On 27 February 1998, the Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta and the office of the Fulbright binational educational exchanges in Calcutta jointly hosted a seminar on 'The Tradition of Non Violence: The American Experience and the Gandhian' at the Management Centre for Human Values. There were two keynote presentations. The one on the American experience was by Michael True, Professor of English Literature at Assumption College, Massachusetts, who was teaching as Fulbright visiting lecturer at Utkal University, Bhubaneswar. The Gandhian (...) case was presented by Profes sor Amlan Datta, economist and writer, also former Vice-Chancellor of Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan. The session was chaired by Professor Amitava Bose, Director, Indian Institute of Management. To close the discussions, a summing up was presented by Professor S.K. Chakraborty, Convenor, Management Centre for Human Values. The importance of discussions on the subject of non-violence and the Gandhian alterna tive cannot be overestimated in this year of the 50th anniversary of Indian independence and a nationwide soul-searching over these five decades. The US Educational Foundation in India contributed to the national discussion through this bilateral seminar and its comparative perspective. (shrink)

What are we to make of the New Christian Right’s loss of political influence and the rise of the Tea Party and libertarianism more broadly? Rather than imagine a coalition of resentment as does William E. Connolly, this paper argues that several key religious ideas of protestant fundamentalism have become secularized and now function as a political theology that privileges the personal and marginalizes the public arena. American fundamentalism shares several characteristics with protestant fundamentalism—even as it represents what might be (...) called a migration of the holy. (shrink)

This volume addresses the way ethics is taught in American Business Schools. The Editors has assembled a collection of timely essays offering practical experienced-based insights in business education. The authors of these essays address a diversity of topics yet are unanimous in calling for change (even if they occasionally disagree on the best means of accomplishing it). For business faculties seeking to meet this growing and multifaceted challenge within their discipline, this book offers a wealth of useful insights and practical (...) solutions. (shrink)

What does world peace mean? Peace is more than the absence and prevention of war, whether international or civil, yet most of our ways of conceptualizing and measuring peace amount to just that definition. In this essay, as part of the roundtable “World Peace,” I argue that any vision of world peace must grapple not only with war but with the continuums of violence and peace emphasized by feminists: running from the home and community to the public spaces of international (...) relations. Breaking free of the constraints of the last century's intellectual boundaries, I suggest that war and peace are not a dichotomy but rather are intimately related. Yet the dearth of feminist perspectives in global debates prevents us from seeing how violence and harm are exacerbated in households and through the global economy under conditions of both “war” and “peace.” To understand the possibilities for world peace, we must understand these varieties of violence and harm that threaten peace. And tosustainpeace we must address the harmful gendered identities, ideologies, and social dynamics that support violence in every society. A narrow understanding of peace as merely the absence of organized violence does not engender the kind of nuanced and rich understanding of human history and human relations needed to bring an end to the structural and physical violence that remains pervasive worldwide. (shrink)

After the re-emergence of the tradition of virtue ethics in the early 1980s Reinhold Niebuhr has often served as a foil for authors who locate themselves in that tradition. However, this exercise has often proved controversial. This collection of essays continues this work, across a wide range of subjects, with the aim of avoiding some of the polemics that have previously accompanied it. The central thesis of this book is that putting the work of Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian realism in (...) dialogue with contemporary virtue theory is a profitable undertaking. An introductory essay argues against locating Niebuhr as a consequentialist and in favour of thinking of his work in terms of a dispositional ethics Contributors take different positions on whether Niebuhr's dispositional ethics should be considered a form of virtue ethics or an alternative to virtue ethics. Several of the articles relate Niebuhr and Christian realism to particular virtues. Throughout there is an appreciation of the ways in which any Niebuhrian approach to dispositional ethics or virtue must be shaped by a sense of tragedy, paradox, or irony. The most moral disposition will be one which includes doubts about its own virtue. This volume allows for a repositioning of Niebuhr in the context of contemporary moral theory as well as a rereading of the tradition of virtue ethics in the light of a distinctly Protestant, Christian realist and paradoxical view of virtue. As a result, it will be of great interest to scholars of Niebuhr and Christian Ethics and scholars working in Moral Philosophy and the Philosophy of Religion more generally. (shrink)

La comparaison des portraits à l’huile réalisés par Romaine Brooks dans les années 20 et les photographies de Claude Cahun et sa partenaire Marcel Moore de la même époque rend visible les positions idéologiques conflictuelles que ces women of vision défendirent dans les milieux artistique et politique où les débats sur la femme moderne se sont élaborés.

