Tradition and Discovery 26 (2):21-30 (1999)

Walter Van Herck
University of Antwerp
This essay explores the notion of practical religious knowledge in three steps. I examine a short passage in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (A 132-3 / B 171-2) on judgment, a passage that points out that we (necessarily) know more than we can say or state. I then introduce Michael Polanyi’s account of tacit knowledge to suggest what “religious tacit knowledge” is. Finally, I analyze a text from Master Eckhart’s Counsels on Discernment (Reden der Unterweisung) to show the relevance of this notion of practical (or tacit) knowledge in religious contexts
Keywords Major Philosophers  Philosophy and Religion
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ISBN(s) 1057-1027
DOI 10.5840/traddisc1999/200026220
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