The article attempts to define the concept of “post-neo-Kantianism” based on the nature of its relationship to the concept of “neo-Kantianism”. Concerning this matter, the author poses the following tasks: to characterize the phenomenon of neo-Kantianism, to point out the problems of its definition, to identify the relevance of the term “post-neo-Kantianism” and its relation to the philosophy of I. Kant in particular. The author emphasizes the need to introduce this term in the classification (...) of philosophy of the XX century with the appropriateness of building the model of “Kantianism - Neo-Kantianism - Neo-Neo-Kantianism - Post-Neo-Kantianism”, where each new stage is determined by the nature of the reflection of thinkers of a certain period over the fundamental philosophical problems articulated in Kant's “Critics”. Among the post-Neo-Kantians, A. Noras names thinkers traditionally considered to be german phenomenologists, such as E. Husserl and M. Heidegger: it is from the philosophical concept of Husserl that one can speak of the emergence of post-Neo-Kantianism, and the semantically correct interpretation of Heidegger, according to author, is most clearly understood in the framework of Baden Neo-Kantianism. Investigating the phenomenon of post-Neo-Kantianism, the need is established for answering a question regarding the preceding Neo-Kantian tradition, within which there is still a number of contradictions unresolved in the history of philosophy regarding the classification of Neo-Kantian schools and the distinction between the two periods of Neo-Kantianism: early and late. Neo-Kantianism shows the relevance of Kantian philosophy, highlighting the ongoing debate about understanding the Kantian “Critique of Pure Reason”. Post-Neo-Kantianism plays an important role in terms of the perspectives of modern Kant studies, which include Gottfried Martin, Manfred Brelage, or Hans-Michael Baumgartner. (shrink)

One of the most important tasks in each philosophical tradition is to determine the methodological foundations and the target reason for research practice. Russian Russian neo-Kantianism raises several fundamental questions, including the criteria for distinguishing individual systems and the possibility of their integral reconstruction, the identification of the independence of Russian philosophers in overcoming the key contradictions of transcendental idealism, as well as discussions regarding the contribution of Russian neo-Kantians to the history of the development of Russian and European (...) philosophy. No less significant is the problem of uniting Russian neo-Kantianism in the context of the general tradition of neo-Kantianism in its development to the latest trends. The prospect of turning to the heritage of Russian philosophers is largely determined by the design of post-Kantianism and post-Neo-Kantianism. In the works of A.I. Vvedensky, and then B.A. Focht, V.E. Seseman, S.L. Rubinstein, and many others, the transition from German classical idealism in the prism of the specifics of Russian philosophy to the formation of a new understanding of transcendental philosophy and its tasks was marked. In many ways, the proposed solutions were distinguished by originality and obvious independence, but at the same time they were implicitly within the boundaries of the tradition of German neo-Kantian philosophy set by I. Kant. Comparing the latest prospects for the development of neo-Kantian methodology, it can be assumed, not without reason, that Russian neo-Kantianism has largely anticipated the latest trends. Russian neo-Kantians need to reveal the unity of the entire tradition for an objective assessment and subsequent actualization of the heritage of the Russian Neo-Kantians, accompanying this process with a historical and philosophical reconstruction of individual systems of philosophy, but also identifying those perspectives for philosophy that were designated by Russian thinkers. Russian neo-Kantians' problem field of self-determination within the framework of the history of Russian and European philosophy is proposed in the content of the article. Special attention is focused on the unity of methodological tasks and the target reason for the research practices of thinkers who at different stages of their development contributed to the formation of the phenomenon of Russian neo-Kantianism. (shrink)