Phillips and colleagues convincingly argue that knowledge attribution is a faster, more automatic form of mindreading than belief attribution. However, they do not explain what it is about knowledge attribution that lends it this cognitive advantage. I suggest an explanation of the knowledge-attribution advantage that would also help to distinguish it from belief-based and minimalist alternatives.

This article defends the existence of _borderline consciousness._ In borderline consciousness, conscious experience is neither determinately present nor determinately absent, but rather somewhere between. The argument in brief is this. In considering what types of systems are conscious, we face a quadrilemma. Either nothing is conscious, or everything is conscious, or there’s a sharp boundary across the apparent continuum between conscious systems and nonconscious ones, or consciousness is a vague property admitting indeterminate cases. Assuming mainstream naturalism about consciousness, we ought (...) to reject the first three options, which forces us to the fourth, indeterminacy. Standard objections to the existence of borderline consciousness turn on the inconceivability of borderline cases. However, borderline cases are only inconceivable by an inappropriately demanding standard of conceivability. I conclude with some plausible cases and applications. (shrink)

Peirce maintains that facts and propositions are structurally isomorphic. When we understand how Peirce thinks they are isomorphic, we find that a common objection raised against epistemic conceptions of truth – that there are facts beyond the ken of discovery – holds no water against Peirce’s claim that truth is what would be believed after a sufficiently long and rigorous course of inquiry.

A longstanding philosophical premise perceives simplicity as a desirable attribute of scientific theories. One of several raised justifications for this notion is that simple theories are more likely to indicate the true makeup of natural systems. Qualitatively parsimonious hypotheses and theories keep to a minimum the number of different postulated entities within a system. Formulation of such ontologically simple working hypotheses proved to be useful in the experimental probing of narrowly defined bio systems. It is less certain, however, whether (...) qualitatively parsimonious theories are effective indicators of the true nature of complex biological systems. This paper assesses the success of ontologically simple theories in envisaging the makeup of three complex systems in bacteriology, immunology, and molecular biology. Evidence shows that parsimonious theories completely misconstrued the actual ontologically complex constitutions of the three examined systems. Since evolution and selective pressures typically produce ontologically intricate rather than simple bio systems, qualitatively parsimonious theories are mostly inapt indicators of the true nature of complex biological systems. (shrink)

Charles Sanders Peirce proposed two different solutions to the Liar Paradox. He proposed the first in 1865 and the second in 1869. However, no one has yet noted in the literature that Peirce rejected his 1869 solution in 1903. Peirce never explicitly proposed a third solution to the Liar Paradox. Nonetheless, I shall argue he developed the resources for a third and novel solution to the Liar Paradox.In what follows, I will first explain the Liar Paradox. Second, I will briefly (...) rehearse Peirce's 1865 solution and his reasons for rejecting it.1 Third, I will review his 1869 solution and his reasons for rejecting it in 1903. Lastly, I will propose a novel solution to the Liar Paradox by drawing upon Peirce's later.. (shrink)

We show that the theory of the partial order of computably enumerable equivalence relations (ceers) under computable reduction is 1-equivalent to true arithmetic. We show the same result for the structure comprised of the dark ceers and the structure comprised of the light ceers. We also show the same for the structure of L-degrees in the dark, light, or complete structure. In each case, we show that there is an interpretable copy of (N, +, \times) .

This essay is divided into four sections, the communal aim of which is to provide essential pathways to experiential bodily truths, thereby bringing to light the essential nature of the first-person body, the body subject. The essential pathways are anchored in Husserlian insights concerning the animate nature of the body subject. To arrive at these insights, it is necessary first to clear the field of conceptual obstacles, notably those stemming from idiosyncratic notions of proprioception that fail to accord with the (...) human realities of animate life. Accordingly, Section I provides essential clarifications of proprioception. The Husserlian insights that constitute Section II first draw attention to Husserl’s... (shrink)

The question whether quantum discontinuity can or cannot provide an answer to Zeno's Paradoxes is reopened. It is observed that what is usually understood by the term "discontinuity", namely, Einstein's conception of the photon as described by himself and all others, is unsuitable to the task because, essentially,it reduces to the trivial 'discontinuity' of objects scattered in space. By contrast, quantization of energy levels, which are not in space but can only alternate in time, provide the right sort of discontinuity (...) required. Discrete quantized orbits, corresponding to eigen-frequencies, are irreducible, and nothing is allowed to stand in-between them in satisfaction of the quantum postulate, furnishing the requisite, and so far missing, immediate nextness of a point to a certain other. In this way, Zeno's Runner need not postpone his first step indefinitely, always waiting upon an infinity of preceding steps, before it can be taken. There is now a point that is next to a point and so a step on that point, which is the first step. It follows that, if one kind of discontinuity, Einstein's, is incapable of offerring an answer to Zeno, while another kind can, the two are discrepant. One of them, the former, is not a kind of discontinuity properly so called at all, though evidently the consequence of one. (shrink)

