I examine the phenomenon of implicit learning, the process by which knowledge about the rule-governed complexities of the stimulus environment is acquired independently of conscious attempts to do so. Our research with the two seemingly disparate experimental paradigms of synthetic grammar learning and probability learning, is reviewed and integrated with other approaches to the general problem of unconscious cognition. The conclusions reached are as follows: Implicit learning produces a tacit knowledge base that is abstract and representative (...) of the structure of the environment; such knowledge is optimally acquired independently of conscious efforts to learn; and it can be used implicitly to solve problems and make accurate decisions about novel stimulus circumstances. Various epistemological issues and related problems such as intuition, neuroclinical disorders of learning and memory, and the relationship of evolutionary processes to cognitive science are also discussed. (shrink)

Phenomenon of transdisciplinarity was put into the fore of analysis rather recently. In the article an attempt is made to find out whether it is possible to attribute this phenomenon not only to a science of the 21st century, or we have here the case where some scientific realities come to the attention of researchers with certain delay and has its value for the culture in general? It is possible to judge even the emergence of a kind of (...) cognitive revolution affecting both science culture. We need to find out what is meant by a transdisciplinarity, and how it differs from the inter- or multiransdisciplinarity. In the study the method of historical reconstruction, combining elements of presentism and antiqurism, was implemented. This method allows us to interpret historical events in the context of a specific level of knowledge, and at the same time to evaluate them in terms of modern ideas related to transdisciplinarity, inter- and multidisciplinarity. System-structural method, focused on an integrated analysis of the dynamics of development of cognitive processes in culture was implied as well, and the method of comparative analysis, which is aimed at comparing different but conceptually similar processes in various areas of conceptual art practice. It is in the framework of paradigm adopted a tacit agreement among scientists about the validity and effectiveness of research methods and techniques of inquiry. Within the paradigm, which presupposes certain fundamental principles, goals, and certain values shared by the scientific community, the novel sprouts of radical ideas once emerge. The scientific revolution here means a radical revision of the admissibility of accepted and proven methods, goals and values that are common to the members of the scientific community. Typically, new theories and concepts proposed and already mastered new scientific community, which is gradually replacing its representatives on the key command altitudes. The kernel of scientific community in fact is a style of thinking that is emerged in the context of a particular discipline, and then experience expansion in the form of discursive practices at a wide space of science and culture due to the novel cognitive schemes open the way to synthesize various research domains into a certain integrity. There is no question of the scientific revolution in the sense of Kuhn, since any significant goals and values of the scientific communities are not affected. Nevertheless, in some sense cognitive revolution taking place, the revolution of transdisciplinary type. The adoption of a new style of scientific thinking often gives rise to new types of objects and directions of cognitive activity, a new type of explanation that require new types of research proposals and cultural activities. Thus, the main idea of this article is that along with the Kuhn type scientific revolutions, transdisciplinary type scientific revolutions are conceivable, and even transdisciplinary cognitive types. This revolutions manifests in a change in style of reasoning, and it results in the expansion of this style to wide space of science and culture through the cognitive schemes and techniques, which enables to synthesize research and art activity in some integrity. Adoption of a new way of reasoning and the transition to new discursive practices generates new types of research facilities, new mechanisms of explanation, new cultural blueprints and instruments. Cognitive activity, based on a new style of thinking, involves multidisciplinarity, formation of new scientific and cultural institutions, and, therefore, causes a noticeable social change. Based on an analysis of interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary processes in modern science and culture the authors claim that it is namely transdisciplinarity would determine the face of science and culture in the medium term, and will form the basis for the convergence of science, technology, art, and consciousness studies in general. (shrink)

In this article the philosophy of mathematics issues related to the procedure of mathematical symbolization are studied on the basis of phenomenon of implicit knowledge. The specificity of mathematical symbolization and conditions of its implementation, defines the role of mathematical symbolization in the development of mathematics. The author believes that the results can justify the thesis that the basis of mathematical symbolization is a priori epistemological ‘foundation‘. The author believes that the conclusions of the article significantly limit the (...) prospects of the popular contemporary philosophy of science epistemological relativism in the philosophy of mathematics, as well as in the theory of knowledge in general. Further studies on the role of implicit knowledge in the development of mathematics, according to the author, should contribute to the strengthening and further spread of a similar approach in the theory of knowledge. (shrink)

Promoting a better understanding of the phenomenon of colonization and its connection with environmental knowledge and technology, this article proposes a reframing of research agendas to take into account the municipal character of colonization in the Hispanic realm and to ask new questions. Questions should address what human–ecosystem relations, and the ways of knowing and techniques for transforming the physical realm, can tell us about colonization itself; who the historical agents involved were, and what these actors knew, learned, (...) and did in their environments. Using the Basin of Mexico’s drainage and the agency of commoners, this article proposes that colonization depends on the massive deployment and generation of tacit knowledge about how to harness matter, energy, and time for the reproduction of human societies; the quotidian appropriation and reworking of autochthonous knowledge, techniques, and technology by the colonizing groups; the collaboration of the local populations in whom these are vested; and the agency of commoners with practical skills, environmental knowledge, and technological savvy derived from and honed in the realm of material production. In the Ibero-American realm, these agents were primarily commoners with skills in agropastoral production and the building trades; race, ethnicity, language, and gender were secondary conditions. (shrink)

