The literature on methodological individualism is characterized by a widely held view that if the doctrine were stated with sufficient care it would be seen to be trivially true. Professor Bhargava questions this view. He begins by carefully disentangling the various formulations of the doctrine, identifies its most plausible version, and finally locates the principal assumption underlying it, namely that beliefs are attitudes individuated entirely in terms of what lies within the individual mind. Bhargava argues that once this individualist (...) assumption is challenged it is possible to rehabilitate a non-individualist methodology which permits a contextual study of beliefs and actions, and even a study of social context relatively independent of the beliefs and actions of individuals. (shrink)

Bhargava's goal is to reinvigorate the debate about methodological individualism in the philosophy of social science, by identifying a clear and controversial form of that doctrine and by sketching a plausible nonindividualist alternative. He identifies several strands in traditional characterizations of methodological individualism, and focuses on two. The "ontological" strand insists that all social entities and their properties are constituted by individuals and their properties. The "explanatory" strand insists that all social phenomena are to (...) be explained by reference to individuals and their properties. Bhargava focuses on a form of methodological individualism that is modelled on Elster's work, and which Bhargava calls "intentionalism.". (shrink)

Individualists about social ontology hold that social facts are “built out of” facts about individuals. In this paper, I argue that there are two distinct kinds of individualism about social ontology, two different ways individual people might be the metaphysical “builders” of the social world. The familiar kind is ontological individualism. This is the thesis that social facts supervene on, or are exhaustively grounded by, facts about individual people. What I call anchor (...) class='Hi'>individualism is the alternative thesis that facts about individuals put in place the conditions for a social entity to exist, or the conditions for something to have a social property. Examples include conventionalist theories of the social world, such as David Hume’s theories of promises, money, and government, and collective acceptance theories, such as John Searle’s theory of institutional facts. Anchor individualism is often conflated with ontological individualism. But in fact, the two theses are in tension with one another: if one of these kinds of individualism is true, then the other is very unlikely to be. My aim in this paper is to clarify both, and argue that they should be sharply distinguished from one another. (shrink)

_Tradition in Social Science _is the social philosophy written early in life by the jurisprudent who became the preeminent public law jurist in France in the first quarter of the twentieth century, Maurice Hauriou. His work remains prominent in theorizing European Community as well as in Latin American jurisprudence. His studies concern three areas of research: legal theory, social science, and philosophy. In this book Hauriou first focuses on the object and method of the (...) class='Hi'>social sciences in a preliminary chapter. The main text is devoted first to a philosophy of history that uses the growth objectively in fraternity, liberty and equality as the criterion for progress; and next to the subjective elements of progress, namely, the recognition of a “pessimistic individualism” in which failure in conduct is to be expected, but is rectified by social institutions. This part closes with the dynamizing of his philosophy of history by evolution and alternation between two phases of social development, namely, middle ages and renaissances. The second part is the philosophy of social science built around social matter, where the dynamic of imitation is the motive force, and three social networks—positive, religious, and metaphysical—specify its consequences. The last of these, the political fabric, is provided with a final chapter of its own. The main doctrinal device that Hauriou developed for use in law was his theory of the institution; this is developed for the first time in the present work. (shrink)

The predictive inadequacy of the social sciences is well documented, and philosophers have sought to diagnose it. This paper examines Brian Epstein’s recent diagnosis. He argues that the social sciences treat the social world as entirely composed of individual people. Instead, social scientists should recognize that material, non-individualistic entities determine the social world, as well. First, I argue that Epstein’s argument both begs the question against his opponents and is not sufficiently charitable. Second, I present (...) doubts that his proposal will improve predictive success for the social sciences, which I support with Edith Penrose’s resource-based theory of the firm. (shrink)

Critics of functional explanations in social science maintain that such explanations are illegitimate unless a mechanism is specified. Others argue that mechanisms are not necessary for causal inference and that functional explanations are a type of causal claim that raise no special difficulties for testing. I show that there is indeed a special problem that confronts testing functional explanations resulting from their connection to second-order causal claims. I explain how mechanisms can resolve this difficulty, but argue that this (...) does not provide support for methodological individualism since it is not necessary that the mechanisms be described in terms of individual interactions. (shrink)

This article argues that the tradition within the individualism-holism debate of importing arguments from the micro–macro discussion in other disciplines significantly has hampered our understanding of the “individual-social” relationship. While, for example, the “neural-mental” and “atomic-molecular” links represent empirical “gives rise to” relationships, in the social sciences the micro–macro link is a purely analytical “qualifies as” type of relationship. This disanalogy is important, since it has significant implications for the individualism-holism debate: it implies a phenomenally monist (...) social ontology and it disqualifies the notion of social macro causation. (shrink)

