There are three riddles of induction. The New Riddle is this: How do we give a definition of 'projectible hypothesis' which is noncircular, and which yet divides all universal hypotheses unerringly into two disjoint classes--the projectible and the unprojectible? This is a purely analytical problem: build a machine which sorts hypotheses in the intuitively correct way, it making no difference why the machine works, so long as it works : Why should we rely on inductions to acquire beliefs (...) about the unobserved, rather than on any other method of inference to acquire alternative beliefs about the unobserved? ;Here, we solve all three riddles. Chapter One is devoted to the New Riddle. Chapter Two serves to introduce some important matters concerning counterfactuals and causation, necessary for the hard labor of Chapter Three, which addresses the Old Riddle. The true pattern of inference from experience is discussed and two kinds of counterfactuals are distinguished, suggesting an answer to Hume. (shrink)

Many believe that Goodman’s new riddle of induction proves the impossibility of a purely syntactical theory of confirmation. After discussing and rejecting Jackson’s solution to Goodman’s paradox, I formulate the “new riddle of deduction,” in analogy to the new riddle of induction. Since it is generally agreed that deductive validity can be defined syntactically, the new riddle of induction equally does not show that inductive validity cannot be defined syntactically. I further rely on (...) the analogy between induction and deduction in order to explain why some predicates, such as “grue,” are unprojectible. (shrink)

With his new riddle of induction, Goodman raised a problem for enumerative induction which many have taken to show that only some ‘natural’ properties can be used for making inductive inferences. Arguably, however, (i) enumerative induction is not a method that scientists use for making inductive inferences in the first place. Moreover, it seems at first sight that (ii) Goodman’s problem does not affect the method that scientists actually use for making such inferences—namely, classical statistics. Taken (...) together, this would indicate that (iii) ‘naturalness’ is not such a relevant concept for the problem of induction, after all. I have no objections against (i) and (iii). But, contrary to (ii), I argue that classical statistics does face a version of Goodman’s problem, which I call the statistical riddle of induction. Given that his problem merely is an instance of the more general problem of underdetermination, this is hardly surprising. Perhaps more importantly, I also show how my riddle can be used for exposing a common fallacy in probabilistic reasoning, without relying on Bayesian assumptions. (shrink)

The paper deals with the New Riddle of Induction set forth by N. Goodman in his Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. The problem is introduced through the definition of grue-predicate. The relation between the grue-hypothesis and empirical evidence is examined. Goodman’s underlying thesis about the neutrality of empirical evidence is undermined. The intelligibility of the idea that disjunctive properties such as Grue can be observed and seen is questioned. A solution of Goodman’s riddle is outlined by means of (...) the definition of the identity of empirical properties and further deve- loped through postulating of the necessary condition of induction executability which prohibits the inference from “Some a, b, c, d emeralds are green” to the hypothesis “All emeralds are grue”. (shrink)

The most innovative and important parts of Bertrand Russell's Human Knowledge were the result of his first attempt in three decades to come to grips with the problem of induction, or, more generally, ‘non-demonstrative inference’. My purpose here is to argue that that work constituted giant progress on the problem; if I succeed, something will have been done to restore this work to its proper place in the history of philosophy and, correlatively, to rearrange that history.