Neo-Kantianism is traditionally seen as a philosophy that was formed to develop and actualise Kant’s philosophy and Kantian transcendental methodology. However, Kant was the determining, but by no means the only, influence on the emergence of the neo-Kantian tradition. Neo-Kantianism was strongly influenced by the entire German post-Kantian philosophy, especially by Fichte and Hegel, although neo-Kantians have repeatedly tried to dissociate themselves from the great idealists. In many ways neo-Kantianism was cultivated by the Fichtean reading of (...) Kant, which enabled succeeding philosophers, notably H.-G. Gadamer, to consider neo-Kantianism to be “hidden neo-Fichteanism”. The main goal of this study is a historical-philosophical reconstruction of the image of Fichtean philosophy formed within German neo-Kantianism. To achieve this aim I have analysed the key projects of the German neo-Kantians in which the influence of Fichte’s philosophy, in particular his interpretation of the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of practical reason, is most clearly manifested. I show that the theory of values of the Southwest neo-Kantians and the ethics of pure will of the Marburg neo-Kantians are associated with the Fichtean revision of Kant’s doctrine of the primacy of practical reason. The following, in my opinion, are the main features of the image of Fichte’s philosophy: it is close to neo-Kantians precisely because it strives to combine theoretical and practical reason; it is in ethics that Fiche’s ideas are most manifest in neo-Kantianism; neo-Kantian original theories contain the ideas of self-consciousness “in the spirit” of Fichte. The conclusion is drawn that the growth of the metaphysical component in neo-Kantian doctrines may be connected with the influence of Fichte’s philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary PhilosophyFrederick BeiserRudolf A. Makkreel and Sebastian Luft, editors. Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy. Studies in Continental Thought. Bloomington-Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010. Pp. ix. + 331. Paper, $27.95.This collection of essays testifies to the growing interest in neo-Kantianism in the Anglophone world. The editors boast that “it is the first of its kind published in English,” though they have been beat to the (...) post by an issue of the The Philosophical Forum (Vol. XXXIX, no. 2, Summer 2008), Back to Kant: Neo-Kantianism and its Relevance Today, edited by Andrew Chignell, Terence Irwin, and Thomas Teufel. Still, claims to priority are of small moment where quality is concerned, and the many valuable essays in this volume more than compensate for second place. In their introductory essay, Makkreel and Luft make a convincing case for the continuing relevance of neo-Kantianism in contemporary philosophy. Basically, nearly every philosophical movement of the twentieth century—phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneutics, positivism, Frankfurt school—was influenced by, or grew out of a reaction to, neo-Kantianism, so that we cannot understand and assess these movements unless we have a handle on neo-Kantianism itself. The editors missed a trick, however, when they failed to mention the concept of normativity, which plays such a big role in contemporary philosophy, and whose roots lie in neo-Kantianism.Despite the high quality of many of its essays, this volume suffers from a lack of balance and perspective. Contemporary scholars on neo-Kantianism tend to focus on the Marburg school, especially the work of Cohen, Cassirer, and Natorp. This volume reflects this bias: almost all the articles are centered on these figures. Only two essays focus on the Southwestern or Baden school: one on Emil Lask by Steven Crowell, another on Dilthey and the neo-Kantians by Makkreel. The latter article, however, is more a defense of Dilthey than a study of the neo-Kantians. The important contributions of the Southwestern school to value-theory, and the logic of history and the social sciences, receive scant treatment.The lack of balance is especially evident in the case of the neo-Friesian school, which is never mentioned. This school of neo-Kantianism prospered in Göttingen in the early twentieth century under the leadership of Leonard Nelson. Its members—the theologian Rudolf Otto (1869–1937), the psychiatrist Arthur Kronfeld (1886–1941), the Nobel Prize winner Otto Meyerhoff (1884–1951), and the mathematician Gerhard Hessenberg (1874–1925)—were eminent in their own right and advocated noble social and political causes. Their circle is of great cultural interest, and it deserves a place in history no less than the Marburg and Southwestern schools. Following Fries, Nelson developed an anthropological interpretation of Kant competing with the logicist interpretation of the Marburg and Southwestern schools. Nowadays Heidegger is given credit for the anthropological interpretation, though its origins ultimately go back to Fries.The bias in perspective becomes explicit in the essay by Manfred Kühn, “Interpreting Kant Correctly: On the Kant of the Neo-Kantians.” Kühn attempts to find the common [End Page 145] interpretation of Kant in the Marburg and Southwestern schools, and locates it in the Platonized version of Kant of the later Cohen, an interpretation that eliminates sensibility and stresses the autonomy of pure thought. Kühn’s generalization is problematic for three reasons: (1) It ignores the anthropological interpretation of the Friesian school; (2) it scarcely works for the Southwestern school, which never eliminated Kant’s sensibility (Kühn bases his interpretation on a single later essay by Rickert, as if it held for all his earlier work and for Windelband and Lask); and (3) it applies only to the later Cohen, who took the plunge toward an objective idealist interpretation only in his 1896 Einleitung mit kritischen Nachtrag zur neunten Auflage der Geschichte des Materialismus. Although there are indeed Platonic tendencies to Cohen’s thinking even in the late 1860s, they do not erase the Kantian dualism between understanding and sensibility, which remains well in place even in the second edition of Kant’s Theorie der Erfahrung (1885). On the whole, Kühn’s interpretation is very anachronistic... (shrink)

The meaning and validity of Kant’s Kant’s doctrine of schematism remains contested until today. In neo-Kantianism and post-War transcendental philosophy, Kant’s schematism of the pure concepts of understanding is transformed drastically. Kant’s thesis of heterogeneity is overcome by taking it back into the internal relationships of the structure of cognition. The spontaneity of thought, performing schematizations, is retained, but Kant’s project of conceiving of the foundations of knowledge in the fashion of a theory of apperception of the I (...) as well as the externality of the given and the determination of the given that goes along with it is sublated by an objective order of validity-noematic constitution and regulation. Kant’s doctrine of schematism, then, shows to be methodology. (shrink)

This innovative collection traces the heretical development of productive imagination in post-Kantian philosophy. The book offers an original study that comprises unprecedented investigations into the kinaesthetic, pre-linguistic, poetic, historical, artistic, social and political dimensions of the productive power of imagination.

This chapter focuses on several ‘post-Kantians’ who were active between roughly the late 1780s and late 1880s, and whose views on ethics are of continuing interest in the early twenty-first century. These include Jacobi, Schiller, Friedrich Schlegel, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. The era under discussion begins historically with the French Revolution and the initial public assimilation of the Kantian philosophy, and ends when the Second German Empire succeeded in establishing itself and neo-Kantianism was beginning to consolidate its (...) hold on academic philosophy. (shrink)

The article presents the philosophical thought of Rudolf Zocher, Wolfgang Cramer and Hans Wagner, whose theoretical stance can be dubbed Neoneo-Kantianism. The article investigates their philosophical output and argues that they developed a transcendental reflection of a different kind than that of Baden Neo-Kantianism. The transcendental reflection of Neoneo-Kantianism, especially in the work of Hans Wagner, takes on the topic of phenomenological inquiry and treats consciousness as a source of subject- object distinction, unlike Rickert and Windelband, who (...) were developing transcendental reflection focused on aprioristic forms of cognition, much in the post-Fichtean vein, thus giving primacy to the subjective conditions of possible experience. (shrink)

RESUMENEl intento del presente artículo es investigar el lugar de Ortega en el panorama del pensamiento europeo, especialmente alemán, de la primera mitad del siglo XX, utilizando uno de los conceptos fundamentales de su filosofía, es decir, el concepto de la «generación». Por tanto se defiende la tesis de que Ortega puede ser considerado como uno de los representantes de la generación post-neokantiana llamada por él mismo la generación de 1911 y que el pensamiento orteguiano se inscriba en el (...) programa intelectual de filósofos como: Nicolai Hartmann, Heinz Heimsoeth, Karl Jaspers o Martin Heidegger. Todos estos filósofos brotan de la tradición neokantiana y la superan creando una nueva actitud filosófica centrándose en la reflexión ontológica y en el proyecto de superar el idealismo moderno.PALABRAS CLAVESORTEGA, GENERACIÓN, NEOKANTISMO, POST-NEOKANTISMO, ONTOLOGÍA, IDEALISMO ABSTRACTThe aim of this paper is to investigate the site of Ortega in the panorama of European, especially German thought, in the first half of the twentieth century, using one of the fundamental concepts of his philosophy, that is, the concept of «generation». Therefore I will defend the thesis that Ortega can be considered as one of the representatives of the post-neo-Kantian generation, called by himself the «generation of 1911» and that Ortega’s thought participates in the intellectual program of philosophers such as: Nicolai Hartmann, Heinz Heimsoeth, Karl Jaspers or Martin Heidegger. All these philosophers emerge from the neo-Kantian tradition but it overcomes, creating a new philosophical attitude, focusing on ontological reflection and on the project to overcome modern idealism.KEYWORDSORTEGA, GENERATION, NEO-KANTIANISM, POST-NEO-KANTIANISM, ONTOLOGY, IDEALISM. (shrink)