This book provides a comprehensive overview of the nature of explanations as given in both natural and social sciences. It discusses models of explanation adopted in natural and social sciences. The author also elaborates upon naturalistic and anti-naturalistic views and other types of explanations such as functional, purposive, etc in social science. The volume elaborates upon themes like bridge principle; functional explanation; purposive explanation; teleological explanation; prediction; methodological individualism; methodological collectivism; illocutionary redescription; principle of action; (...) and dispositional explanations, to understand whether the explanations given in the realm of social sciences are the same or different from the explanations that are given in the field of natural sciences. This introductory book is a must read for students and scholars of philosophy of science, logic, science and technology studies, social sciences, and philosophy in general. (shrink)

The social, behavioral, and a good chunk of the biological sciences concern the nature of individual agency, where our paradigm for an individual is a human being. Theories of economic behavior, of mental function and dysfunction, and of ontogenetic development, for example, are theories of how such individuals act, and of what internal and external factors are determinative of that action. Such theories construe individuals in distinctive ways.

The schema, or theoretical framework, holism, is concerned with the essence of society as a whole. Though undermined by Popper, it cannot be refuted ? nor proved. The extreme alternative is individualism. Several forms, due to Freud, Wittgenstein, and phenomenology, make presuppositions that require the individualist interpretation of society to be reopened at a new point. Popper's ? or Weber's ? is the sturdiest; its units being individual actions plus their unintended by?products. The Weber?Popper schema can provide a framework (...) for many satisfactory societal explanations. But individualism misses the holistic possibility of dynamic societal forces; the individualist fails to produce any dynamic laws. A dynamic bipolar schema could put both schemata to work without prescribing which would predominate. Empirical investigation would determine the more fruitful for a given problem. This schema would be ?justified? by fostering a satisfactory empirical social theory. The present investigation also reveals where the real controversies about schemata lie. (shrink)

The debates on the scientificity of social sciences in general, and sociology in particular, are recurring. From the original methodenstreitat the end the 19th Century to the contemporary controversy on the legitimacy of “regional epistemologies”, a same set of interrogations reappears. Are social sciences really scientific? And if so, are they sciences like other sciences? How should we conceive “research programs” Lakatos (1978) or “research traditions” for Laudan (1977) able to produce advancement of knowledge in the field of (...) social and human phenomena? Is the progress of knowledge in social sciences similar to the one generally observed in natural sciences? Is it possible to evaluate the relative merits of each one of these research programs? -/- These debates are important vectors of social and intellectual polarization. The historical divide between the positivist and the hermeneutics poles precedes the structure of the contemporary debate around the epistemic space of social sciences, It is not only a question of renewing the opposition between a monist view of sciences (e.g. McIntyre, 1996) and a dualistic one (e.g. Geertz, 1973) or even a trialist view of sciences (e.g. Lepenies, 1985). It is also a question of asserting dichotomies transformed into framework (including when it is a question of exceeding them): nature-culture, nomothetic-idiographic, models-narrative, structure-history, cause-reason, explanation-comprehension. -/- In this short introduction, we provide, in section 2, a first overview of this epistemological debate in social science. Section 3 proposes a different standpoint on the same questions, by introducing both ontological and methodological aspects in this basic epistemological debate. Namely, following (Hollis, 1994) oppositions of the explanation - understanding, causes - meaning, etc., types discussed in the firsts ection are comparatively examined together with oppositions of the structure - action, holism - individualism types. This allows us to discus show multi-agent design, by integrating various dimensions and standpoints in the same framework (Phan, Amblard, 2007, Chapters 1, 5, 14) can help us to shift these boundaries, and to bypass these oppositions. As model building and ontology design are at the core of this process (Phan, Amblard, 2007, Chapter 12), Section4 discusses various issues of the art of modelling, starting both from economists’ and sociologists’ current standpoints. (shrink)

In this paper I argue, contrary to the modern paradigm of rational choice theory in sociological theorising, that Dürkheim was correct to think that collectivistic notions are required if there is to be sui generis social science. However, Durkheim's anti-individualism must be naturalised to be compatible with modern monistic ontology. I argue that the required naturalisation is offered by the notion of humans as strongly social animals in general and the notion of collective intentionality in particular. (...) I argue that such a collectivistic but ontologically naturalistic notion is (i) a fundamental building block of social reality, (ii) supported by empirical studies, (iii) required by theoretical analyses of social action dilemmas and, finally, (iv) capable of providing the key to the construction of a more humane world of the future. (shrink)

