In this visionary book, Cormac Cullinan explains how, if the community of life on Earth is to survive, a new understanding of nature and a new concept of legal systems are needed.Cullinan proposes a new approach or "Earth Jurisprudence" and gives practical guidance on how to begin moving towards it. He shows that this philosophy could help develop new legal systems that would foster human connections to nature. It would encourage personal and social practices that ensure our planet remains liveable. (...) class='Hi'>Wild Law is an inspiring and stimulating book, which fuses politics, legal theory, ancient wisdom and personal experiences into a fascinating and eminently readable story."This important book shows not only why we need to revise our governance systems completely, but also how to begin doing so in a way that draws inspiration from nature and from our diverse human communities."Professor Wangari Mathai, Nobel Peace Prize 2004. (shrink)

Anthills and aardvarks -- The illusion of independence -- The myth of the master species -- Why law and jurisprudence matter -- The conceit of law -- Respecting the great law -- Remembering who we are -- The question of rights -- Elements of Earth governance -- Seeking Earth jurisprudence -- The rhythms of life -- The law of the land -- A communion of communities -- Transforming law and governance -- The mountain path.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau devoted an important chapter of his Social Contract to the dictatorship. Carl Schmitt interpreted Rousseau’s chapter as marking the transition from ‘commissarial’ to ‘sovereign dictatorship’. This article argues that Schmitt’s interpretation is historically and conceptually inaccurate. Instead of paving the way for sovereign dictatorship, Rousseau carefully distinguished the dictatorship from the people’s sovereign authority. Taking position in the ‘debate’ between Bodin and Grotius on the relation between dictatorship and sovereignty, he argued that the dictator could provisionally suspend the (...) people’s sovereign authority, but not abolish it. More particularly, the dictator did not possess the power to make generally binding laws, which had to remain the exclusive authority of the popular assembly. However, this did not prevent Rousseau from recognizing the dictatorship as a means for democratic reform. Rousseau thus conceived of the dictatorship as a time-limited and revocable commission to protect the constitution and to provide for a more stable and effective state organization based on the principle of popular sovereignty. (shrink)

This book is the first extended attempt to explain Plato's ethics of natural law, to place it accurately in the history of moral theory, and to defend it against the objections that it is totalitarian. Wild provides a clarification of Plato's ethical doctrine and a defense of that doctrine based not only of his analysis of the dialogues but on the belief that Plato must acknowledged as the founder of the Western tradition of the philosophy of natural law. The (...) book begins with a presentation of the major objections raised against Plato by modern authors, Toynbee, Karl Popper and others, who have condemned the so called totalitarianism of Plato's thought. Wild answers these objections point by point and with a wealth of evidence taken from Plato's own arguments. He then presents a historical study of the ethics of natural law, defining the theory and showing through an examination of relevant dialogues that Plato held such a theory. The work concludes with a systematic study of his realistic ethics and its bearing on contemporary problems. This is a reprint of the 1953 Chicago edition. (shrink)

: Bioethics has focused on the areas of individual ethical choices--patient care--or public policy and law. There are, however, important arenas for ethical choices that have been overlooked. Health care is populated with intermediate arenas such as hospitals, nursing homes, hospices, and health care systems. This essay argues that bioethics needs to develop a language and concepts for institutional ethics. A first step in this direction is to think about institutional conscience.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Death: A Persistent Controversial StateKevin Wm. Wildes S.J. (bio)Along with the moral questions surrounding research and experimentation, the moral questions of death and dying have ranked among the most central and formative sets of issues for the field of bioethics. While the questions of death and dying have a long history (Wildes 1996), the attempt to address them as secular questions is an element of what established bioethics as (...) a field of inquiry.The controversies of death and dying are not only formative of bioethics, but also are among the most persistent bioethical controversies. Today, almost 30 years after the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee’s definition of death and 20 years after the Quinlan decision, the questions of death and dying are still with us. Recently, the question of physician-assisted suicide once again gained national [End Page 378] attention with the trials of Dr. Kevorkian and the decisions of the Ninth and Second Circuit Courts on the constitutionality of the Washington and New York state laws prohibiting physician-assisted suicide. At the same time, questions and controversies about the appropriate extent of treatment and the determination of death in relationship to treatment continue to be problematic in health care.As I reviewed the literature in the area of death and dying, one central question emerged: Why, after so much reflection, energy, and discussion, do the problems around death and dying continue to persist? There is a recurring character to these questions that is indeed a wonder. In reviewing these moral controversies, one might ask what these controversies and their persistent character tell us about bioethics that can help us to understand the issues and the field.Some might blame the development of medical technology for the persistence of these issues of death and dying. The development and use of technological resources certainly is an important element of these continuing controversies. The use of medical technologies at the end of life allows us the possibility to sustain lives that would have been lost just a few decades ago. However, while medical technology certainly opens new horizons and possibilities, the development and deployment of technology does not sufficiently explain why these issues are so difficult and persistent. The question underlying the use of medical technology at the end of life is the question about which criteria are to be used to make judgments about the appropriate use of such technology. If the use of medical technology depends on the moral views one holds about death, suffering, and the appropriate use of resources, then such issues will be morally controversial in a society that is morally pluralistic.To address these questions, it is important to remember what is all too obvious and yet often forgotten. Death is not only a medical event. In this century, particularly in the last 40 years, we have reduced death to a medical event, yet, the medical meanings do not exhaust the event (see Engelhardt 1996, pp. 189–238). Death is also a social, cultural, and often religious event and the medical realities of death must be interpreted within these different contexts. As such, death will be the locus of different meanings and interpretations. By keeping these different structures of interpretation in mind, we are better able to understand why controversies around death and dying persist. Just as the meaning of death will vary from culture to culture, so too will the criteria of death vary. Different moral communities have different criteria for death—e.g., pulmonary or cognitive function. Put another way, different communities and cultures will have different views of what constitutes a good life, and those views influence the way death is understood. How one understands the obligations to support life also varies according to one’s moral commitments and values.One’s view of what counts as death, or what counts as a good death, is influenced [End Page 379] by the moral commitments that one holds. The persistent controversies over death and dying are a symptom of deep, widespread moral and cultural pluralism. These views are controversial because, in many ways, our deaths are no longer private. That is, the way we die often is tied to a health... (shrink)

