35 found
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  1. Against Gullibility.Elizabeth Fricker - 1994 - In A. Chakrabarti & B. K. Matilal (eds.), Knowing from Words. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  2. Critical notice: Telling and trusting: Reductionism and anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony.Elizabeth Fricker - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):393-411.
  3. The Epistemology of Testimony.Elizabeth Fricker & David E. Cooper - 1987 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 61 (1):57 - 106.
  4. Second-hand knowledge.Elizabeth Fricker - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):592–618.
    We citizens of the 21st century live in a world where division of epistemic labour rules. Most of what we know we learned from the spoken or written word of others, and we depend in endless practical ways on the technological fruits of the dispersed knowledge of others—of which we often know almost nothing—in virtually every moment of our lives. Interest has been growing in recent years amongst philosophers, in the issues in epistemology raised by this fact. One issue concerns (...)
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  5.  65
    Critical Notice.Elizabeth Fricker - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):393 - 411.
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  6. I—Elizabeth Fricker: Stating and Insinuating.Elizabeth Fricker - 2012 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):61-94.
    An utterer may convey a message to her intended audience by means of an explicit statement; or by a non‐conventionally mediated one‐off signal from which the audience is able to work out the intended message; or by conversational implicature. I investigate whether the last two are equivalent to explicit testifying, as communicative act and epistemic source. I find that there are important differences between explicit statement and insinuation; only with the first does the utterer assume full responsibility for the truth (...)
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  7. Understanding and knowledge of what is said.Elizabeth Fricker - 2003 - In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of language. Oxford University Press. pp. 325--66.
  8. Trusting others in the sciences: a priori or empirical warrant?Elizabeth Fricker - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):373-383.
    Testimony is indispensable in the sciences. To deny the propriety of relying on it engenders an untenable scepticism. But this leaves open the issue of what exactly confers a scientist’s epistemic right to rely upon the word of her colleagues. Some authors have suggested a recipient of testimony enjoys an epistemic entitlement to trust the word of another as such, not requiring evidence of her trustworthiness, so long as there is not evidence of her untrustworthiness. I argue that, whether or (...)
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  9.  55
    Second-Hand Knowledge.Elizabeth Fricker - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):592-618.
    We citizens of the 21st century live in a world where division of epistemic labour rules. Most of what we know we learned from the spoken or written word of others, and we depend in endless practical ways on the technological fruits of the dispersed knowledge of others—of which we often know almost nothing—in virtually every moment of our lives. Interest has been growing in recent years amongst philosophers, in the issues in epistemology raised by this fact. One issue concerns (...)
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  10. Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy.Elizabeth Fricker - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. pp. 225.
  11. Norms, Constitutive and Social, and Assertion.Elizabeth Fricker - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):397-418.
    I define a social norm as a regularity in behavior whose persistence is causally explained by the existence of sanctioning attitudes of participants toward violations—without these sanctions, individuals have motive to violate the norm. I show how a universal precept "When in circumstances S, do action F" can be sustained by the conditional preference of each to conform, given that others do, of a convention, and also reinforced by the sanctions of a norm. I observe that a precept with moral (...)
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  12. How to make invidious distinctions amongst reliable testifiers.Elizabeth Fricker - 2015 - Episteme 12 (2):173-202.
  13.  89
    Unreliable Testimony.Elizabeth Fricker - 2016 - In Brian McLaughlin & Hilary Kornblith (eds.), Goldman and his Critics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 88-120.
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  14. Is knowing a state of mind? The case against.Elizabeth Fricker - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
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  15. Testimony: Knowing through being told.Elizabeth Fricker - 2004 - In M. Sintonen, J. Wolenski & I. Niiniluoto (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 109--130.
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  16. Doing (better) what comes naturally: Zagzebski on rationality and epistemic self-trust.Elizabeth Fricker - 2016 - Episteme 13 (2):151-166.
    I offer an account of what trust is, and of what epistemic self-trust consists in. I identify five distinct arguments extracted from Chapter 2 of Zagzebski's Epistemic Authority for the rationality and epistemic legitimacy of epistemic self-trust. I take issue with the general account of human rational self-regulation on which one of her arguments rests. Zagzebski maintains that this consists in restoring harmony in the psyche by eliminating conflict and so ending. I argue that epistemic rationality is distinct from psychic (...)
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  17. Varieties of Anti-Reductionism About Testimony—A Reply to Goldberg and Henderson.Elizabeth Fricker - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):618-628.
    One of the central points of contention in the epistemology of testimony concerns the uniqueness (or not) of the justification of beliefs formed through testimony-whether such justification can be accounted for in terms of, or 'reduced to,' other familiar sort of justification, e.g. without relying on any epistemic principles unique to testimony. One influential argument for the reductionist position, found in the work of Elizabeth Fricker, argues by appeal to the need for the hearer to monitor the testimony for credibility. (...)
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  18.  43
    Comment on Article: ‘Authorship and Chat GPT’ (PHTE D 23 -00197).Elizabeth Fricker - 2024 - Philosophy and Technology 37 (2):1-5.
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  19.  13
    Unreliable Testimony.Elizabeth Fricker - 2016 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Hilary Kornblith (eds.), Goldman and His Critics. Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley. pp. 88–123.
