Formal and empirical work on the Wisdom of Crowds has extolled the virtue of diverse and independent judgment as essential to the maintenance of ‘wise crowds’. In other words, com-munication and imitation among members of a group may have the negative effect of decreasing the aggregate wisdom of the group. In contrast, it is demonstrable that certain meta-inductive methods provide optimal means for predicting unknown events. Such meta-inductive methods are essentially imitative, where the predictions of other agents (...) are imitated to the extent that those agents have proven successful in the past. Despite the (self-serving) optimality of meta-inductive methods, their imitative nature may undermine the ‘wisdom of the crowd’, since these methods recommend that agents imitate the predictions of other agents. In this paper, I present a replication of selected results of Thorn and Schurz, illustrating the effect on a group’s performance that may result from having members of a group adopt meta-inductive methods. I then expand on the work of Thorn and Schurz by considering three simple measures by which meta-inductive prediction methods may improve their own performance, while simultaneously mitigating their negative impact on group performance. The effects of adopting these maneuvers are investigated using computer simulations. (shrink)

This article comments on the article of Thorn and Schurz in this volume and focuses on, what we call, the problem of parasitic experts. We discuss that both meta- induction and crowd wisdom can be understood as pertaining to absolute reliability rather than comparative optimality, and we suggest that the involvement of reliability will provide a handle on this problem.

This paper investigates how communication influences people’s judgment quality in simple estimation tasks. Except for an exchange of estimates, our design also allows the exchange of supportive evidence underlying the estimates in a controlled manner. Compared with the control treatment, the exchange of estimates and supportive evidence together improves judgment quality at both the individual level and the crowd level. On the other hand, the exchange of estimates or supportive evidence separately has no impact.

This paper is about a problem that can arise when we try to harness the “wisdom of the crowd” from groups comprised of individuals who exhibit a certain kind of epistemic humility in the way they respond to testimonial evidence. I begin by setting out the problem and then make some initial steps toward solving it. The solution I develop is tentative and may not apply in all circumstances, but it promises to alleviate what seems to me to be a (...) problem of both theoretical interest and practical importance. (shrink)

Mereological nihilism is the thesis that there are no composite objects—i.e. objects with proper material parts. One of the main advantages of mereological nihilism is that it allows its supporters to avoid a number of notorious philosophical puzzles. However, it seems to offer this advantage only at the expense of certain widespread and deeply entrenched beliefs. In particular, it is usually assumed that mereological nihilism entails eliminativism about ordinary objects—i.e. the counterintuitive thesis that there are no such things as tables, (...) apples, cats, and the like. In this paper, I argue that this assumption is false—mereological nihilists do not need to be eliminativists about tables, apples, or cats. Non-eliminativist nihilists claim that all it takes for there to be a cat is that there are simples arranged cat-wise. More specifically, non-eliminative nihilists argue that expressions such as ‘the cat’ in sentences such as ‘The cat is on the mat’ do not refer to composite objects but only to simples arranged cat-wise and compare this metaphysical discovery to the scientific discovery that ‘water’ refers to dihydrogen oxide. Non-eliminative nihilism, I argue, is not only a coherent position, but it is preferable to its more popular, eliminativist counterpart, as it enjoys the key benefits of nihilism without incurring the prohibitive costs of eliminativism. Moreover, unlike conciliatory strategies adopted by eliminative nihilists, non-eliminative nihilism allow its supporters to account not only for how we can assert something true by saying ‘The cat is on the mat’ but also for how we can believe something true by believing that the cat is on the mat. (shrink)

Meta-induction, in its various forms, is an imitative prediction method, where the prediction methods and the predictions of other agents are imitated to the extent that those methods or agents have proven successful in the past. In past work, Schurz demonstrated the optimality of meta-induction as a method for predicting unknown events and quantities. However, much recent discussion, along with formal and empirical work, on the Wisdom of Crowds has extolled the virtue of diverse and independent judgment as essential (...) to maintenance of 'wise crowds'. This suggests that meta-inductive prediction methods could undermine the wisdom of the crowd inasmuch these methods recommend that agents imitate the predictions of other agents. In this article, we evaluate meta-inductive methods with a focus on the impact on a group's performance that may result from including meta-inductivists among its members. In addition to considering cases of global accessibility (i.e., cases where the judgments of all members of the group are available to all of the group's members), we consider cases where agents only have access to the judgments of other agents within their own local neighborhoods. (shrink)

