The feeling of error (FOE) is the subjective experience that something went wrong during a reasoning or calculation task. The main goal of the present study was to assess the accuracy of the FOE in the context of mental mathematical calculation. We used the number bisection task (NBT) to evoke this metacognitive feeling and assessed it by asking participants if they felt they have committed an error after solving the task. In the NBT participants have to determine (...) whether the number presented in the middle of a triplet corresponds to the arithmetic mean of the two outer numbers (e.g., 07_16_25) with a Yes/No answer. Our results show that FOE reports were strongly correlated with arithmetic errors and numerical properties of the NBT, suggesting that the FOE accurately represents the error. This finding indicates that even very fast metacognitive feelings are reliable when it comes to evaluating one’s own mental performance. Moreover, our results suggest that the occurrence of FOEs is determined by the fluency with which each triplet was solved and the post-decision evaluation processes that occurred after the NBT was solved. Additionally, we asked participants to report their confidence in the given answer for the cases where they did not report FOEs. Participants reported less confidence for the (objectively) incorrect answers than for the (objectively) correct ones, suggesting that in cases where they did not have a conscious FOE they still were able to implicitly detect their errors. Remarkably, confidence was also determined by the fluency of the NBT. (shrink)

The popular idea that mental calculation involves covert operations as counterparts to the scribblings, sayings or manipulations involved in classroom calculation is rejected by familiar arguments in Section I. Philosophers do not readily agree on an alternative account. Section II considers reasons why they are puzzled, reasons which encourage a return to the discredited position. The currently fashionable Causal or Functionalist view is criticised in Section III. Section IV reconsiders the stubborn fact that when someone calculates in (...) their head they do something at the time which explains their arithmetical successes or failures. Some dispositional descriptions are rejected as inadequate. Though a restrained dispositionalism is finally supported, it does not have the implication that nothing was going on in the silence. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the phenomenology of mental agency by addressing the question of the ontological category of the conscious mental acts an agent is aware of when engaged in such directed mental activities as conscious calculation and deliberation. An argument is offered for the claim that the mental acts in question must involve phenomenally conscious mental events that have temporal extension. The problem the chapter goes on to address is how to reconcile this (...) line of thought with Geach's arguments for the claim that mental acts like judging lack temporal extension. (shrink)

We propose to extend Clark and Chalmer’s concept of the extended mind to consider the possibility that social institutions (e.g., legal systems, museums) may operate in ways similar to the hand-held conveniences (notebooks, calculators) that are often used as examples of extended mind. The inspiration for this suggestion can be found in the writings of Hegel on “objective spirit” which involves the mind in a constant process of externalizing and internalizing. For Hegel, social institutions are pieces of the mind, externalized (...) in their specific time and place. These institutions are the products of shared mental processes. We then use these institutions instrumentally to do further cognitive work, for example, to solve problems or to control behavior. (shrink)

Hauser argues that his pocket calculator (Cal) has certain arithmetical abilities: it seems Cal calculates. That calculating is thinking seems equally untendentious. Yet these two claims together provide premises for a seemingly valid syllogism whose conclusion - Cal thinks - most would deny. He considers several ways to avoid this conclusion, and finds them mostly wanting. Either we ourselves can't be said to think or calculate if our calculation-like performances are judged by the standards proposed to rule out Cal; (...) or the standards- e.g., autonomy and self-consciousness- make it impossible to verify whether anything or anyone (save oneself) meets them. While appeals to the intentionality of thought or the unity of minds provide more credible lines of resistance, available accounts of intentionality and mental unity are insufficiently clear and warranted to provide very substantial arguments against Cal's title to be called a thinking thing. Indeed, considerations favoring granting that title are more formidable than is generally appreciated. Rapaport's comments suggest that, on a strong view of thinking, mere calculating is not thinking (and pocket calculators don't think), but on a weak, but unexciting, sense of thinking, pocket calculators do think. He closes with some observations on the implications of this conclusion. (shrink)

Introduction:The concept of mentalizing is nowadays widely used in research as well as in clinical practice. Despite its popularity, the development of an economic assessment is still challenging. The Mentalization Scale appears to be a promising measurement with good psychometric properties but lacking convergent validity with the Reflective Functioning Scale.Objective:This study aims to test the construct validity of the Mentalization Scale through correlations with the gold standard, the Reflective Functioning Scale, within a clinical sample. Furthermore, it was of interest to (...) replicate its internal consistency.Methods:Twenty-six inpatients of an acute psychiatric ward in Vienna were given the Mentalization Scale (MentS). They were interviewed with the Brief Reflective Function Interview, which was coded with the Reflective Functioning Scale. Correlations and internal consistency were calculated.Results:Concerning the primary aim of this study, the validity was satisfactory for the MentS whole-scale mentalizing as well as for the subscales self- and other-oriented mentalizing. Internal consistency was lower to the findings of the developer and close to the 0.70 threshold.Conclusion:Our findings could foster the psychometric properties of the MentS. Furthermore, the MentS seems to be a promising measurement tool for detecting different dimensions of reflective functioning. Limitations and further research are discussed. (shrink)

Media exposure influences mental health symptomology in response to salient aversive events, like terrorist attacks, but little has been done to explore the impact of news coverage that varies more subtly in affective content. Here, we utilized an existing data set in which participants self-reported physical symptoms, depressive symptoms, and anxiety symptoms, and completed a potentiated startle task assessing their physiological reactivity to aversive stimuli at three time points (waves) over a 9-month period. Using a computational linguistics approach, we (...) then calculated an average ratio of words with positive vs. negative affective connotations for only articles from news sources to which each participant self-reported being exposed over the prior 2 weeks at each wave of data collection. As hypothesized, individuals exposed to news coverage with more negative affective tone over the prior 2 weeks reported significantly greater physical and depressive symptoms, and had significantly greater physiological reactivity to aversive stimuli. (shrink)

This Article is a contribution to the torture debate. It argues that the abusive interrogation tactics used by the United States in what was then called the “global war on terrorism” are, unequivocally, torture under U.S. law. To some readers, this might sound like déjà vu all over again. Hasn’t this issue been picked over for nearly fifteen years? It has, but we think the legal analysis we offer has been mostly overlooked. We argue that the basic character of the (...) CIA’s interrogation of so-called “high-value detainees” has been misunderstood: both lawyers and commentators have placed far too much emphasis on the dozen or so “enhanced interrogation techniques” (EITs) short-listed in government “torture memos,” and far too little emphasis on other forms of physical violence, psychological stressors, environmental manipulations, and abusive conditions of confinement that are crucial to the question of whether the detainees were tortured. Furthermore, we dispute one of the standard narratives about the origins of the program: that it was the brainchild of civilian contractor psychologists because— in the CIA’s words—“[n]on-standard interrogation methodologies were not an area of expertise of CIA officers or of the US Government generally.” This narrative ignores the CIA’s role in devising these methods, in spite of the decades of prior CIA research and doctrine about forcing interrogation subjects into a state of extreme psychological debilitation, and about how to do so—by making them physically weak, intensely fearful and anxious, and helplessly dependent. By neglecting this history and focusing on the contractors and the EITs they devised, this narrative contributes to the misunderstanding that the torture debate is about EITs and nothing else. In effect, a “torture debate” about EITs and the torture memos neglects the purloined letter in front of our eyes: the abusive conditions the CIA inflicted on prisoners even when they were not subject to EITs, including abuses that the torture memos never bothered to discuss. Unpacking what this debate is really about turns out to be crucial to understanding that such interrogation methods are torture under existing U.S. law. The U.S. Torture Act includes a clause in its definition of mental torture that was intended to ban exactly the kind of interrogation methods the CIA had researched, out of concern that our Cold War adversaries were using them: mind-altering procedures “calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality.” That is precisely the “non-standard interrogation methodology” the CIA employed after 9/11. (shrink)

My pocket calculator (Cal) has certain arithmetical abilities: it seems Cal calculates. That calculating is thinking seems equally untendentious. Yet these two claims together provide premises for a seemingly valid syllogism whose conclusion -- Cal thinks -- most would deny. I consider several ways to avoid this conclusion, and find them mostly wanting. Either we ourselves can't be said to think or calculate if our calculation-like performances are judged by the standards proposed to rule out Cal; or the standards (...) -- e.g., autonomy and self-consciousness -- make it impossible to verify whether anything or anyone (save myself) meets them. While appeals to the intentionality of thought or the unity of minds provide more credible lines of resistance, available accounts of intentionality and mental unity are insufficiently clear and warranted to provide very substantial arguments against Cal's title to be called a thinking thing. Indeed, considerations favoring granting that title are more formidable than generally appreciated. (shrink)

Interactivity has been linked to better performance in problem solving, due in part to a more efficient allocation of attentional resources, a better distribution of cognitive load, but perhaps more important by enabling the reasoner to shape and reshape the physical problem presentation to promote the development of the problem solution. Interactivity in solving quotidian arithmetic problems involves gestures, pointing, and the recruitment of artefacts to facilitate computation and augment efficiency. In the experiment reported here, different types of interactivity were (...) examined with a series of mental arithmetic problems. Using a repeated-measures design, participants solved series of five 11-digit sums in four conditions that varied in the type of interactivity: no interactivity, pointing, pen and paper, and tokens. Performance in the four conditions was measured in terms of accuracy, calculation error, and efficiency. These quantitative analyses were supplemented by a detailed qualitative examination of a participant’s actions in the different conditions. The integration of artefacts, such as tokens or a pen, offered reasoners the opportunity to reconfigure the physical presentation of the problem, enacting different arithmetic strategies: the affordance landscape shifts as the problem trajectory is enacted through interactivity, and this generally produced better “mental” arithmetic performance. Participants also felt more positive about and better engaged with the task when they could reconfigure the problem presentation through interactivity. These findings underscore the importance of engineering task environments in the laboratory that offer a window on how problem solving unfolds through a coalition of mental and physical resources. (shrink)

L’interprétation dite “computationelle” de la pensée logico-linguistique de Hobbes est aujourd’hui courante. Ele attribue à Hobbes l’idée que penser ou raisonner, c’est essentiellement manipuler des symboles apartenant à une langue publique, c’est calculer sur des noms comme on calcule normalement sur des chiffres ou des lignes . Ce que nous aurions immédiatement dans l’esprit, ce sont des mots, les noms des choses, et non des représentations mentales de ces choses qui leur seraient associées par convention. Cette interprétation soulève bien des (...) problèmes qui ont été discutés dès le XVIIe siècle. Je voudrais montrer qu’il y a, sous la manipulation ou calcul des noms, une ratiocinatio interna sine verbis, un calcul sur des phantasmata qui mérite déjà certainement le titre de pensée. (shrink)

Human beings are permanently required to process the world numerically and, consequently, to perform computations to adapt their behaviour and they have developed various calculation strategies, some of them based on specific manipulations of the fingers. In this chapter, we argue that the way we express physically numerical concepts by raising fingers while counting leads to embodied representations of numbers and calculation procedures in the adult brain. To illustrate this, we focus on number and finger interactions in the (...) context of simple arithmetic operations. We show that the fixed order of fingers on the hand provides human beings with unique facilities to increment numerical changes or represent a cardinal value while solving arithmetic problems. In order to specify the influence of finger representation on mental arithmetic both at the cognitive and neural level, we review past and recent findings from behavioural, electrophysiological, and brain imaging studies. We start with anthropological and developmental data showing the role of fingers in the acquisition of arithmetic knowledge, then address the issue of whether number and finger interactions are also observed in adults solving arithmetic problems mentally. We suggest that arithmetic performance depends on the integrity of finger representations in children and adults. Finally, we overview the results of recent functional magnetic resonance imaging studies showing a common brain substrate for finger and number representations during and after the acquisition of arithmetic skills. (shrink)