In a recent paper in this journal, Schramm presents what he takes to be an answer to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction. His solution relies on the technical notion of evidential significance, which is meant to distinguish two ways that evidence may bear on a hypothesis: either via support or confirmation. As he puts his view in slogan form: “confirmation is support by significant evidence”. Once we make this distinction, Schramm claims, we see that Goodman’s famous riddle (...) is dissolved, and we are no longer forced into the “intolerable result” that anything confirms anything. Schramm makes a number of incisive observations in his paper, but I do not think he has solved the New Riddle. There are two reasons for this. First, Schramm has an overly narrow conception of what the Riddle amounts to; I would venture to guess that it is narrower than that of most contemporary philosophers. Thus his proposal does not address the primary concern. Second, Schramm’s notion of significant evidence relies on a counterfactual condition that bears more than a passing resemblance to that made famous by Jackson in his paper on the topic. However, Jackson’s proposal faces several well-known counterexamples, some of which can be adapted into Schramm’s framework. Schramm’s solution thus inherits a number of outstanding problems from Jackson’s proposal, which he has not shown us how to handle. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider Goodman’s new riddle of induction and how we should best respond to it. Noticing that all the emeralds so far observed are green, we infer that all emeralds are green. However, all emeralds so far observed are also grue, so we could also infer that they are grue. Only one of these inductive inferences or projections could, however, be valid. For the hypothesis that all emeralds are green predicts that the next observed emerald (...) will be green; whereas the hypothesis that they are grue predicts that it will blue. Goodman’s new riddle is the problem of saying why the inductive inference involving “green” is the valid one. Goodman’s own solution appeals to the idea of entrenchment. His idea is that “green” is a more entrenched predicate than “grue” in the sense that it has figured many more times in our past projections than has “grue”. In his view, this explains why “green” is projectible whereas “grue” isn’t. I argue that this response doesn’t go far enough and that we additionally need an explanation of why “green” is more entrenched than “grue”—that we are otherwise left with the unsatisfactory view that its superior entrenchment is a mere linguistic accident. I try to supplement Goodman’s solution with an explanation of this kind. I argue that “grue” is not entrenched be- cause past successful inductions involving “green” show that past projections that could have been made using what I call “grue-like” predicates—predicates which are like “grue” except that the times featuring in their definitions are past—would have been unsuccessful. (shrink)

I propose a novel solution to Goodman's new riddle of induction, one on which aspects of scientific methodology preclude significant confirmation of the Grue Hypothesis. The solution appeals to intuitive constraints on the confirmation of explanatory hypotheses, and can be construed as a fragment of a theory of Inference to the Best Explanation. I give it an objective Bayesian formalisation, and contrast it with Goodman's and Sober's solutions, which make appeal to both methodological and non-methodological considerations, and those (...) of Jackson, Godfrey-Smith, and White, on which explanatory considerations play a very different role. (shrink)

Logic for Dewey is a normative inquiry into the nature of inquiry itself. Goodman’s grue example is assessed in light of Dewey's vocabulary for logic as presented in his 1938 Logic.

Although the relevance and importance of his work has been recognized only belatedly, Charles Sanders Peirce was, throughout his life, a careful student and significant contributor to the development of logic, scientific theory, and philosophy generally. Occasionally, complete appreciation of Peirce's efforts has been hampered because his work is often unique and, at times, highly idiosyncratic. Yet, we hope to show in this paper that for one aspect of his work in logic Peirce did not abandon the ordinary without purpose. (...) Only relatively recently have philosophers of science become interested in the logic of discovery - that is, in the logic of the selection of hypotheses to be tested rather than simply in the ways of testing hypotheses which have already been selected. (shrink)

The limited aim here is to explain what John Dewey might say about the formulation of the grue example. Nelson Goodman’s problem of distinguishing good and bad inductive inferences is an important one, but the grue example misconstrues this complex problem for certain technical reasons, due to ambiguities that contemporary logical theory has not yet come to terms with. Goodman’s problem is a problem for the theory of induction and thus for logical theory in general. Behind the whole discussion (...) of these issues over the last several decades is a certain view of logic hammered out by Russell, Carnap, Tarski, Quine, and many others. Goodman’s nominalism hinges in essential ways on a certain view of formal logic with an extensional quantification theory at its core. This raises many issues, but the one issue most germane here is the conception of predicates ensconced in this view of logic. (shrink)