This article questions the concept of tacit knowledge as the basis for our conceptual understanding of practice. The first part of the article is a critical introduction to the concept of tacit knowledge. It is emphasized that this concept is situated in various academic practices and not defined and homogeneously but in accordance with issues and intentions significant for these practices. The second part of the article outlines some consequences of conceptualizing practice as basically a matter (...) of tacit knowledge. It is argued that tacit knowledge should be seen in relation to the growth of professions in modern society and to the need to legitimate them. It is further claimed that as a legitimating concept tacit knowledge may bring about various problems leading to a marginalization of specific experiences, to social uniformity, to the reappearance of individualism and to the maintenance of a dualistic view of knowledge. (shrink)

This essay explores the notion of practical religious knowledge in three steps. I examine a short passage in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (A 132-3 / B 171-2) on judgment, a passage that points out that we (necessarily) know more than we can say or state. I then introduce Michael Polanyi’s account of tacit knowledge to suggest what “religious tacit knowledge” is. Finally, I analyze a text from Master Eckhart’s Counsels on Discernment (Reden der Unterweisung) (...) to show the relevance of this notion of practical (or tacit) knowledge in religious contexts. (shrink)

The ongoing pursuit of tacit knowledge Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-5 DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9500-6 Authors Charles W. Smith, Department of Sociology, Queens College, CUNY, 65-30 Kissena Boulevard, Flushing, NY 11367, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

The concepts of “collective” and “social” are routinely confused, with claims about collective facts and their necessity justified by evidence that involves only social or interactional facts. This is the case with Harry Colllins’ argument for tacit knowledge as well. But the error is deeply rooted in the history of philosophy, in the notion of shared presuppositions popularized by neo-Kantianism, which confused logical claims of necessity with factual claims about groups. Claims of this neo-Kantian kind have difficulties shared (...) by Collins’s argument for Collective Tacit Knowledge. The alternative, a fully social account of our capacities of understanding and interpretation, avoids these difficulties and allows for a model of tacit knowledge that serves the supposed explanatory needs that the “collective” part of Collins’s account purports to meet. (shrink)

Tacit knowledge is widely acknowledged to be an important component of innovation, but such recognition is rarely accompanied by more detailed explanations about the nature of tacit knowledge, why such knowledge is significant, how it becomes codified or whether there may be limits to codification. This paper attempts to fill some of the gaps, drawing on a recent study of university/industry links in three emerging technologies. It concludes that tacit knowledge, which can only (...) be transmitted through personal interaction, will continue to play an important role in innovation. This derives from a variety of reasons, but most significant are the complexity of systems and the emergence of new technologies. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss and extend the taxonomy of tacit knowledge proposed by Collins in his 2010 book, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge. First, we question the definition and the name of one of Collins’s three categories of TK, namely Relational Tacit Knowledge (RTK). After having explained the true fundamental principle that individuates RTK as one category distinct from the two others (Somatic Tacit Knowledge STK and Collective Tacit Knowledge CTK), (...) we suggest an alternative name for RTK, which fits this principle better. Second, our analyses identify a possible ambiguity in the interpretation of RTK, STK and CTK, and indicate how to avoid the related possible confusions. For this purpose, we introduce several notations that specify Collins’s ones. The corresponding developments strengthen and specify a point implicitly suggested in Collins’s book, namely the existence of a serious asymmetry between RTK on the one hand, and STK/CTK on the other. Third, the paper attempts to elaborate and complete Collins’s framework. In this vein, we introduce the possibility of different sub-types of RTK. One of these sub-cases raises the issue of individual, intellectual tacit knowledge—a case that does not seem to have any place in Collins’s picture. We also look at Collins’s framework in a dynamical perspective, and discuss the possibility—not considered by Collins—of dynamic transformations between some of the three categories. Finally, we make two suggestions in order to avoid confusions or misunderstandings when using Collins’s distinctions. When the qualities “explicit”, “explicable” or “tacit” are attributed to some knowledge, these qualities should always be accompanied by the specification for whom and when. Moreover, the attributions “explicit” and “explicable” should always indicate which of Collins’s four senses is meant—elaboration, transformation, mechanization or scientific explanation. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss and extend the taxonomy of tacit knowledge proposed by Collins in his 2010 book, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge. First, we question the definition and the name of one of Collins’s three categories of TK, namely Relational Tacit Knowledge (RTK). After having explained the true fundamental principle that individuates RTK as one category distinct from the two others (Somatic Tacit Knowledge STK and Collective Tacit Knowledge CTK), (...) we suggest an alternative name for RTK, which fits this principle better. Second, our analyses identify a possible ambiguity in the interpretation of RTK, STK and CTK, and indicate how to avoid the related possible confusions. For this purpose, we introduce several notations that specify Collins’s ones. The corresponding developments strengthen and specify a point implicitly suggested in Collins’s book, namely the existence of a serious asymmetry between RTK on the one hand, and STK/CTK on the other. Third, the paper attempts to elaborate and complete Collins’s framework. In this vein, we introduce the possibility of different sub-types of RTK. One of these sub-cases raises the issue of individual, intellectual tacit knowledge—a case that does not seem to have any place in Collins’s picture. We also look at Collins’s framework in a dynamical perspective, and discuss the possibility—not considered by Collins—of dynamic transformations between some of the three categories. Finally, we make two suggestions in order to avoid confusions or misunderstandings when using Collins’s distinctions. When the qualities “explicit”, “explicable” or “tacit” are attributed to some knowledge, these qualities should always be accompanied by the specification for whom and when. Moreover, the attributions “explicit” and “explicable” should always indicate which of Collins’s four senses is meant—elaboration, transformation, mechanization or scientific explanation. (shrink)