In this paper I argue, contrary to the modern paradigm of rational choice theory in sociological theorising, that Dürkheim was correct to think that collectivistic notions are required if there is to be sui generis social science. However, Durkheim's anti-individualism must be naturalised to be compatible with modern monistic ontology. I argue that the required naturalisation is offered by the notion of humans as strongly social animals in general and the notion of collective intentionality in particular. (...) I argue that such a collectivistic but ontologically naturalistic notion is (i) a fundamental building block of social reality, (ii) supported by empirical studies, (iii) required by theoretical analyses of social action dilemmas and, finally, (iv) capable of providing the key to the construction of a more humane world of the future. (shrink)

This 1996 book defends the prospects for a science of society. It argues that behind the diverse methods of the natural sciences lies a common core of scientific rationality that the social sciences can and sometimes do achieve. It also argues that good social science must be in part about large-scale social structures and processes and thus that methodological individualism is misguided. These theses are supported by a detailed discussion of actual social research, (...) including theories of agrarian revolution, organizational ecology, social theories of depression, and supply-demand explanations in economics. Professor Kincaid provides a general picture of explanation and confirmation in the social sciences and discusses the nature of scientific rationality, functional explanation, optimality arguments, meaning and interpretation, the place of microfoundations in social explanation, the status of neo-classical economics, the role of idealizations and non-experimental evidence, and other specific controversies. (shrink)

We live in a world of crowds and corporations, artworks and artifacts, legislatures and languages, money and markets. These are all social objects — they are made, at least in part, by people and by communities. But what exactly are these things? How are they made, and what is the role of people in making them? In The Ant Trap, Brian Epstein rewrites our understanding of the nature of the social world and the foundations of the social (...) sciences. Epstein explains and challenges the three prevailing traditions about how the social world is made. One tradition takes the social world to be built out of people, much as traffic is built out of cars. A second tradition also takes people to be the building blocks of the social world, but focuses on thoughts and attitudes we have toward one another. And a third tradition takes the social world to be a collective projection onto the physical world. Epstein shows that these share critical flaws. Most fundamentally, all three traditions overestimate the role of people in building the social world: they are overly anthropocentric. Epstein starts from scratch, bringing the resources of contemporary metaphysics to bear. In the place of traditional theories, he introduces a model based on a new distinction between the grounds and the anchors of social facts. Epstein illustrates the model with a study of the nature of law, and shows how to interpret the prevailing traditions about the social world. Then he turns to social groups, and to what it means for a group to take an action or have an intention. Contrary to the overwhelming consensus, these often depend on more than the actions and intentions of group members. (shrink)

Agent-based models are increasingly important in social science research. They have two obvious apparent virtues: they can model complex macrosociological phenomena without strong assumptions about agents and without analytic solutions for models, and they seem to instantiate the methodological individualist program in a concrete way. We argue that the latter claim is false. After providing schematic accounts of ABM models and a first introduction to ways in which to characterize individualist explanations, we work through six conceptions of individualist (...) explanations that are decreasingly "less individualist" and argue that ABM-based explanations in the social sciences are not inevitably individualist in any of these senses. ABMs allow for explanatory relations among social entities and properties in the model environment and they are silent on what basic agents are, allowing social entities and properties to play basic explanatory roles. (shrink)

Methodological individualism has a long, successful, and controversial track record in the social sciences. Its record in ecology is much shorter but proving as successful and controversial with so-called individual-based models. Distinctions and debates about methodological individualism in social sciences clarify the commitments of this general, individualistic approach to modeling ecological phenomena and show that there is a lot recommending it. In particular, a representational priority on individual organisms yields a cogent albeit deflationary account of ecological (...) emergence and helps reveal how quite disparate models and theories in ecology might be unified. (shrink)

The concept of holism is of great use in philosophy of science. But its meaning does not correspond to the traditional use of holism in social sciences. The aim of the paper is to criticize an attempt to link the two meanings. Such a confusion derives from a misunderstanding of methodological individualism which is erroneously considered to be an atomism. Since the concepts of holism can be related to many different meanings, and since there are many different (...) models of action (including different models of rationality) behind the concept of methodological individualism, the debate should be cautious of all those differences. The papers gives a brief survey of these and discusses specific theses expressed by Vincent Descombes to support holism in social sciences. (shrink)