The article deals with the main tendencies in the studies of Russian neo-Kantianism in Poland. Although the number and quality of research in the history of Russian neo-Kantianism still cannot be equated with those of the history of German neo-Kantianism, the situation of these studies is constantly changing for the better. The authors mark the undeniable progress in the studies of Russian neo-Kantianism in Poland in the recent years: there are monographs, articles, collections, research projects on (...) particular thinkers or themes related to the history of Russian neo-Kantianism. The authors consider A. Noras’s idea of the development of neo-Kantianism into post-neo-Kantianism rather heuristic. One of the main features of this development is the ontologization of the cognitive process. This “ontological turn”, typical of Russian neo-Kantianism, in particular as represented by S. Hessen, V. Sesemann, B. Jakovenko, is, on the one hand, the hallmark of the entire Russian philosophy and, on the other, it brings together the philosophical efforts of Russian neo-Kantians and the conception of the author of the “new ontology” – N. Hartmann. (shrink)

This innovative collection traces the heretical development of productive imagination in post-Kantian philosophy. The book offers an original study that comprises unprecedented investigations into the kinaesthetic, pre-linguistic, poetic, historical, artistic, social and political dimensions of the productive power of imagination.

The physiologist Johannes Müller’s doctrine of specific nerve energies had a decisive influence on neo-Kantian conceptions of the objectivity of knowledge in the 1850s - 1870s. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Müller amassed a body of experimental evidence to support his doctrine, according to which the character of our sensations is determined by the structures of our own sensory nerves, and not by the external objects that cause the sensations. Neo-Kantians such as Hermann von Helmholtz, F.A. Lange, (...) and Otto Liebmann took Müller’s doctrine to have far-reaching consequences for their epistemologies. Over the course of the 1850s - 1870s, these three neo-Kantians, each in his own way, argued that reflection on Müller’s doctrine ruled out a certain conception of the objectivity of knowledge. It ruled out the view that knowledge is objective in virtue of affording us information about objects in a mind-independent external world. -/- This paper traces how Helmholtz, Lange, and Liebmann developed their arguments for this view, and how each developed his own alternative conception of objectivity, according to which objectivity has nothing to do with a mind-independent world. Finally, the paper concludes by considering why these arguments modelled on Müller’s doctrine would have been so powerful against rival post-Hegelian conceptions of objectivity, especially those of scientific materialists like Ludwig Büchner. (shrink)

Consider the claims that representations of physical laws are intersubjective, and that they ultimately provide the foundation for all other intersubjective knowledge. Those claims, as well as the deeper philosophical commitments that justify them, constitute rare points of agreement between the Marburg School neo-Kantians Paul Natorp and Ernst Cassirer and their positivist rival, Ernst Mach. This is surprising, since Natorp and Cassirer are both often at pains to distinguish their theories of natural scientific knowledge from positivist views like Mach’s, and (...) often from Mach’s views in particular. Thus the very fact of this agreement between the Marburg School neo-Kantians and their positivist stalking horse points to a deep current of ideas that runs beneath the whole of the post-Kantian intellectual context they shared. (shrink)

This article examines three moments of the post-Kantian philosophical tradition in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: Kantianism, Post-Kantian Idealism, and Neo-Kantianism. It elucidates the distinctive methods of a tradition that has never entirely disappeared and is now acknowledged once again as the source of contemporary insights. It outlines two problematics—naturalist scepticism and historicist nihilism—threatening the possibility of metaphysics. The first concerns sceptical worries about reason, emerging from attempts to extend the methods of natural science to (...) the study of human beings. Kant’s project of a critical and transcendental analysis of reason, with its distinctive methods, should be considered a response. The second arises from the development of new methods of historical inquiry, seeming to undermine the very possibility of individual agency. Also considered are Kant’s successors’ revisions of the critical and transcendental analysis of reason, undertaken to overcome challenges confronting the original versions of Kant’s methods. (shrink)

By drawing on the insights of diverse scholars from around the globe, this volume systematically investigates the meaning and reality of the concept of negation in Post-Kantian Philosophy—German Idealism, Early German Romanticism, and Neo-Kantianism. The reader benefits from the historical, critical, and systematic investigations contained which trace not only the significance of negation in these traditions, but also the role it has played in shaping the philosophical landscape of Post-Kantian philosophy. By drawing attention to historically neglected thinkers (...) and traditions, and positioning the dialogue within a global and comparative context, this volume demonstrates the enduring relevance of Post-Kantian philosophy for philosophers thinking in today’s global context. This text should appeal to graduate students and professors of German Idealism, Post-Kantian philosophy, comparative philosophy, German studies, and intellectual history. (shrink)

The relativistic revolution led to varieties of neo-Kantianism in which constitutive principles define the object of scientific knowledge in a domain-dependent and historically mutable manner. These principles are a priori insofar as they are necessary premises for the formulation of empirical laws in a given domain, but they lack the self-evidence of Kant’s a priori and they cannot be identified without prior knowledge of the theory they purport to frame. In contrast, the rationalist endeavors of a few masters of (...) theoretical physics have led to comprehensibility conditions that are easily admitted in a given domain and yet suffice to generate the theory of this domain. The purpose of this essay is to compare these two kinds of relativized a priori, to discuss the nature of the comprehensibility conditions, and to demonstrate their effectiveness in a modular conception of physical theories. (shrink)

