The use of the social sciences in the interpretation of the New Testament emerged from the 1970s and has become a standard methodology for interpreting the New Testament. However, it has not been significantly used in the interpretation of the New Testament in Nigeria by biblical scholars. This article discusses what social-scientific criticism is and the need for its application in the interpretation of the New Testament by Nigerian New Testament scholars for a better understanding of the New (...) Testament and the people, beliefs and teachings it presents and contextualisation in the face of changing contexts of Christianity in Nigeria. Contribution: As far as we know, this article is the first one written on using social-scientific criticism to interpret the New Testament in the Nigerian context. It therefore contributes to the need for a multidisciplinary approach to interpreting the New Testament in Nigeria in particular and Africa in general. It therefore contributes also on methodological considerations with regard to interpreting the New Testament. (shrink)

Under the conditions of the revolution in science and technology, of tremendous social changes, of the tempestuous and significant growth in the prestige of scientific knowledge, and of the exacerbation of the ideological struggle, there has been an immeasurable broadening of the social tasks and spheres of operation of such social phenomena as scientific criticism and self-criticism. Study of social, theoretical, and psychological cross-sections of these phenomena is one of the necessary conditions for cultivating lofty civic (...) qualities, a communist world-view, and the moral and aesthetic improvement of the individual. Special attention is directed to the socializing function of criticism and self-criticism in the Program of the CPSU, the materials of the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU, and the resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On Literary and Artistic Criticism" and "On the State of Criticism and Self-Criticism in the Tambov Regional Party Organization." Scientific criticism reveals the extent to which the results or processes of practical activity are in accord with communist ideals and to what degree the moral and aesthetic norms of individuals and collectives are an expression of proletarian and general human culture. This is a distinctive intellectual and theoretical form of solution of social contradictions. Criticism is organically interwoven into theoretical and practical human activity. It breaks down old and established social traditions and customary values and impels human thought to undertake scientific quests. It does not permit society to content itself merely with its past triumphs. Scientific criticism arouses and cultivates class consciousness and provides an evaluation of social phenomena from the standpoint of the progressive class. Under the conditions of developed socialist society, criticism and self-criticism become an active means for improving ideological, political, and educational work, the development of the toilers' creative capacities, and activation of the sociopolitical and intellectual life of society. (shrink)

Imre Lakatos; II—Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 69, Issue 1, 1 June 1969, Page.

Imre Lakatos; II—Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 69, Issue 1, 1 June 1969, Page.

Determination of time-of-death is closely related to the mortality criteria. In prehistoric times, the criteria of death were narrated through the event of the body being evacuated from the spirit or soul leaving the human body. Along with the development of science in the modern era, scientists argue the criteria of biological death and clinical death. This study projected to critically philosophically analyze the time-of-death determination related to scientific criteria. The methods used in the data analysis stage were historical, (...) hermeneutic, comparative, and critical reflection. The results showed that the scientific criteria of death were inadequate to be used in the determination of time-of-death. Time-of-death objectively existed as a separate reality outside of human beings and its existence was absolutely determined or influenced by the existence of other realities. Time-of-death ontologically meant the end of life; epistemologically signified the absence of life and had no mysterious nature; axiologically it was a symbol or metaphor of human powerlessness to judge and determine the continuity of life. (shrink)

This article analyzes, Polanyi’s notion of authority in science and his criticism of Popper and Russell. It uses the history of early genetics and neo-Darwinism in order to examine the fruitfulness of Polanyi's concepts for an understanding of the history of biology. It discusses the responsibility of scientists in influential positions and shows that scientific authority is – as is criticism – indispensable for progress.

Abstract This paper is a close textual criticism of Theodosius Dobzhansky's Genetics and the Origin of Species. It argues that the book succeeds as interdisciplinary communication by promoting polysemy. The professional goals of two scientific communities are embedded in the text in such a way that each audience reads the call for co?operative action as implicit support for their own methods.