A challenger of traditions and boundaries A pivotal figure in 20th-century philosophy, Nelson Goodman has made seminal contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, and the philosophy of language, with surprising connections that cut across traditional boundaries. In the early 1950s, Goodman, Quine, and White published a series of papers that threatened to torpedo fundamental assumptions of traditional philosophy. They advocated repudiating analyticity, necessity, and prior assumptions. Some philosophers, realizing the seismic effects repudiation would cause, argued that philosophy should retain the familiar (...) framework. Others considered the arguments compelling, but despaired of doing philosophy without the framework. Goodman disagreed with both factions. Rather than regretting the loss of structure, he capitalized on the opportunities that arise when the strictures of tradition are loosened. (shrink)

Although the relevance and importance of his work has been recognized only belatedly, Charles Sanders Peirce was, throughout his life, a careful student and significant contributor to the development of logic, scientific theory, and philosophy generally. Occasionally, complete appreciation of Peirce's efforts has been hampered because his work is often unique and, at times, highly idiosyncratic. Yet, we hope to show in this paper that for one aspect of his work in logic Peirce did not abandon the ordinary without purpose. (...) Only relatively recently have philosophers of science become interested in the logic of discovery - that is, in the logic of the selection of hypotheses to be tested rather than simply in the ways of testing hypotheses which have already been selected. (shrink)

That past patterns may continue in many different ways has long been identified as a problem for accounts of induction. The novelty of Goodman’s ”new riddle of induction” lies in a meta-argument that purports to show that no account of induction can discriminate between incompatible continuations. That meta-argument depends on the perfect symmetry of the definitions of grue/bleen and green/blue, so that any evidence that favors the ordinary continuation must equally favor the grue-ified continuation. I argue (...) that this very dependence on the perfect symmetry defeats the novelty of the new riddle. The symmetry can be obtained in contrived circumstances, such as when we grue-ify our total science. However, in all such cases, we cannot preclude the possibility that the original and grue-ified descriptions are merely notationally variant descriptions of the same physical facts; or if there are facts that separate them, these facts are ineffable, so that no account of induction should be expected to pick between them. In ordinary circumstances, there are facts that distinguish the regular and grue-ified descriptions. Since accounts of induction can and do call upon these facts, Goodman’s meta-argument cannot provide principled grounds for the failure of all accounts of induction. It assures us only of the failure of accounts of induction, such as unaugmented enumerative induction, that cannot exploit these symmetry breaking facts. (shrink)

Israel 2004 claims that numerous philosophers have misinterpreted Goodman’s original ‘New Riddle of Induction’, and weakened it in the process, because they do not define ‘grue’ as referring to past observations. Both claims are false: Goodman clearly took the riddle to concern the maximally general problem of “projecting” any type of characteristic from a given realm of objects into another, and since this problem subsumes Israel’s, Goodman formulated a stronger philosophical challenge than the latter surmises.

Nelson Goodman's new riddle of induction forcefully illustrates a challenge that must be confronted by any adequate theory of inductive inference: provide some basis for choosing among alternative hypotheses that fit past data but make divergent predictions. One response to this challenge is to distinguish among alternatives by means of some epistemically significant characteristic beyond fit with the data. Statistical learning theory takes this approach by showing how a concept similar to Popper's notion of degrees of testability is (...) linked to minimizing expected predictive error. In contrast, formal learning theory appeals to Ockham's razor, which it justifies by reference to the goal of enhancing efficient convergence to the truth. In this essay, I show that, despite their differences, statistical and formal learning theory yield precisely the same result for a class of inductive problems that I call strongly VC ordered, of which Goodman's riddle is just one example. (shrink)