The question whether quantum discontinuity can or cannot provide an answer to Zeno’s Paradoxes is reopened. It is observed that what is usually understood by the term “discontinuity”, namely, Einstein’s conception of the photon as described by himself and all others, is unsuitable to the task because, essentially,it reduces to the trivial ‘discontinuity’ of objects scattered in space. By contrast, quantization of energy levels, which are not in space but can only alternate in time, provide the right sort of discontinuity (...) required. Discrete quantized orbits, corresponding to eigen-frequencies, are irreducible, and nothing is allowed to stand in-between them in satisfaction of the quantum postulate, furnishing the requisite, and so far missing, immediate nextness of a point to a certain other. In this way, Zeno’s Runner need not postpone his first step indefinitely, always waiting upon an infinity of preceding steps, before it can be taken. There is now a point that is next to a point and so a step on that point, which is the first step. It follows that, if one kind of discontinuity, Einstein’s, is incapable of offerring an answer to Zeno, while another kind can, the two are discrepant. One of them, the former, is not a kind of discontinuity properly so called at all, though evidently the consequence of one. (shrink)

The words 'true value' assume an existential relationship with the thing being measured. There is assumed to exist some aspect of the thing being measured that is independent of its relationship to the person who is interested in the result of the measurement. Yet measurement is a response to the need of an observer to know something about the real world. There is therefore an epistemological aspect to measurement. Some aspect of measurement has to do with the observer as (...) a knower of the result of the measurement. The paper considers electrical measurement. It proposes that these relationships correspond to two distinct kinds of measurement: one has the characteristic that there does exist such a thing as a true value, though it cannot be known: in the other kind, no such thing as true value even exists. The notion of true value is very useful, and for the kind of measurement where such a thing does not exist, the paper defines an alternative that has the advantage that it can actually be known under some circumstances in calibration. (shrink)

Given the significant exculpatory power that ignorance has when it comes to moral, legal, and epistemic transgressions, it is important to have an accurate understanding of the concept of ignorance. According to the Standard View of factual ignorance, a person is ignorant that p whenever they do not know that p, while on the New View, a person is ignorant that p whenever they do not truly believe that p. On their own though, neither of these accounts explains how ignorance (...) can often be a degreed notion—how we can sometimes be slightly ignorant, quite ignorant, or completely ignorant that p. In this paper, I will argue that there is a route for advocates of the Standard View and the New View to accommodate the gradability of ignorance. On the view I defend, ‘ignorant’ picks out everyone that is ignorant to some degree, making it possible that ignorance can be both degreed and characterized as a lack of knowledge or true belief. Even though we can be ignorant to a greater or lesser extent, the only way to avoid being ignorant that p is to know or truly believe. (shrink)

I argue in this paper that the cases Gettier considers are not examples of justified true beliefs and that the question whether justified true belief sufficiently defines knowledge is not in fact, addressed. Indeed, the question is wholly untouched by Gettier or glossed over at best.

According to Hegel, the true infinite is the fundamental concept of philosophy. Yet despite this fact, there is absence of consensus concerning its meaning and significance. The true infinite challenges the currently dominant non-metaphysical interpretations of Hegel, as it challenged the dominance of the Kantian framework in its own day, specifically Kant’s attack on theology and his treatment of theology as a postulate of moralit y. Kant admits that the God-postulate has only subjective necessity and validity, and is (...) an expression of moral faith. Hegel both accepts Kant’s approach to the God-question through freedom and practical reason, but he rejects Kant’s philosophy of the postulates as incoherent, burdened with finitude and antithesis. The ought is only the beginning of the transcendence of finitude, but also essentially clings to finitude. This is the spurious infinite. In contrast to the traditional view of abstract transcendence, Hegel shows that the very attempt to separate the infinite from the finite only renders the infinite finite and levels it. The consciousness of limit (finitude) implies a transcendence of limit. The true infinite is an onto-theological principle, a social infinite that overcomes the limits imposed by abstract transcendence and the dualisms imposed by the Kantian frame. It is of vital importance for Hegel’s philosophy of religion, as both a doctrine of divine presence and absolute spirit in its community. (shrink)