Taking user’s role and features as milestones for an approach on scientific representation has become a growing trend. We shall investigate the implications that pragmatics bring in the relevant debate. Proponents of pragmatic approaches support that questions such as ‘how an object represents another’ or ‘which features of a certain object represent the target of the representation and in what way’ can be answered only within the given context of representation’s use. Thus, attention is drawn to the intentionality of (...) the representation, in contrast to the semantic tradition, according to which the representational function is based on morphic relations between the representation and the represented object. Given that scientific representations surrogate objects and phenomena in our studies, they should reproduce aspects, relations and interactions of them, possessing the appropriate features. Therefore, we support that user’s intention is not enough to build the representational relation on it. We claim that a) a sustainable and successful theory of scientific representations cannot be grounded on pragmatics b) pragmatic approaches undermine the objectivity of the knowledge inferred by representations c) the important role of the cognizing subject in a theory of scientific representation can be rescued without the burden coming with pragmatic approaches. (shrink)

This article analyzes the treatment of natural philosophy in the work of Thomas Aquinas from the point of view of assimilation of the Aristotelian physical corpus. It focuses primarily on the Aquinas’s defense of the conception of the fallibility of the natural reason, the provisional and revisable character of all physical theories, the necessity of intercultural dialogue to discover the truths about nature, and Aquinas’s role in the development of the skeptical attitude in scientific research of the mobile’s world.

Two books have been particularly influential in contemporary philosophy of science: Karl R. Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery, and Thomas S. Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Both agree upon the importance of revolutions in science, but differ about the role of criticism in science's revolutionary growth. This volume arose out of a symposium on Kuhn's work, with Popper in the chair, at an international colloquium held in London in 1965. The book begins with Kuhn's statement of his (...) position followed by seven essays offering criticism and analysis, and finally by Kuhn's reply. The book will interest senior undergraduates and graduate students of the philosophy and history of science, as well as professional philosophers, philosophically inclined scientists, and some psychologists and sociologists. (shrink)

In the scientific communities most criticisms are constructive, while they are destructive in the humanistic circles. Indeed, scientists circulate their drafts among colleagues and students, hoping to elicit their comments and suggestions before submitting their work to publication. In contrast, philosophers and political thinkers attack their rivals, without sparing arguments ad hominem or even insults. The reason for this difference is that scientists are after the truth, whereas most humanists fight for more or less noble causes, from swelling their (...) own curricula to joining crusades for or against rationality, realism, justice, or what have you. (shrink)

In his late years, Thomas Kuhn became interested in the process of scientific specialization, which does not seem to possess the destructive element that is characteristic of scientific revolutions. It therefore makes sense to investigate whether and how Kuhn’s insights about specialization are consistent with, and actually fit, his model of scientific progress through revolutions. In this paper, I argue that the transition toward a new specialty corresponds to a revolutionary change for the group of scientists involved (...) in such a transition. I will clarify the role of the scientific community in revolutionary changes and characterize the incommensurability across specialties as possessing both semantic and methodological aspects. The discussion of the discovery of the structure of DNA will serve both as an illustration of my main argument and as reply to one criticism raised against Kuhn—namely, that his model cannot capture cases of revolutionary yet non-disruptive episodes of scientific progress. Revisiting Kuhn’s ideas on specialization will shed new light on some often overlooked features of scientific change. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Barry Loewer attempts to defend Humeanism about laws of nature from a charge that Humean laws are not adequately explanatory. Central to his defense is a distinction between metaphysical and scientific explanations: even if Humeans cannot offer further metaphysical explanations of particular features of their “mosaic,” that does not preclude them from offering scientific explanations of these features. According to Marc Lange, however, Loewer’s distinction is of no avail. Defending a transitivity principle linking (...) class='Hi'>scientific explanantia to their metaphysical grounds, Lange argues that a charge of explanatory inadequacy resurfaces once this intuitive principle is in place. This paper surveys, on behalf of the Humean, three strategies for responding to Lange’s criticism. The ready availability of these strategies suggests that Lange’s argument may not bolster anti-Humean convictions, since the argument rests on premises that those not antecedently sharing these convictions may well reject. The three strategies also correspond to three interesting ways of thinking about relations of grounding linking Humean laws and their instances, all of which are consistent with theses of Humean supervenience, and some of which have been heretofore overlooked. (shrink)