Over the course of three books—Wandering Significance, Physics Avoidance, and most recently Imitation of Rigor—Mark Wilson seeks to rectify what he takes to be a century of error regarding analytic philoso-phy’s understanding of scientific theorizing. This is largely framed in terms of a sustained attack on what Wilson terms ‘theory T thinking’, which he uses to refer to a melange of philosophical tendencies that he argues fail to do justice to the nuances of how world–theory relations are forged in the (...) physical sciences. In its place, Wilson puts forward an intricate account of the shifting explanatory strategies scientists and mathematicians utilize, strategies that result in the morphing of the semantic import of our scientific terms. In the aftermath an important question emerges: what is to become of scientific realism? Despite numerous pronunciations of his own ‘stout’ realist stance, it remains unclear what Wilson’s position might actually entail. -/- I first sketch Wilson’s disputes with theory T thinking and demonstrate how his rejection of the main tenets of most contemporary realist accounts leaves a question as to what his own realist avowals could mean, further arguing that these are largely attempts to distance himself from any whiff of neo-Kantianism. In the remainder of the article, I turn to discuss a neo-Kantian account that I argue is both complementary to Wilson’s viewpoint and provides a foundation for a post-theory T realism: Ernst Cassirer’s account of concept-formation in the natural sciences. By fleshing out Cassirer’s notion of the transformation of the given and the particular role he attributes to theoretical idealization, I reconstruct his account in a way that draws out a number of fruitful parallels between his philosophy and Wilson’s. The upshot is that a post-theory T scientific realism can plausibly be brought into line with neo-Kantian conceptions. (shrink)

Da gegenwärtig kein allgemeinverbindlicher Begriff des ‚Neukantianismus‘ oder gar der ‚Transzendentalphilosophie‘ zur Verfügung steht und somit unter heutigen Bedingungen nicht aufs Geratewohl eine Geschichte der transzendentalsystematischen Bemühungen des 20. Jahrhunderts verfaßt werden kann, lag es nahe, sich diesem Thema anhand einer Analyse der Diskussionen zu nähern, in denen sich die sogenannte Selbstauflösung des Neukantianismus dokumentiert. Im Zuge dieser Annäherung war insbesondere an Siegfried Marcks zweibändiges Werk über DIE DIALEKTIK IN DER PHILOSOPHIE DER GEGENWART (Tübingen 1929/31) anzuknüpfen, das die transzendentalphilosophische Diskussion (...) der 20er Jahre unter dem Aspekt einer „kritischen Dialektik“ zusammenfaßt; einer kritischen Dialektik, die sich aufgrund der Ablehnung der neukantianischen „Konstruktion eines idealen Subjekts“ und der darum nunmehr verstärkten Einsicht in die „Spannung zwischen dem existierenden Subjekte und dem Geltungsbereich“ ausgeformt habe und als das verbindende Motiv in „Jonas Cohns Theorie der Dialektik, R. Höngswalds Denkpsychologie, Br. Bauchs Ideenlehre, P. Natorps Lehre vom Grenzdenken, N. Hartmanns Aporetik, E. Cassirers philosophische[r] ‚Anthropologie‘, Max Adlers neukantische[m] Marxismus“ anzusehen sei (S. Marck [1929], S. III). Wie allein schon der Hinweis auf „N[icolai] Hartmanns Aporetik“ zeigt, geht diese,Hegel-Renaissance in der deutschen Philosophie‘ (H. Levy) auch Hand in Hand mit einer Ontologisierung der Transzendentalphilosophie. Dieser Transzendentalontologie, die sich - teils in dialektischem Einverständnis mit und teils in antidialektischem Gegensatz zur ‚Hegel-Renaissance‘ - mit einer nach den unterschiedlichsten Richtungen hin wirksamen ‚Leibniz-Renaissance‘ verband, war im Titel der vorliegenden Untersuchung um so mehr Rechnung zu tragen, als das ontologische Motiv (vorallem unter dem Eindruck der Hartmannschen Neo-Ontologie und der Heideggerschen Existentialontologie) in den transzendentalsystematischen Arbeiten der Nachkriegszeit eindeutig in den Vordergrund tritt. Der Titel KRITISCHE DIALEKTIK UND TRANSZENDENTALONTOLOGIE steckt daher sowohl den inhaltlichen wie auch den zeitlichen Rahmen der Untersuchung ab: ihr Thema sind die post-neukantianischen Systembildungen, die in Auseinandersetzung mit den dominierenden Philosophemen der Zwischen- und Nachkriegszeit (der Neo-Ontologie und der Lebens- und Existenzphilosophie) am transzendentalen Ansatz und Systemanspruch festhielten, indem sie den überzeitlichen Geltungsanspruch der Idee und die innerzeitliche Existenz ‚dialektisch‘ oder ‚monadologisch‘ zu vermitteln suchten. Nachdem aus transzendentalsystematischer Sicht das Ringen um eben diese Vermittlungsproblematik ohnehin die gesamte abendländische Philosophiegeschichte ‚seit Parmenides und Platon‘ beherrscht, sagt diese Eingrenzung der Thematik allerdings mehr über das Selbstverständnis der Systemdenker aus, als sie zu deren philosophiegeschichtlicher Positionierung beiträgt. Man kommt daher dem Eigentümlichen der post-neukantianischen Systembildungen näher, wenn man – ihre Differenz zum Neukantianismus hervorhebend – betont, daß sie sich aufgrund der Ablehnung der neukantianischen „Konstruktion eines idealen Subjekts“ (S. Marck) dem Problem der ‚Konkretisierung der Transzendentalität‘ (Erich Heintel) oder einer ‚Philosophie der konkreten Subjektivität‘ (Hans Wagner) stellen. Da man die Phänomenologie Husserls und die Philosophische Anthropologie in gleicher Weise charakterisieren kann, muß diese Problemstellung in unserem Zusammenhang freilich nicht so sehr als Verabschiedung, sondern als Weiterführung neukantianischer Traditionen verstanden werden; da der Versuch einer Rekonstruktion der neukantianischen Theoriestränge, die sich gegenüber den lebensphilosophischen, ontologischen und positivistischen Zersetzungen des kritizistischen Ansatzes resistent erwiesen, zur Revision einiger gängiger Vorurteile bezüglich des Neukantianismus zwingt, wird im Zuge der einleitenden Analyse der sogenannten Selbstauflösung des Neukantianismus aber auch der Begriff ‚Neukantianismus‘ selbst in grundsätzlicher Weise zu bestimmen sein. Diese Begriffsbestimmung liefert das gesuchte Kriterium für die systematische Eingrenzung der Thematik und somit für die Auswahl der Repräsentanten der Kritischen Dialektik und Transzendentalontologie, deren philosophische Bemühungen in der Folge dokumentiert sind. Durchaus in Verbindung und Übereinstimmung mit diesen systematischen Erwägungen war für die nähere Auseinandersetzung mit Richard Hönigswald und Wolfgang Cramer, Bruno Bauch und Hans Wagner, sowie mit Robert Reininger und Erich Heintel, nicht zuletzt der Umstand maßgeblich, daß ihre Arbeiten eine für die Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts bemerkenswerte Kontinuität transzendentalphilosophischer Ansätze demonstrieren und dennoch keineswegs die Beachtung gefunden haben, die sie im Interesse einer lebendigen Aneignung und kritischen Weiterführung der Transzendentalphilosophie verdienen. Die vorliegende Arbeit versucht vorallem diese Kontinuität transzendentalphilosophischer bzw. neukantianischer Ansätze herauszustellen und die aus der individuellen Problemsicht der genannten Autoren resultierende produktive Weiterbildung dieser Ansätze zu dokumentieren, indem sie jeweils monographisch die einzelnen Denkwege verfolgt. (shrink)