Political science is divided between methodological individualists, who seek to explain political phenomena by reference to individuals and their interactions, and holists (or nonreductionists), who consider some higher-level social entities or properties such as states, institutions, or cultures ontologically or causally significant. We propose a reconciliation between these two perspectives, building on related work in philosophy. After laying out a taxonomy of different variants of each view, we observe that (i) although political phenomena result from underlying individual attitudes (...) and behavior, individual-level descriptions do not always capture all explanatorily salient properties, and (ii) nonreductionistic explanations are mandated when social regularities are robust to changes in their individual-level realization. We characterize the dividing line between phenomena requiring nonreductionistic explanation and phenomena permitting individualistic explanation and give examples from the study of ethnic conflicts, social-network theory, and international-relations theory. (shrink)

The problem of holism in social science has, as Zahle and Collin, the editors of this volume note, a long history. It has revived, however, in a peculiar way, inspired by such things as the literature on corporate responsibility in ethics, the idea of supervenience, “Critical Realism” in sociology, ideas about emergence, the use of game-theoretic models to account for collective outcomes, and various notions of collective actors with collective intentions. These new inspirations interact with older problematics, such (...) as the micro–macro relation problem in sociology, the traditional argument that sentences such as “the crowd stormed the Bastille” have explanatory import apart from the import of sentences about the individual, and claims about reducibility of various kinds.This volume collects original papers by many of the main commentators on this set of topics and is an indispensable starting point for future discussion. No one should venture into this area without understanding the v .. (shrink)

The debate between the individualist and the holist understanding of social items (social entities, events, institutions, phenomena and so on) has a long history and potentially a wide range of political implications. Political positions and political assumptions often play a significant role in the debate and it is not rare that participants in the discussion seek to associate the positions they oppose with unpopular political views, instead of providing actual theoretical arguments. The tendency to associate individualist positions in (...) the social sciences with political libertarianism and neo-liberal economic agendas is particularly common. At the same time, disciplinary politics and concerns about the integrity of the social sciences (especially in the form of fears from their reducibility to psychology) also play an important role in the debate. In this paper I analyze such political assumptions that often motivate, or are stated to motivate, the debate. (shrink)

During the past decade, social mechanisms and mechanism-based ex- planations have received considerable attention in the social sciences as well as in the philosophy of science. This article critically reviews the most important philosophical and social science contributions to the mechanism approach. The first part discusses the idea of mechanism- based explanation from the point of view of philosophy of science and relates it to causation and to the covering-law account of explanation. The second (...) part focuses on how the idea of mechanisms has been used in the social sciences. The final part discusses recent developments in analytical sociology, covering the nature of sociological explananda, the role of theory of action in mechanism-based explanations, Merton’s idea of middle-range theory, and the role of agent-based simulations in the development of mechanism-based explanations. (shrink)

Past criticisms to the contrary, methodological individualism in the social sciences is neither trivial nor obviously false. In the style of Weber's sociology, it restricts the ultimate explanatory repertoire of social science to agents' reasons for action. Although this restriction is not obviously false, it ought not to be accepted, at present, as a regulative principle. It excludes, as too far-fetched to merit investigation, certain hypotheses concerning the influence of objective interests on large-scale social phenomena. (...) And these hypotheses, in fact, merit empirical consideration. The attractiveness of methodological individualism as a regulative principle depends on two independent confusions, the conflation of an agent's reasons for action with the beliefs, needs, desires, or goals which are the reasons why he acted as he did, and the identification of explaining a phenomenon and describing its causes. (shrink)

The aim of this thesis is to discuss the nature of social phenomena, and to determine the appropriate way to explain them. Many of the contentions advanced rest largely upon the fact that social phenomena can be investigated only by methods which respect their distinctive character and status as social phenomena. In chapter I it is argued that the most important difference between the social and the natural sciences is that the former have to employ intentional (...) criteria to identify their explananda-phenomena. Because human and societal phenomena are intrinsically meaningful, the type of causation which prevails in the social realm is fundamentally different from that which prevails in the physical. In chapter II the claim of Popper and Hayek that the task of the social sciences is to trace the unintended consequences of human actions is critically examined. Two examples of economic explanation are given in order to show the importance of unintended consequences, and to illustrate the general form explanations of social phenomena should adopt. In chapter III the contention that the social sciences deal with inherently complex phenomena is examined and defended, and the main implications of this contention for social analysis are drawn. The extent to which social phenomena are in principle predictable is discussed. In chapter IV the structural properties of formal scientific theories are briefly characterised, and then Friedman's famous argument on the testability of economic theories is analysed and rejected. The role within a scientific theory of statements formulated with reference to idealisations of the phenomena being studied, and the role within a social explanation of the 'principle of rationality', are discussed. In chapter V the central questions behind the methodological individualism/methodological holism controversy are brought to light. Provided that methodological individualism is not construed as a reductionist or mechanistic principle, it can successfully avoid the main objections of its detractors. It is argued that the method of functional analysis in sociology is consistent with methodological individualism. Finally, it is claimed that the principle of methodological individualism does indeed recommend the appropriate way to explain societal phenomena. In chapter VI, the various strands of thought running through the five preceding chapters are drawn together in a brief summary of the most important points raised by this thesis. (shrink)