Most discussion of the unity of science has concerned what might be called vertical relations between theories: the reducibility of biology to chemistry, or chemistry to physics, and so on. In this paper I shall be concerned rather with horizontal relations, that is to say, with theories of different kinds that deal with objects at the same structural level. Whereas the former, vertical, conception of unity through reduction has come under a good deal of criticism recently (see, e.g., Dupré (...) 1993), horizontal unity has generally been conceded to be an important goal. The most pressing questions about horizontal unification arise in the study of human behavior. Numerous sciences including psychology, economics, anthropology, sociology, and parts of biology, attempt to provide explanations of human behavior. It is possible that some of these sciences may be able to coexist peacefully or even cooperatively. However things do not always go so smoothly, and at least two approaches to human behavior, those deriving from economics and evolutionary biology, often involve clearly imperialist tendencies. Devotees of these approaches are inclined to claim that they are in possession not just of one useful perspective on human behavior, but of the key that will open doors to the understanding of ever wider areas of human behavior. In this paper I shall consider some areas in which economic and evolutionary imperialists are currently staking claims. It is of particular interest to look at situations where two the two imperialist programs are staking the same claim, but limitations of space force me to focus here mainly on economics, and my remarks on evolutionary imperialism will be cursory. As well as some specific insights into the particular strategies of these scientific programs, I hope that my discussion will throw some more general light on the limits of such general theoretical strategies and, thereby, I shall suggest some motivations for adhering to a horizontal pluralism of science that matches the vertical pluralism advocated by anti-reductionists. (shrink)

Criticism in philosophy goes in accordance with general skeptical scientific attitude toward results of a research. The latter are to be achieved, presupposed, given as data and become to be verified or falsified, questioned by critique, analyzing etc. Criticism is improved mean to avoid persuasion and relativism, but (as selected sample versions of philosophical criticism will illustrate, in particular critical legacy of I. Kant, H. Putnam and L. Wittgenstein, especially via resolute interpretation of his views by (...) J. Conant) all three methodological attitudes are mutually correlated, sometimes even viciously. Relativism appears to be less vicious, because it could be treated as performative: relativism is relative. Attention to performativity of relativism can provide for its contextual validity and relativity. (shrink)

As Aristotle stated, scientific explanation is based on deductive argument--yet, Wesley C. Salmon points out, not all deductive arguments are qualified explanations. The validity of the explanation must itself be examined. _Four Decades of Scientific Explanation_ provides a comprehensive account of the developments in scientific explanation that transpired in the last four decades of the twentieth century. It continues to stand as the most comprehensive treatment of the writings on the subject during these years. Building on the (...) historic 1948 essay by Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” which introduced the deductive-nomological model on which most work on scientific explanation was based for the following four decades, Salmon goes beyond this model's inherent basis of describing empirical knowledge to tells us “not only _what,_ but also _why_.” Salmon examines the predominant models in chronological order and describes their development, refinement, and criticism or rejection. _Four Decades of Scientific Explanation_ underscores the need for a consensus of approach and ongoing evaluations of methodology in scientific explanation, with the goal of providing a better understanding of natural phenomena. (shrink)

Methodological criticism may be defined as the critique of scientific practice in the light of methodological principles, and critical methodology as the study of proper methods of criticism; the problem is that of the interaction between the scientific methods which give methodological criticism its methodological character and the critical methods which give it its character of criticism. These ideas and this problem are illustrated by an examination of Karl Popper's critique of Marxian social science. (...) It is argued that though Popper's favorable articulations of Marx are valuable, his unfavorable criticism is invalid, the grounds of my argument being certain ideas in critical methodology relating to the distinctions between theory and practice, between inaccurate and invalid criticism, and between the justification of favorable criticism and the justification of unfavorable criticism. (shrink)

This paper will defend scientific study of the social by scrutinizing Clifford Geertz's interpretive anthropology, and evolutionary psychologists' criticism of it. I shall critically examine Geertz's identification of anthropology with literary criticism, his assumption that a science of society is possible only on a positivist model, his view of the relation between culture and mind, and his anti anti-relativism. Then I shall discuss evolutionary psychologists' criticism of Geertz's view as an exemplar of the so-called "Standard Social (...) Science Model." Finally, I shall claim that both Geertz and evolutionary psychologists misunderstand the aim of the social sciences, which is to explain the unintended consequences of human actions in institutional contexts. Key Words: Clifford Geertz • evolutionary psychology • interpretive anthropology • positivism • Standard Social Science Model (SSSM). (shrink)

Criticism as a means towards ampler understanding has been a key theme of Hans Albert’s work for many decades. In the main his influential and widely appreciated efforts have addressed its role in advancing scientific progress. And there is, further, good reason to think that it is equally profitable elsewhere, and in this brief discussion I would accordingly like to stress the role of criticism in relation to philosophical work.

