Evan Westra
York University
Phillips and colleagues convincingly argue that knowledge attribution is a faster, more automatic form of mindreading than belief attribution. However, they do not explain what it is about knowledge attribution that lends it this cognitive advantage. I suggest an explanation of the knowledge-attribution advantage that would also help to distinguish it from belief-based and minimalist alternatives.
Keywords knowledge  mindreading  belief  knowledge attribution  belief attribution
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Young Children's Conceptions of Knowledge.Rachel Dudley - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (6):e12494.
True Belief and Knowledge Revisited.John Peterson - 1996 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 52 (1):127-135.
True Belief and Knowledge Revisited.John Peterson - 1996 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 52 (1):127-135.
Embedded Mental Action in Self-Attribution of Belief.Antonia Peacocke - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):353-377.
Chisholm on Indirect Attribution.Jane L. McIntyre - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 43 (3):409 - 414.
Factive and Nonfactive Mental State Attribution.Jennifer Nagel - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (5):525-544.
When Is A Belief True Because Of Luck?Preston Greene - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):465-475.
Knowledge is Normal Belief.B. Ball - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):69-76.
Moral Belief Attribution: A Reply to Roskies.Michael Cholbi - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):629 – 638.


Added to PP index

Total views
151 ( #76,466 of 2,499,415 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
53 ( #15,582 of 2,499,415 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes