Propositional Attitudes as Commitments: Unleashing Some Constraints

Dialogue 59 (3):437-457 (2020)
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Abstract

ABSTRACTIn a series of articles, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen and Nick Zangwill argue that, since propositional attitude ascription judgements do not behave like normative judgements in being subject to a priori normative supervenience and the Because Constraint, PAs cannot be constitutively normative.1 I argue that, for a specific version of normativism, according to which PAs are normative commitments, these arguments fail. To this end, I argue that commitments and obligations should be distinguished. Then, I show that the intuitions allegedly governing all normative judgements do not even purport to hold for commitment-attributing judgements.RÉSUMÉDans une série d'articles, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen et Nick Zangwill font valoir que, puisque les jugements d'attribution d'attitude propositionnelle ne se comportent pas comme des jugements normatifs en étant soumis à la survenance normative a priori et à la contrainte du Parce que, les AP ne peuvent être constitutivement normatives. Je soutiens que, pour une version spécifique du normativisme, selon laquelle les AP sont des engagements normatifs, ces arguments échouent. À cette fin, je soutiens d'abord que les engagements et les obligations devraient être séparés. Ensuite, je démontre que les intuitions qui régiraient prétendument tous les jugements normatifs ne prétendent même pas s'appliquer aux jugements attributifs d'un engagement.

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Alireza Kazemi
Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences

Citations of this work

Still committed to the normativity of folk psychology.Alireza Kazemi - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):58-74.
Still committed to the normativity of folk psychology.Alireza Kazemi - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):58-74.
Commitment, Norm-Governedness and Guidance.Alireza Kazemi - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):213-228.
The norms of belief as the norms of commitment: A case for pluralism.Alireza Kazemi - 2023 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 61 (3):474-490.

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Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
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Précis of Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self‐Knowledge.Richard Moran - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):423-426.

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