This article, after tracing a precise classification of the exegetical trend known as iʿjāz ʿilmī, summarizes and discusses the criticism leveled at it and examines how the “scientific interpretation” of the Qur’ān is liable to blend with pseudoscience and conspiracy theories to the detriment of a solid harmonization of science and religion and of a genuine appreciation of natural science. Furthermore, the article offers some practical ideas that can be implemented in order to effectively and fairly address iʿjāz (...) ʿilmī in the Muslim world. (shrink)

In this paper I show how certain requirements must be set on any tenable account of scientific representation, such as the requirement allowing for misrepresentation. I then continue to argue that two leading accounts of scientific representation— the inferential account and the interpretational account—are flawed for they do not satisfy such requirements. Through such criticism, and drawing on an analogy from non-scientific representation, I also sketch the outline of a superior account. In particular, I propose to (...) take epistemic representations to be intentional objects that come with reference, semantic contents and a representational code, and I identify faithful representations as representations that act as guides to ontology. (shrink)

Wellek is surely right in arguing that the New Critics did not intend to behave as formalists, but I think he needs to explain why they came so close to doing so in spite of themselves. One explanation may lie in a sphere Wellek mentions but might have probed even more fully, the long-standing Romantic and modernist revolt against the culture of science, positivism, and utilitarianism. In Culture and Society, 1780-1950 , Raymond Williams argues that the Romantic reaction against industrial-utilitarian (...) society led to a specialization of literature that attenuated literature's claims in a self-defeating way. Instead of contesting the realm of objective knowledge, the defenders of literature conceded this territory to science and commerce, either celebrating literature for its very freedom from such knowledge or claiming for it some alternate form of knowledge that could not be made rationally respectable. One could argue that the same pattern of misplaced reaction is seen in the New Criticism, that its revolt against the utilitarian, "Platonic" drives of science and positivism took the form of an attempt to divest literature of objective "truth of correspondence." Having equated this kind of truth with the most reductive forms of scientism, moralism, and propagandizing, the New Critics made it difficult to justify their own ambitious claims for the humanistic knowledge embodied in literature. Their way of reacting against the depravities of technological culture continues to be a common one today and can even be found in such adversaries of the New Critics as the cultural revolutionaries, the phenomenologists, and the deconstructionists—all of whom express the paradigms of our modern "adversary culture." It is an understandable and even perhaps an admirable reaction, but it has led to distortions in our conception of the humanities—one of which is the aggravation of that very dissociation of sensibility into scientific and poetic components that we all say we want to have done with. Gerald Graff, chairman of the English department at Northwestern University, is the author of Poetic Statement and Critical Dogma and, most recently, Literature against Itself: Literary Ideas in Modern Society. He responds in this article to René Wellek's "The New Criticism: Pro and Contra," published in Summer 1978 in Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

Resumen: Este trabajo reconstruye la crítica general del conflacionismo hecha por Margaret Archer. En su programa de morfogénesis social la autora británica realizó un agudo diagnóstico acerca de los déficits fundamentales de las diversas construcciones del objeto sociológico y las cuestionó teórica y epistemológicamente a través de la figura crítica de conflacionismo, en la que distinguió tres modalidades. Aquí las reconstruiremos por separado y analizaremos en esa crítica general la formulación in nuce de las bases teóricas o fundamento operativo del (...) programa de realismo crítico morfogenético, que impulsará la autora con el ariete alternativo de establecer una sociología no-conflacionista, informada ontológica y epistemológicamente por el realismo crítico y metodológicamente por el dualismo analítico. Para llevar a cabo esta tarea asumimos la perspectiva sistemática de programas multinivelados y la categoría de estrategia de metateorización de tipo preludio de Ritzer.: This text reconstructs the general criticism to conflation formulated by Margaret Archer. In its social morphogenesis programme, Archer elaborates an acute diagnosis about the main deficits of different constructions of sociological object and she questioned them ontological and epistemologically through the figure of conflation, in which she distinguished three modes. Here we reconstruct each of them separately and we analyse the formulation in nuce the theoretical basis of critical and morphogenetic realism, a scientific research programme that she establishes as a non-conflation sociological way, supported by critical realism and analytical dualism. In doing so, we assume the systematic perspective of multileveled research programmes and the category of metatheorizing as prelude by Ritzer. (shrink)