Introduction. Eating Disorders (EDs) are serious psychiatric disorders, impacting physical and psychosocial functioning, often with a chronic course and high mortality rates. The two continua model of mental health states that mental health is a complete state, that is not merely the absence of mental illness, but also the presence of mental health. This model was studied among ED patients by comparing the levels of well-being to the Dutch general population and by examining the of well-being (...) and psychopathology. Method. A total of 468 female ED patients participated in this study during application and intake at a specialized ED treatment centre in the Netherlands. They filled out questionnaires about well-being (MHC-SF), general psychopathology (OQ-45), and ED psychopathology (EDE-Q). Categorical and mean well-being levels were calculated. Also, the correlates of these variables were examined with Pearson correlation and multiple hierarchical regression analysis. Results. ED patients showed lower levels of emotional, psychological and social well-being on average compared to the general population. About 26% of the ED patients experienced low levels of well-being (languishing). However, also 13% experienced high levels of well-being (flourishing), varying between 9% in Anorexia Nervosa to 25% in Binge Eating Disorder. ED psychopathology and general well-being showed a moderate negative correlation. For patients with Bulimia Nervosa and Binge Eating Disorder however no such correlation was found. Lower general psychopathology, not having a history of hospitalization for the ED, and adaptive personal functioning were correlated with well-being among ED patients. Conclusion This study shows initial support for the two continua model of mental health among ED patients. Psychopathology and well-being should be considered as related, but distinct dimensions of mental health in ED patients. Further research should focus on the possible reciprocal relationships between psychopathology and well-being during recovery. It is recommended to monitor well-being during treatment and to implement interventions for well-being to realize complete recovery for those patients with inadequate levels of well-being. (shrink)

People frequently gesture when problem-solving, particularly on tasks that require spatial transformation. Gesture often facilitates task performance by interacting with internal mental representations, but how this process works is not well understood. We investigated this question by exploring the case of mental abacus, a technique in which users not only imagine moving beads on an abacus to compute sums, but also produce movements in gestures that accompany the calculations. Because the content of MA is transparent and readily manipulated, (...) the task offers a unique window onto how gestures interface with mental representations. We find that the size and number of MA gestures reflect the length and difficulty of math problems. Also, by selectively interfering with aspects of gesture, we find that participants perform significantly worse on MA under motor interference, but that perceptual feedback is not critical for success on the task. We conclude that premotor processes involved in the planning of gestures are critical to mental representation in MA. (shrink)

Purpose: To analyze how individual characteristics and the social context are associated with mental distress symptoms in the Brazilian population.Method: A multilevel cross-sectional study with data from the 2013 National Health Survey. There were two dependent variables: decreased vital energy and somatic symptoms, the presence of depressive thoughts. The independent variables were biological characteristics, education and income, habits and lifestyle, and context variables. Bivariate analysis was performed, and Prevalence Ratios calculated in a Poisson Regression. A multilevel Poisson Regression was (...) performed to verify the effect of individual and contextual variables.Results: Regarding depressive thoughts, young and middle-aged individuals, low education, women, absence of partner, smokers or former smokers, and absence of health insurance were the categories at highest risk; belonging to classes D-E and living in states with lower expected years of schooling proved to be protective factors. Similar results were found for the second outcome.Conclusions: Symptoms of mental distress were associated with the individual characteristics and contextual aspects of the federation unit. These findings indicate the importance of strengthening psychosocial care aimed at vulnerable groups. (shrink)

Physical fatigue negatively affects postural control, resulting in impaired balance performance in young and older adults. Similar effects on postural control can be observed for mental fatigue mainly in older adults. Controversial results exist for young adults. There is a void in the literature on the effects of fatigue on balance and cortical activity. Therefore, this study aimed to examine the acute effects of PF and MF on postural sway and cortical activity. Fifteen healthy young adults aged 28 ± (...) 3 years participated in this study. MF and PF protocols comprising of an all-out repeated sit-to-stand task and a computer-based attention network test, respectively, were applied in random order. Pre and post fatigue, cortical activity and postural sway were tested during a challenging bipedal balance board task. Absolute spectral power was calculated for theta, alpha-2, beta-1, and beta-2 in frontal, central, and parietal regions of interest and baseline-normalized. Inference statistics revealed a significant time-by-fatigue interaction for CoPd and CoPv, and a significant main effect of time for CoP variability. Post hoc analyses showed a significant increase in CoPd and CoPv following PF but not MF. For cortical activity, a significant time-by-fatigue interaction was found for relative alpha-2 power in parietal areas. Post hoc tests indicated larger alpha-2 power increases after PF compared to MF. In addition, changes in parietal alpha-2 power and measures of postural sway did not correlate significantly, irrespective of the applied fatigue protocol. No significant changes were found for the other frequency bands, irrespective of the fatigue protocol and ROI under investigation. Thus, the applied PF protocol resulted in increased postural sway and CoP variability accompanied by enhanced alpha-2 power in the parietal ROI while MF led to increased CoP variability and alpha-2 power in our sample of young adults. Potential underlying cortical mechanisms responsible for the greater increase in parietal alpha-2 power after PF were discussed but could not be clearly identified as cause. Therefore, further future research is needed to decipher alternative interpretations. (shrink)