Debates about effective responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have emphasized the paramount importance of digital tracing technology in suppressing the disease. So far, discussions about the ethics of this technology have focused on privacy concerns, efficacy, and uptake. However, important issues regarding power imbalances and vulnerability also warrant attention. As demonstrated in other forms of digital surveillance, vulnerable subpopulations pay a higher price for surveillance measures. There is reason to worry that some types of COVID-19 technology might lead to the (...) employment of disproportionate profiling, policing, and criminalization of marginalized groups. It is, thus, of crucial importance to interrogate vulnerability in COVID-19 apps and ensure that the development, implementation, and data use of this surveillance technology avoids exacerbating vulnerability and the risk of harm to surveilled subpopulations, while maintaining the benefits of data collection across the whole population. This paper outlines the major challenges and a set of values that should be taken into account when implementing disease surveillance technology in the pandemic response. (shrink)

In The Prenatal Person: Ethics from Conception to Birth Norman Ford has provided an important, thoughtful, accessible account of a natural law view of early human life. Ford has written an engaging book that puts this fundamental moral position about persons and prenatal life in conversation with critics of the position, common morality, the Christian tradition, and many of the complex clinical problems of contemporary medicine. The book is a timely contribution to bioethics and many of the controversies surrounding embryonic (...) stem cell and cloning research. It takes up one of the most important positions in these debates and gives a clear, concise development of the natural law tradition. Ford very clearly lays out a natural law position on early human life and then draws out the implications of that position for many current and important …. (shrink)

Fokus eines Kriegseinsatzes und Fluchtpunkt des Preußischen Staatsrats Schmitt und seiner Lebens-, Zeit-, Rechts- und Ideengeschichte. Korrumpiert und verstoßen, widerstrebend und vereinnahmt ging das "Chamäleon" Carl Schmitt im Dritten Reich seinen eigenen Weg. Die europäische Zeit- und Rechtsgeschichte spiegelt sich exemplarisch im Werden und Wirken des "Kronjuristen des Dritten Reiches", und heute sind die Ideen dieses Staatsrechtsvordenkers und Großraumvisionärs wieder brennend aktuell.

In The Prenatal Person: Ethics from Conception to Birth Norman Ford has provided an important, thoughtful, accessible account of a natural law view of early human life. Ford has written an engaging book that puts this fundamental moral position about persons and prenatal life in conversation with critics of the position, common morality, the Christian tradition, and many of the complex clinical problems of contemporary medicine. The book is a timely contribution to bioethics and many of the controversies surrounding embryonic (...) stem cell and cloning research. It takes up one of the most important positions in these debates and gives a clear, concise development of the natural law tradition. Ford very clearly lays out a natural law position on early human life and then draws out the implications of that position for many current and important …. (shrink)

New mechanisms to ensure that counter ter ror ism ac t ivit ies do not contravene international law or ethical values and principles will require careful design. Apart from the ethical and legal grounds, there are good practical rea-sons to design more effective counterter-rorism measures. Preventable harms to population health contribute to mistrust and instability and undermine the stated objectives of the intelligence services.