The thesis of methodological individualism in social science is commonly divided into two different claims—explanatory individualism and ontological individualism. Ontological individualism is the thesis that facts about individuals exhaustively determine social facts. Initially taken to be a claim about the identity of groups with sets of individuals or their properties, ontological individualism has more recently been understood as a global supervenience claim. While explanatory individualism has remained controversial, ontological individualism thus (...) understood is almost universally accepted. In this paper I argue that ontological individualism is false. Only if the thesis is weakened to the point that it is equivalent to physicalism can it be true, but then it fails to be a thesis about the determination of social facts by facts about individual persons. Even when individualistic facts are expanded to include people’s local environments and practices, I shall argue, those still underdetermine the social facts that obtain. If true, this has implications for explanation as well as ontology. I first consider arguments against the local supervenience of social facts on facts about individuals, correcting some flaws in existing arguments and affirming that local supervenience fails for a broad set of social properties. I subsequently apply a similar approach to defeat a particularly weak form of global supervenience, and consider potential responses. Finally, I explore why it is that people have taken ontological individualism to be true. (shrink)

The structure of explanation for methodological individualism (MI) can be represented by the expression M = M [m(P)] where the global phenomenon M results from a set of stylized individual behaviors m resulting from motivations which are themselves affected by global data P. In this, MI differs from holistic methodology in that it takes into account the individual (generally ideal–typical) reasons underlying these collective phenomena, and refuses, in principle, to treat a group as an actor endowed with a conscience (...) and a will, or to describe the individual as the crossing point of collective forces. Boudon gives several examples showing that the individualist paradigm and the rationality hypothesis it includes (according to which the actors’ reasons are, in principle, comprehensible by the observer as a function of their situation) enables sociological explanation to progress and avoid the dreaded trap of sociocentrism. (shrink)

_The Philosophy of Social Science Reader_ is an outstanding, comprehensive and up-to-date collection of key readings in the philosophy of social science, covering the essential issues, problems and debates in this important interdisciplinary area. Each section is carefully introduced by the editors, and the readings placed in context. The anthology is organized into seven clear parts: Values and Social Science Causal Inference and Explanation Interpretation Rationality and Choice Individualism Norms Cultural Evolution. Featuring the (...) work of influential philosophers and social scientists such as Ernest Nagel, Ian Hacking, John Searle, Clifford Geertz, Daniel Kahneman, Steven Lukes and Richard Dawkins, _The Philosophy of Social Science Reader_ is the ideal text for philosophy of social science courses, and for students in related disciplines interested in the differences between the social and natural sciences. (shrink)

In this paper, I intend to clarify Alfred Schutz’s complex relationship to methodological individualism (MI), showing that he defends a “hermeneutic,” “weak” and “partial” variant of this approach. I will do so by focusing mainly on his reception of Max Weber, given the latter’s centrality in the MI paradigm.. In order to achieve my objective, I will proceed in three steps. First (1), to avoid misunderstandings, I will provide an updated definition of MI, distinguishing it from ontological and normative (...) individualism and giving an overview of its different variants. Second (2), I will systematically reconstruct Schutz’s convergences with Weber’s “hermeneutic” MI. Finally (3), I will develop the thesis of the “partiality” and “weakness” of Schutz’s MI with the help of recent literature on his work. (shrink)

Originally published in 1980, this book examines the major issues in the philosophy of social science, paying specific attention to cross-cultural understanding, humanism versus scientism, individualism versus collectivism, and the shaping of theory by evaluative commitment. Arguing for a cross-cultural conception of human beings, the authors defend humanism and individualism, and reject the notion that social inquiry is necessarily vitiated by an adherence to values.

