95 found
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  1. Value-Free Science: Ideals and Illusions?Harold Kincaid, John Dupré & Alison Wylie (eds.) - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
  2. Scientific metaphysics.Don Ross, James Ladyman & Harold Kincaid (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Original essays by leading philosophers of science explore the question of whether metaphysics can and should be naturalized--conducted as part of natural science.
  3. Philosophical Foundations of the Social Sciences: Analyzing Controversies in Social Research.Harold Kincaid - 1995 - Cambridge University Press.
    This 1996 book defends the prospects for a science of society. It argues that behind the diverse methods of the natural sciences lies a common core of scientific rationality that the social sciences can and sometimes do achieve. It also argues that good social science must be in part about large-scale social structures and processes and thus that methodological individualism is misguided. These theses are supported by a detailed discussion of actual social research, including theories of agrarian revolution, organizational ecology, (...)
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  4. Classifying Psychopathology: Mental Kinds and Natural Kinds.Harold Kincaid & Jacqueline Anne Sullivan - 2014 - In Harold Kincaid & Jacqueline Anne Sullivan (eds.), Classifying Psychopathology: Mental Kinds and Natural Kinds. MIT Press. pp. 1-10.
    In this volume, leading philosophers of psychiatry examine psychiatric classification systems, including the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, asking whether current systems are sufficient for effective diagnosis, treatment, and research. Doing so, they take up the question of whether mental disorders are natural kinds, grounded in something in the outside world. Psychiatric categories based on natural kinds should group phenomena in such a way that they are subject to the same type of causal explanations and respond similarly to (...)
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  5. Putting inference to the best explanation in its place.Timothy Day & Harold Kincaid - 1994 - Synthese 98 (2):271-295.
    This paper discusses the nature and the status of inference to the best explanation. We outline the foundational role given IBE by its defenders and the arguments of critics who deny it any place at all ; argue that, on the two main conceptions of explanation, IBE cannot be a foundational inference rule ; sketch an account of IBE that makes it contextual and dependent on substantive empirical assumptions, much as simplicity seems to be ; show how that account avoids (...)
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  6. Reduction, explanation, and individualism.Harold Kincaid - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (4):492-513.
    This paper contributes to the recently renewed debate over methodological individualism (MI) by carefully sorting out various individualist claims and by making use of recent work on reduction and explanation outside the social sciences. My major focus is on individualist claims about reduction and explanation. I argue that reductionist versions of MI fail for much the same reasons that mental predicates cannot be reduced to physical predicates and that attempts to establish reducibility by weakening the requirements for reduction also fail. (...)
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  7.  43
    The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Medicine.Miriam Solomon, Jeremy R. Simon & Harold Kincaid (eds.) - 2016 - New York, NY: Routledge.
    _The_ _Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Medicine _is a comprehensive guide to topics in the fields of epistemology and metaphysics of medicine. It examines traditional topics such as the concept of disease, causality in medicine, the epistemology of the randomized controlled trial, the biopsychosocial model, explanation, clinical judgment and phenomenology of medicine and emerging topics, such as philosophy of epidemiology, measuring harms, the concept of disability, nursing perspectives, race and gender, the metaphysics of Chinese medicine, and narrative medicine. Each of (...)
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  8. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics.Don Ross & Harold Kincaid (eds.) - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics is a reference work on philosophical issues in the practice of economics. It is motivated by the view that there is more to economics than general equilibrium theory, and that the philosophy of economics should reflect the diversity of activities and topics that currently occupy economists. Contributions in the book are thus closely tied to on-going theoretical and empirical concerns in economics. Contributors include both philosophers of science and economists. Articles fall into three (...)
  9.  52
    The Case for Idealism.Harold Kincaid & John Foster - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):465.
  10. Why be a methodological individualist?Julie Zahle & Harold Kincaid - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):655-675.
    In the recent methodological individualism-holism debate on explanation, there has been considerable focus on what reasons methodological holists may advance in support of their position. We believe it is useful to approach the other direction and ask what considerations methodological individualists may in fact offer in favor of their view about explanation. This is the background for the question we pursue in this paper: Why be a methodological individualist? We start out by introducing the methodological individualism-holism debate while distinguishing two (...)