These essays bring Neo-Kantianism back into contemporary philosophical discourse.

Johannes Daubert he was an acknowledged leader, and in some respects the founder, of the early phenomenological movement, and was considered – as much by its members as by Husserl himself – the most brilliant member of the group. In Daubert’s unpublished writings we find a series of reflections on Lask, and on Neo-Kantianism, which form the subject-matter of this paper. They range over topics such as the ontology of the ‘Sachverhalt’ or state of affairs, truthvalues (Wahrheitswerte) and the (...) value of truth, negative judgments and the copula, and the relation between perception and judgment. (shrink)

Neo-Kantianism was an important movement in German philosophy of the late 19th century: Frederick Beiser traces its development back to the late 18th century, and explains its rise as a response to three major developments in German culture: the collapse of speculative idealism; the materialism controversy; and the identity crisis of philosophy.

Editorial Board: Karl P. Ameriks, Margaret Atherton, Frederick Beiser, Fabien Capeillères, Faustino Fabbianelli, Daniel Garber, Rudolf A. Makkreel, Steven Nadler, Alan Nelson, Christof Rapp, Ursula Renz, Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, Denis Thouard, Paul Ziche, Günter Zöller The series publishes monographs and essay collections devoted to the history of philosophy as well as studies in the theory of writing the history of philosophy. A special emphasis is placed on the contextualization of philosophical historiography into the areas of the history of science, culture, and (...) the wider scope of intellectual history. (shrink)

Russian neo-Kantianismʼs status in the history of the development of Russian philosophy is an important, but poorly presented in scientific publications, issue is revealed in the article. With some exceptions, which are represented by a number of few, but informative and informative articles and a monograph, the problem remains without proper reception in the scientific discourse of our time. Russian neo-Kantianism, however, leaving aside the question of what is the phenomenon of Russian neo-Kantianism, it is impossible to productively (...) and consistently actualize the content of Russian neo-Kantians and, moreover, to show their significance in the history of Russian philosophical and socio-humanitarian thought in general. Three key difficulties stand out: 1) the question of originality and the related theme of the independence of the philosophical direction (originality, independence and originality – differ from each other, but are united in their immanent orientation); 2) Russian neo-Kantianism, which in many ways seems to be the most difficult task for researchers engaged in historical and philosophical reconstruction; 3) the question remains ambiguous as to whether Russian neo-Kantianism is a continuation of the German tradition or whether it is a direction of Russian philosophy of thought. Russian neo-Kantianism, the three difficulties identified in the reception of the phenomenon of Russian neo-Kantianism taken as a whole, are consistently revealed in the content of the proposed article, supplemented by a brief overview of the most systemic positions of Russian philosophers, ranked among Russian neo-Kantianism. Overcoming the indicated difficulties, which undoubtedly affect the objective disclosure of the creativity of each representative of Russian neo-Kantianism or thinkers related to them, seems appropriate not only from the standpoint of the history of philosophy, but also for actualizing the heritage of philosophers in the conditions of modern socio-humanitarian pragmatics. Russian neo-Kantianism The author of the article suggests that one of the ways to overcome the ambiguity of the definition of Russian neo-Kantianism in the history of Russian thought may be, firstly, a more detailed consecration of the activities of Russian neo-Kantians in the historical and philosophical literature, and secondly, a comprehensive representation of this direction, including studies of individual personalities and their works. Despite the controversial and polemical nature of the task, its formulation is necessary for the objectivity of the meaning of Russian thought in the global context. (shrink)

This comprehensive treatment of Neo-Kantianism discusses the main topics and key figures of the movement and their intersection with other 20th-century philosophers. With the advent of phenomenology, existentialism, and the Frankfurt School, Neo-Kantianism was deemed too narrowly academic and science-oriented to compete with new directions in philosophy. These essays bring Neo-Kantianism back into contemporary philosophical discourse. They expand current views of the Neo-Kantians and reassess the movement and the philosophical traditions emerging from it. This groundbreaking volume provides (...) new and important insights into the history of philosophy, the scope of transcendental thought, and Neo-Kantian influence on the sciences and intellectual culture. (shrink)

W artykule podjęta została próba przyjrzenia się sposobowi, w jaki Andrzej J. Noras odnosił się do historii filozofii jako dyscypliny metafilozoficznej. W swoich pracach wielokrotnie podejmował problem znaczenia i wartości badań historyczno-filozoficznych. U podstaw stosunku Andrzeja J. Norasa do dyscypliny, w obrębie której się poruszał była postawa krytyczna, oznaczająca, by niczego nie pomijać, by badany przedmiot oświetlić z różnych perspektyw. W swoich badaniach podążał szlakami, które są rzadko uczęszczane przez historyków filozofii Dzięki temu udało mu się dokonać wielu interesujących ustaleń (...) dotyczących głównego przedmiotu jego zainteresowań, jakim był neokantyzm. Wiele uwagi poświęcił także opisom sylwetek i dokonań filozofów mało znanych bądź po prostu zapomnianych. Zasługą Andrzeja J. Norasa jest to, że pozwolił im przemówić. (shrink)