In the article, there proposed an original idea of the collective agent of cognition (CAC) that overcomes the controversy of individualism and collectivism. In the history of philosophy a clear conceptualization of has been offered by I. Kant (the notion of transcendental agent and scheme of imagination). This was interpretedby, among others, G.W.F. Hegel ("Zeitgeist") and K. Marx (the concept of the total and joint labor). A critical analysis of analytic social epistemology (A. Goldman, J. Lackey) helps clarify the (...) class='Hi'>tacit presuppositions of the "individual-collective" dualism. In reducing the CAC to the cognizing individual, Lackey fails to interpret adequately the phenomenon of distributed knowledge widely spread in modern science and social practice (F. Hayek, H. Collins). As an alternative to reductionism, the article proposes a typological approach to CAC. It aims to understand its structure as consisting of four main levels (transcendental, imbedded, contract and distributed agent of cognition), each of which being illustrated by a paradigm example. In conclusion, the duality of collective and individual agents of cognition is unmasked as based on the mixture of everyday and philosophical discourses. (shrink)

In today’s knowledge economy, knowledge and knowledge sharing are fundamental for organizations to achieve competitiveness and for individuals to strengthen their innovation capabilities. Knowledge sharing is a complex language-based activity; language affects how individuals communicate and relate. The growth in international collaborations and the increasing number of diverse teams affect knowledge sharing because individuals engage in daily knowledge activities in a language they are not native speakers. Understanding the challenges they face, and how they (...) manage the emerging difficulties is the main aim of this manuscript. For this purpose, an explorative case study was conducted in an international university research project, namely the TED project. Both interviews and direct observations were employed to understand the phenomenon better and deliberately triangulate data and improve validity. Results show that non-native language use determines the emergence of different language proficiency, depending on the nature of the knowledge domain–job-related vs. non-job-related. Within non-job-related knowledge domains, the lack of linguistic abilities, summed to the perceived cultural diversities, mainly affects people’s propensity to engage in personal and more intense social relationships. Under such circumstances, tacit knowledge sharing is reduced with negative consequences on the project’s long-term innovative performance. Since the project is still running, detecting language challenges will allow the partners to design and apply effective measures to support cooperation with language and cultural barriers. Among them, code switching, adopted by “bridge” actors, already emerges as tool supporting communication and knowledge exchange. (shrink)

Walter Gulick criticizes The Social Theory of Practices for its non-Polanyian views of the problem of the objective character of tacit knowledge, its insistence that there should be plausible causal mechanisms that correspond to claims about tacit knowledge and its “social” transmission, and its denial of the social, telic character of practices. In this reply it is asserted that the demand for causally plausible mechanisms is not scientistic or for that matter non-Polanyian, that the book has (...) a view of objectivity that parallels Polanyi’s own, and that the idea of telic practices is subject to the same problems over mechanism as non-telic ones, with the additional problem that telic concepts need supra-individual feedback mechanisms, of which no plausible examples exist. In each case, the non-social or personal explanations of the phenomenon of “practice” are better than the “social” ones. The discussion concludes by posing the challenge of connectionism to Polanyi, as well as the opportunity it presents. (shrink)

Michael Polanyi and H.M. Collins contrast tacit knowledge with explicit knowledge. For Collins, secrets and other forms of “relational tacit knowledge” are tacit, but only in relation to specific circumstances and relationships. Collins treats such relational knowledge as less interesting theoretically than collective knowledge that is essentially difficult and perhaps impossible to convey through explicit formulations. In this paper I focus on relational tacit knowledge, despite its marginality in Collins’s typology, (...) because it draws attention to conceptual ambiguities in the relationship between tacit and explicit knowledge. More importantly, such ambiguities come into play as strategic resources in historical labor conflicts and in efforts to secure and preserve professional autonomy. Instead of treating tacit knowledge as a substantive possession of individuals and groups, I suggest that an empirical sociological alternative is to investigate pragmatic and polemical uses of the tacit/explicit distinction in particular circumstances of action and conflict. (shrink)

Michael Polanyi and H.M. Collins contrast tacit knowledge with explicit knowledge. For Collins, secrets and other forms of “relational tacit knowledge” are tacit, but only in relation to specific circumstances and relationships. Collins treats such relational knowledge as less interesting theoretically than collective knowledge that is essentially difficult and perhaps impossible to convey through explicit formulations. In this paper I focus on relational tacit knowledge, despite its marginality in Collins’s typology, (...) because it draws attention to conceptual ambiguities in the relationship between tacit and explicit knowledge. More importantly, such ambiguities come into play as strategic resources in historical labor conflicts and in efforts to secure and preserve professional autonomy. Instead of treating tacit knowledge as a substantive possession of individuals and groups, I suggest that an empirical sociological alternative is to investigate pragmatic and polemical uses of the tacit/explicit distinction in particular circumstances of action and conflict. (shrink)