In the debate of epistemic peer disagreement the equal-weight view suggests to split the difference between one's own and one's peer's opinions. An argument in favour of this view---which is prominently held by Adam Elga---is that by such a difference-splitting one may make some use of a so-called wise-crowd effect. In this paper it is argued that such a view faces two main problems: First, the problem that the standards for making use of a wise-crowd effect are quite (...) low. And second, the problem that following the equal-weight view decreases such effects and by this the argument's own basis is defeated. We therefore come to the conclusion that an argument for the equal-weight view with the help of wise-crowd effects as provided more or less explicitly by Elga does not succeed. (shrink)

In their paper on the influence of meta-induction to the wisdom of the crowd, Paul Thorn and Gerhard Schurz argue that adding meta-inductive methods to a group influences the group positively, whereas replacing independend methods of a group with meta-inductive ones may have a negative impact. The first fact is due to an improvement of average ability of a group, the second fact is due to an impairment of average diversity within a group by meta-induction. In this paper some critical (...) remarks to meta-inductive group expansion and replacement are made. In particular it is stressed that both ability and diversity are of equal importance to a group’s performance. (shrink)

A look at the nature of the universe, God, and our place within it explores the transformational role of consciousness in all human enterprise, offering inspirational insights into questions about religion, human existence, and good and evil.

The actual originality and radicalism of Canetti's mass psychology provides a comprehensive picture of humanity and society which could also accommodate a naturalized political domain. Proceeding according to a deliberate plan, Canetti discusses four “purely” political complexes on the basis of his mass‐psychological conception. These four complexes are completed, architecturally as it were, by the Schreber Case, the keystone, which legitimately unites and synthesizes the political and psychological domains in terms of power. His strategy does not involve the projection of (...) already available psychological explanatory patterns onto the political subject‐matter. He chooses rather a political subject‐matter in the analysis of which the already elaborated mass‐psychological insights can resurface. The way leads, therefore, not from mass psychology to politics, but from politics to politics seen in a different way—via innovative mass‐psychological insights. The four case‐studies selected by Canetti display remarkable coherence in their conceptual structure. At the same time, they are also astonishingly diverse and variable. The Versaille Case describes a unique act involving the suppression of collective identity, while the Inflation Case captures the possibility of the shocking devaluation of individual and collective identity, a possibility which can in principle always become reality. The approach is yet again different in the Parliamentarianism Case: politics is shown to be wise enough to restrain political struggle by means of a taboo. Finally, for the case of socialism Canetti provides an original concretization and interpretation of a widely shared view, which is nevertheless seldom articulated with the required precision, namely that socialism and human nature run, at least latently, counter to one another, making their incompatibility predetermined. (shrink)

To Wayne Booth it was clear, authors seek to exert control and writers like Jane Austen endeavor to satisfy this imperative through rhetorical techniques that may include the creation of a wise male figure who can be counted upon to provide the necessary guidance for flawed heroine and reader alike. We require help "to direct our reactions," and thus throughout Austen's novel Emma, her hero and "chief corrective," Mr. Knightley, stands in the reader's mind for what Emma lacks.1 Subsequent (...) scholars have questioned Booth's interpretation of Mr. Knightley's role and narrative status, and the subtitle of Mary Waldron's influential essay—"The Confusions of Mr. Knightley"—anticipates her views on the subject.2In... (shrink)

This collection addresses a post-WWII shift in the hierarchy of scientific explanations, where the highest goal moves from reductionism towards some ...

We report here on an ongoing study of a self-defining community of physicists whose work spans an interestingly diverse set of subjects, typically in the borderland between macroscopic and microscopic description and between quantum and classical domains. Its methods are typically semi-classical. It is this borderland—of people, subject, and methods—in which we are primarily interested and which we will attempt to characterise. For concreteness, we will focus on the subset of ‘quantum chaos’ and more particularly on the work that the (...) physicists Eric Heller and Steven Tomsovic have called ‘postmodern quantum mechanics’, using their characterisation to ground a somewhat more expansive interpretation. (shrink)

