Results for 'propositional attitudes'

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  1. Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them.Mark Richard - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defence of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is 'psychologically real'. The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude ascription. The view is worked out in detail with attention to such topics as the semantics of conversations, iterated attitude ascriptions, and the role of propositions as bearers of truth. Along the way important (...)
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  2. Propositional Attitudes.Jerry A. Fodor - 1978 - The Monist 61 (October):501-23.
    Some philosophers hold that philosophy is what you do to a problem until it’s clear enough to solve it by doing science. Others hold that if a philosophical problem succumbs to empirical methods, that shows it wasn’t really philosophical to begin with. Either way, the facts seem clear enough: questions first mooted by philosophers are sometimes coopted by people who do experiments. This seems to be happening now to the question: “what are propositional attitudes?” and cognitive psychology is (...)
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  3. Non‐Propositional Attitudes.Alex Grzankowski - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1123-1137.
    Intentionality, or the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for things, remains central in the philosophy of mind. But the study of intentionality in the analytic tradition has been dominated by discussions of propositional attitudes such as belief, desire, and visual perception. There are, however, intentional states that aren't obviously propositional attitudes. For example, Indiana Jones fears snakes, Antony loves Cleopatra, and Jane hates the monster under her bed. The present paper (...)
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  4. Propositional Attitudes as Commitments: Unleashing Some Constraints.Alireza Kazemi - 2020 - Dialogue 59 (3):437-457.
    ABSTRACTIn a series of articles, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen and Nick Zangwill argue that, since propositional attitude ascription judgements do not behave like normative judgements in being subject to a priori normative supervenience and the Because Constraint, PAs cannot be constitutively normative.1 I argue that, for a specific version of normativism, according to which PAs are normative commitments, these arguments fail. To this end, I argue that commitments and obligations should be distinguished. Then, I show that the intuitions allegedly governing all (...)
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  5. Propositional Attitudes and Mental Acts.Indrek Reiland - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):239-245.
    Peter Hanks and Scott Soames have recently developed similar views of propositional attitudes on which they consist at least partly of being disposed to perform mental acts. Both think that to believe a proposition is at least partly to be disposed to perform the primitive propositional act: one the performance of which is part of the performance of any other propositional act. However, they differ over whether the primitive act is the forceless entertaining or the forceful (...)
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  6. Propositional Attitudes Without Propositions.Friederike Moltmann - 2003 - Synthese 135 (1):77 - 118.
    The most common account of attitude reports is the relational analysis according towhich an attitude verb taking that-clause complements expresses a two-placerelation between agents and propositions and the that-clause acts as an expressionwhose function is to provide the propositional argument. I will argue that a closerexamination of a broader range of linguistic facts raises serious problems for thisanalysis and instead favours a Russellian `multiple relations analysis' (which hasgenerally been discarded because of its apparent obvious linguistic implausibility).The resulting account can (...)
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    Propositional Attitudes.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - The Monist 61 (4):501-523.
    Some philosophers hold that philosophy is what you do to a problem until it’s clear enough to solve it by doing science. Others hold that if a philosophical problem succumbs to empirical methods, that shows it wasn’t really philosophical to begin with. Either way, the facts seem clear enough: questions first mooted by philosophers are sometimes coopted by people who do experiments. This seems to be happening now to the question: “what are propositional attitudes?” and cognitive psychology is (...)
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  8. Are Propositional Attitudes Mental States?Umut Baysan - forthcoming - Minds and Machines:1-16.
    I present an argument that propositional attitudes are not mental states. In a nutshell, the argument is that if propositional attitudes are mental states, then only minded beings could have them; but there are reasons to think that some non-minded beings could bear propositional attitudes. To illustrate this, I appeal to cases of genuine group intentionality. I argue that these are cases in which some group entities bear propositional attitudes, but they are (...)
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  9. Propositional Attitudes.Timothy Schroeder - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):65-73.
    The propositional attitudes are attitudes such as believing and desiring, taken toward propositions such as the proposition that snow flurries are expected, or that the Prime Minister likes poutine. Collectively, our views about the propositional attitudes make up much of folk psychology, our everyday theory of how the mind works.
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  10. Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content.Scott Soames - 1987 - Philosophical Topics 15 (1):47-87.
  11. Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes.Paul M. Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):67-90.
    This article describes a theory of the computations underlying the selection of coordinated motion patterns, especially in reaching tasks. The central idea is that when a spatial target is selected as an object to be reached, stored postures are evaluated for the contributions they can make to the task. Weights are assigned to the stored postures, and a single target posture is found by taking a weighted sum of the stored postures. Movement is achieved by reducing the distance between the (...)