Cormac McCarthy’s The Road demonstrates the centrality of individualism to the unsustainability that defines consumer culture in the Anthropocene. His representation of cannibalism not only reflects the main problems of consumer culture but also sheds light on individualism as its driving force. While the cannibalistic world of The Road presents a struggle of individuals for autonomy, the novel’s unnamed boy protagonist shows that empathy can be a viable solution for that struggle. The novel suggests that making consumer culture (...) sustainable means recognizing the violence of individualism and the significance of empathetic consciousness simultaneously. To exit the highway that leads to unsustainability means taking the road of empathy, for only this will potentially lead to sustainability in the Anthropocene. (shrink)

It is often claimed that the social sciences cannot be reduced to a lower-level individualistic science. The standard argument for this position is the Fodorian multiple realizability argument. Its defenders endorse token–token identities between “higher-level” social objects and pluralities/sums of “lower-level” individuals, but they maintain that the properties expressed by social science predicates are often multiply realizable, entailing that type–type identities between social and individualistic properties are ruled out. In this paper I argue that (...) the multiple realizability argument for explanatory holism is unsound. The social sciences are indeed irreducible, but the principled reason for this is that the required token–token identifications cannot in general be carried through. In consequence, paradigmatic social science predicates cannot be taken to apply to the objects quantified over in the lower-level sciences. The result is that typical social science predicates cannot even be held to be co-extensive with individualistic predicates, which means type–type identifications are ruled out too. Multiple realizability has nothing to do with this failure of co-extensiveness, because the relevant social science predicates are not multiply realized in the sense intended by the explanatory holists, a sense which presupposes reductive token–token identifications. (shrink)

Social scientists associate agent-based simulation (ABS) models with three ideas about explanation: they provide generative explanations, they are models of mechanisms, and they implement methodological individualism. In light of a philosophical account of explanation, we show that these ideas are not necessarily related and offer an account of the explanatory import of ABS models. We also argue that their bottom-up research strategy should be distinguished from methodological individualism.

In 1974 a British biologist, John Randal Baker , published a large and controversial book simply entitled Race that reiterated persistent eugenicist themes concerning the relation between race, intelligence, and progress. The history of Baker’s book is a case study in the politics of scientific publishing, and his ideas influenced scholars associated with later works such as The Bell Curve. Baker, a student of Julian Huxley, was a longtime participant in the British eugenics movement and opponent of what he took (...) to be a facile belief in human equality. In 1942, together with Michael Polanyi, he founded the Society for Freedom in Science to oppose those who advocated the central planning of scientific research. Baker’s eugenics, political activities, and views on race express an elitist individualism, associated with the conservative wing of the eugenics movement, that this paper explores in the context of his career as a whole. (shrink)

The Branch of Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), the Institute of Sociology of the Federal Center for Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the RAS, the RAS Institute of Philosophy, and the RAS Institute of Psychology are arranging “Individualization and Collectivism in Contemporary Russian Society” scientific conference, to be held in Moscow, April 2024. The event marks the 300th anniversary of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the 95th birth anniversary of the Russian philosopher and (...) class='Hi'>social theorist A.S. Akhiezer. Its primary objective is to foster the development of criteria for analyzing intersubjective relations within the act of social development. The conference’s focus on the investigation of social development is grounded in the dominants of contemporary philosophical-sociological non-classics and proposes several topics for discussion. These include the transition from the absolutization of Kant’s categorical imperative, which mandates the consideration of humans solely as the ultimate end in the system of intersubjective communication and the knowledge process, to an alternative consideration of humans as means of self-improvement and a crucial resource for social development (V.S. Bibler). It encompasses the rejection of absolutizing the function of contrasting faith and knowledge, the Self and the Other, the “own” and the “foreign,” scientific and everyday consciousness (V.A. Lectorsky, I.T. Kasavin, V.N. Porus). The interpretation of the meaning of personality shifts from concepts like cogito ergo sum, “pure Self,” “Self,” “Ego,” “Super-,” to the “ability of the Self to respond to the call of the Other,” thereby forming the smallest cell of the socio-individual as a synthesis of the social and the individual (M.M. Bakhtin, V.A. Lectorsky, R.S. Grinberg). Overcoming the established inequality of economic systems is addressed through the socio-individualism of small and medium-sized enterprises (A.S. Akhiezer, R.S. Grinberg). The conference also anticipates discussions on the following topics: How do the transfer and exchange of accumulated global knowledge from the individual to the other, and vice versa, contribute to the formation of small creative groups, serving as a communicative platform for nurturing socially oriented individuals – agents of social development? Moreover, how can dialogue be effectively constructed among participants of partnership relations who operate on differing premises (J.-P. Sartre)? The discussion is aimed at contemplating the contradictory, oxymoronic, yet dialogue and synthesis-oriented concepts of “individualization of the social,” “socially oriented individual,” and “socio-individualism.”. (shrink)