In his commentary on my paper, “Means-Ends Epistemology”, David Chart constructs a Riddle of Induction with the following feature: Means-ends analysis, as I formulated it in the paper, selects “all emeralds are grue” as the optimal conjecture after observing a sample of all green emeralds. Chart’s construction is rigorous and correct. If we disagree, it is in the philosophical morals to be drawn from his example. Such morals are best discussed by elucidating some of the larger epistemological issues (...) involved. “Means-ends Epistemology” sought a normative theory of hypothesis selection. I defined what it means for an inductive method to reliably and efficiently find a correct hypothesis from a set of alternative hypotheses. (In fact, I investigated a number of standards of empirical success for inductive methods.) Call such methods optimal. We may take optimal inferences to be those made by optimal methods. This defines a relation Optimal-Inference(h,e,H): “given the set of alternative hypotheses H, and evidence e, hypothesis h is an optimal inference”. One fundamental difference between the means-ends approach and traditional confirmation theory is that the latter has sought a two-place relation between theory and evidence alone, something like “hypothesis h is highly confirmed given evidence e”. From my point of view, posing the problem of induction as discerning the right relation between theory and evidence is elliptical because it leaves unspecified the set of alternative hypotheses under investigation (as well as other relevant factors, such as the scientist’s background knowledge, observational means, cognitive capacities and epistemic values). Chart’s Riddle highlights the fact that depending on the space of alternative hypotheses, means-ends analysis may select a different hypothesis on the same evidence: “all emeralds are green” in my Goodmanian Riddle, and “all emeralds are grue” in his. To my mind, his example.. (shrink)

Goodman'snew riddle of induction can be characterized by the following questions: What is the difference between grue and green?; Why is the hypothesis that all emeralds are grue not lawlike?; Why is this hypothesis not confirmed by its positive instances?; and, Why is the predicate grue not projectible? I argue in favor of epistemological answers to Goodman's questions. The notions of lawlikeness, confirmation, and projectibility have to be relativized to (actual and counterfactual) epistemic situations that are determined by (...) the available background information. In order to defend this thesis, I discuss an example that is less strange than the grue example. From the general conclusions of this discussion, it follows that grue is not projectible in the actual epistemic situation, but it is projectible in certain counterfactual epistemic situations. (shrink)

The hidden strength of Goodman's ingenious "new riddle of induction" lies in the perfect symmetry of grue/bleen and green/blue. The very same sentence forms used to define grue/bleen in terms of green/blue can be used to define green/blue in terms of grue/bleen by permutation of terms. Therein lies its undoing. In the artificially restricted case in which there are no additional facts that can break the symmetry, grue/bleen and green/blue are merely notational variants of the same facts; or, (...) if they represent different facts, the differences are ineffable, and no account of induction should be expected to pick between them. This still obtains in the more interesting case in which we embed grue/bleen in a grue-ified total science; the grue-ified and regular total sciences are merely equivalent descriptions of the same facts. In the most realistic case, we allow additional facts that break the symmetry and then we can also evade Goodman's new riddle by employing an account of induction rich enough to exploit these facts. Unaugmented enumerative induction is not such an account and it is the primary casualty of Goodman's new riddle. (shrink)

Nelson Goodman’s new riddle of induction forcefully illustrates a challenge that must be confronted by any adequate theory of inductive inference: provide some basis for choosing among alternative hypotheses that fit past data but make divergent predictions. One response to this challenge is to distinguish among alternatives by means of some epistemically significant characteristic beyond fit with the data. Statistical learning theory takes this approach by showing how a concept similar to Popper’s notion of degrees of testability is (...) linked to minimizing expected predictive error. In contrast, formal learning theory appeals to Ockham’s razor, which it justifies by reference to the goal of enhancing efficient convergence to the truth. In this essay, I show that, despite their differences, statistical and formal learning theory yield precisely the same result for a class of inductive problems that I call strongly VC ordered , of which Goodman’s riddle is just one example. (shrink)

This essay demonstrates a previously unnoticed connection between formal and statistical learning theory with regard to Nelson Goodman’s new riddle of induction. Discussions of Goodman’s riddle in formal learning theory explain how conjecturing “all green” before “all grue” can enhance efficient convergence to the truth, where efficiency is understood in terms of minimizing the maximum number of retractions or “mind changes.” Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension is a central concept in statistical learning theory and is similar to Popper’s notion (...) of degrees of testability. I show that for a class inductive problems of which Goodman’s riddle is one example, a reliable inductive method minimizes the maximum number of mind changes exactly if it always conjectures the hypothesis from the set with lowest VC dimension consistent with the data. I also discuss the relevance of these results to language invariance and curve fitting. (shrink)