Despite the success of artificial intelligence, we are still far away from AI that model the world as humans do. This study focuses for explaining human behavior from intuitive mental models’ perspectives. We describe how behavior arises in biological systems and how the better understanding of this biological system can lead to advances in the development of human-like AI. Human can build intuitive models from physical, social, and cultural situations. In addition, we follow Bayesian inference to combine intuitive models (...) and new information to make decisions. We should build similar intuitive models and Bayesian algorithms for the new AI. We suggest that the probability calculation in Bayesian sense is sensitive to semantic properties of the objects’ combination formed by observation and prior experience. We call this brain process as computational meaningfulness and it is closer to the Bayesian ideal, when the occurrence of probabilities of these objects are believable. How does the human brain form models of the world and apply these models in its behavior? We outline the answers from three perspectives. First, intuitive models support an individual to use information meaningful ways in a current context. Second, neuroeconomics proposes that the valuation network in the brain has essential role in human decision making. It combines psychological, economical, and neuroscientific approaches to reveal the biological mechanisms by which decisions are made. Then, the brain is an over-parameterized modeling organ and produces optimal behavior in a complex word. Finally, a progress in data analysis techniques in AI has allowed us to decipher how the human brain valuates different options in complex situations. By combining big datasets with machine learning models, it is possible to gain insight from complex neural data beyond what was possible before. We describe these solutions by reviewing the current research from this perspective. In this study, we outline the basic aspects for human-like AI and we discuss on how science can benefit from AI. The better we understand human’s brain mechanisms, the better we can apply this understanding for building new AI. Both development of AI and understanding of human behavior go hand in hand. (shrink)

Research QuestionsIn a first research question, we examined whether the relations that are generally observed between the coherence of written autobiographical narratives and outcomes of mental health and social support, can be replicated for the coherence of oral narratives. Second, we studied whether the coherence of oral narratives is related to the coherence of written narratives.MethodsPearson correlations and t-tests were calculated on data of two separate studies to examine the research questions.ResultsFirst, only thematic coherence of oral narratives was significantly, (...) although moderately, negatively associated to symptoms of depression, anxiety and negative social interactions. Second, the coherence of oral narratives was higher than the coherence of written narratives. Only the thematic coherence of oral narratives was positively associated with thematic and total coherence of written narratives. Furthermore, correlations between written and oral narratives were stronger for negative narratives as compared to positive narratives.DiscussionThe ability to elaborate emotionally and make meaning out of important life events in oral narratives is, to a certain extent, related to better mental health and more social support. Furthermore, thematic coherence may be a relatively stable feature of individuals’ narrative styles that is reflected in narratives of different modalities. Nonetheless, these topics need to be further researched to overcome present limitations. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a heated debate about how to interpret findings that seem to show that humans rapidly and automatically calculate the visual perspectives of others. In the current study, we investigated the question of whether automatic interference effects found in the dot-perspective task (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010) are the product of domain-specific perspective-taking processes or of domain-general “submentalizing” processes (Heyes, 2014). Previous attempts to address this question have done so by implementing inanimate (...) controls, such as arrows, as stimuli. The rationale for this is that submentalizing processes that respond to directionality should be engaged by such stimuli, whereas domain-specific perspective-taking mechanisms, if they exist, should not. These previous attempts have been limited, however, by the implied intentionality of the stimuli they have used (e.g. arrows), which may have invited participants to imbue them with perspectival agency. Drawing inspiration from “novel entity” paradigms from infant gaze-following research, we designed a version of the dot-perspective task that allowed us to precisely control whether a central stimulus was viewed as animate or inanimate. Across four experiments, we found no evidence that automatic “perspective-taking” effects in the dot-perspective task are modulated by beliefs about the animacy of the central stimulus. Our results also suggest that these effects may be due to the task-switching elements of the dot-perspective paradigm, rather than automatic directional orienting. Together, these results indicate that neither the perspective-taking nor the standard submentalizing interpretations of the dot-perspective task are fully correct. (shrink)

With the continuous development of the era of big data, community management plays an important role in people’s mental health. Improve people’s mental health through the use of big data to improve governance of the community. To solve the problem, sequence segmentation is used in feature extraction, histogram absolute difference calculation and K-means intelligent algorithm, to analyze the existing problems one by one. Research shows that it is possible to systematically govern the community through big data and (...) intelligent computing, so that community residents can live a higher quality of life. In order to get rid of psychological problems, it can be solved by establishing special psychological support institutions in the community and strengthening the role of the government in community management. With the continuous development of big data, the application of big data and intelligence in community governance and mental health community is a trend. With the continuous progress of society, it also brings pressure to people, which leads to the decline of people’s mental health quality. We need to do something to improve community governance and people’s mental health. (shrink)