The COVID-19 pandemic presents unprecedented challenges to public health decision-making. Specifically, the lack of evidence and the urgency with which a response is called for, raise the ethical challenge of assessing how much (and what kind of) evidence is required for the justification of interventions in response to the various threats we face. Here we discuss the intervention of introducing technology that aims to trace and alert contacts of infected persons—contact tracing (CT) technology. Determining whether such an intervention is proportional (...) is complicated by complex trade-offs and feedback loops. We suggest that the resulting uncertainties necessitate a precautionary approach. On the one hand, precautionary reasons support CT technology as a means to contribute to the prevention of harms caused by alternative interventions, or COVID-19 itself. On the other hand, however, both the extent to which such technology itself present risks of serious harm, as well as its effectiveness, remain unclear. We therefore argue that a precautionary approach should put reversibility of CT technology at the forefront. We outline several practical implications. (shrink)

This book considers the efficacy of the common regulatory model of the licensing regime as a means of regulating animal use in England, with a particular focus on wild animals and the regime’s ability to ensure animal welfare needs are met. Using information gleaned from over 550 inspection reports relating to the period 2008 through 2019, obtained using FOI Act requests, the book analyses the extent to which animals used by these industries are protected by law. Tyson analyses the (...) limitations present in the practical application of English legislation responsible for creating a number of relevant licensing regimes.The regimes discussed include: The Zoo Licensing Act 1981, the now repealed Welfare of Wild Animals in Travelling Circuses Regulations 2012, and the Animal Welfare Regulations 2018, introduced under the Animal Welfare Act 2006. Exploring the weakness in the use of this type of regulatory model, Tyson proposes compelling recommendations for change in future policy development. Making an important contribution to the question of enforcement of animal welfare laws, this book provides useful and original insights into the implementation of licensing regimes, and will be of particular interest to scholars of animal welfare law, animal ethics, and critical animal studies. (shrink)

This essay lays out preliminary grounds for an alternative theological approach to animal ethics based on closer consideration of natural law theory and ethological reports of wild justice compared with dominant animal rights perspectives. It draws on Jean Porter's interpretation of scholastic natural law theory and on scientific narratives about the laws of nature to navigate the difficult territory between nature and reason in natural law. In Western societies, attempts to detach from our animal roots have fostered forms of (...) legal provisions that treat animals as property rather than as living, social beings entangled with human societies. (shrink)

To the attentive reader, the high contrast between Thoreau's depiction of a life in conformity to "Higher Laws" and his depiction of Wildness can seem to be yet another endorsement of nature/culture dualism. I argue that while such a dualism frames much of Thoreau's "experiment" at Walden Pond, a deeper understanding of the relationship between Higher Laws and Wildness emerges which is decidedly nondualistic, an understanding for which I invoke the Buddhist image of the Dusty World. I conclude with some (...) reflections on Val Plumwood's recent work on the nature/culture dualisms at work in current discussions about wilderness. (shrink)

Agent-causal libertarians maintain we are irreducible agents who, by acting, settle matters that aren’t already settled. This implies that the neural matters underlying the exercise of our agency don’t conform to deterministic laws, but it does not appear to exclude the possibility that they conform to statistical laws. However, Pereboom (Noûs 29:21–45, 1995; Living without free will, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001; in: Nadelhoffer (ed) The future of punishment, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013) has argued that, if these neural (...) matters conform to either statistical or deterministic physical laws, the complete conformity of an irreducible agent’s settling of matters with what should be expected given the applicable laws would involve coincidences too wild to be credible. Here, I show that Pereboom’s argument depends on the assumption that, at times, the antecedent probability certain behavior will occur applies in each of a number of occasions, and is incapable of changing as a result of what one does from one occasion to the next. There is, however, no evidence this assumption is true. The upshot is the wild coincidence objection is an empirical objection lacking empirical support. Thus, it isn’t a compelling argument against agent-causal libertarianism. (shrink)

Antibiotic resistance is a serious public health problem on a global scale. In both developed and developing countries, the unpleasant consequences of the phenomenon are being felt. This paper discusses wild-card patent extensions as a means to incentivize research and development of new antibiotics. The thesis defended in the paper is that the implementation of such patent extensions is an appropriate legislative response to the problem of antibiotic resistance. The general idea of wild-card patent extensions is presented in (...) the first part of the paper. A number of objections to the idea are thereafter discussed and rejected. (shrink)