The concepts of “collective” and “social” are routinely confused, with claims about collective facts and their necessity justified by evidence that involves only social or interactional facts. This is the case with Harry Colllins’ argument for tacit knowledge as well. But the error is deeply rooted in the history of philosophy, in the notion of shared presuppositions popularized by neo-Kantianism, which confused logical claims of necessity with factual claims about groups. Claims of this neo-Kantian kind have difficulties shared (...) by Collins’s argument for Collective Tacit Knowledge. The alternative, a fully social account of our capacities of understanding and interpretation, avoids these difficulties and allows for a model of tacit knowledge that serves the supposed explanatory needs that the “collective” part of Collins’s account purports to meet. (shrink)

This paper tries to express a critical point of view on the computational turn in philosophy by looking at a specific field of study: philosophy of science. The paper starts by briefly discussing the main contributions that information and communication technologies have given to the rising of computational philosophy of science, and in particular to the cognitive modelling approach. The main question then arises, concerning how computational models can cope with the presence of tacit knowledge in science. Would (...) it be possible to develop new ways of handling this specific type of knowledge, in order to incorporate it in computational models of scientific thinking? Or should tacit knowledge lead us to other approaches in using computer sciences to model scientific cognition? These questions are addressed by making reference to a detailed case study of a recent innovation development in the field of biotechnology. (shrink)

Pierre Bourdieu has developed a philosophy of social science, grounded in the phenomenological tradition, which treats knowledge as a practical ability embodied in skilful behaviour, rather than an intellectual capacity for the representation and manipulation of propositional knowledge. He invokes Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following as one way of explicating the idea that knowledge is a skill. Bourdieu’s conception of tacit knowledge is a dispositional one, adopted to avoid a perceived dilemma for methodological individualism. That dilemma (...) requires either the explanation of regularities in social behaviour as the result of the tacit representation of procedural rules (‘legalism’) or the self-conscious representation of behavioural goals (‘voluntarism’) by individuals. After explaining the apparent dilemma, I then argue that Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule following actually undermine, rather than support, a dispositional solution. Nonetheless, the philosophy of social science can survive without a dispositional account of knowledge. Such a social science needs, firstly, to embrace one horn of the dilemma, voluntarism, provided that the relevant regularities can be explained as unintended consequences of agents’ self-represented intentions. Secondly, such a social science should treat theorists’ interpretations as unifying generalizations, not hypotheses about the acquisition of tacit knowledge. Finally, where appeal to cognitive psychology can distinguish otherwise equivalent theories in social science, social science should incorporate the data of cognitive psychology concerning tacit mental processes. (shrink)

As AI systems become increasingly complex it may become unclear, even to the designer of a system, why exactly a system does what it does. This leads to a lack of trust in AI systems. To solve this, the field of explainable AI has been working on ways to produce explanations of these systems’ behaviors. Many methods in explainable AI, such as LIME, offer only a statistical argument for the validity of their explanations. However, some methods instead study the internal (...) structure of the system and try to find components which can be assigned an interpretation. I believe that these methods provide more valuable explanations than those statistical in nature. I will try to identify which explanations can be considered internal to the system using the Chomskyan notion of tacit knowledge. I argue that each explanation expresses a rule, and through the localization of this rule in the system internals, we can take a system to have tacit knowledge of the rule. I conclude that the only methods which are able to sufficiently establish this tacit knowledge are those along the lines of Olah : 4901–4911, 2017), and therefore they provide explanations with unique strengths. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Harry Collins’s influential writing on tacit knowledge. In particular I turn my attention to his recent book, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge [Collins 2010], or TEK, which is arguably the most complete and systematic statement of what he means by the term “tacit knowledge”. As well as examining tacit knowledge as elaborated in this contribution, I draw out an underlying tension in Collins’s major contributions to the sociology of (...) scientific knowledge in general between the realism underlying his notion of “tacit knowledge” and the constructivism underlying his other well-known concept, “the experimenters’ regress” (as for instance, elaborated in his well-known book Changing Order [Collins 1992]). In order to make this argument I pay particular attention to an aspect of his writings on tacit knowledge which I think is worthy of closer examination: namely the sorts of empirical support claimed for the features and properties of tacit knowledge to which he attends. In short I ask questions concerning some of the specific empirical examples and the conclusions he draws from them. (shrink)

This article defends deliberative democracy against the problem of tacit knowledge. It has been argued that deliberative democracy gives a privileged position to linguistic communication and therefore excludes tacit forms of knowledge which cannot be expressed propositionally. This article shows how the exclusion of such knowledge presents important challenges to both proceduralist and epistemic conceptions of deliberative democracy, and how it has been taken by some to favour markets over democratic institutions. After pointing to the (...) limitations of market alternatives, deliberative democracy is defended by arguing that tacit knowledge can be brought into deliberation through the mechanism of trust in testimony. By trusting the testimony of a speaker, deliberators are able to act on knowledge even without it being explicitly expressed. The article then goes on to discuss the implications of this defence for deliberative theory, and particularly, the forms of reason which deliberative democrats must see as legitimate. (shrink)

