Pragmatics Cognition 23 (1):92-116 (2016)

According to relevance theory, irony comprehension invariably entails the identification of some opinion or thought and the identification of the speaker’s dissociative attitude. In this paper, it is argued that it is also essential for hearers to identify not only that propositional attitude, but also the affective attitude that the speaker holds towards the source of this echo so that an optimallyrelevant interpretive outcomeis achieved. This notion comprises feelings and emotions of a non-propositional quality which affect the propositional effects obtained in ironical communication. The paper further argues for the need to incorporate non-propositional effects into the traditional propositional object of pragmatic research.
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DOI 10.1075/pc.23.1.05yus
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References found in this work BETA

Relevance.D. Sperber & Deirdre Wilson - 1986 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 2.
Beyond Speaker’s Meaning.Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson - 2015 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 15 (2):117-149.
How Can Emotions Be Both Cognitive and Bodily?Michelle Maiese - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):513-531.
Irony is Critical.Joana Garmendia - 2010 - Pragmatics and Cognition 18 (2):397-421.

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Citations of this work BETA

Relevance.Tim Wharton - 2021 - Pragmatics and Cognition 28 (2):321-346.
Satire as a Genre.Marcella Bertuccelli Papi - 2018 - Pragmatics and Cognition 25 (3):459-482.

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