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  12. Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them.Mark Richard - 1991 - Mind 100 (3):408-410.
     
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  13. Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind.C. Anthony Anderson (ed.) - 1990 - Stanford: CSLI.
    These papers treat those issues involved in formulating a logic of propositional attitutudes and consider the relevance of the attitudes to the continuing study of both the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. Table of Contents: Introduction, by C. Anthony Anderson and Joseph Owens Quine on Quantifying In, by Kit Fine Prolegomena to a Structural Theory of Belief and Other Attitudes, by Hans Kemp A Study in Comparitive Semantics, by Ernest LePore and Barry Loewer Wherein (...)
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  14.  47
    Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them. [REVIEW]Mark Crimmins - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):895.
  15. The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and Their Attribution.Robert J. Matthews - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    A prospective introduction -- The received view -- Troubles with the received view -- Are propositional attitudes relations? -- Foundations of a measurement-theoretic account of the attitudes -- The basic measurement-theoretic account -- Elaboration and explication of the proposed measurement-theoretic account.
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  16. Propositional Attitudes De Dicto and De Re.Ernest Sosa - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (21):883-896.
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  17. Propositional Attitudes in Modern Philosophy.Walter Ott - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (3):551-568.
    Philosophers of the modern period are often presented as having made an elementary error: that of confounding the attitude one adopts toward a proposition with its content. By examining the works of Locke and the Port-Royalians, I show that this accusation is ill-founded and that Locke, in particular, has the resources to construct a theory of propositional attitudes.
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  18. Propositional Attitudes?Trenton Merricks - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):207 - 232.
  19.  47
    Propositional Attitude Reports.Thomas McKay - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  20. The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3.
    How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to filling this gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of (...)
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  21. Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes.Willard van Orman Quine - 1956 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):177-187.
  22.  84
    Propositional Attitudes and Consciousness.Norton Nelkin - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (March):413-30.
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  23.  51
    Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content.Scott Soames - 1987 - In Philosophical Essays, Volume 2: The Philosophical Significance of Language. Princeton University Press. pp. 33-71.
  24. Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?Tim Crane - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469.
    It is widely agreed that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i.e., that it has representational content. Many philosophers take this to mean that like belief, experience has propositional content, that it can be true or false. I accept that perceptual experience has intentionality; but I dispute the claim that it has propositional content. This claim does not follow from the fact that experience is intentional, nor does it follow from the fact that experiences are accurate or (...)
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  25. Ascent Routines for Propositional Attitudes.Robert M. Gordon - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):151 - 165.
    An ascent routine (AR) allows a speaker to self-ascribe a given propositional attitude (PA) by redeploying the process that generates a corresponding lower level utterance. Thus, we may report on our beliefs about the weather by reporting (under certain constraints) on the weather. The chief criticism of my AR account of self-ascription, by Alvin Goldman and others, is that it covers few if any PA’s other than belief and offers no account of how we can attain reliability in identifying (...)
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  26. Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions.Angela Mendelovici - 2020 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Kevin Corcoran (eds.), Common Sense Metaphysics: Themes From the Philosophy of Lynne Rudder Baker. Oxford, UK: Routledge. pp. 54-74.
    According to Lynne Rudder Baker’s Practical Realism, we know that we have beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes independent of any scientific investigation. Propositional attitudes are an indispensable part of our everyday conception of the world and not in need of scientific validation. This paper asks what is the nature of the attitudes such that we may know them so well from a commonsense perspective. I argue for a self-ascriptivist view, on which we have (...) attitudes in virtue of ascribing them to ourselves. On this view, propositional attitudes are derived representational states, deriving their contents and their attitude types from our self-ascriptions. (shrink)
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  27. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul Churchland - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
  28.  60
    The Phenomenology of Propositional Attitudes.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):445-462.
    Propositional attitudes are often classified as non-phenomenal mental states. I argue that there is no good reason for doing so. The unwillingness to view propositional attitudes as being essentially phenomenal stems from a biased notion of phenomenality, from not paying sufficient attention to the idioms in which propositional attitudes are usually reported, from overlooking the considerable degree to which different intentional modes can be said to be phenomenologically continuous, and from not considering the possibility (...)
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  29.  42
    Propositional Attitudes and Embodied Skills in the Philosophy of Action.William Hasselberger - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):449-476.
    Propositionalism in the philosophy of action is the popular view that intentional actions are bodily movements caused and rationalized by certain ‘internal’ propositional attitude states that constitute the agent's perspective. I attack propositionalism's background claim that the genuinely mental/cognitive dimension of human action resides solely in some range of ‘internal’ agency-conferring representational states that causally trigger, and thus are always conceptually disentangle-able from, bodily activity itself. My opposing claim, following Ryle, Wittgenstein, and others, is that mentality and intentionality can (...)