Barker and Achinstein misread Goodman's definitions of 'grue' and 'bleen'. If we stick to Goodman's definition of 'grue' as applying "to all things examined before t just in case they are green but to other things just in case they are blue" (my italics), and his parallel definition of 'bleen', then Barker and Achinstein's arguments are seen to be irrelevant. The result is to by-pass the question whether Mr. Grue sees things as grue rather than as green while showing that (...) it is possible for human conceptual schemes to employ different sensory terms. These two issues are separate. (shrink)

Das Folgende stellt den Versuch dar, die Goodman'sche Wahrscheinlichkeitsparadoxie in einer "transzendentalen" Reflexion auf das Wesen der Induktion und auf die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung aufzulösen. Die Zulassung Goodman'scher Prädikate, die durch die entscheidende Bezugnahme auf den je gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt definiert sind, müßte zur Aufhebung aller Induktion führen und damit zugleich auch auf die Aufhebung aller Erfahrung hinauslaufen, die wesentlich durch mehr oder weniger bestimmte, durch vergangene Erfahrungen motivierte, aber natürlich enttäuschbare Antizipationen des in der jeweiligen Gegenwart noch nicht (...) Gegebenen gekennzeichnet ist. Die Goodman'sche Paradoxie beruht auf einer Verkennung dieses antizipatorisch-induktorischen Grundzuges aller Erfahrung. Sie ist darüber hinaus widersprüchlich, insofern sie bei stillschweigender Aufhebung der Voraussetzung der Induktion bestimmte Prädikate dennoch einem Induktionsversuch unterwirft; sie ist mindestens jedoch zirkulär, da sie die ihr zugrundeliegende Negation des Induktionsprinzips nachträglich nur expliziert. Es folgt, daß entgegen Kutschera Goodman'sche Prädikate auch in anderen als den uns vertrauten Sprachen nicht induzierbar sein können. (shrink)

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY PRIZE for the best published book in the history of philosophy [Awarded in 2010] _______________ -/- Although it is widely recognized that David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) belongs among the greatest works of philosophy, there is little agreement about the correct way to interpret his fundamental intentions. It is an established orthodoxy among almost all commentators that skepticism and naturalism are the two dominant themes in this work. The difficulty has been, (...) however, that Hume's skeptical arguments and commitments appear to undermine and discredit his naturalistic ambition to contribute to "the science of man". This schism appears to leave his entire project broken-backed. The solution to this riddle depends on challenging another, closely related, point of orthodoxy: namely, that before Hume published the Treatise he removed almost all material concerned with problems of religion. Russell argues, contrary to this view, that irreligious aims and objectives are fundamental to the Treatise and account for its underlying unity and coherence. It is Hume's basic anti-Christian aims and objectives that serve to shape and direct both his skeptical and naturalistic commitments. When Hume's arguments are viewed from this perspective we can solve, not only puzzles arising from his discussion of various specific issues, we can also explain the intimate and intricate connections that hold his entire project together. This "irreligious" interpretation provides a comprehensive fresh account of the nature of Hume's fundamental aims and ambitions in the Treatise. It also presents a radically different picture of the way in which Hume's project was rooted in the debates and controversies of his own time, placing the Treatise in an irreligious or anti-Chrisitan philosophical tradition that includes Hobbes, Spinoza and freethinking followers. Considered in these terms, Hume's Treatise constitutes the crowning achievement of the Radical Enlightenment. (shrink)