The article intends to show the significance of Ch. Peirce’s ideas for the development of contemporary philosophy, to find out the main directions of his criticism of the principles of Cartesian and more broadly modern philosophy (where it comes from Descartes) and to consider the positive program of his philosophy, which he offers as an alternative to Modern philosophy. Peirce starts from a pragmatic and semiotic approach to human nature, consciousness and cognition. Thanks to this approach, he managed to (...) undermine the key ideas of the modern understanding of cognition, human, language, namely: individualism, linguistic atomism, dogmatism, dualism, representationism, nominalism, foundationalism, etc. And, instead, to propose a new theory of knowledge, a new ontology and anthropology. Peirce asserts the indirectness of human cognition by signs (linguistic, cultural, sensory), the impossibility of introspection and intuition, advocates holism, fallibilism, pragmatism, realism, synechism, inferentialism and offers a new understanding of the personality — all this makes him a relevant and contemporary thinker. Peirce’s ideas offer a fresh perspective on modern scientific practice. Peirce’s rethinking of the foundations of knowledge puts him alongside many thinkers of the 20th and 21st centuries. The development of his ideas can be seen in modern anthropology, epistemology, research on artificial intelligence, semiotics, etc. The article is divided into four subsections, which are devoted to the main directions of Peirce’s criticism of Descartes’ philosophy: in the first — against Descartes’ skeptical methodology, Peirce puts the concept of fallibilism and the principle of belief, in the second — Peirce denies the possibility of intuition and proves the indirectness of our cognition by signs, in the third — it is about the advantages of the semiotic and communicative approach over individualism and linguistic atomism, in the fourth — Descartes’ nominalism and dualism, Peirce contrasts the realist approach and his theory of synechism, as well as semiotic anthropology. (shrink)

This paper is a supplement to, and provides a proof of principle of, Kuhn vs. Popper on Criticism and Dogmatism in Science: A Resolution at the Group Level. It illustrates how calculations may be performed in order to determine how the balance between different functions in science—such as imaginative, critical, and dogmatic—should be struck, with respect to confirmation (or corroboration) functions and rules of scientific method.

Two books have been particularly influential in contemporary philosophy of science: Karl R. Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery, and Thomas S. Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Both agree upon the importance of revolutions in science, but differ about the role of criticism in science's revolutionary growth. This volume arose out of a symposium on Kuhn's work, with Popper in the chair, at an international colloquium held in London in 1965. The book begins with Kuhn's statement of his (...) position followed by seven essays offering criticism and analysis, and finally by Kuhn's reply. The book will interest senior undergraduates and graduate students of the philosophy and history of science, as well as professional philosophers, philosophically inclined scientists, and some psychologists and sociologists. (shrink)

This paper describes the development of theories of scientific explanation since Hempel's earliest models in the 1940ies. It focuses on deductive and probabilistic whyexplanations and their main problems: lawlikeness, explanation-prediction asymmetries, causality, deductive and probabilistic relevance, maximal specifity and homogenity, the height of the probability value. For all of these topic the paper explains the most important approaches as well as their criticism, including the author's own accounts. Three main theses of this paper are: (1) Both deductive and (...) probabilistic explanations are important in science, not reducible to each other. (2) One must distinguish between (cause giving) explanations and (reason giving) justifications and predictions. (3) The adequacy of deductive as well as probabilistic explanations is relative to a pragmatically given background knowledge-which does not exclude, however, the possibility of purely semantic models. (shrink)

More than a century after Guido Adler's appointment to the first chair in musicology at the University of Vienna, Music, Criticism, and the Challenge of History provides a first look at the discipline in this earliest period, and at the ideological dilemmas and methodological anxieties that characterized it upon its institutionalization. Author Kevin Karnes contends that some of the most vital questions surrounding musicology's disciplinary identities today-the relationship between musicology and criticism, the role of the subject in analysis (...) and the narration of history, and the responsibilities of the scholar to the listening public-originate in these conflicted and largely forgotten beginnings. Karnes lays bare the nature of music study in the late nineteenth century through insightful readings of long-overlooked contributions by three of musicology's foremost pioneers-Adler, Eduard Hanslick, and Heinrich Schenker. Shaped as much by the skeptical pronouncements of the likes of Nietzsche and Wagner as it was by progressivist ideologies of scientific positivism, the new discipline comprised an array of oft-contested and intensely personal visions of music study, its value, and its future. Karnes introduces readers to a Hanslick who rejected the call of positivist scholarship and dedicated himself to penning an avowedly subjective history of Viennese musical life. He argues that Schenker's analytical experiments had roots in a Wagner-inspired search for a critical alternative to Adler's style-obsessed scholarship. And he illuminates Adler's determined response to Nietzsche's warnings about the vitality of artistic and cultural life in an increasingly scientific age. Through sophisticated and meticulous presentation, Music, Criticism, and the Challenge of History demonstrates that the new discipline of musicology was inextricably tied in with the cultural discourse of its time. (shrink)