After the demise of German Idealism, Neo-Kantianism flourished as the defining philosophical movement of Continental Europe from the 1860s until the Weimar Republic. This collection of new essays by distinguished scholars offers a fresh examination of the many and enduring contributions that Neo-Kantianism has made to a diverse range of philosophical subjects. The essays discuss classical figures and themes, including the Marburg and Southwestern Schools, Cohen, Cassirer, Rickert, and Natorp's psychology. In addition they examine lesser-known topics, including the (...) Neo-Kantian influence on theory of law, Husserlian phenomenology, Simmel's study of Rembrandt, Cassirer's philosophy of science, Cohen's philosophy of religion in relation to Rawls and Habermas, and Rickert's theory of number. This rich exploration of a major philosophical movement will interest scholars and upper-level students of Kant, twentieth-century philosophy, continental philosophy, sociology, and psychology. (shrink)

This article is a novel assessment of Hermann Cohen’s theoretical philosophy, starting out from his Kant interpretation. Hermann Cohen was the head and founder of the Marburg School of Neo- Kantianism. In the beginning, hence, I will commence with some initial reflections on the makeup and importance of this school, before I move on to Cohen’s revolutionary Kant interpretation and its ramification for the Marburg School in general.

This paper explores a pair of puzzling and controversial topics in the history of late nineteenth-century philosophy: the psychologism debates, and the nature of neo-Kantianism. Each is sufficientl...

This chapter presents an overview of the Neo‐Kantian movement in philosophy that spanned the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and that was concentrated geographically in Germany. Following a summary of the institutional and intellectual context surrounding Neo‐Kantianism, the chapter explores the core philosophical principles associated with the movement, attending in particular to the ways in which Neo‐ Kantian philosophers appropriate and depart from the core tenets of Kant's critical philosophy. After briefly surveying the context in which Neo‐Kantianism (...) took shape, the chapter surveys the two major “schools” into which the movement crystallized around 1880: the Marburg School, comprised primarily of Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, and Ernst Cassirer, and the Baden, or Southwest School, comprised principally of Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, and Emil Lask. Both schools of Neo‐ Kantianism are marked by a rich and fascinating process of internal conceptual development. (shrink)

This paper explores a pair of puzzling and controversial topics in the history of late nineteenth-century philosophy: the psychologism debates, and the nature of neo-Kantianism. Each is sufficientl...

This is a translation of a work increasingly recognized as one of the most important & innovative contributions to the history of philosophy in recent times. Kohnke's account of the impact of the amorphous movement known as neo-Kantianism combines statistical analysis of the actual courses taught at German universities with broader speculation on the political & social tastes of the thinkers discussed. A major contribution to the intellectual history of the nineteenth century, Kohnke's book has profound implications for the (...) way in which the history of philosophy is pursued. Lewis White Beck, the dean of American scholars in this field, has provided a foreword to R. J. Hollingdale's lucid translation, & the whole is likely to have an impact well beyond specialists in nineteenth-century German thought. (shrink)

Neo‐Kantianism, a movement with roots deep in the nineteenth century, dominated German academic philosophy between 1890 and 1920. Though it carried the impulse of German Idealism into the culture of the twentieth century and set the agenda for philosophies which displaced it, the movement is little studied now. One encounters it primarily in liberation narratives constructed by those whose own thinking took shape in the clash between neo‐Kantianism and the “rebellious” interwar generation spearheaded by jaspers (see Article 17) (...) and heidegger (see Article 18). Thus, before Heidegger – so Hannah Arendt (Arendt 1978, p. 294) – “philosophy was not so much communicated as drowned in a sea of boredom.” And with Heidegger – so Hans‐Georg Gadamer (Gadamer 1977, p. 214) – “the complacent system‐building of neo‐Kantian methodologism” gave way; its “calm and confident aloofness … suddenly seemed to be mere child's play” (Gadamer 1977, p. 230). Here neo‐Kantianism is the terminus ad quem of a “liberation from the unbreakable circle of reflection” toward recovery of the “evocative power of conceptual thinking and philosophical language” (Gadamer 1977, p. 202). It thus enters the lore of Continental philosophy as the father who had to be slain in order that philosophy might live. (shrink)

The dissertation treats of Paul Natorp's and Martin Heidegger's interpretations of Plato. My goal is twofold: sympathetically to expound each of these interpretations in its own right, and to contrast them against each other as emblematic of the conflict between neo-Kantianism and Phenomenology . The philosophical controversy centers on the relation of thinking and being, a controversy which in this specific context may ultimately be traced back to Kant. Natorp and Heidegger both, for different reasons, return to the Platonic (...) "theory of forms" in order to ground their respective conceptions of thinking and being. Accordingly, I discuss in Chapter One the role of the Platonic forms in Kant's own philosophy. In Chapter Two, I examine the central doctrine of neo-Kantianism and its roots in post-Kantian German philosophy. In Chapter Three, I show how this doctrine is embodied in Natorp's analysis of several of Plato's dialogues. In Chapter Four, I lay out the principal points of Phenomenology's dispute with neo-Kantianism, as well as Heidegger's understanding of that dispute. Finally, in Chapter Five, I show how Heidegger's fundamental ontology is expressed in his interpretations of several key passages of Plato. (shrink)

From the Reformation to the present, German political philosophy has done much to shape the contours of theoretical debate on politics, law, and the conditions of political legitimacy; many of the most decisive and influential theoretical impulses in European political history have originated in Germany. Until now, there has been no thorough history of German political philosophy available in English. This book offers a synoptic account of the main debates in its evolution. Commencing with the formal reception of Roman law (...) and the constitutional reforms in the Holy Roman Empire in the late fifteenth century, German Political Philosophy includes chapters on: · the political ideas of Luther, Zwingli and Melanchthon in the Reformation; · the natural-law theories of the early German Enlightenment; · Kant, Hegel and the age of German idealism; · romanticism and historicism; the Young Hegelians and Karl Marx; · legal positivism and organic theory; · Nietzsche, Weber and early sociology; · neo-Kantianism in the late nineteenth century; · constitutional theory in the Weimar Republic; · the critical theories of the Frankfurt School; · post-1945 sociological functionalism; · Niklas Luhmann's systems theory. At the heart of this book is the claim that, despite - or perhaps because of - the great upheavals and ruptures in the history of state-formation in Germany, there are certain recurrent themes and concerns which persist through these discontinuities to give a distinctive character to German political reflection. This valuable book will be of great interest to political philosophers, intellectual historians, lawyers, and historical sociologists.'. (shrink)

