Two interpretations of ‘grue’– or how to misunderstand the new Riddle of induction

Analysis 64 (4):335–339 (2004)
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Rami Israel
Open University of Israel

Citations of this work

Evidence, Hypothesis, and Grue.Alfred Schramm - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):571-591.
On the equivalence of Goodman’s and Hempel’s paradoxes.Kenneth Boyce - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45:32-42.
Projectibility and Explainability or How to Draw a New Picture of Inductive Practices.Rami Israel - 2006 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (2):269-286.

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References found in this work

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1965 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
A query on confirmation.Nelson Goodman - 1946 - Journal of Philosophy 43 (14):383-385.
On the new Riddle of induction.S. F. Barker & Peter Achinstein - 1960 - Philosophical Review 69 (4):511-522.
Ramifications of 'grue'.Mary Hesse - 1969 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (1):13-25.

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