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  30.  85
    Conscious Propositional Attitudes and Moral Responsibility.Uwe Peters - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (5):585-597.
    By drawing on empirical evidence, Matt King and Peter Carruthers have recently argued that there are no conscious propositional attitudes, such as decisions, and that this undermines moral responsibility. Neil Levy responds to King and Carruthers, and claims that their considerations needn’t worry theorists of moral responsibility. I argue that Levy’s response to King and Carruthers’ challenge to moral responsibility is unsatisfactory. After that, I propose what I take to be a preferable way of dealing with their challenge. (...)
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  31. Propositional or Non-Propositional Attitudes?Sean Crawford - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):179-210.
    Propositionalism is the view that intentional attitudes, such as belief, are relations to propositions. Propositionalists argue that propositionalism follows from the intuitive validity of certain kinds of inferences involving attitude reports. Jubien (2001) argues powerfully against propositions and sketches some interesting positive proposals, based on Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment, about how to accommodate “propositional phenomena” without appeal to propositions. This paper argues that none of Jubien’s proposals succeeds in accommodating an important range of propositional phenomena, (...)
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  32.  11
    Propositional Attitudes.David Lindeman - 2021 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Propositional Attitudes Sentences such as “Galileo believes that the earth moves” and “Pia hopes that it will rain” are used to report what philosophers, psychologists, and other cognitive scientists call propositional attitudes—for example, the belief that the earth moves and the hope that it will rain. Just what propositional attitudes are is a matter of … Continue reading Propositional Attitudes →.
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  33.  37
    Propositional Attitude, Affective Attitude and Irony Comprehension.Francisco Yus - 2016 - Pragmatics Cognition 23 (1):92-116.
    According to relevance theory, irony comprehension invariably entails the identification of some opinion or thought and the identification of the speaker’s dissociative attitude. In this paper, it is argued that it is also essential for hearers to identify not only that propositional attitude, but also the affective attitude that the speaker holds towards the source of this echo so that an optimallyrelevant interpretive outcomeis achieved. This notion comprises feelings and emotions of a non-propositional quality which affect the (...) effects obtained in ironical communication. The paper further argues for the need to incorporate non-propositional effects into the traditional propositional object of pragmatic research. (shrink)
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  34. Proper Names, Propositional Attitudes and Non-Descriptive Connotations.Diana Ackerman - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 35 (1):55 - 69.
  35. Propositional Attitude Psychology as an Ideal Type.Justin Schwartz - 1992 - Topoi 11 (1):5-26.
    This paper critiques the view, widely held by philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists, that psychological explanation is a matter of ascribing propositional attitudes (such as beliefs and desires) towards language-like propositions in the mind, and that cognitive mental states consist in intentional attitudes towards propositions of a linguistic quasi-linguistic nature. On this view, thought is structured very much like a language. Denial that propositional attitude psychology is an adequate account of mind is therefore, on this (...)
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    Propositional Attitudes.David Lindeman - 2021 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Propositional Attitudes Sentences such as “Galileo believes that the earth moves” and “Pia hopes that it will rain” are used to report what philosophers, psychologists, and other cognitive scientists call propositional attitudes—for example, the belief that the earth moves and the hope that it will rain. Just what propositional attitudes are is a matter of … Continue reading Propositional Attitudes →.
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  37. Is Attention a Non-Propositional Attitude?Sebastian Watzl - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 272-302.
    I argue first that attention is a (maybe the) paradigmatic case of an object-directed, non-propositional intentional mental episode. In addition attention cannot be reduced to any other (propositional or non-propositional) mental episodes. Yet, second, attention is not a non-propositional mental attitude. It might appear puzzling how one could hold both of these claims. I show how to combine them, and how that combination shows how propositionality and non-propositionality can co-exist in a mental life. The crucial move (...)
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  38.  22
    The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and Their Attribution.Robert Matthews - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):185-187.
    The deflationary aim of this book, which occupies Part I, is to show that a widely held view has little to be said for it. The constructive aim, pursued in Part II, is to make plausible a measure-theoretic account of propositional attitudes. The discussion is throughout instructive, illuminating and sensitive to the many intricacies surrounding attitude ascriptions and how they can carry information about a subject's psychology. There is close engagement with cognitive science. The book should be read (...)
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  39. Is Belief a Propositional Attitude?Ray Buchanan - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12.