"An American psychologist, Daniel N. Robinson, traces the development of the insanity plea...[He offers] an assured historical survey." Roy Porter, The Times [UK] "Wild Beasts and Idle Humours is truly unique. It synthesizes material that I do not believe has ever been considered in this context, and links up the historical past with contemporaneous values and politics. Robinson effortlessly weaves religious history, literary history, medical history, and political history, and demonstrates how the insanity defense cannot be fully understood without (...) consideration of all these sources." Michael L. Perlin, New York Law School "Daniel N. Robinson has written a graceful history of insanity and the law stretching from Homer to Hinckley. He attempts no final theory as to how the law should cope with the insane; he seeks, rather, to use the shifting notions of when madness exculpates criminal activity to illuminate the core self-perceptions of the cultures developing ever-evolving resolutions of the problem...[T]he grandeur of the theme...commands attention and respect." --Neal Johnston, The Nation . (shrink)

Comparative religion scholar Thomas Berry’s influential concept of “Earth jurisprudence” has been helpfully elaborated in three principal books. My first section identifies four of their common themes, deriving therefrom an implicit narrative: (1) the basis of ecology is autopoiesis, which (2) originally generated human communities and Indigenous vernacular laws, which were (3) later reasserted by forest defenders who fought to create the Magna Carta’s “Charter of the Forest,” which is (4) now championed globally by the Indian physicist and eco-activist Vandana (...) Shiva’s Earth Democracy movement. My next three sections identify mutually exclusive elements of the three books, deriving the following alternative narrative: self-conscious new dancing rituals (Cullinan) could empower an historically informed reconstruction of private property (Burdon) via commons-based vernacular law (Weston and Bollier). And my conclusion offers one template for such a strategy, namely a new environmental variation on my dancing-poetic conception of legal justice, christened “emerald star-law.”. (shrink)

Should laws about sex and pornography be based on social conventions about what is disgusting? Should felons be required to display bumper stickers or wear T-shirts that announce their crimes? This powerful and elegantly written book, by one of America's most influential philosophers, presents a critique of the role that shame and disgust play in our individual and social lives and, in particular, in the law.Martha Nussbaum argues that we should be wary of these emotions because they are associated in (...) troubling ways with a desire to hide from our humanity, embodying an unrealistic and sometimes pathological wish to be invulnerable. Nussbaum argues that the thought-content of disgust embodies "magical ideas of contamination, and impossible aspirations to purity that are just not in line with human life as we know it." She argues that disgust should never be the basis for criminalizing an act, or play either the aggravating or the mitigating role in criminal law it currently does. She writes that we should be similarly suspicious of what she calls "primitive shame," a shame "at the very fact of human imperfection," and she is harshly critical of the role that such shame plays in certain punishments.Drawing on an extraordinarily rich variety of philosophical, psychological, and historical references--from Aristotle and Freud to Nazi ideas about purity--and on legal examples as diverse as the trials of Oscar Wilde and the Martha Stewart insider trading case, this is a major work of legal and moral philosophy. (shrink)

Pereboom’s ‘wild coincidences’ argument against agent-causal libertarianism is based on the claim that in a world governed by statistical laws, the dovetailing of indeterministic physical happenings with the free actions of agent causes would be a coincidence too wild to be credible. In this paper it is shown that the conclusion is valid for deterministic laws, but that it fails for statistical laws. Therefore, the ‘wild coincidences’ argument does not provide the promised empirical refutation of agent-causal libertarianism.

I focus on the question as to what rationale could possibly underlie the doctrine of double effect or related principles. I first briefly review the correct critiques of the claim that people who intend some evil as a means to a good must be “guided by evil,” and that this is allegedly always wrong. I then argue that Quinn’s claim that violations of the DDE express certain negative attitudes of the agent and that agents violating the DDE must make an (...) additional morally problematic presumption regarding their victims is mistaken. Tadros claims that an agent violating the means principle must force his victims to adopt his goals. I demonstrate that the difference Tadros tries to construe between an agent inflicting intended harm and an agent inflicting merely foreseen harm is non-existent. Sarch’s official rationale for the DDE also fails to distinguish harming as a means from side-effect harming, and reformulations of his rationale that suggest themselves run into severe problems. Walen’s defense of the means principle in terms of the “restricting claims principle” and Øverland’s appeal to “moral obstacles” are susceptible to counter-examples and appear to be question-begging. Recently, Walen has offered a revised formulation of his Restricting Claims Principle, claiming that it overcomes counter-examples and explains the means principle. I will argue that it contradicts the means principle and does not overcome the counter-examples. Thus I conclude that so far we are still left without a reasonable rationale for the DDE or related principles. (shrink)