Background: The brief generic Multicultural Quality of Life Index is a culturally informed self-report 10-item questionnaire used to measure health-related quality of life. QoL is an important outcome measure in guiding healthcare and is held as a substantial parameter to evaluate the effectiveness of healthcare. Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in children might negatively influence the parents’ QoL. Having a validated questionnaire to measure QoL for this population will therefore be a vital first step in guiding healthcare for parents of children (...) with ADHD. We aimed to examine the reliability and validity of the Norwegian version of the MQLI in a sample of parents of children with ADHD.Methods: In a cross-sectional study, 128 parents of children with ADHD were recruited from four outpatient clinics within the Child and Adolescents Mental Health Services in Norway. They completed the MQLI along with an alternative well-being scale, the Five-item World Health Organization Well-being Index, and a form including demographic variables. Reliability and validity of the MQLI were examined. We conducted a factor analysis and calculated internal consistency and the correlation between the MQLI and the WHO-5.Results: Factor analysis of the parents reported MQLI yielded a one-factor solution. For the MQLI, Cronbach’s alpha was 0.73. The correlation between the two measures of MQLI and WHO-5 was high, reflecting convergent validity since the association between the two measures was strong.Conclusion: Results from this study support the reliability and validity of the Norwegian version of the MQLI for assessment of quality of life in parents of children with ADHD with good psychometric properties. Study findings support the use of the questionnaire in CAMHS. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to understand the influence mechanism of college students’ entrepreneurial intention in view of the increasing number of college students at present to alleviate college students’ employment competition. The psychological factors that influence the entrepreneurial tendency of art graduates were analyzed and studied. First, venture capital and factors affecting entrepreneurial performance were analyzed. Second, the coefficient calculation is carried out for college students majoring in art through the regression analysis of the logistic model. Finally, (...) a team entrepreneurial performance questionnaire was designed, and team reward levels were discussed. The results show that the logistic model can well reflect the real situation of the respondents. The significance level of the entrepreneurial team was 0.02, which was correlated. Additionally, corresponding suggestions were put forward according to the questionnaire results. Clear team goals, assignment of tasks to members, good pressure resistance, and psychological quality of members are necessary qualities for successful entrepreneurship. This conclusion provides a certain theoretical basis for the current college students’ entrepreneurial learning and a reliable inspiration for helping college students to successfully start a business. (shrink)

This study compares the neural substrate of moral decision making processes between Korean and American participants. By comparison with Americans, Korean participants showed increased activity in the right putamen associated with socio-intuitive processes and right superior frontal gyrus associated with cognitive control processes under a moral-personal condition, and in the right postcentral sulcus associated with mental calculation in familiar contexts under a moral-impersonal condition. On the other hand, American participants showed a significantly higher degree of activity in the (...) bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) associated with conflict resolution under the moral-personal condition, and in the right medial frontal gyrus (MFG) associated with simple cognitive branching in non-familiar contexts under the moral-impersonal condition when a more lenient threshold was applied, than Korean participants. These findings support the ideas of the interactions between the cultural background, education, and brain development, proposed in the field of cultural psychology and educational psychology. The study introduces educational implications relevant to moral psychologists and educators. (shrink)

In his 1997 book, Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again, Andy Clark advocates ‘embodied, active cognition,’ to discuss the manner in which an autonomous, embodied agent interacts with its environment. The implication is that since our minds as well as our bodies are matter, and otherwise nothing special, it is inevitable that we humans are natural born cyborgs and the human-machine interface will before long become completely transparent to the point of being invisible. In his critique of (...) causality, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between mechanical actions and structure. What is significant in his argument is the idea of structure, specifically vital structure as mental calculation or as Merleau-Ponty calls it, nascent intelligibility. This leads to the possible conclusion that when human beings take up and utilize digital technology and even biotechnology, each living being measures the action of things upon itself and responds so as to delimit its milieu. Human engagement with technology is thus due to the fact that there is a network of significative intentions that are lived rather than due to the material nature of mind and body.Dans son livre de 1997 Being There : Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again, Andy Clark préconise la « cognition incarnée, active » pour discuter la manière selon laquelle un agent autonome, incarné, interagit avec son environnement. L’implication est la suivante : puisque nos esprits et nos corps sont matière, et par ailleurs rien de spécial, il est inévitable que nous, humains, soyons des cyborgs nés et que l’interface humain-machine devienne d’ici peu complètement transparente, au point de devenir invisible. Dans sa critique de la causalité, Merleau-Ponty distingue les actions mécaniques de la structure. Ce qui importe dans l’argument, c’est l’idée de structure, spécifiquement la structure vitale comme calcul mental ou comme Merleau-Ponty l’appelle : l’intelligibilité à l’état naissant. Ce qui mène à la conclusion possible selon laquelle, quand l’être humain prend et utilise une technologie digitale voire une biotechnologie, chaque être vivant mesure l’action des choses sur lui-même et réagit de façon à délimiter son milieu. L’engagement humain avec la technologie est alors dû au fait qu’il y ait un réseau d’intentions significatives qui sont vécues plutôt que causées par la nature matérielle de l’esprit et du corps.Nel suo libro del 1997, Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again, Andy Clark si serve della nozione di “embodied, active cognition (cognizione attiva incarnata)” per spiegare il modo in cui un agente autonomo incarnato interagisce con il suo ambiente. Questo implica allo stesso tempo che: dal momento in cui le nostre menti, così come i nostri corpi, sono fatti di materia è inevitabile che noi umani nasciamo allo stesso tempo come cyborg, e poi che le interfacce uomo-macchina diverranno presto completamente trasparenti, al punto di risultare invisibili. Nella sua critica della causalità, Merleau-Ponty distingue tra azioni meccaniche e struttura. Quello che è particolarmente significativo nella sua argomentazione è l’idea di struttura, in quanto struttura propriamente vitale, come calcolo mentale o, come Merleau-Ponty la definisce, intelligibilità allo stato nascente. Questo porta alla conclusione possibile che quando gli esseri umani hanno a che fare e si servono della tecnologia digitale e anche della biotecnologia, ogni essere vivente si relazione con l’azione delle cose nei suoi confronti e vi risponde in modo tale da delimitare il suo ambiente (milieu). L’implicazione umana con la tecnologia può quindi essere compresa a partire dal fatto che esiste una rete di intenzioni significanti, che, più che essere dovute alla natura materiale di mente e corpo, sono vissute. (shrink)