The ArgumentThe societal context within which science is pursued generally acts as a productive force in the generation of knowledge. To analyze this action it is helpful to consider particular modes of mediation through which societal concerns are projected into the very local and esoteric concerns of a particular domain of research. One such mode of mediation occurs through material systems. Here I treat two such systems – the steam engine and the electric telegraph – in the natural philosophy of (...) William Thomson (Lord Kelvin).The steam engine illustratesconceptualmediation. It simultaneously instantiates “labor value” in political economy and “work” in engineering mechanics, thereby identifying the two concepts in the region of their common reference. The partial identification carries with it a structural analogy between a network of concepts from political economy and a similar network in natural philosophy, providing a potent heuristic for the reformulation and further development of dynamics.The electric telegraph illustratesmethodologicalmediation. It projects the interests of engineering and industry into the interests of electromagnetic theory and vice versa, thereby establishing, in Thomson's view, a Baconian unity of truth and utility. As the common reference of theory and practice, the telegraph locates the truth of theoretical knowledge in its utility and the utility of practical knowledge in its truth.These particular cases of conceptual and methodological mediation indicate how the local practices, concepts, and interests of a research specialty, or subculture, draw on and are adapted to those of the larger culture within which they develop. Thus the analysis of mediation leads to an ecological model of the social construction of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

ABSTRACT An overview of some of the main modes of making images of natural objects and processes, as they have appeared in the history of science, leads to two main conclusions. First, the dichotomies that have traditionally distinguished, for example, art from science, museums from laboratories, and geometrical from algebraic methods have produced a poverty of understanding of visualization. It is at the intersections of these dichotomies where much of the creative work of science occurs, and it is into those (...) intersections that this Focus section leads us. Second, the section suggests that we need to understand images as arguments. Generalizing, we need to develop a “materialized epistemology” that reunites sensual with ideational knowing. Recent work in the history of science is already pointing the way and producing a dramatically new historiography. (shrink)

Approximately a quarter of a billion people around the world suffer from malaria each year. Most cases are located in sub-Saharan Africa where Anopheles gambiae mosquitoes are the principal vectors of this public health problem. With the use of CRISPR-based gene drives, the population of mosquitoes can be modified, eventually causing their extinction. First, we discuss the moral status of the organism and argue that using genetically modified mosquitoes to combat malaria should not be abandoned based on some moral value (...) of A. gambiae. Secondly, we argue that environmental impact studies should be performed to obtain an accurate account of the possible effects of a potential eradication of the organism. However, the risks from the purposeful extinction of A. gambiae should not overtake the benefits of eradicating malaria and risk assessments should be used to determine acceptable risks. Thirdly, we argue that the eventual release of the genetically modified mosquitoes will depend on transparency, community involvement, and cooperation between different nations. (shrink)

The traditional mode of explanation in physics via deduction from partial differential equations is contrasted here with explanation via simulations. I argue that the different technologies employed constitute different languages, which support different sorts of narratives. The narratives that accompany simulations and articulate their meaning are typically historical or natural historical in kind. They explain complex phenomena by growing them rather than by referring them to general laws. Examples of such growth simulations and growth narratives come from the evolution of (...) wave functions in quantum chaos, snowflake formation, and Etruscan genetics. The examples suggest a few concluding remarks on historical explanation. (shrink)

ABSTRACT An overview of some of the main modes of making images of natural objects and processes, as they have appeared in the history of science, leads to two main conclusions. First, the dichotomies that have traditionally distinguished, for example, art from science, museums from laboratories, and geometrical from algebraic methods have produced a poverty of understanding of visualization. It is at the intersections of these dichotomies where much of the creative work of science occurs, and it is into those (...) intersections that this Focus section leads us. Second, the section suggests that we need to understand images as arguments. Generalizing, we need to develop a “materialized epistemology” that reunites sensual with ideational knowing. Recent work in the history of science is already pointing the way and producing a dramatically new historiography. (shrink)

Science and Ethics inextricably intertwinedDawson and Yentis argue that research ethics committees have an obligation to consider the science of applications because this is inextricably entwined with ethics. They lament the fact that the recent English ministerial review of RECs suggests that science should be assessed by others for RECs and not by the committee members themselves. In fact, these views are not as incompatible as they might first appear.The plain truth of the matter is that in a maximum membership (...) of 18, at least a third of whom must be lay members, the capacity of each of the 186 RECs currently in the UK to review …. (shrink)