The Oscar Wilde trials (1895) have usually been interpreted either as a historical document which gives insight into the regulation of sexuality in the late nineteenth century, or as literary biography explicating the playwright's life and works. Taking its cue from recent scholarship in ‘law and literature’, and also from Wilde's own conception of the relationship between art and life, this article proposes a reading of the trials which blurs the distinction between legal history and literary criticism by considering them (...) as a form of literature. It argues that the trial transcripts enact and reflect Wilde's vision of what literature is and how it should be read, and as such should be given a place amongst his literary works, alongside such aesthetic manifestos as ‘The Decay of Lying’ and ‘The Critic as Artist’. (shrink)

This piece, included in the drift special issue of continent., was created as one step in a thread of inquiry. While each of the contributions to drift stand on their own, the project was an attempt to follow a line of theoretical inquiry as it passed through time and the postal service from October 2012 until May 2013. This issue hosts two threads: between space & place and between intention & attention. The editors recommend that to experience the drifiting thought (...) that attention be paid to the contributions as they entered into conversation one after another. This particular piece is from the BETWEEN SPACE & PLACE thread: April Vannini, Those Between the Common * Laura Dean & Jesse McClelland, Ballard: A Portrait of Placemaking * Amara Hark Weber, Crossroad * Isaac Linder & Berit Soli-Holt, The Call of the Wild: Terror Modulations * Ashley D. Hairston, Momma taught us to keep a clean house * Sean Smith, The Garage * * * * Instead of beginning with radical doubt, we start from naiveté. —Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object Deep in the forest a call was sounding, and as often as he heard this call, mysteriously thrilling and luring, he felt compelled to turn his back upon the fire and the beaten earth around it, and to plunge into the forest, and on and on, he knew not where or why; nor did he wonder where or why, the call sounding imperiously, deep in the forest. —Jack London, The Call of the Wild The figure of the feral remains a perpetual enigma, but the parameters remain relatively consistent. A person, usually a child, enters civilization after having been raised by wolves or kept in some kind of cruel captivity. The outsider perspective on domestication ensuing in an edge of a culture's self-recognition of its clumsier attributes, what has been taken for granted becomes apparent, is brought to the foreground with the stranger and made questionable. Amusement follows naïve questions or observations such as Kaspar Hauser in the Herzog film, The Enigma of Kaspar Hauser, when Kaspar notes that while in his room he is engulfed by it, but when he looks at the tower he can turn away and it disappears. Ergo, the room is larger than the tower. How entertaining. The aberrant one destabilizes the comforting cultural normative. Places become seen as mere impressions out of space, a patterning, a rut that not everyone lives in like us. This is one figure of the feral. The naiveté that begs all the questions. As a figure for a certain philosophical disposition, the rapidity of one’s saccade scans the environment, intuits it’s space, not from an initial thaumazein or a Critchlean sense of disappointment, but from a child-like naiveté bent on survival. To serve the naïve is merely one form of critique, and it is not nearly used enough in lieu of the critique that provides answers. How dull. It is not necessary to be an outsider to entrench a critique with naiveté. After having forced to suffer in the most parched and rocky terror, itself for so long rooted upwards of fifty feet into the ground upon which it grows, even a grapevine can spontaneously produce a white grape on a red vine. The curious feral can arise from within, and like pinot grigio, it adds variety without admonishing its roots. There is also the feral dog. Not raised by wolves, but humans. Founded in place the figure of this feral denies this place. The trajectory of this feral roves from the cultivated to uncultivated, or in speaking of plants from controlled to volunteer, finding the necessary nutrients and survival patterns on its own. Finding other places, reaching out into space testing its fertility. And when introduced into a foreign environment, it withers or flourishes. We would like to attempt a thesis at this juncture and to accept neither feral figure in its entirety, but to argue for the intimate conjunction between a cultivated place and its resonance with the space it procures for its nest and kin. I'm not a biter, I'm a writer for myself and others. —Jay-Z, What More Can I Say? I am writing for myself and strangers. This is the only way that I can do it. Everybody is a real one to me, everybody is like some one else too to me. No one of them that I know can want to know it and so I write for myself and strangers. —Gertrude Stein, The Making of Americans There is no subjective disposition outlining an unambiguous individual of the para-academy. There is no para-academic. We all have day jobs. 