The Willingness to be Rationally Persuaded

Argumentation, Objectivity, and Bias: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA) (2016)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that underlying phronêsis is the more foundational virtue of a willingness to be rationally persuaded. A WTBRP is a virtue in the sense that it fulfills the doctrine of the mean by falling between two vices – never sticking to your position and never giving it up. Articulating a WTBRP in this way also helps address problems phronêsis faces in light of implicit bias research.

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Virtue Argumentation and Bias.Aberdein Andrew - 2016 - Argumentation, Objectivity and Bias: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18--21, 2016.
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Citations of this work

Was Aristotle a virtue argumentation theorist?Andrew Aberdein - 2021 - In Joseph Andrew Bjelde, David Merry & Christopher Roser (eds.), Essays on Argumentation in Antiquity. Cham: Springer. pp. 215-229.
Endoxa and Epistemology in Aristotle’s Topics.Joseph Bjelde - 2021 - In Joseph Andrew Bjelde, David Merry & Christopher Roser (eds.), Essays on Argumentation in Antiquity. Cham: Springer. pp. 201-214.

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References found in this work

Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Nicomachean ethics. Aristotle - 1999 - New York: Clarendon Press. Edited by Michael Pakaluk. Translated by Michael Pakaluk.
Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse & Glen Pettigrove - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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