In this paper, I will discuss accounts to solve the problem of induction by introducing necessary connections. The basic idea is this: if we know that there are necessary connections between properties F and G such that F -ness necessarily brings about G-ness, then we are justified to infer that all, including future or unobserved, F s will be Gs. To solve the problem of induction with ontology has been proposed by David Armstrong and Brian Ellis. In this (...) paper, I will argue that these attempts to solve the problem of induction fail. Necessary connections fail to reliably imply the respective regularities for two main reasons: Firstly, according to an argument originally presented by Helen Beebee, the respective necessary connections might be time-limited, and hence do not warrant inferences about future cases. As I will discuss, arguments against the possibility or explanatory power of time-limited necessary connections fail. Secondly, even time-unlimited necessary connections do not entail strict or non-strict regularities, and nor do they allow inferences about individual cases, which is an important function of inductive reasoning. Moreover, the proposed solution to the problem of induction would only apply to a tiny minority of inductive inferences. I argue that most inductive inferences are not easily reducible to the proposed inference pattern, as the vast majority of everyday inductive inferences do not involve necessary connections between fundamental physical properties or essences. (shrink)

Yehezkel presents an interesting argument to resolve Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction, and in effect to claim that a purely syntactical theory of confirmation is possible. In this paper I suggest that Yehezkel’s argument relies on two premises not proven in his paper. The first premise is that if “a New Riddle of Deduction” can be formulated then there is no New Riddle of Induction. This premise seems to be wrong as I claim in part (...) 2 of this paper. The second premise is that a New Riddle of Deduction can be formulated. Despite Yehezkel’s efforts to prove this claim, it seems to me false, or at least, unproven. I therefore conclude that there is no New Riddle of Deduction, and therefore, no actual resolution to the New Riddle of Induction. (shrink)

In The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise, Paul Russell has given us a marvelously good book. I intend that as very strong praise indeed, for as readers of Hume on miracles know, the marvelous constitutes the very upper limit on what can properly be established on the basis of human testimony—which is, of course, what I am offering. What makes the book so marvelous? In defense of what he calls his “irreligious interpretation” of A Treatise of Human Understanding, Russell makes (...) many deep and permanent contributions to our understanding of Hume’s philosophy. His careful tracing of the influence of disputes pitting “speculative atheists” (such as Hobbes, Collins, Toland, Tindal, and Dudgeon) against “religious philosophers” (such as Cudworth, Baxter, Butler, and above all Clarke), in both England and Scotland, helps to reorient our understanding of the context of the Treatise; and his analysis of the early reception of the Treatise from the point of view of its bearing on religion helps to reorient our understanding of its significance. .... Perhaps most importantly, Russell offers original and compelling accounts of the irreligious implications of central arguments of the Treatise on an impressive range of topics—the idea of God, space and time, power and necessary connection, induction, the existence of bodies, the immateriality of the soul, personal identity, liberty and necessity, the moral sense, the artificial virtues, and more—even if some of these implications directly oppose only a more-or-less Clarkean conception of the requirements and proper supports of the Christian religion. ... As Russell says, it should never again be claimed that the Treatise is largely unconcerned with questions of religion. (shrink)

This is part II in a series of papers outlining Abstraction Theory, a theory that I propose provides a solution to the characterisation or epistemological problem of induction. Logic is built from first principles severed from language such that there is one universal logic independent of specific logical languages. A theory of (non-linguistic) meaning is developed which provides the basis for the dissolution of the `grue' problem and problems of the non-uniqueness of probabilities in inductive logics. The problem of (...) counterfactual conditionals is generalised to a problem of truth conditions of hypotheses and this general problem is then solved by the notion of abstractions. The probability calculus is developed with examples given. In future parts of the series the full decision theory is developed and its properties explored. (shrink)

I argue that despite criticism from some disability rights organizations, aid in dying is morally permissible. First, I suggest that disability-related concerns can be classified as emerging from one of two kinds of harm: person affecting, and personhood affecting. Second, I examine whether person affecting harm has occurred within those jurisdictions that have legalized aid in dying. I conclude that despite suggestions to the contrary, there is no evidence to demonstrate that people with disabilities have been adversely impacted by legalized (...) medical aid in dying. Third, I entertain these same arguments as a matter of principle and conclude the principled objections should not give us reason for concern. Fourth, I explore whether we have evidence to suggest the presence of increased personhood affecting harm where aid in dying is permissible. I suggest, through a focus on disability support services, that no evidence of social attitudes that diminish the moral worth of disabled people is present. Fifth, I examine whether we ought to have a principled concern with personhood affecting harm emerging from medical aid in dying. I conclude that to the contrary, to deny people with disabilities access to aid in dying constitutes a morally egregious form of personhood affecting harm. (shrink)