'Para-academic' seeped through the cracks as an adjective in the call to frame publishing dedicated to the critical rigor expected by academic publishing, but to deny the limitations of guarded legitimation through capital means. Open-access holds hands with this parasitic descriptor. Para-academic publishing's refusal to adhere to the valuation of locked access of a site, the site “of a desperate initiation to the empty form of value,” 1 seeks to recognize not merely an inclusive interpretation of significance, but the significance of thinking practice. The practice inside the paywalls of academic 'education' is held in a deathgrip by its infatuation with value and information, both empty without the apprehension of human experience, the barbaric yawp. “I can't breathe in here.” It is not that a para-academic practice leads one to the childish wonder of Kaspar Hauser who wonders about the spatiality of his room. It is the academic legitimation that distorts that one can hold the understanding of both in a constellation of place and space. Led to believe there is only a place for things, we are led to disillusionment. It is also not that a para-academic practice relinquishes itself to the invasive growth outside of careful cultivation, an abandonment of pleasantries for the toothy growl of a predator. It is the academy's fear that thought does not require capital to signify value. Some of the most nutritious meals can be foraged. Defining a para-academic practice is not outlining a place of accreditation of the practice, it is the recognition that any place is subject to modulation by the space it inhabits as well as creates. The para-academic practice keeps an eye of the creation of spaces, follows those paths that eat themselves in the name of academia. This is not unlike Red Peter's report to the academy, only successful if we report in idle idiosyncratic banalities that we have once again become victorious in our acculturation and nullification within the confines of accredited mush and our trajectory of wild rigor is defeated in our desire for recognition as recognizable in this place. Weeds are integral to the functioning of a large ecosystem. The manicured garden is entirely reliant on its keeper. The pansy can also go wild once neglected, the daisy definitely does.... a universe comes into being when a space is severed or taken apart. The skin of a living organism cuts off an outside from an inside. So does the circumference of a circle in a plane. By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can begin to reconstruct, with an accuracy and coverage that appear almost uncanny, the basic forms underlying linguistic, mathematical, physical, and biological science, and can begin to see how the familiar laws of our own experience follow from the original act of severance. The act is itself already remembered, even if unconsciously, as our first attempt to distinguish different things in a world where, in the first place, the boundaries can be drawn anywhere we please. At this stage the universe cannot be distinguished from how we act upon it, and the world may seem like shifting sand beneath our feet. —George Spencer-Brown, Laws of Form Two edges are created: an obedient, conformist, plagiarizing edge, and another edge, mobile, blank, which is never anything but the site of its effect: the place where the death of language is glimpsed. These two edges, the compromise they bring about, are necessary. —Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text Between these two epigraphs, interminable questions of where and questions of happening, gesture, and interface. To stay buoyed between a site of visible happening and haptic perspicacity. Bounded by one or the other leads to a desiccation of potential knowledge. The tumbleweed tumbles until met with mud, a bare structure moving but not movement. A tumbleweed tumbleweeds, propagates only at a place. It becomes significant again, continues. Significance, the site where meaning is made known through kinesthetic apprehension. 2 The feral founds a gestural horizon; an outsider’s scrawl-becoming-law; Deleuze teaching Meno’s dog geometry. Place as marked, outlined, recognized, territorialized. The academies marked by their peculiar disciplines, outlined by their rigid boundaries, recognized as factories of value. This far from ensures complete purchase on the space of thought, but it has made an undeniably elaborate means of making work significant. The academy is a muddy spot, it is fertile, but its gates are high and its dogs are barking. The coordinates of concept and experience. Already claimed by a stabilizing suspension, the terms enter specificity of ‘this is this’. Another correlation: activity and the individual. The individual, a placeholder in the crosshairs of juridical identification. Activity, what expands and surrounds this location, but utterly indebted to the node of “one who”. What's happening in this oscillation of nature and nurture is practice. Practice, as Stengers tells us “is not the activity of an individual or the product of that activity. It is the ingredient without which neither that activity nor this product would exist as such.” 3 Moving outward from our own honing, we're curious about the ingredient creating the place for holding conceptual and experiential engagements in each hand. And we'd like to argue that this place is not a limiting specification, but a practice undulating daily, by the minute. And we call this practice the para-academic practice. I repeat: there was no attraction for me in imitating human beings; I imitated them because I needed a way out, and for no other reason. —Franz Kafka, A Report to an Academy In order to exist, man must rebel, but rebellion must respect the limit it discovers in itself—a limit where minds meet and, in meeting, begin to exist. — Albert Camus, The Rebel Anyone is a para-academic or practicer of such means. The academic can, and we argue should, be active para-academically, to escape the bounds, recognizing no site specific place as a place to rest on or the place to grab the Kafka's top