This article defends the paradoxical thesis that neo-Kantianism is better described as neo-Fichteanism rather than neo-Kantianism. It maintains that neo-Kantianism is closer to Fichte than Kant in four fundamental respects: in its nationalism, socialism, activism, and in its dynamic and quantitative conception of the dualism between understanding and sensibility. By contrast, Kant’s philosophy was cosmopolitan, liberal, non-activist quietist and held a static and qualitative view of the dualism between understanding and sensibility. I attempt to explain why it (...) took the neo-Kantians so long to recognize these profound affinities with Fichte: they were influenced by Fries conception of Fichte as a speculative metaphysician. I argue that the hold of Friesian interpretation of Fichte was first broken by Emil Lask in his Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte. (shrink)

In the first two decades of the century Vvedenskij developed and defended what he took to be an original argument in support of the impossibility of metaphysical knowledge. This argument, which he hailed as a proof, involved an examination of the four laws of thought alone. As it made no appeal to the highly technical analyses found in Kant''s first Critique, Vvedenskij considered it to be more efficient and thereby effective than Kant''s own arguments. Although Vvedenskij''s estimation of his accomplishment (...) actually increased with the passage of time, the proof rested on highly dubious assumptions. (shrink)

After the completion of I. Kant’s “Copernican” turn in metaphysics, all subsequent European philosophy to one degree or another was under his influence. The purpose of the article is to consider the reception and transformation of the Kantian theoretical philosophy by the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism. It is necessary to analyze the reasons for H. Cohen's and P. Natorp’s interpretation of Kant's criticism. To do this, one should consider (i) internalist and (ii) externalist factors in the formation of the (...) Marburg School. Neo-Kantianism, on the one hand, emerged as a response to materialism, naturalism, and post-Kantian German idealism. In addition, the Marburg School was strongly influenced by the change in the scientific paradigm in mathematical natural science at the end of the 19th century. The justification by the Marburgers of Kant’s a priori doctrine presupposed thematization, first of all, of: a) purity of thought; b) systematic unity of thought and experience; c) the orientation of philosophy to the “fact of science”; d) transcendental method. As a result, the Marburg School interpreted the Kantian concept of the unity of consciousness; abandoned the principle of synthetic (real) unity of consciousness in favor of systematic (logical) unity; substantiated the purity of scientific thinking; put forward the requirement of orientation of philosophy to the “fact of science”; developed the concept of the origin of thinking (Ursprung); abandoned the idea of “givenness” of the subject of knowledge and proved its “assignment”; changed the understanding of the essence and functions of the transcendental method; put forward the concept of thinking as “generation” (“production”); formulated a new understanding a priori. The changes that took place in the 19th century in philosophy, mathematical natural science and mathematical sciences led to a sharp activation of constructivism. It can be concluded that Kant’s epistemological paradigm was realistic constructivism. Pure constructivism became the paradigm of the Marburg School. (shrink)

Kant’s science of the conditions of intelligibility leaves post-Kantians with a question: can a science of intelligibility tolerate brute facts? ‘Facticity’ is associated with phenomenology, for which the concept denotes underivable or brute conditions of intelligibility like temporality, sociality, and embodiment. While this suggests an affirmative answer to the post-Kantian question, scholars overlook that ‘facticity’ is a concept from German idealism, whose proponents answer the question in the negative. Fichte coins ‘facticity’ to denote the intolerable bruteness of conditions (...) that are putatively presupposed by, and hence inexplicable limitations on, reason. A science of intelligibility must eliminate putative bruteness if it is to be systematic, as Fichte says, or presuppositionless, as Hegel says. Moreover, eliminating putative bruteness requires a new logic for deriving conditions of intelligibility from reason’s own contradictions, a dialectical logic that Fichte invents and Hegel develops. German idealism’s logical revolution subsequently provokes Heidegger’s phenomenological objection that dialectic presupposes brute conditions of the dialectician’s lived experience, conditions whose facticity dialectic inevitably reproduces and hence can only interpret hermeneutically. The heretofore untold history of the concept of facticity thus contains the deepest parting of the ways after Kant. On the one hand, Hegel eliminates vestigial facticity in Fichte’s system in his final step toward a presuppositionless science of intelligibility, although Schelling charges Hegel with presupposing both the value of science and the existence that science renders intelligible. On the other hand, Lask’s otherwise misleading reading of Fichte inspires Heidegger to reject the very idea of presuppositionlessness on behalf of a hermeneutics of facticity. The trajectory from German idealism via neo-Kantianism to phenomenology is accordingly one in which facticity begins as the obstacle to the science of intelligibility and ends as the character of the situation in which this science is possible in the first place. Within this trajectory and up to our own time, reason is fated to transform from the hand that unconditionally holds the world to the thrown activity of being in the world. (shrink)