Half a century after Michael Polanyi conceptualised ‘the tacit component’ in personal knowing, management studies has reinvented ‘tacit knowledge’—albeit in ways that squander the advantages of Polanyi’s insights and ignore his faith in ‘spiritual reality’. While tacit knowing challenged the absurdities of sheer objectivity, expressed in a ‘perfect language’, it fused rational knowing, based on personal experience, with mystical speculation about an un-experienced ‘external reality’. Faith alone saved Polanyi’s model from solipsism. But Ernst von Glasersfeld’s radical (...) constructivism provides scope to rethink personal tacit knowing with regard to ‘other people’ and the intersubjectively viable construction of ‘experiential reality’. By separating tacit knowing from Polanyi’s metaphysical realism and drawing on Benedict Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined communities’, it is possible to conceptualise ‘imagined institutions’ as the tacit dimension of power that shapes human interaction. Whereas Douglass North claimed institutions could be reduced to rules, imagined institutions are known in ways we cannot tell. (shrink)

This article offers a detailed reading Gascoigne and Thornton’s book Tacit Knowledge, which aims to account for the tacitness of tacit knowledge while preserving its status as knowledge proper. I take issue with their characterization and rejection of the existential-phenomenological Background—which they presuppose even as they dismiss—and their claim that TK can be articulated “from within”—which betrays a residual Cartesianism, the result of their elision of conceptuality and propositionality. Knowledgeable acts instantiate capacities which we might (...) know we have and of which we can be aware, but which are not propositionally structured at their “core”. Nevertheless, propositionality is necessary to what Robert Brandom calls, in Making It Explicit and Articulating Reasons, “explicitation”, which notion also presupposes a tacit dimension, which is, simply, the embodied person, without which no conception of knowledge can get any purchase. On my view, there is no knowledgeable act that can be understood as such separately from the notion of skilled corporeal performance. The account I offer cannot make sense of so-called “knowledge-based” education, as opposed to systems and styles which supposedly privilege “contentless” skills over and above “knowledge”, because on the phenomenological and inferentialist lines I endorse, neither the concepts “knowledge” nor “skill” has any purchase or meaning without the other. (shrink)

How can we identify and estimate workers’ tacit knowledge? How can we design a personnel mix aimed at improving and speeding up its transfer and development? How is it possible to implement tacit knowledge sustainable projects in remote areas? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to distinguish between types of tacit knowledge, to establish what they allow for and to consider their sources. It is also essential to find a way of (...) managing the tacit knowledge ‘stock’ and distribution within the workforce. In short, a conceptual framework is needed to manage tacit knowledge. Based on previous works and 2 years of action research, this paper introduces such a framework and describes its partial application to support the pre-operational training and hiring in a large industrial plant in Brazil. Two contributions emerge from the research. First, the concept of ‘levels of similarity’ is introduced as a means to qualify the experience of workers and estimate the associated tacit knowledge. Second, the capability of carrying out three types of judgement properly and speedily is put forward as being a core ability of those who possess what has been called ‘collective tacit knowledge’ (Collins in Organ Stud 28(2):257–262, 2007). In practical terms, the results indicate the opportunity for companies to capitalize on the experience and tacit knowledge of their workers in a systematic way and with due recognition. Ultimately, positive impacts are expected in their absorptive capacity as well as in their management and human resources systems, accident prevention, productivity and the development of sustainable projects in remote areas. (shrink)

This paper elaborates on the link between different types and degrees of experience that can be gone through within a form of life or collectivity—the so-called levels of immersion—and the development of distinct types of tacit knowledge and expertise. The framework is then probed empirically and theoretically. In the first case, its ‘predictions’ are compared with the accounts of novices who have gone through different ‘learning opportunities’ during a pre-operational training programme for running a huge nickel industrial plant (...) in Brazil. These are also analysed vis-à-vis the experience of an expert who has designed and experienced the outcomes of two pre-operational training sessions in the nickel industry before developing and managing the one discussed here. Theoretically, the framework is used to pinpoint exactly what interactional experts who have developed their expertise through linguistic socialisation alone are able to do as well as to analyse the case of technical connoisseurs. The results indicate that the proposed framework is useful. It supports the design and improvement of training programmes for the development of tacit knowledge while at the same time bringing about a refined analysis of claims concerning the abilities of types of experts and expertise. (shrink)

In the article, there proposed an original idea of the collective agent of cognition (CAC) that overcomes the controversy of individualism and collectivism. In the history of philosophy a clear conceptualization of has been offered by I. Kant (the notion of transcendental agent and scheme of imagination). This was interpretedby, among others, G.W.F. Hegel ("Zeitgeist") and K. Marx (the concept of the total and joint labor). A critical analysis of analytic social epistemology (A. Goldman, J. Lackey) helps clarify the (...) class='Hi'>tacit presuppositions of the "individual-collective" dualism. In reducing the CAC to the cognizing individual, Lackey fails to interpret adequately the phenomenon of distributed knowledge widely spread in modern science and social practice (F. Hayek, H. Collins). As an alternative to reductionism, the article proposes a typological approach to CAC. It aims to understand its structure as consisting of four main levels (transcendental, imbedded, contract and distributed agent of cognition), each of which being illustrated by a paradigm example. In conclusion, the duality of collective and individual agents of cognition is unmasked as based on the mixture of everyday and philosophical discourses. (shrink)

