Abstract

In The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise, Paul Russell has given us a marvelously good book. I intend that as very strong praise indeed, for as readers of Hume on miracles know, the marvelous constitutes the very upper limit on what can properly be established on the basis of human testimony—which is, of course, what I am offering. What makes the book so marvelous? In defense of what he calls his “irreligious interpretation” of A Treatise of Human Understanding, Russell makes many deep and permanent contributions to our understanding of Hume’s philosophy. His careful tracing of the influence of disputes pitting “speculative atheists” (such as Hobbes, Collins, Toland, Tindal, and Dudgeon) against “religious philosophers” (such as Cudworth, Baxter, Butler, and above all Clarke), in both England and Scotland, helps to reorient our understanding of the context of the Treatise; and his analysis of the early reception of the Treatise from the point of view of its bearing on religion helps to reorient our understanding of its significance. .... Perhaps most importantly, Russell offers original and compelling accounts of the irreligious implications of central arguments of the Treatise on an impressive range of topics—the idea of God, space and time, power and necessary connection, induction, the existence of bodies, the immateriality of the soul, personal identity, liberty and necessity, the moral sense, the artificial virtues, and more—even if some of these implications directly oppose only a more-or-less Clarkean conception of the requirements and proper supports of the Christian religion. ... As Russell says, it should never again be claimed that the Treatise is largely unconcerned with questions of religion.