My dissertation traces the consequences following for social science from an analysis of the nature of its object domain, which I call "socio-historical reality." In particular, I hope thereby to dissolve many misconceptions about the character of social science. ;Influenced by Dilthey, I propose an "individualist" account that analyzes socio-historical reality as nothing but interrelated everyday lives, which themselves consist in series of actions that are governed by practical intelligibility and performed in interconnected settings. This analysis (...) differs from traditional versions of individualist social ontology because in elaborating Heidegger's idea that action is governed by practical intelligibility, and in emphasizing the role of setting in ongoing action, it offers a novel account of the ingredients out of which socio-historical reality consists. These ingredients are: actions, the entities found in settings, a broad range of factors such as rules, paradigms, ideas, goals, and normal practices, which are articulated by entities in settings and determine what it makes sense to people to do, and concrete relations between these phenomena, for example, chains of actions and commonalities in the factors mentioned under . An important consequence of my account is that socio-historical reality does not contain unexperienceable types of entities. ;This analysis of the object domain of social science has implications for the constitution of overarching social formations , the nature of social causality, and the character of social science. I maintain, for example, that all social science should be verstehende, though not necessarily interpretive; that it is unlikely that social science will discover laws governing what happens in socio-historical reality; that much of contemporary social science unknowingly and illegitimately uses fictions in its accounts; and that explanation in social science refers ultimately to individual actions and does not rest on laws or generalizations. (shrink)

Illustrating the knowledge and ideas of thinkers such as Mandeville, Hume, Montesquieu and Smith, this book fully investigates the entire panorama of social sciences as well as providing a clear and concise analysis of the history of the social sciences from the point at which evolutionary theory entered the field. Examining the history of culture and humanity, Lorenzo Infantino discusses the 'discovery of society, ' when people stopped seeing behind every social phenomenon the direct action of human (...) and/or divine will, and how the subsequent void was filled by the unintended creation of language, habits, customs, laws and public power. Focussing on the idea that the object of social sciences should be the study of unintended consequences, Infantino also expertly reviews the approach of 'methodological individualism'. Forward-thinking, the book highlights the need for a rule of law in cultural evolution to prevent harm to others and allow a greater freedom of choice when deciding future actions. Providing an in-depth explanation of why the social sciences are needed and highlighting the task of a social scientist, this book will be invaluable for researchers in the fields of politics, economics and sociology. (shrink)

Despite advances in theory, often driven by feminist ethicists, research ethics struggles in practice to adequately account for and respond to the agency and autonomy of people considered vulnerable in the research context. We argue that shifts within feminist research ethics scholarship to better characterise and respond to autonomy and agency can be bolstered by further grounding in discourses from the social sciences, in work that confirms the complex nature of human agency in contexts of structural and other sources (...) of vulnerability. We discuss some of the core concepts and critiques emerging from the literature on women and children's agency in under‐resourced settings, highlighting calls to move from individualistic to relational models of agency, and to recognise the ambiguous, value‐laden, and heterogeneous nature of the concept. We then draw out what these conceptual shifts might mean for research ethics obligations and guidance, illustrating our analysis using a case vignette based on research ethics work conducted in South Africa. We conclude that if research practices are to be supportive of agency, it will be crucial to scrutinise the moral judgements which underpin accounts of agency, derive more situated definitions of and responses to agency, and enable people and participants to influence these based on their own experiences and self‐perceptions. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In Power Without Knowledge, Jeffrey Friedman contends that ideational complexity can stymie social-scientific understanding and prevent the reliable predictive knowledge required of a well-functioning technocracy. However, even this somewhat pessimistic outlook may understate the problem. Ideational complexity has both cognitive and phenomenal dimensions, each of which poses unique dilemmas. Further, due to its methodological individualism, Friedman’s vision may neglect emergent layers of knowledge produced through social interaction, creating yet another source of unknowns. Given these two factors, (...) social science should embrace a pluralism regarding levels of analysis. This would recognize the multifaceted limitations on social-science knowledge production, furthering epistemic humility about the potential role of social science in technocratic policymaking. (shrink)