This paper presents parts of a theory of radical translation with applications to the problem of construing reference. First, in sections 1 to 4 the general standpoint, inspired by Goodman's approach to induction, is set forth. Codification of sound translational practice replaces the aim of behavioral reduction of semantic notions. The need for a theory of translational projection (manual construction on the basis of a finite empirical correlation of sentences) is established by showing the anomalies otherwise resulting (e.g. from (...) Quine's position). Then in section 5 a partial characterization of what constitutes an "admissible translation manual" is developed in the form of rules of translational projection governing correspondence of sentence-parts of a language-pair. Finally, in section 6, we give applications of the theory to the problem of construing reference. The general rules of section 5 suffice to rule out deviant referential schemes which have been held inscrutable alternatives to standard schemes. (shrink)

As scientists start to adopt machine learning (ML) as one research tool, the security of ML and the knowledge generated become a concern. In this paper, I explain how supervised ML can be improved with better data ontology, or the way we make categories and turn information into data. More specifically, we should design data ontology in such a way that is consistent with the knowledge that we have about the target phenomenon so that such ontology can help us make (...) the inductive leap. I do so by thinking through a thought experiment, Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction (Fact, fiction, and forecast, Harvard University Press, 1955). Goodman’s riddle helps flesh out three problems of induction: (1) the problem of equal goodies, that there are often too many equally good inductive results given the same data; (2) the problem of diverging performance, that these equally good results can give opposite predictions in the future; and (3) the problem of mediocrity, that when averaged across all equally possible datasets and tasks, no inductive algorithm outperforms any other. I show that all these three problems are manifested as real obstacles in ML practice, namely, the Rashomon effect (Breiman in Stat Sci 16(3):199–231, 2001), the problem of underspecification (D’Amour et al. in J Mach Learn Res, 2020, https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2011.03395 ), and the No Free Lunch theorem (Wolpert in Neural Comput 8(7):1341–90, 1996, https://doi.org/10.1162/neco.1996.8.7.1341 ). Lastly, I argue that proper data ontology can help mitigate these problems and I demonstrate how using concrete examples from climate science. This research highlights the links between philosophers’ discussions of induction and implications in ML practice. (shrink)

'Practices without foundations' is, in genesis and in effect, a discussion of the following quotation , which serves therefore as an epigraph to it: ;Nelson Goodman's discussion of the 'new riddle of induction' ... deserves comparison with Wittgenstein's work. Indeed ... the basic strategy of Goodman's treatment of the 'new riddle' is strikingly close to Wittgenstein's sceptical arguments .... Although our paradigm of Wittgenstein's problem was formulated for a mathematical problem it ... is completely general and can (...) be applied to any rule or word. In particular, if it were formulated for the language of color impressions, as Wittgenstein himself suggests, Goodman's 'grue', or something similar, would play the role of 'quus'. But the problem would not be Goodman's about induction--"Why not predict that grass, which has been grue in the past will be grue in the future?"--but Wittgenstein's about meaning: "Who is to say that in the past I didn't mean grue by 'green', so that now I should call the sky, not the grass, 'green'?" vskip9pt ;This fascinating remark of Kripke's suggests a project, that of charting out both the interpretive and philosophic points of connection and disconnection between Wittgenstein, Goodman and Kripke. That project is this dissertation. ;My work severely tests Kripke's remark. For I argue that Kripke not only misreads Wittgenstein, but also mistakes the extremity of the 'scepticism' of his version of Wittgenstein for the priority of the philosophical puzzle that Goodman has bequeathed to us. ;To reach this conclusion, I show that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'meaning-scepticism' is unanswerable if statable, but actually unstatable; and that, under certain interpretations, the same is true of putative scepticisms derivable from Goodman's text. The upshot is that the sceptical reading of most twentieth century philosophy must be displaced in favour of 'post-scepticism' and 'philosophical ethnography'. The latter concepts, sketched toward the end of the dissertation, are perhaps its telos. (shrink)