Originally a student of Marburg Neo-Kantianism, Nicolai Hartmann departed from this tradition to become one of the leading German philosophers of the first half of the twentieth century. He wrote on all the major fields of philosophy, including the philosophy of history, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics, although his central interest was ontology. He held teaching posts in Marburg, Cologne, Berlin, and Göttingen, and was president of the German Philosophical Association after the Second World War. Perhaps unique among his peers, (...) he spearheaded the resurgence of ontology by developing a pluralistic, humanistic realism that attempted to do justice to both the sciences and the humanities.Over the last... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:F. H. Bradley and the Working-out of Absolute Idealism* JOHN HERMAN RANDALL, JR. FRANCIS HERBERTBRADLEY (1846-1924) 1 agreed with the other English idealists that the real world is the experienced world. But he started with the fundamental conviction that "experience" is more than "thought," as Green had maintained. Bradley's basic drive is the refusal to abolish "feeling" in favor of knowledge and intelligibility. "Feeling" is a fundamental and ineradicable (...) aspect of "reality"m more fundamental, in fact, than thinking. In the immediately experienced world, all intelligible distinctions and relations are merged in a "whole of feeling" which is the ultimate subject-matter of philosophy. "Thought" arises out of feeling, out of "immediacy," as an interpretation of immediate experience by distinguishing relations and aspects in it. "Knowledge " is only one aspect of the experienced world; it needs blending with "feeling" and will to include all the experienced aspects. "Feeling" starts for Bradley, in his Principles of Logic (1883), in pretty much the empiricist sense, as isolated sensations, and as subjective (in flavor at least). It then becomes neutral: "feeling" is identified with "the felt"; and it grows richer, attempting to include the whole wealth of immediate experience. Thus Bradley gets very close to Dewey's conception of "direct experience," "non-reflective experience," without, however, Dewey's biological analysis. It is through this conception of experience that Bradley approaches the naturalism to which his thinking almost arrived at the end. Thought, that is, has a setting in experience " it is relational, and by its analysis it breaks up experienced and felt wholes. There is a double insistence in Bradley. On the one hand, reality is experienced, but is not adequately expressed in thought. On the other, reality/s accessible to knowledge. What has often been called Bradley's "skepticism" is really an objective relativism. Thought, logical structure, is not ultimate. In Appearance and *This study of F. It. Bradley is based on one of five chapters on post-ttegehan philosophical Ideahsm in Britain and America to be included in my forthcoming Career oJ Philosophy in Modem Times, Vol.III: The Hundred Years Since Darwin. ISee Bradley ed. of Mind, XXXIV (1925); A. E. Taylor, "F. H. Bradley"; J. H. Muirhead, "Bradley's Place in Philosophy." See also T. M. Forsyth, English Philosophy (London: 1910), chap. VII, 2rid part; Rudolf Kagey, F. H. Bradley's Logic (New York: 1931). The best philosophical analyses of Bradley are Robert D. Mack, The Appeal to Immediate Experience (New York: 1945),and Richard Wollheim,F. H. Bradley (Pelican Books, 1959). [245] 246 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Reality, he insists it is really self-contradictory; then later he emphasizes rather that it is always relative to its particular subiect-matter. The real, experienced world is never identical with the intelligible world, yet it is also never "extraneous " to it. The relation of the two can be said to be, in Aristotelian terms, that of substance to form, that of what is to its intelligible aspect. The intelligible world, the system of science and knowledge, thus fundamentally needs criticism in the light of its setting in the experienced world. This is not only the entire drive of Dewey's Experience and Nature; it is the expression of that whole current of thought on the Continent which began with the criticism of Hegel's "panlogism" in the 1840's and is today called "Existentialism." Bradley is the British counterpart of all those who have criticized philosophies of logical structure like T. H. Green's, or like the other contemporary forms of Neo-Kantianism in Germany and France. The "known world" is a world of relations distingflished in the richer "real world." These distinctions are ultimately relative to their particular setting, but in that setting they are valid enough. Bradley's celebrated doctrine of the "degrees of truth and reality" means that practically knowledge is "true"; any idea which fulfills its purpose of rendering some portion or aspect of experience intelligible and significant and meaningful, and which is not ousted by a better idea, Bradley is willing to say is "so far true." It is valid, in its own sphere and purpose, despite its ultimate inconsistency; the wave-theory... (shrink)

The phenomenon of sacrifice was a major problem in nineteenth-century social thought about religion for a variety of reasons. These surfaced in a spectacular way in a German trial in which the most prominent Jewish philosopher of the century, the neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen, was asked to be an expert witness. The text he produced on the nature of Judaism was widely circulated and influential. It presents what can be taken as the neo-Kantian approach to understanding ritual. But it also reveals (...) the ways in which neo-Kantianism avoided becoming relativistic social science. In this case, it came to the edge and stopped. Cohen's account is compared to the similar, but ‘empirical’, account of the same material in Marcel Mauss and Henri Hubert, which completed the transition. (shrink)

The editors' main objective with this selection of texts is to show that Hermann Cohen (1842–1918) was, throughout most of his career, driven by a desire to provide an interpretation of Kant consistent with Judaism. The editors believe that, just as Moses Maimonides had combined Judaism with Aristotle in the Middle Ages, Cohen endeavored to combine it with Kant. Cohen lived his whole life as an observant Jew and, according to the editors, he always wished to synthesize Judaism and (...) class='Hi'>Kantianism. Not only this, but the editors also claim that Cohen held that Kant drew from the wellspring of Judaism and that Kant and Judaism headed in the same direction, namely, towards socialism. Moreover, since materialism and naturalism are inimical to religious Judaism, Cohen attacked them and argued that only Kantian idealism could provide the epistemological foundation that the natural sciences require. Cohen has oftentimes been approached with the assumption that his Neo-Kantianism could be understood independently of his religious faith and as if the latter had no significant implication for his philosophy. But this collection of texts demonstrates the contrary and puts to rest any interpretation of Cohen as an impartial philosopher. (shrink)

The paper uses the Neo-Kantian distinction between Natural and Human sciences and its methodological implications to navigate W. E. B. Du Bois’s and Alain L. Locke’s theories of race. In tracing a continuity between these two figures, the paper also shows how their respective reliance on Neo-Kantian categories leads them to different results. The goal is to show how, while Du Bois’s Neo-Kantianism is best understood as a Diltheyan Neo-Kantianism of the psycho-physical unity of human nature influenced by (...) an anti-metaphysical orientation, Locke’s Neo-Kantianism can be seen as a Neo-Kantianism whose focus is the rejection of causality and of the causal nexus between biological and non-biological traits. (shrink)

This article deals with Moritz Schlick's critical realism and its sources that dominated his philosophy until about 1925. It is shown that his celebrated analysis of Einstein's relativity theory is the result of an earlier philosophical discussion about space perception and its role for the theory of space. In particular, Schlick's "method of coincidences" did not owe anything to "entirely new principles" based on the work of Einstein, Poincaré or Hilbert, as claimed by Michael Friedman, but was already in place (...) before these principles were developed. The first part of the article is devoted to Alois Riehl's critical realism—a neo-Kantian variant which rejects the dominant interpretation of the thing-in-itself as a mere limiting concept and takes empirical theories of space perception into consideration. The second part deals with the central role of "Psychological Parallelism" for Riehl and its integration with Kant's epistemology. In the third part it is shown that Schlick's theory of knowledge is based on Riehl's intricate reworking of Kantian epistemology, physiological psychology, theory of sense perception and philosophy of mathematics. The conclusion stresses the position of the unity of consciousness in Riehl's philosophy which Schlick admittedly cannot cope with. (shrink)