Many of you may be familiar with what is today called the “Gaia hypothesis.” It consists in the thesis that the earth is a super-organism that exhibits specific properties of life: It regulates its own temperature, “excretes” waste, combats poisonous “infections,” and the like. In a word, it maintains homoeostasis. The hypothesis has supposedly been established by using a scientific method: the proposal of a hypothesis putatively based on observation and the reasonable explanation of the data. It was offered (...) ostensibly as the only viable explanation for a vast host of natural phenomena, of which the actual processes and mechanics are not truly understood. I will note just a few of these. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The individual-community relationship has always been one of the most fundamental topics of social sciences. In sociology, this is known as the micro-macro relationship while in economics it refers to the processes, through which, individual actions lead to macroeconomic phenomena. Based on philosophical discourse and systems theory, many sociologists even use the term "emergence" in their understanding of micro-macro relationship, which refers to collective phenomena that are created by the cooperation of individuals, but cannot be reduced to individual actions. (...) "Emergence" theories attempt to explain the nature of society as a complex system by examining how individuals and their relationships lead to the creation of integrated and macro-social phenomena such as markets, educational systems, cultural beliefs, and shared social practices. As a prelude to activity, every researcher has to answer the question from the methodological point of view, how is it possible to study the behavior of social groups and how can we gain knowledge about the laws related to social groups? Anyone who deals with humanities and social sciences or any reality and phenomenon that affects human beings, inevitably deals with the reality that is emerging. In fact, emergence occurs when one level of reality emerges radically from another level. Examples of emergent levels of reality include how the mind emerges from the body; or the way society emerges from human beings. Therefore, when there is an emerging factor, different scientific disciplines should be used, because it is inevitable to talk about social affairs, psychology and neurobiology, as well as physical and even chemical. -/- INTRODUCTION Since its beginning in the 19th century, sociology has faced the fundamental question of what a social phenomena stands for? At a glance, sociologists deal with the study of social groups, collective behavior, institutions, social structures, social networks, and social dynamics, and ultimately all such phenomena are composed of individuals. Therefore, social phenomena seem to have no independent ontological status, and in this case, sociology is ultimately about reducible individuals. Different approaches about the micro-macro relationship, using the concept of "emergence", argue that although collective phenomena are created by individuals, they cannot be reduced to individual action. The term "emergence" is used to distinguish "emergent results" from " Procedural results". Results are called Procedural that can only be calculated by adding or subtracting the causes that act together. On the contrary, they are emergent outcomes that are qualitatively novel compared to the causes from which they originate. An example of such emergent results is mental characteristics that emerge from neural processes, but are not considered among the characteristics of neural processes of components - which are their origin. Philosophical debates about emergentism and reductionism focus on the mind-brain relationship, but as many philosophers have noted, they can be generalized to apply to any hierarchical set of features. The cognitive revolution reactivated a 19th century controversy between theorists of Identity and dualism. The theorists of Identity believe in reductionist materialism and elimination of metaphysics, according to which the mind is nothing more than the biological, while the dualists believe that the mind and the brain are distinct from each other. Emergence has been considered as a third way between the theories of Identity and dualism. -/- METHODOLOGY Interdisciplinarity Is fundamentally indicated by the dominance of open systems as well as social and emerging systems at different levels. Therefore, as long as we are facing a new emergentism, there will necessarily be different fields and an interdisciplinary method. The commonality of social sciences and cognitive sciences on the issue of emergence provides the possibility of interaction and exchange of concepts between these two for deeper research. Therefore, in this research, apart from the concepts of Subvenience and downward causation, we have used multiple realization and wildly disjunctive, which are used to explain the emerging concept in cognitive sciences, including neurobiology, psychology, and philosophy. For analytical and interdisciplinary approaches, after examining the concepts of subvenience, and wildly disjunctive, Individualistic and collectivist emergentism have been reviewed. And then their adequacy is criticized and evaluated in meeting strong emergence conditions. -/- FINDINGS Philosophers of the mind have been able to define the conditions of irreducibility and downward causation, which are essential for strong emergence, by using the principle of subvenience with the help of multiple