This study explored tacit knowledge based on an expert nurse's practice who cares for stroke patients by using the hermeneutic phenomenological approach. The participant (‘Ms. A’) was a nursing researcher and college faculty member involved in the education of advanced practice nurses; her specialty was stroke rehabilitation nursing. She was asked to describe the meaning and value she gained from her memorable nursing experiences. Four interviews—approximately 1 h each—were conducted, and the associated data were interpreted together with the (...) participant based on the method of interpretive circulation. Notably, the analysis was ended when a fusion of horizons was recognized. The participant recalled her nursing experiences based on six model cases. During the analysis, the following five elements were extracted: [belief in the ability of vulnerable people to survive]; [being together]; [respect for human dignity]; [preparedness to respond to and bear suffering together]; and [theoretical knowledge base approaches true understanding of patient experience]. Further, the nursing model—the Roy Adaptation Model—utilized by Ms. A in the process of recognizing humans as whole beings was deeply interpreted and implemented as a guideline for her implicit advanced practice. Moreover, her deep understanding and utilization of theoretical knowledge base also built the foundation for her implicit advanced practice. In conclusion, Ms. A's tacit knowledge and the elements support the process of tacit knowledge acquisition. Her narratives, hermeneutic attitude as an interpreter, and learning attitude throughout interaction with others will strongly help her knowledge development. We intend to continue the study with multiple participants and explore the structure of tacit knowledge possessed by advanced practitioners. Future endeavours will include the development of a tacit knowledge learning strategy. (shrink)

In workplace situations of all kinds novices are transformed by experience of practice into highly proficient practitioners. How are we to understand this change which appears to be as much a qualitative one as it is a quantitative one? This paper argues that the available resources for understanding the informal learning that occurs during the course of successful workplace practice are somewhat limited. Theories about know‐how are criticised for shedding little light on this topic. The notion of tacit (...) class='Hi'>knowledge is also rejected as unhelpful. The development of judgement is proposed as a more promising way to understand the phenomenon. A consideration of four main dimensions of contextuality is used as a lead into an account of eleven key features of workplace practical judgement. (shrink)

In workplace situations of all kinds novices are transformed by experience of practice into highly proficient practitioners. How are we to understand this change which appears to be as much a qualitative one as it is a quantitative one? This paper argues that the available resources for understanding the informal learning that occurs during the course of successful workplace practice are somewhat limited. Theories about know-how are criticised for shedding little light on this topic. The notion of tacit (...) class='Hi'>knowledge is also rejected as unhelpful. The development of judgement is proposed as a more promising way to understand the phenomenon. A consideration of four main dimensions of contextuality is used as a lead into an account of eleven key features of workplace practical judgement. (shrink)

The evidence-based medicine movement advocates basing all medical decisions on certain types of quantitative research data and has stimulated protracted controversy and debate since its inception. Evidence-based medicine presupposes an inaccurate and deficient view of medical knowledge. Michael Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge both explains this deficiency and suggests remedies for it. Polanyi shows how all explicit human knowledge depends on a wealth of tacit knowledge which accrues from experience and is essential for problem (...) solving. Edmund Pellegrino’s classic treatment of clinical judgment is examined, and a Polanyian critique of this position demonstrates that tacit knowledge is necessary for understanding how clinical judgment and medical decisions involve persons. An adequate medical epistemology requires much more qualitative research relevant to the clinical encounter and medical decision making than is currently being done. This research is necessary for preventing an uncritical application of evidence-based medicine by health care managers that erodes good clinical practice. Polanyi’s epistemology shows the need for this work and provides the structural core for building an adequate and robust medical epistemology that moves beyond evidence-based medicine. (shrink)

Despite its phenomenal success since its inception in the early nineteen-nineties, the evidence-based medicine movement has not succeeded in shaking off an epistemological critique derived from the experiential or tacit dimensions of clinical reasoning about particular individuals. This critique claims that the evidence-based medicine model does not take account of tacit knowing as developed by the philosopher Michael Polanyi. However, the epistemology of evidence-based medicine is premised on the elimination of the tacit dimension from clinical judgment. This (...) is demonstrated through analyzing the dichotomy between clinical and statistical intuition in evidence-based medicine’s epistemology of clinical reasoning. I argue that clinical epidemiology presents a more nuanced epistemological model for the application of statistical epidemiology to the clinical context. Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing is compatible with the model of clinical reasoning associated with clinical epidemiology, but not evidence-based medicine. (shrink)