This essay sketches the potential implications of Wittgensteinian thought for conceptualizations of socalled fictive mental states, e.g. mental calculating, imagination, pretend play, as they are currently discussed in developmental psychology and philosophy of mind. In developmental psychology the young child's pretend play and make-belief are seen as a manifestation of the command of an underlying individualistic “theory of mind”. When saying “This banana is a telephone” the child's mind entertains simultaneously two mental representations, a primary or veridical (...) representation about the real properties of banana's and a pretend representation. It is the task of psychology to explain how this “double knowledge” does not result in conceptual chaos. Various sorts of internal mechanisms are postulated. In this essay it is argued that the threat of chaos is misconceived, and that the solutions are irrelevant. Following Wittgenstein's sparse remarks about the secondary sense of words, I argue that pretend language does not refer to underlying individual mental representations but to the child's creative transference of words used in one, primary, domain of application to another, secondary domain. The command and use of the secondary domain logically presupposes the command and use of the primary domain. Since the latter domain is necessarily public and social, fictive mental states cannot be dealt with purely individualistically as current mentalism assumes. (shrink)

Why does performing certain tasks cause the aversive experience of mental effort and concomitant deterioration in task performance? One explanation posits a physical resource that is depleted over time. We propose an alternative explanation that centers on mental representations of the costs and benefits associated with task performance. Specifically, certain computational mechanisms, especially those associated with executive function, can be deployed for only a limited number of simultaneous tasks at any given moment. Consequently, the deployment of these computational (...) mechanisms carries an opportunity cost – that is, the next-best use to which these systems might be put. We argue that the phenomenology of effort can be understood as the felt output of these cost/benefit computations. In turn, the subjective experience of effort motivates reduced deployment of these computational mechanisms in the service of the present task. These opportunity cost representations, then, together with other cost/benefit calculations, determine effort expended and, everything else equal, result in performance reductions. In making our case for this position, we review alternative explanations for both the phenomenology of effort associated with these tasks and for performance reductions over time. Likewise, we review the broad range of relevant empirical results from across sub-disciplines, especially psychology and neuroscience. We hope that our proposal will help to build links among the diverse fields that have been addressing similar questions from different perspectives, and we emphasize ways in which alternative models might be empirically distinguished. (shrink)

Why does performing certain tasks cause the aversive experience of mental effort and concomitant deterioration in task performance? One explanation posits a physical resource that is depleted over time. We propose an alternative explanation that centers on mental representations of the costs and benefits associated with task performance. Specifically, certain computational mechanisms, especially those associated with executive function, can be deployed for only a limited number of simultaneous tasks at any given moment. Consequently, the deployment of these computational (...) mechanisms carries an opportunity cost – that is, the next-best use to which these systems might be put. We argue that the phenomenology of effort can be understood as the felt output of these cost/benefit computations. In turn, the subjective experience of effort motivates reduced deployment of these computational mechanisms in the service of the present task. These opportunity cost representations, then, together with other cost/benefit calculations, determine effort expended and, everything else equal, result in performance reductions. In making our case for this position, we review alternative explanations for both the phenomenology of effort associated with these tasks and for performance reductions over time. Likewise, we review the broad range of relevant empirical results from across sub-disciplines, especially psychology and neuroscience. We hope that our proposal will help to build links among the diverse fields that have been addressing similar questions from different perspectives, and we emphasize ways in which alternative models might be empirically distinguished. (shrink)

We examined how children’s strategy choices in solving complex subtraction problems are related to grade and to variations in problem complexity. In two studies, third- and fifth-grade children (N≈160 each study) solved multi-digit subtraction problems (e.g., 34 - 18) and described their solution strategies. In the first experiment, strategy selection was investigated by means of a free-choice paradigm, whereas in the second study a discrete-choice approach was implemented. In both experiments, analyses of strategy repertoire indicated that third-grade children were more (...) likely to report less-efficient strategies (i.e., counting) and relied more on the right-to-left solution algorithm compared to fifth-grade children who more often used efficient memory-based retrieval and conceptually-based left-to-right (i.e., decomposition) strategies. Nevertheless, all strategies were reported or selected by both older and younger children and strategy use varied with problem complexity and presentation format for both age groups. These results supported the overlapping waves model of strategy development and provide detailed information about patterns of strategy choice on complex subtraction problems. (shrink)

Mental acts are conspicuously absent from philosophical debates over the nature of action. A typical protagonist of a typical scenario is far more likely to raise her arm or open the window than she is to perform a calculation in her head or talk to herself silently. One possible explanation for this omission is that the standard ‘causalist’ account of action, on which acts are analyzed in terms of mental states causing bodily movements, faces difficulties in accommodating (...) some paradigmatic cases of mental action – or so I argue. After drawing out these objections to causalism, I outline a more promising approach. Building on previous work, I show how the approach I favour, on which the attempt to analyze action is dispensed with, provides a unified account of both mental and physical action. (shrink)

In this essay, I explore how cognitive science could illuminate the concept of beauty. Two results from the extensive literature on aesthetics guide my discussion. As the term “beauty” is overextended in general usage, I choose as my starting point the notion of “perfect form.” Aesthetic theorists are in reasonable agreement about the criteria for perfect form. What do these criteria imply for mental representations that are experienced as beautiful? Complexity theory can be used to specify constraints on (...) class='Hi'>mental representations abstractly formulated as vectors in a high-dimensional space. A central feature of the proposed model is that perfect form depends both on features of the objects or events perceived and on the nature of the encoding strategies or model of the observer. A simple example illustrates the proposed calculations. A number of interesting implications that arise as a consequence of reformulating beauty in this way are noted. (shrink)

Advocates of the computational theory of mind claim that the mind is a computer whose operations can be implemented by various computational systems. According to these philosophers, the mind is multiply realisable because—as they claim—thinking involves the manipulation of syntactically structured mental representations. Since syntactically structured representations can be made of different kinds of material while performing the same calculation, mental processes can also be implemented by different kinds of material. From this perspective, consciousness plays a minor (...) role in mental activity. However, contemporary neuroscience provides experimental evidence suggesting that mental representations necessarily involve consciousness. Consciousness does not only enable individuals to become aware of their own thoughts, it also constantly changes the causal properties of these thoughts. In light of these empirical studies, mental representations appear to be intrinsically dependent on consciousness. This discovery represents an obstacle to any attempt to construct an artificial mind. (shrink)