and wonder at its disobedience not to continue. Yet, the para-academic practice must maintain the desire for rigor in scholarship. Indeed desiring past itself to claim a more naïve rigor, one that does not take its form for granted. Without a para-academic practice, the scholar spends half the time merely working on behalf of a hierarchy, to maintain it, and the other measly amounts of time are in the name of thinking, but only in name. Not to mention the amount of debt it takes to attend the halls of higher education. Not to mention the snoring tenures. Not to mention the barely scraping by adjuncts. Not to mention the materials that shake the very force of producible theory. Not to mention when swimming in texts becomes slogging through data. Academia is a barbaric food chain and it is our claim that there is, as always, an imperative for thought to move, with Heidegger, beyond the logics of calculation and planning, to a time of its own. The path, into the panic of the dark wood of this space can be followed by any; any who let the silence and the rigor enter the play. Where the little theater is larger when inhabited ; where the data of the tutor asymptotically refutes; and where, as much as one wouldn’t expect it here, ballet may turn out to be the most feral of forms… NOTES Jean Baudrillard, “Value's Last Tango” Simulacra and Simulation trans. Sheila Faria Glaser,. “What is significance? It is meaning, insofar as it is sensually produced.” Roland Barthes in The Pleasure of the Text. Isabelle Stengers, “The Science Wars” Cosmopolitics I trans. Robert Bononno, 47. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Where the Wild Child IsRebecca TuvelSeshadri's book challenges us to consider the political potential of silence for race and animal studies. While acknowledging the many ways in which animals and inferiorized races have been (and continue to be) consigned to realms of speechlessness, their words rendered mute and ultimately irrelevant, Seshadri seeks the neutralizing power that resides in such exiled spaces. She asks: "When power uses a concept (...) of language to silence the other, to render this other a wretched hybrid of human and animal…is there, however, a possibility that in turn silences or further neutralizes power?" (Seshadri 2012, 13). Counter to intuitions that the space of silence is powerless, Seshadri urges readers to consider what this space opens up (rather than closes down). Seshadri asks: What happens when "powerful silence functions as a mode of refusal" (21)? Might silence open a "space for opposition" (21)?An engagement with Derrida and Agamben, among others, suggests yes—that insofar as the space of silence exposes the very operation of sovereign power, it can resist that power. Here lies what Seshadri calls silence's "nonsovereign power" (13). Consider the following: traditionally, you become a subject under the law only if you have speech. Even if it is not your own speech, if the law applies to you, someone speaks on your behalf (someone has given a "voice" to your "voicelessness"). The case of animal rights is exemplary here. By giving animals a voice, we bring animals under the law. When the protection of the law is withheld from you, however, you are silenced; you are denied access to speech. In short, your voice does not matter. The screams of an animal, the protests of a slave—they are simultaneously consigned to a realm of silence (either meaningless babble or speechlessness entirely) and to a realm beyond access to the law. In short, language and law are co-implicated. [End Page 186]And yet, if silence is a part of language, and this part of language has been exiled or liberated from the law, does not this also open a space where power can be offset? Following Agamben, Seshadri's logic here runs as follows: the law, in attempting to consign speechlessness to a realm outside the law (a realm of exile or a space of nonsubjection to the law) is by this very attempt admitting there is a space outside the law. It does this in two ways. First, in order for the sovereign to say who does and does not speak, the sovereign itself must in a sense be outside language and the law, for he can only create the rules from a place beyond the rules. Second, in order for the sovereign to push anything to a realm "outside" the law, the sovereign is admitting there is a space outside his totalizing control, a space of silent yet potent resistance.In what follows, I explore some implications of Seshadri's thesis concerning silence's neutralizing power for race and animal studies. I do so by focusing on Seshadri's discussion of the "wild child." Seshadri claims that the wild child represents the space of silence par excellence. The wild child refers to those cases of feral children seen in the woods at the outskirts of villages, captured, and brought into cities where attempts are made to civilize them. Peter the Wild Boy is a famous example. This feral child without language, home, or society, who lives among the animals, sits on the fence between humanity and animality—she is what Seshadri calls a humAnimal—a figure that ultimately eludes the law. The wild child comes with neither an identity card nor a language that might enable us to identify her, locate her origins, or her race. In short, the wild child has no belonging. But by virtue of her exile from the law and shared language, she occupies a space of powerful silence.In the interest of exploring the potential of the wild child figure further, I here pose two questions for consideration. First, exactly how might Seshadri's reflections on the wild child figure be productively extended to race and animal studies? And, second... (shrink)