Harry Collins is a science studies scholar no other description fits without qualification who has contributed enormously to the discussion of tacit knowledge. Collins says that he is providing an account for the ontologically bashful, meaning, presumably, that it does not carry the burdens of Durkheim's notion of the collective consciousness. Polanyi says that 'a wholly explicit knowledge is unthinkable'. Collins wants to translate this into 'strings must be interpreted before they are meaningful'. Somatic limits are the (...) source of the mystery element of tacit knowledge. In fact, machines can be programmed to do the things it involves, although they will do it in a different way. In Social Cartesianism, the individual is not the unit of analysis: the individual merely shares the collectivity's knowledge. Collins point in these contexts is that functional substitutability implies nothing about similarity in underlying causal structure. (shrink)

In his paper ‘Scmantic Theory and Tacit Knowlcdgc’, Gareth Evans uscs a familiar kind of cxamplc in ordcr to render vivid his account of tacit knowledge. We arc to consider a finite language, with just one hundrcd scntcnccs. Each scntcncc is made up of a subjcct (a name) and a prcdicatc. The names are ‘a’, ‘b’, . . ., T. The prcdicatcs arc ‘F’, ‘G’, . . ., ‘O’. Thc scntcnccs have meanings which dcpcnd in a systematic (...) way upon their construction. Thus, all scntcnccs containing ‘a’ mean something about john; all scntcnccs containing ‘b’ mean something about Harry; all scntcnccs containing ‘F’ mean something about being bald; all scntcnccs containing ‘G’ mean something about being happy; and so 011. For this vcry simple language L, wc arc to consider various semantic theories. We could consider thcorics whosc dclivcranccs about wholc scntcnccs are of.. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on a set of arguments whose upshot is that, whatever tacit knowledge of the axiomatic base of a semantic theory is, it cannot be construed as a genuine propositional attitude or intentional state. It outlines three criticisms that Crispin Wright has raised against Evans's dispositionalist account of tacit knowledge of semantic axioms, and the responses that have been offered by Martin Davies on Evans's behalf. The chapter outlines Wright's alternative proposal, and argues that (...) it presupposes, rather than undercuts, the Evans‐Davies account which proceeds via the imposition of the mirror constraint. It attempts to defend the suggestion that the construction of theories of meaning should be subject to Davies's mirror constraint. The chapter concludes by considering whether the project of constructing semantic theories in accordance with the mirror constraint is in tension with Wittgenstein's reflections on rule‐following. (shrink)

In workplace situations of all kinds novices are transformed by experience of practice into highly proficient practitioners. How are we to understand this change which appears to be as much a qualitative one as it is a quantitative one? This paper argues that the available resources for understanding the informal learning that occurs during the course of successful workplace practice are somewhat limited. Theories about know-how are criticised for shedding little light on this topic. The notion of tacit (...) class='Hi'>knowledge is also rejected as unhelpful. The development of judgement is proposed as a more promising way to understand the phenomenon. A consideration of four main dimensions of contextuality is used as a lead into an account of eleven key features of workplace practical judgement. (shrink)

Tacit knowledge is the form of implicit knowledge that we rely on for learning. It is invoked in a wide range of intellectual inquiries, from traditional academic subjects to more pragmatically orientated investigations into the nature and transmission of skills and expertise. Notwithstanding its apparent pervasiveness, the notion of tacit knowledge is a complex and puzzling one. What is its status as knowledge? What is its relation to explicit knowledge? What does it mean (...) to say that knowledge is tacit? Can it be measured? Recent years have seen a growing interest from philosophers in understanding the nature of tacit knowledge. Philosophers of science have discussed its role in scientific problem-solving; philosophers of language have been concerned with the speaker's relation to grammatical theories; and phenomenologists have attempted to describe the relation of explicit theoretical knowledge to a background understanding of matters that are taken for granted. This book seeks to bring a unity to these diverse philosophical discussions by clarifying their conceptual underpinnings. In addition the book advances a specific account of tacit knowledge that elucidates the importance of the concept for understanding the character of human cognition, and demonstrates the relevance of the recommended account to those concerned with the communication of expertise. The book will be of interest to philosophers of language, epistemologists, cognitive psychologists and students of theoretical linguistics. (shrink)

The paper outlines the role that tacit knowledge plays in what might seem to be an area of knowledge that can be made fully explicit or codified and which forms a central element of Evidence Based Medicine. Appeal to the role the role of tacit knowledge in science provides a way to unify the tripartite definition of Evidence Based Medicine given by Sackett et al: the integration of best research evidence with clinical expertise and patient (...) values. Each of these three elements, crucially including research evidence, rests on an ineliminable and irreducible notion of uncodified good judgement. (shrink)

In what follows I propose to bring out certain methodological properties of projects of modelling the tacit realm that bear on the kinds of modelling done in connection with scientific cognition by computer as well as by ethnomethodological sociologists, both of whom must make some claims about the tacit in the course of their efforts to model cognition. The same issues, I will suggest, bear on the project of a cognitive psychology of science as well.