The thesis of the extended mind (ExM) holds that the material underpinnings of an individual’s mental states and processes need not be restricted to those contained within biological boundaries: when conditions are right, material artefacts can be incorporated by the thinking subject in such a way as to become a component of her extended mind. Up to this point, the focus of this approach has been on phenomena of a distinctively cognitive nature, such as states of dispositional belief, and (...) processes of planning and calculation. In this paper, we aim to expand the scope of ExM by considering the case for extended affectivity. We begin by clarifying the central commitments of ExM, before investigating its applicability to a range of affective phenomena, both dispositional and occurrent. We argue that proponents of ExM should also accept that the vehicles of emotions, moods, sentiments, temperaments, and character traits can extend beyond skull and skin. (shrink)

This book shines bright light into the dim recesses of quantum theory, where the mysteries of entanglement, nonlocality, and wave collapse have motivated some to conjure up multiple universes, and others to adopt a "shut up and calculate" mentality. After an extensive and accessible introduction to quantum mechanics and its history, the author turns attention to his transactional model. Using a quantum handshake between normal and time-reversed waves, this model provides a clear visual picture explaining the baffling experimental results that (...) flow daily from the quantum physics laboratories of the world. To demonstrate its powerful simplicity, the transactional model is applied to a collection of counter-intuitive experiments and conceptual problems. (shrink)

We report the results of an experiment in which human subjects were trained to perform a perceptual matching task. Subjects were asked to manipulate comparison objects until they matched target objects using the fewest manipulations possible. An unusual feature of the experimental task is that efficient performance requires an understanding of the hidden or latent causal structure governing the relationships between actions and perceptual outcomes. We use two benchmarks to evaluate the quality of subjects’ learning. One benchmark is based on (...) optimal performance as calculated by a dynamic programming procedure. The other is based on an adaptive computational agent that uses a reinforcement-learning method known as Q-learning to learn to perform the task. Our analyses suggest that subjects were successful learners. In particular, they learned to perform the perceptual matching task in a near-optimal manner (i.e., using a small number of manipulations) at the end of training. Subjects were able to achieve near-optimal performance because they learned, at least partially, the causal structure underlying the task. In addition, subjects’ performances were broadly consistent with those of model-based reinforcement-learning agents that built and used internal models of how their actions influenced the external environment. We hypothesize that people will achieve near-optimal performances on tasks requiring sequences of action—especially sensorimotor tasks with underlying latent causal structures—when they can detect the effects of their actions on the environment, and when they can represent and reason about these effects using an internal mental model. (shrink)

Arguably, emotions figure prominently in contemporary philosophy, not only in the fields of aesthetics and philosophy of religion, but also in the study of morality and cognition. Expressions like “emotional intelligence” are now commonly used and there is even talk of an affective turn in the cognitive sciences. Twentieth-century philosophers paved the way with conceptual creations like “poietic thinking” (dichtende Denken), “sentient intelligence” (inteligencia sentiente) or “poetic reason” (razón poética). It is also widely acknowledged that our apparently rational thoughts, calculations (...) and decisions are inextricably intertwined with our emotions, which even alter our mental judgement without making us aware of it. Thus, the clear contrast between reason and feelings―as separate and mutually exclusive―that runs through much of Western philosophical thought seems to be fading away. We could ask ourselves whether this has been the case in other philosophical traditions, or whether, far from it, this contrast has led them to privilege the rational over the affective. Moreover, in valuing these other traditions as philosophical, it is also worth considering the extent to which this opposition remains valid, perhaps behind the scenes. (shrink)

According to Husserl’s phenomenology, the intentional horizon is a general structure of experience. However, its characterisation beyond perceptual experience has not been explored yet. This paper aims, first, to fill this gap by arguing that there is a viable notion of cognitive horizon that presents features that are analogous to features of the perceptual horizon. Secondly, it proposes to characterise a specific structure of the cognitive horizon—that which presents possibilities for action—as a cognitive affordance. Cognitive affordances present cognitive elements as (...) opportunities for mental action (i.e., a problem affording trying to solve it, a thought affording calculating, an idea affording reflection). Thirdly, it argues that postulating cognitive affordances helps to unfold a rational dimension of thinking by conceiving of them as motivating reasons for action, something that in turn provides an argument for the experienced character of cognitive affordances. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.4 (2003) 361-367 [Access article in PDF] Psychopathology and Two Kinds of Narrative Account of the Self Tim Thornton Keywords self, narrative, reductionism, embodiment, Dennett, Strawson, McDowell The self plays an important role in psycho pathology. Conditions such as dementia raise the question of how much loss of memory and awareness there can be before there is, if ever, also a loss of the self. (...) Syndromes such as Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) or Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) raise the possibility of a fragmentation of one self into a number of selves. Depersonalization disorder suggests a kind of diminution both of the sense of self and the reality of the world. Symptoms such as thought insertion suggest a different kind of fragmentation of the coherence of thought within a self.At the same time there is something prima facie paradoxical about the very idea of the fragmentation or loss of self. It seems to be one thing for a self to suffer loss, quite another to think of the self as being lost. Although the experiences or beliefs had or entertained by a self might be disordered or chaotic, how can a self be anything other than whole and seem real and whole to itself?The narrative approach to the self looks like a tool purpose built to shed light on some aspects of psychopathology. The papers in this issue have examined its application to four revealing case histories and questioned its effectiveness in accounting for features of psychopathology. But in this short note I wish to stand back from the particular cases discussed in previous papers and to shed light on the general approach by setting out two contrasting versions of it. Crudely put, the first forges a connection between the concepts of self and personality; the second between the concepts of self and person. I will use the contrast between these two to draw some general lessons for the philosophy of psychopathology. Dennett's Austere Narrative Account I will start with Dennett's influential version of a narrative account of the self. His central idea is that the very idea of a self should be understood as dependent on a particular kind of interpretative strategy. Roughly, this contrasts with the idea that it is a more basic datum calling out for notice prior to adopting a specific theoretical perspective.Dennett suggests an analogy with centers of gravity both to outline the consequences of this view for the reality of selves, and the connection between the self and the interpretative strategy involved. [End Page 361] A center of gravity is just an abstractum. It's just a fictional object. But when I say it's a fictional object, I do not mean to disparage it; it's a wonderful fictional object, and it has a perfectly legitimate place within serious, sober, echt physical science. (Dennett 1992) The concept of a center of gravity is deployed within a branch of physics to describe and predict the behavior of physical systems acting under physical forces. It is the theoretical context that determines the nature of centers of gravity; at the same time, they contribute to that broader context. Dennett stresses that they are abstract or calculation-bound theoretical objects to contrast with objects that are also theoretically posited but causally interactive, such as microphysical particles (Dennett 1987, 53).Dennett has also used the analogy with abstracta to account for mental states such as beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes, which he suggests are ascribed using a particular interpretative strategy: the "Intentional Stance" (Dennett 1987, 13-42). The suggestion is that by showing the necessity of adopting that stance to make sense of human behavior he can defend a form of objectivity about mental states even while rejecting the industrial-strength realism that requires identifying mental states with physical, and thus causally interactive, internal states.Selves are given similar treatment. Like centers of gravity or mental states, they are theoretical, even fictional, entities articulated within an interpretative theoretical stance: A self is also an abstract object, a theorist's fiction... (shrink)