    According to proponents of the face-value account, a beliefreport of the form ‘S believes that p’ is true just in case the agentbelieves a proposition referred to by the that-clause. As againstthis familiar view, I argue that there are cases of true beliefreports of the relevant form in which there is no proposition that thethat-clause, or the speaker using the that-clause, can plausibly betaken as referring to. Moreover, I argue that given the distinctiveway in which the face-value theory of belief-reports (...)
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  40. Knowledge-the and Propositional Attitude Ascriptions.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):147-190.
    Determiner phrases embedded under a propositional attitude verb have traditionally been taken to denote answers to implicit questions. For example, 'the capital of Vermont' as it occurs in 'John knows the capital of Vermont' has been thought to denote the proposition which answers the implicit question 'what is the capital of Vermont?' Thus, where 'know' is treated as a propositional attitude verb rather than an acquaintance verb, 'John knows the capital of Vermont' is true iff John knows that (...)
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  41. Propositional Attitudes and Compositional Semantics.Steven E. Boer - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:341-380.
  42.  60
    Propositional Attitudes and Psychological Explanation.Keith Quillen - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (2):133-57.
    Propositional attitudes, states like believing, desiring, intending, etc., have played a central role in the articulation of many of our major theories, both in philosophy and the social sciences. Until relatively recently, psychology was a prominent entry on the list of social sciences in which propositional attitudes occupied center stage. In this century, though, behaviorists began to make a self-conscious effort to expunge "mentalistic" notions from their theorizing. Behaviorism has failed. Psychology therefore is again experiencing "formative (...)
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  43. Propositional Attitudes.Eric Swanson - 2010 - In Claudia Maienborn, Klaus von Heusinger & Paul Portner (eds.), Semantics: An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter (Draft -- Forthcoming).
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  44. Entertaining as a Propositional Attitude: A Non-Reductive Characterization.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):1-22.
    Contemporary philosophy of mind tends to theorize about the propositional attitudes primarily in terms of belief and desire. But there is a propositional attitude, sometimes called ‘entertaining,’ that seems to resist analysis in terms of belief and desire, and has been thought at other times and places (notably, in late nineteenth-century Austrian philosophy) to be more fundamental than belief and desire. Whether or not we accept the fundamentality of entertaining, it certainly seems to be an attitude ill (...)
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  45.  82
    De Re Propositional Attitudes Toward Integers.Diana Ackerman - 1978 - Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):145-153.
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  46. Direct Reference and Propositional Attitudes.Scott Soames - 1989 - In John Perry, J. Almog & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 393--419.
     
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  47. Measurement‐Theoretic Accounts of Propositional Attitudes.Robert J. Matthews - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (11):828-841.
    In the late 1970s and early 1980s a number of philosophers, notably Churchland, Field, Stalnaker, Dennett, and Davidson, began to argue that propositional attitude predicates are a species of measure predicate, analogous in important ways to numerical predicates by which we attribute physical magnitudes. Other philosophers, including myself, have subsequently developed the idea in greater detail. In this paper I sketch the general outlines of measurement‐theoretic accounts of propositional attitudes, explaining in the briefest terms the basic idea (...)
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  48.  21
    Episodic Memory as a Propositional Attitude: A Critical Perspective.André Sant'Anna - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    The questions of whether episodic memory is a propositional attitude, and of whether it has propositional content, are central to discussions about how memory represents the world, what mental states should count as memories, and what kind of beings are capable of remembering. Despite its importance to such topics, these questions have not been addressed explicitly in the recent literature in philosophy of memory. In one of the very few pieces dealing with the topic, Fernández (2006) provides a (...)
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  49. The Phenomenology of Propositional Attitudes.Sørenarnow H. Klausen - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4).
    Propositional attitudes are often classified as non-phenomenal mental states. I argue that there is no good reason for doing so. The unwillingness to view propositional attitudes as being essentially phenomenal stems from a biased notion of phenomenality, from not paying sufficient attention to the idioms in which propositional attitudes are usually reported, from overlooking the considerable degree to which different intentional modes can be said to be phenomenologically continuous, and from not considering the possibility (...)
     
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  50.  23
    The Propositional Attitude in Perception.Ronald W. Ruegsegger - 1980 - Philosophy Research Archives 1408:1.
    In Part I of this essay I distinguish perception from sensation and sensory processing, and I argue that propositional perceiving is an act, intentional, cognitive, and can go amiss. In Part II I show that perceiving must be committive to go amiss, and since a committive, cognitive, intentional act is assentive, I conclude that propositional perceiving is assentive. In Part III of the essay I argue that nonpropositional perceiving is an act, intentional, cognitive, and capable of going amiss, (...)
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