In this paper I examine Harry Collins’s influential writing on tacit knowledge. In particular I turn my attention to his recent book, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge [Collins 2010], or TEK, which is arguably the most complete and systematic statement of what he means by the term “tacit knowledge”. As well as examining tacit knowledge as elaborated in this contribution, I draw out an underlying tension in Collins’s major contributions to the sociology of (...) scientific knowledge in general between the realism underlying his notion of “tacit knowledge” and the constructivism underlying his other well-known concept, “the experimenters’ regress” (as for instance, elaborated in his well-known book Changing Order [Collins 1992]). In order to make this argument I pay particular attention to an aspect of his writings on tacit knowledge which I think is worthy of closer examination: namely the sorts of empirical support claimed for the features and properties of tacit knowledge to which he attends. In short I ask questions concerning some of the specific empirical examples and the conclusions he draws from them. (shrink)

Ikujiro Nonaka, whose formative experience is Japanese, is an established scholar who has written about large business organizations. He sees knowledge at the heart of the organization and its products and aims to develop Michael Polanyi’s conception of tacit knowledge in a practical direction to enhance organizational “knowledge creation.” For Nonaka, what matters is the practice, the doing, the embodiment of knowledge. An organization can amplify and crystallize individuals’ tacit knowledge in a process (...) that allows them to experience deeper understanding. Nonaka holds that it is iimportant to explore the potential that knowledge holds. His spiral process describes disciplined practices that make tacit knowledge independent and available to restructure the organizational knowledge context. (shrink)

This chapter sets out an account of tacit knowledge as conceptually structured, situation specific practical knowledge. It sets this out against two claims from Michael Polanyi which conjoin the idea that we know more than we can tell with the suggestion that knowledge is practical. Any account of tacit knowledge which attempts to respond to Polanyi’s first claim faces a twofold test of adequacy. It must be tacit and it must be knowledge. (...) To count as knowledge some content must be known but that puts pressure on its tacit status. What stops such a content being put into words? I reject Polanyi’s attempt to answer this based on a distinction between focal and subsidiary awareness. And I reject Harry Collins’ process-based approach that looks more to ontology than epistemology or reference more than sense. By equating tacit knowledge with conceptually structured, situation specific practical knowledge or know-how, I show the respect in which it remains tacit. Although it can be expressed in demonstrations, and is related to concepts, it cannot be expressed in words alone. (shrink)

Neil Gascoigne and Tim Thornton’s Tacit Knowledge is an attempt to find a place for tacit knowledge as “knowledge” within the limits of analytic epistemology. They do so by reference to Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson’s analysis of the term “way” and by the McDowell-like claim that reference to the tacitly rooted “way” of doing something exhausts the knowledge aspect of tacit knowledge, which preserves the notion of tacit knowledge, while (...) excluding most of Michael Polanyi’s examples, and rendering Hubert Dreyfus’s and John Searle’s accounts irrelevant. This is more a redefinition of terms than an account of tacit knowledge. (shrink)

As an answer to the humanistic, socially oriented critique of the information-processing paradigms used as a conceptual frame for library information science, this article formulates a broader and less objective concept of communication than that of the information-processing paradigm. Knowledge can be seen as the mental phenomenon that documents (combining signs into text, depending on the state of knowledge of the recipient) can cause through interpretation. The examination of these “correct circumstances” is an important part of information (...) science. This article represents the following developments in the concept of information: Information is understood as potential until somebody interprets it. The objective carriers of potential knowledge are signs. Signs need interpretation to release knowledge in the form of interpretants. Interpretation is based on the total semantic network, horizons, worldviews, and experience of the person, including the emotional and social aspects. The realm of meaning is rooted in social-historical as well as embodied evolutionary processes that go beyond computational algorithmically logic. The semantic network derives a decisive aspect of signification from a person’s embodied cultural worldview, which, in turn, derives from, develops, and has its roots in undefined tacit knowledge. To theoretically encompass both the computational and the semantic aspects of document classification and retrieval, we need to combine the cybernetic functionalistic approach with the semiotic pragmatic understanding of meaning as social and embodied. For such a marriage, it is necessary to go into the constructivistic secondorder cybernetics and autopoiesis theory of von Foerster, Maturana, and Luhmann, on the one hand, and the pragmatic triadic semiotics of Peirce in the form of the embodied Biosemiotics, on the other hand. This combination is what I call Cybersemiotics. (shrink)

This article is a part of the discussion of Ilya Kasavin’s article “Creativity as a social phenomenon” and is devoted to the analysis of creativity in the era of digitalization. The author discusses creativity in computer programs and the actions of assistant robots. They can be creative because they are able to find new solutions to various problems. The Go program used new strategies that human players had never played before; another program predicted the crystal structure of various substances (...) that had not yet been studied experimentally. The concept of implicit knowledge is used to answer the question about the specifics of creativity. H. Collins singled out three types of tacit knowledge: relative, somatic and collective. The first is associated with the acquirement of various procedures – like cooking, the second – various skills related to body control, such as swimming or cycling, the third – social and cultural rules. Only the third type of tacit knowledge is associated with creativity. Programs and assistant robots can master relative and somatic implicit knowledge. They are not able to work with collective implicit knowledge. Creativity cannot be digitized. At the same time, digitalization forms important social prerequisites for the development of creativity. Currently, a new social group is being formed – the precariat. This is a marginal group; its representatives are not very firmly included in social structures. It is possible to single out the scientific precariat. With the help of digital technologies, it forms new ways, mechanisms, strategies and tools for solving various problems, form new ideas that expand our collective tacit knowledge. (shrink)