Goodman published his "riddle" in the middle of the 20th century and many philosophers have attempted to solve it. These attempts almost all shared an assumption that, I shall argue, might be wrong, namely, the assumption that when we project from cases we have examined to cases we have not, what we project are predicates. I shall argue that this assumption, shared by almost all attempts at a solution, looks wrong, because, in the first place, what we project are (...) generalizations and not predicates, and a generalization is projectible relative to a given context. In this paper I develop the idea of explainable-projectible generalizations versus unexplainable-unprojectible generalizations, relative to a specific context. My main claim is that we rationally project a generalization if and only if we rationally believe that there is something that explains the general phenomenon that the generalized statement in question asserts to obtain, and that a generalization is projectible, if and only if its putative truth can be explained, whether we know that it can be or not. (shrink)

The general scholarship on armed conflict in Manipur, India, ignores the experiences of women as agents. Feminist scholarship counters this tendency, revealing women's everyday responses to the violence that constrains them. However, this scholarship often fails to be intersectional, and it lauds every instance of women's agency without evaluating it in terms of its ability to build peace. Employing Kimberlé Crenshaw's underused distinction between structural and political intersectionality and Saba Mahmood's concept of agency, I analyze my field research conducted with (...) women's peacebuilding groups in Manipur in 2014 and 2015. Using structural intersectionality, I first describe the qualitatively different experiences of women peacebuilders living at different social locations. Using political intersectionality as a normative tool, I then show that ethnic and religious hierarchies often disrupt women's attempts to build peace. Interethnic peacebuilding groups that rely on gender-based solidarity tend to privilege the experiences of the women coming from the majority ethnic group. Other peacebuilding groups, bound by ethnicity, often distrust and resent women who come from different ethnic enclaves. I argue that women's peacebuilding agency must aim at an inclusive justpeace if it is to succeed. We should evaluate agency, rather than glorifying all instances of women's responses to violence. (shrink)

Recent discussions surrounding the conceptualising of disability has resulted in a stalemate between British sociologists and philosophers. The stagnation of theorizing that has occurred threatens not only academic pursuits and the advancement of theoretical interpretations within the Disability Studies community, but also how we educate and advocate politically, legally, and socially. More pointedly, many activists and theorists in the UK appear to believe the British social model is the only effective means of understanding and advocating on behalf of people with (...) disabilities. This model, largely reliant upon materialist research traditions, contends that disability is a form of social oppression and hence, is a phenomenon that should be conceptualised in social terms. Individual properties such as impairments are disregarded as they are viewed to be unimportant in the analysis of the social causes of disability. Concurrently, many bioethicists and philosophers have embraced what Tom Shakespeare has classified as an ‘Interactional Approach’ to disability—that “the experience of a disabled person results from the relationship between factors intrinsic to the individual, and the extrinsic factors arising from the wider context in which she finds herself”. I intend to demonstrate that the benefits of the British social model are now outweighed by its burdens. I suggest, as Jerome Bickenbach has, that while it may be somewhat churlish to critique the social model in light of its political success, taken literally, it implies that people with disabilities require no additional health resources by virtue of their impairments. Despite the eloquent arguments that have preceded me by interactional theorists, none have been accepted as evidence of fallacious reasoning by British social model theorists. This article is an attempt to clarify why it is that the types of arguments British social model theorists have been offering are misguided. I suggest that the British social model, unlike an interactional approach, is unable to provide a realistic account of the experience of disability, and subsequently, unable to be properly utilized to ensure justice for people with disabilities. (shrink)