This paper argues that there is a confusion or inconsistency in Popper's claiming both that the social sciences should adopt the principle of methodological individualism and that they should maintain a unity of method with the natural sciences. Conjointly with the argument and in an appendix, a survey of Popper's philosophy of social science is presented. First, Popper's individualism is given an exegesis and elaboration, being characterized by me as 'the autonomy position'. Second, suggesting unity (...) of method requires minimally the general application of the principle of faisIflability, I show the failure of two arguments apparently suggested by Popper that falslflability entails individualism. To fill the lacuna I then propose other arguments for individualism Popper may have had in mind. But finally, I show the inconsistency by arguing that individualism must on Popper's own assumptions be regarded as an empirical rather than a metaphysical position, thus rendering its stipulation by Popper as methodological incompatible with the application of falslflability. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAlexander Wendt’s Quantum Mind and Social Science challenges social scientists to replace contemporary understandings of the individual and society with concepts better suited to quantum reality. This would mean replacing reductionist materialism with notions of consciousness as probabilistic, not strictly determined; and substituting, for individualistic models of society, new ones that acknowledged our connectedness to each other “at a distance,” i.e., without mediation by mechanisms modeled on Newtonian physics. His challenge is welcome, for in both respects, Wendt (...) would have us replace ways of thinking that have long been inadequate to explain empirical reality. (shrink)

Pierre Bourdieu has developed a philosophy of social science, grounded in the phenomenological tradition, which treats knowledge as a practical ability embodied in skilful behaviour, rather than an intellectual capacity for the representation and manipulation of propositional knowledge. He invokes Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following as one way of explicating the idea that knowledge is a skill. Bourdieu’s conception of tacit knowledge is a dispositional one, adopted to avoid a perceived dilemma for methodological individualism. That dilemma requires either (...) the explanation of regularities in social behaviour as the result of the tacit representation of procedural rules (‘legalism’) or the self-conscious representation of behavioural goals (‘voluntarism’) by individuals. After explaining the apparent dilemma, I then argue that Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule following actually undermine, rather than support, a dispositional solution. Nonetheless, the philosophy of social science can survive without a dispositional account of knowledge. Such a social science needs, firstly, to embrace one horn of the dilemma, voluntarism, provided that the relevant regularities can be explained as unintended consequences of agents’ self-represented intentions. Secondly, such a social science should treat theorists’ interpretations as unifying generalizations, not hypotheses about the acquisition of tacit knowledge. Finally, where appeal to cognitive psychology can distinguish otherwise equivalent theories in social science, social science should incorporate the data of cognitive psychology concerning tacit mental processes. (shrink)

Testimony is indispensable in the sciences. To deny the propriety of relying on it engenders an untenable scepticism. But this leaves open the issue of what exactly confers a scientist’s epistemic right to rely upon the word of her colleagues. Some authors have suggested a recipient of testimony enjoys an epistemic entitlement to trust the word of another as such, not requiring evidence of her trustworthiness, so long as there is not evidence of her untrustworthiness. I argue that, whether or (...) not such an on-no-evidence entitlement to believe what one is told exists, it shrinks to irrelevance in the explanation of the basis on which scientists take each other’s word in the scientific community. This is so, since a normally knowledgeable adult hearer is typically awash with relevant evidence, direct and circumstantial, for and against, concerning a teller’s trustworthiness, and this swamps any alleged entitlement to believe in the absence of such evidence. There need not be personal knowledge of the teller, since social role and topic provide evidence regarding trustworthiness. I also discuss the individuation of ‘testimony’ as an epistemic kind. I suggest that we should not attempt to define a category with sharp boundaries, but instead characterise a paradigm case—one person telling another something in face-to-face personal communication—and then notice other cases which both resemble and diverge from this in epistemically relevant features—lectures, media broadcasts, personal letters, personal diaries, etc.Author Keywords: Testimony; Justification; Knowledge; Individualism; Communication. (shrink)

The Western cultural consensus based on the ideas of free markets and individualism has led many social scientists to consider poverty as a personal experience, a deprivation of material things, and a failure of just distribution. Mary Douglas and Steven Ney find this dominant tradition of social thought about poverty and well-being to be full of contradictions. They argue that the root cause is the impoverished idea of the human person inherited through two centuries of intellectual history, (...) and that two principles, the idea of the solipsist self and the idea of objectivity, cause most of the contradictions. Douglas and Ney state that Economic Man, from its semitechnical niche in eighteenth-century economic theory, has taken over the realms of psychology, consumption, public assistance, political science, and philosophy. They say that by distorting the statistical data presented for policy analysis, the ideas of the solipsist self and objectivity indeed often protect a political bias. The authors propose to correct this by revising the current model of the person. Taking cultural bias into account and giving full play to political dissent, they restore the "persons" who have been missing from the social science debates. Drawing from anthropology, economics, political science, and sociology, the authors set forth a fundamental critique of the social sciences. Their book will find a wide audience among social scientists and will also interest anyone engaged in current discussions of poverty. This book is a copublication with the Russell Sage Foundation. (shrink)