This Article provides a comprehensive, critical overview of proposals to use happiness surveys for steering public policy. Happiness or “subjective well-being” surveys ask individuals to rate their present happiness, life-satisfaction, affective state, etc. A massive literature now engages in such surveys or correlates survey responses with individual attributes. And, increasingly, scholars argue for the policy relevance of happiness data: in particular, as a basis for calculating aggregates such as “gross national happiness,” or for calculating monetary equivalents for non-market goods based (...) on coefficients in a happiness equation. But is individual well-being equivalent to happiness? The happiness literature tends to blur or conflate important concepts: well-being, subjective well-being, happiness, utility, satisfaction. A preference-realization account of well-being denies the equivalence of happiness and welfare, since someone can have preferences for non-mental attributes, such as health, autonomy, goal-fulfillment, knowledge or the quality of her relationships. It is critical, therefore, to differentiate two potential policy roles for happiness surveys. First, the survey response may provide prima facie evidence of the respondent’s preference-utility: the extent to which her preferences are realized. Second, it may indicate her experience-utility: the quality of her mental states. The Article clarifies these two, very different, ideas. It then criticizes, in turn, the preference-utility and the experience-utility defenses of the policy relevance of happiness surveys. Enthusiasm about happiness is premature. (shrink)

Neuroconstructivism postulates the progressive complexity of mental representation over the course of cognitive development and the role of the graphic representation of movement in the transformation of mental schemas, cognitive flexibility, and representational complexity. This study aims to: understand children’s resources in the drawing of movement ; and verify whether there are differences in the graphic representation of movement as an indicator of cognitive flexibility. The participants were N = 240 children aged 5–8 years; 1,440 drawings were collected (...) representing 2,880 characters from six stories. The analysis consisted: data quality control, using the kappa coefficient, and Generalizability Theory to test the instrument’s validity and reliability; Multivariate General Analysis and Mixed Linear Analysis of the factors ; Multivariate General Analysis of the graphic components: categories and microcategories, as well as the elements that make up the macrocategories: “Static,” “Indication,” and “Movement”; and calculation of the generalizability coefficient. The results show that: age best explains variability, with a high effect size across all components, thus increasing its complexity and at ages 6 and 7, “Indication” appears as a modulator of “Static” toward “Movement”. The generalizability coefficient is optimal. It is concluded that changes in the initial graphic representation of movement may interactively transform mental representation, thus increasing cognitive flexibility and prompting teaching applications to optimize such changes. (shrink)

Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part. This doctrine is rooted in Aristotle's conception of the soul, and has antecedents in Hobbes's conception of the mind as a “calculating machine”, but it has become fully articulated (and popularly endorsed) (...) only in the last third of the 20th century. Though the term ‘functionalism’ is used to designate a variety of positions in a variety of other disciplines, including psychology, sociology, economics, and architecture, this entry focuses exclusively on functionalism as a philosophical thesis about the nature of mental states. (shrink)

During the Nazi regime (1933–1945), more than 300 000 psychiatric patients were killed. The well‐calculated killing of chronic mentally ‘ill’ patients was part of a huge biopolitical program of well‐established scientific, eugenic standards of the time. Among the medical personnel implicated in these assassinations were nurses, who carried out this program through their everyday practice. However, newer research raises suspicions that psychiatric patients were being assassinated before and after the Nazi regime, which, I hypothesize, implies that the motives for these (...) killings must be investigated within psychiatric practice itself. An investigation of the impact of the interplay between the notes left by nurses and those by psychiatrists illustrates the active role of the psychiatric medical record in the killing of these patients. Using theoretical insights from Michel Foucault and philosopher Giorgio Agamben and analyzing one part of a particularly rich patient file found in the Langenhorn Psychiatric Asylum in the city of Hamburg, I demonstrate the role of the record in both constructing and deconstructing patient subjectivities. De‐subjectifying patients condemned them to specific zones in the asylum within which they were reduced to their ‘bare life’‐ a precondition for their physical assassination. (shrink)