realization and wildly disjunctive principles. Therefore, by definition, emergentist individualism suffers from the problem of how to explain downward causality and irreducibility, and emergentist collectivism faces the challenge of reification. The analysis of the challenges facing the two methodological approaches of individualism and collectivism leads us to three unresolved issues about the emerging phenomenon, which are realism, downward causality, and mechanism. Despite the differences in the stances of these two approaches regarding the aforementioned triple problems, individualists and collectivists both agree that some social characteristics are reducible; and some others are irreducible due to their complexity, the determination of which, depends on the case study of the mechanism of emergence of each social characteristic. -/- CONCLUSION An emergence that is consistent with reductionism is called a weak emergence. And strong emergence includes the principle of irreducibility and downward causality. According to strong emergence, the characteristics of social phenomena have downward causal power, which cannot be reduced to the causal forces. The principle of subvenience, together with multiple realization and wildly disjunctive, can provide the conditions of irreducibility and downward causality, which are essential conditions of strong emergence. Based on the philosophical analysis of two methodological approaches, individualist and collectivist, it can be concluded that emergentist individualism suffers from the problem of how to explain downward causality and irreducibility, and reification collectivism faces the challenge of reification. The analysis of the problems faced by these two approaches leads us to three unresolved issues, which are realism, downward causality, and mechanism. individualist emergentists acknowledge the existence of emergent social characteristics, but despite this, they believe that these characteristics are not real but merely analytical constructs that require explanation based on individuals and their mutual actions. But collectivists argue that emergentism yields a categorical ontology and supports social realism. They accept the dependence of social characteristics on individuals, but claim that social entities and structures are ontologically independent. Individualists and collectivists both agree that some social characteristics are reducible; and others are irreducible due to their complexity; and the only way to recognize this is to engage in empirical studies of the mechanisms and temporal processes of "emergence" that create social characteristics. -/- NOVELTY The newness of this compact article is as follows: a) Presenting an interdisciplinary approach using the analysis of philosophy of cognitive sciences, including the philosophy of mind, neurobiology and psychology to formulate the issue of social emergence; b) Criticizing individualist and collectivist methodological approaches to the issue of social emergence and explaining the sufficiency and shortcomings of both in providing weak and strong emerging conditions; c) Explaining and categorizing the challenges facing methodological approaches in explaining the phenomenon of social emergence, in three categories: realism, downward causality, and mechanism. 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Researchers in developmental psychology have concluded that no significant differences exist between children raised by lesbians and gay men and those raised by heterosexuals. Although these scientific studies have attracted criticism, scrutiny has shown that they are actually epistemologically sounder than the body of knowledge that the critics themselves have developed in order to mount their case against lesbian and gay parenting. Nevertheless, to the extent that they are limited by a number of problematic assumptions structuring the paradigm (...) within which they have been conducted, the parenting studies are not a body of maximally objective knowledge. The same assumptions have also tended to inform legal discourse on lesbian and gay parenting. A paradigm shift away from questions about the goodness or badness of lesbian and gay parenting is overdue, both in sexuality-focused psychological research on child development and in the law’s approach to nonheterosexual parenting. (shrink)

In ‘Scientific Research and Moral Rectitude’ Robert Hoffman defends the scientific community against critics who maintain that ‘the researcher's claim to freedom of inquiry should be upheld only if his discovery does not adversely affect mankind….’ He uses two arguments in his defence, both of which purport to show that this sort of criticism is logically misconceived.

Marx himself would have agreed with such a practical approach to the criticism of his method..... He was led to this position, I believe, by his conviction that a scientific background was urgently needed by the practical politician.

In the Postscript to the second edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn addresses charges of relativism by exhibiting his notion of scientific progress, a notion he claims is not relativistic. Critics have largely bypassed this as an evasion on Kuhn’s part. This essay argues that Kuhn’s model of progress does not rescue him from self-refutation charges, and that this criticism can be pressed regardless of whether he embraces global relativism. It concludes by tracing the ongoing (...) controversy regarding Kuhn and relativism to the elusive nature of Kuhn’s prose. (shrink)