The author draws on arguments from contemporary philosophy of mind to provide an argument for sociological collectivism. This argument for nonreductive individualism accepts that only individuals exist but rejects methodological individualism. In Part I, the author presents the argument for nonreductive individualism by working through the implications of supervenience, multiple realizability, and wild disjunction in some detail. In Part II, he extends the argument to provide a defense for social causal laws, and this account of social causation does not (...) require any commitment to intentionality or agency on the part of individuals. (shrink)

When people speak of ‘the law of the jungle’, they usually mean unions restrained and ruthless competition, with everyone out solely for his own advantage. But the phrase was coined by Rudyard Kipling, in The Second Jungle Book, and he meant something very different. His law of the jungle is a law that wolves in a pack are supposed to obey. His poem says that ‘the strength of the Pack is the Wolf, and the strength of the Wolf is the (...) Pack’, and it states the basic principles of social co-operation. Its provisions are a judicious mixture of individualism and collectivism, prescribing graduated and qualified rights for fathers of families, mothers with cubs, and young wolves, which constitute an elementary system of welfare services. Of course, Kipling meant his poem to give moral instruction to human children, but he probably thought it was at least roughly correct as a description of the social behaviour of wolves and other wild animals. Was he right, or is the natural world the scene of unrestrained competition, of an individualistic struggle for existence? (shrink)

In the wake of globalisation, we have witnessed the rise of the transnational corporation—powerful, new players in an international human rights system ill-equipped to handle the challenge. Despite the best efforts of the United Nations, international treaties and human rights lawyers the world over, there is simply no mandatory international code of corporate conduct targeting human rights practices. Enter the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), a once-obscure U.S. statute that provides a private cause of action for violations of international human (...) rights law committed by governmental and non-governmental actors. This paper will examine recent ATCA jurisprudence, the landmark Unocal settlement, and the ATCA’s role in reining in Yahoo! Inc. for supplying evidence used to convict Chinese dissidents Wang Xiaoning and Shi Tao. (shrink)

Introduction. The law of the extempore -- The rise and reform of the New York City cabaret laws -- Deconstructive legal improvisation -- The 'wildness' of jazz improvisation -- Demystifying improvisation -- The structure-freedom paradox in law -- Justice as improvisation.

It may seem odd that our legal culture’s uneasiness with regard to the insanity defense has risen in direct proportion to advancements in the scientific understanding of insanity itself. Yet the most intriguing benefit of Daniel N. Robinson’s short history of the insanity defense is his explanation of why this is not an oddity at all. For as Robinson convincingly argues, Western legal systems at least since the seventeenth century have been influenced by theoretical accounts of insanity which have undermined (...) the very understanding of human agency according to which those legal systems were built. The result has been a mounting incoherency in what it means for a plea of insanity to come before a court of law. (shrink)

Derk Pereboom has posed an empirical objection to agent-causal libertarianism: The best empirically confirmed scientific theories feature physical laws predicting no long-run deviations from fixed conditional frequencies that govern events. If agent-causal libertarianism were true, however, then it would be virtually certain, absent ‘wild coincidences’, that such long-run deviations would occur. So, current empirical evidence makes agent-causal libertarianism unlikely. This paper formulates Pereboom’s ‘Problem of Wild Coincidences’ as a five-step argument and considers two recent responses. Then, it offers (...) a different response: The Problem of Wild Coincidences does not show that current empirical evidence makes agent-causal libertarianism unlikely, even if all events are governed by physical laws featuring fixed long-run conditional frequencies and even if agents can ‘overrule’ normal physical laws. (shrink)

This thesis is an interrogation of the viability of transitive production, which I associate with the Aristotelian term hylomorphic. The central axiom of hylomorphic production that will be targeted for critique is that the agent of production must be distinguished absolutely from the product. The thesis follows the thought of production primarily-but not exclusively-in its characteristically modem instantiation in the Kantian transcendental. The argument seeks to demonstrate that the productive aspect of the operator of transitive production is incompatible with the (...) transcendental element, and that Kant was himself increasingly aware of this problem. The Third Critique, under the rubric of an aesthetics, it will be argued, manifests this awareness in its problematic of a manifold of empirical laws. That this constitutes a difficulty for transcendent idealism means that the transcendental operators of the First Critique have failed to constitute experience in a relevant and important way. Furthermore, it is possible to see in some of the famous slogans of the Third Critique, an indication of another mode of production which is immune to the difficulties of the axiom of transitive production. In conclusion I suggest that the consequences of this new mode of intransitive production, associated with materiality, is destructive of the thought of the axiomatic otherworldliness of production operators. Production is not operated at all. Some suggestions are then made as to the explanation of the error embodied in the axiom of transitivity. (shrink)

This paper considers, in the context of an undergraduate law degree, how to encourage students to develop an awareness of ethical issues relating to membership of a 'profession' and how lawyers could and should conduct themselves, whilst retaining the notion of a law degree as part of a liberal arts education. It suggests an interdisciplinary approach, both in its content and its methodologies, as an innovative and interesting means of addressing issues of legal ethics and professional responsibility. It offers an (...) analysis of the trial of Oscar Wilde, to show that it may be possible to inculcate a level of 'ethical awareness' through a study of the actions and behaviours of the legal professionals involved in famous or historical trials. (shrink)