    Reliabilism is the dominant theory in contemporary analytic epistemology. This chapter reviews some considerations which throw doubt on the widely accepted thesis or R‐NEC that reliability is necessary for knowledge. It considers whether the generally pessimistic results in the experimental literature from social psychology concerning subjects’ ability in a test situation to tell, from behavioral cues, whether a speaker is lying, present a severe challenge for R‐NEC. The chapter develops a more classic line of thought invoking intuitions about cases which (...)
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  20.  61
    “Believing the speaker” versus believing on evidence: A critique of Moran.Elizabeth Fricker - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):767-776.
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  21.  53
    Semantic Structure and Speakers' Understanding.Elizabeth Fricker - 1983 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83:49 - 66.
    Elizabeth Fricker; IV*—Semantic Structure and Speakers' Understanding1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 83, Issue 1, 1 June 1983, Pages 49–66, h.
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  22.  37
    Can Trust Work Epistemic Magic?Elizabeth Fricker - 2021 - Philosophical Topics 49 (2):57-82.
    I develop a thin account of trust as trust-based reliance on an occasion. I argue that this thin notion describes the trust a recipient of testimony has in a speaker when she forms belief on his say-so. This basis for trusting belief in what one is told is also available to those who overhear and correctly understand the teller’s speech act. I contrast my account of trusting testimonial uptake with an alternative account that invokes a thicker notion: reciprocal trust. This (...)
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  23. Know first, tell later : the truth about Craig on knowledge.Elizabeth Fricker - 2015 - In David K. Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
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  24.  69
    Self-Knowledge: Special Access versus Artefact of Grammar—A Dichotomy.Elizabeth Fricker - 1998 - In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 155.
  25.  48
    Knowing Full Well from Testimony?Elizabeth Fricker - 2019 - Episteme 16 (4):369-384.
    Testimony poses a challenge to systematic epistemology. I cite two kinds of testimony situation where the recipient's belief is not safe, yet intuitively counts as knowledge. Can Sosa's more sophisticated virtue reliabilism, which theorises animal knowledge as apt belief, yield the intuitively correct verdict on these cases? Sosa shows that a belief can be apt, though it is not safe, and so it may seem a quick positive answer is forthcoming. However, I explore complications in applying his AAA framework, regarding (...)
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  26. The threat of eliminativism.Elizabeth Fricker - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):253-281.
  27.  5
    The Threat of Eliminativism.Elizabeth Fricker - 2007 - Mind and Language 8 (2):253-281.
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  28.  18
    Content, cause and funtion.Elizabeth Fricker - 1991 - Philosophical Books 32 (3):136-144.
  29.  78
    The Exchange of Words, by Richard Moran.Elizabeth Fricker - 2021 - Mind 130 (518):671-680.
    The Exchange of Words, by MoranRichard. Oxford: OUP, 2018. Pp. 254.
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  30. Analyticity, Linguistic Practice and Philosophical Method.Elizabeth Fricker - 1991 - In Klaus Puhl (ed.), Meaning Scepticism. New York: De Gruyter. pp. 218--50.
     
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  31. Audi on Testimony.Elizabeth Fricker - 2007 - In Mark Timmons, John Greco & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Rationality and the Good: Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter addresses Audi's work on testimony, focusing on two theses: the thesis that testimony‐based knowledge requires the attester to have knowledge, and the thesis that a knowledgeable attester and the absence of defeaters are jointly sufficient for testimony‐based knowledge. It argues that Audi is not entitled to accept the first thesis‐in particular, that his supporting reliabilist argument does not succeed. Moreover, the chapter argues that given Audi's account of testimony, he can give no rationale for the first thesis that (...)
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  32. Knowledge and Language.Elizabeth Fricker - 1986 - Dissertation, University of Oxford (United Kingdom)
    Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;This thesis undertakes two interrelated projects. The first is to give an account of the epistemology of testimony. However, as is argued, this cannot be done properly except as an application of a general philosophical account of knowledge. For this reason a partial sketch of such a general account is offered, as a necessary part of the completion of the first project. A complementary second project is also adopted. (...)
     
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  33.  75
    Martians and Meetings: Against Burge's Neo-Kantian Apriorism about Testimony.Elizabeth Fricker - 2006 - Philosophica 78 (2).
    Burge proposes the Acceptance Principle"", which states that it is apriori that a hearer may properly accept what she is told in the absence of defeaters, since any giver of testimony is a rational agent, and as such one can presume she is a ""source of truth"". It is claimed that Burge's Principle is not intuitively compelling, so that a suasive, not merely an explanatory justification for it is needed.
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  34.  18
    Should We Worry About Silicone Chip Technology De-Skilling Us?Elizabeth Fricker - 2021 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 89:131-152.
    It is argued that many means-end skills are mere drudgery, and there is no case from well-being to regret that the advance of technology has replaced them with machines. But a case is made that for humans possessing some skills is important for well-being, and that certain core skills are important for it. It is argued that these include navigational skills. While the march of technology has tended to promote human well-being, there is now some cause for concern that silicone (...)
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  35.  10
    Making the Human Mind.Elizabeth Fricker - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):388-391.
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