conductive arguments could also be understood from a rhetorical perspective, and to offer a Pragma-dialectical point of view regarding to the likelihood and importance of conductive arguments. In particular, it is contended that the mentioning of counter-considerations in a conductive argument is mainly for some rhetorical concerns in (...) order to achieve better persuasiveness in audience. On that basis, it is argued that conductive arguments can be theorized as a particular mode of strategic maneuvering, rather than a new type of argument. Then it demonstrates that the use of conductive arguments can be analyzed and evaluated in an adequate way by adopting the theoretical tools and the normative standards pertinent to strategic maneuvering. (shrink)

On one account, the moral point of view is impartial, hence in this sense objective. On a different account, morality sometimes seems to recommend partiality, hence, in one sense of 'partiality,' bias. Still another view says that in some cases morality is neutral between impartiality and partiality in choosing between alternative actions. My main concern will be with impartiality and partiality in relation to arguments of the kind presented in first-order ethical argumentation. Part of my discussion will focus on one (...) type of theory of practical reasons; theories of this type are objective in as much as they hold that practical reasons are based on values that are objective in the sense of being mind-independent. I will refer to selected philosophers, including Wayne Sumner, Russ Shafer-Landau, Derek Parfit and Peter Singer. (shrink)

Commentators have read Twain’s Is Shakespeare Dead? as the strained work of a man worried about his own literary legacy. But it is actually an essay about argumentation. Twain writes about the burden of argument, premise relevance, understanding and inference, and norms and practices of argumentation. I will argue that what is taken to be a thoroughgoing cynicism on Twain’s part is best understood as a thoughtful scepticism about the scope of reasoning.

In some visual cases, especially those in which one reasons from a visual model to a conclusion, it is tempting to think that some new normative base, perhaps a visual logic is in order. I show that, at least in the case of what I’ll call appeal to visual models, the same criteria are required in visual and verbal cases.

The translation into French of the English word “fallacy” opens a discussion on the difference between fallacy and sophism in English. The two words are sometimes synonyms, but a difference is sometimes made on the ground that a sophism is deliberate and a fallacy is non-deliberate. In a second part of the paper this distinctive criterion is taken seriously to discuss the relative frequency of sophisms and of fallacies for a typical kind of fallacious argument. I claim that this aspect (...) should be taken into account by a theory of fallacious argument. (shrink)

This paper will add to the discourse on analogical arguments by showing that they need not be deductively reconstructed in common contexts of persuasion. Analogical arguments have varying degrees of similarity, which helps us to understand their varying degrees of strength. Pace Shecaira it will be argued that this is a common and useful way of examining analogical arguments. It will be shown that deductive reconstruction does not adequately capture the needed degrees of strength. Let us start with two-wise similarity (...) claims. Subject S1 says that the disputed case C1 is similar to C2 and should be treated as x, just as C2 is. S2 says that C1 is similar to C3 and should be treated as y, just as C3 is. S1 may counter with a three-wise similarity claim: C1 is more similar to C2 than it is to C3, because…, so C1 should be treated as x. Think of lawyers in court. It will be shown that the evaluation of analogical arguments in these contexts turns in a central way on similarity, and that deductive reconstructions get in the way of a proper understanding of the preceding. (shrink)

Accounts of arguments from expert opinion take it for granted that expert judgments count as (defeasible) evidence for propositions, and so an argument that proceeds from premises about what an expert judges to a conclusion that the expert is probably right is a strong argument. In Mizrahi (2013), I consider a potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are significantly more likely to be true than novice judgments, and find it wanting because of empirical evidence suggesting that expert (...) judgments under uncertainty are not significantly more likely to be true than novice judgments or even chance. In this paper, I consider another potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are not influenced by the cognitive biases novice judgments are influenced by, and find it wanting, too, because of empirical evidence suggesting that experts are vulnerable to pretty much the same cognitive biases that novices are vulnerable to. If this is correct, then the basic assumption at the core of accounts of arguments from expert opinion, namely, that expert judgments count as (defeasible) evidence for propositions, remains unjustified. (shrink)

I consider hype as it relates to discourse surrounding climate change. The presence of hype about a subject can make it difficult to judge what and whom one should believe. This may lead to concerns about climate change to be unfairly dismissed. For this reason, I argue that advocating for climate change mitigation efforts requires not only reiterating the soundness of the underlying science, but also understanding the social and psychological phenomena that produce the confusion.

In this paper I argue that underlying phronêsis is the more foundational virtue of a willingness to be rationally persuaded. A WTBRP is a virtue in the sense that it fulfills the doctrine of the mean by falling between two vices – never sticking to your position and never giving it up. Articulating a WTBRP in this way also helps address problems phronêsis faces in light of implicit bias research.

Why is there resistance in acknowledging emotional arguments? I explore the ambiguity entrenched in the emotional mode of argument, which may contribute to the lack of widespread agreement about its existence. In particular, belief systems and personality styles are addressed, as they are integral to the emotional mode of argumentation. This multidisciplinary approach neither advocates or dismisses the emotional mode; it adds another layer of understanding to the literature that is important to consider.

How is it possible that biases are cognitive vices, objectivity is an exemplary intellectual virtue, and yet objectivity is itself a bias? In this paper, we argue that objectivity is indeed a kind of bias but is still an argumentative virtue. In common with many biases – and many virtues – its effects are neither uniformly negative nor uniformly positive. Consequences alone are not enough to determine which character traits are argumentative virtues. Context matters. The opening section addresses the problem (...) of identifying argumentative virtues and provides a preliminary response to recent questions from Goddu and Godden regarding the foundations of virtue-based argumentation theories. The middle section analyzes courtroom argumentation as a case study. The assigned roles in legal settings provide high-definition examples of how the roles that all arguers routinely inhabit in ordinary argumentation factor into the evaluation of virtues. The contextually variable values of objectivity and biases are on clear display. The final section employs the conclusions from the middle section to answer the questions from the first section and to complete the argument that objectivity can be an occasionally “vicious virtue”. (shrink)

Scientists can find it difficult to be seen as objective within the chaos of a civic controversy. This paper gives a normative pragmatic account of the strategy one GMO scientist used to demonstrate his trustworthiness. Kevin Folta made his talk expensive by undertaking to answer all questions, and carried out this responsibility by acting as if every comment addressed to him—even the most hostile—was in fact a question in good faith. This presumption of audience good faith gave in turn his (...) audience good reason to presume his good faith, and a situation of reciprocal distrust was transformed into one with the potential for reciprocal candor. (shrink)

The context for this paper is evidence-based practice. EBP is about production of desirable change. The evidence should come from randomized controlled trials. To make sense of RCT evidence it must be placed in an argument structure. I compare two different models, Toulmin and Cartwright, and investigate whether the two models can be merged into one. I shall argue that such merging is not feasible.