Propositional attitudes, harm and public hate speech situations: towards a maieutic approach

European Journal of Political Theory 20 (4):609-630 (2021)
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Abstract

In this article, I provide an argument against the idea that public hate-speech events are harmful because they cause a discrete, traceable and harmful change in one’s propositional attitudes. To do so, I identify the essential conceptual architecture of public hate-speech situations, I assess existing arguments for the direct and indirect harm of public hate speech and I propose a novel way to approach public hate-speech situations: a maieutic approach. On this perspective, public hate-speech events do not cause changes in propositional attitudes, but rather, if successful, either such events bring a person’s latent propositional attitudes into clear consciousness, or they play with propositional attitudes speakers and their audience had prior to the public hate-speech situation.

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Corrado Fumagalli
Università degli Studi di Genova

Citations of this work

A Model for Free Speech.Daniel Weston - 2022 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 35 (6):2211-2240.

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References found in this work

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Meaning.Herbert Paul Grice - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388.
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Scorekeeping in a Language Game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (3):339.
Racism, Ideology, and Social Movements.Sally Haslanger - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (1):1-22.

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