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  11. Molecular biology and the unity of science.Harold Kincaid - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (4):575-593.
    Advances in molecular biology have generally been taken to support the claim that biology is reducible to chemistry. I argue against that claim by looking in detail at a number of central results from molecular biology and showing that none of them supports reduction because (1) their basic predicates have multiple realizations, (2) their chemical realization is context-sensitive and (3) their explanations often presuppose biological facts rather than eliminate them. I then consider the heuristic and confirmational implications of irreducibility and (...)
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  12. Defending laws in the social sciences.Harold Kincaid - 1990 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20 (1):56?83.
    This article defends laws in the social sciences. Arguments against social laws are considered and rejected based on the "open" nature of social theory, the multiple realizability of social predicates, the macro and/or teleological nature of social laws, and the inadequacies of belief-desire psychology. The more serious problem that social laws are usually qualified ceteris paribus is then considered. How the natural sciences handle ceteris paribus laws is discussed and it is argued that such procedures are possible in the social (...)
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  13. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science.Harold Kincaid (ed.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    This Handbook is a major, comprehensive look at the key ideas in the field, is guided by several principles.
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  14.  22
    Concrete Ontology: Comments on Lauer, Little, and Lohse.Harold Kincaid - 2021 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 51 (1):40-47.
    I share with all the other authors the view that conceptual metaphysics without close ties to science is of minimal value, that this holds for much of current work on social ontology, and that if there is value in social ontology, it has to be in contributing to empirical social science. I do perhaps disagree with all three authors about making any blanket statements concerning either instrumentalism or realism about the social sciences and their ontologies. I argue and try to (...)
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  15.  72
    Debating the Reality of Race, Caste, and Ethnicity.Harold Kincaid - 2018 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 48 (2):139-167.
    There is a lively ongoing debate among philosophers and social scientists about the reality of race and among social scientists about the reality of caste and ethnicity. This paper tries to sort out what the issues are and makes some preliminary suggestions about what the evidence shows. Standard philosophical analyses try to find the necessary and sufficient conditions of our concept of race. I argue that this is not the best way to approach the issue and that the reality of (...)
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  16. Introduction to Cultural domination: philosophical perspectives.Thomas M. Besch, Raphael Van Riel, Harold Kincaid & Tarun Menon - forthcoming - In Thomas M. Besch, Raphael Van Riel, Harold Kincaid & Tarun Menon (eds.), Cultural domination: philosophical perspectives. Routledge (expected 2024).
  17.  59
    Debating the Reality of Social Classes.Harold Kincaid - 2016 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (2):189-209.
    This article first surveys a significant set of issues that are intertwined in asking whether social classes are real. It distinguishes two different notions of class: class as organized social entities and class as types of individuals based on individual characteristics. There is good evidence for some classes as social entities—ruling classes and underclasses in some societies—but other classes in contemporary society are sometimes best thought of in terms of types, not social entities. Implications are drawn for pluralist accounts of (...)
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  18. Structural realism and the social sciences.Harold Kincaid - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):720-731.
    After sorting different structuralist claims, I argue that structural realist ideas are instantiated in the social sciences, providing both clarification of social science research and support for some components of structural realism. My main focus is on three distinct ways that the social sciences can be about structural relations—exemplified by claims about social structure, reduced form structures in causal modeling, and equilibrium explanations—and on the implication of structuralist ideas for thinking about issues concerning causal explanation and nonreductive pictures of the (...)
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  19. Supervenience and explanation.Harold Kincaid - 1988 - Synthese 77 (November):251-81.
    This paper explores the explanatory adequacy of lower-level theories when their higher-level counterparts are irreducible. If some state or entity described by a high-level theory supervenes upon and is realized in events, entities, etc. described by the relevant lower-level theory, does the latter fully explain the higher-level event even if the higher-level theory is irreducible? While the autonomy of the special sciences and the success of various eliminativist programs depends in large part on how we answer this question, neither the (...)
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  20.  70
    Open Empirical and Methodological Issues in the Individualism-Holism Debate.Harold Kincaid - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (5):1127-1138.
    I briefly argue that some issues in the individualism-holism debate have been fairly clearly settled and other issues still plagued by unclarity. The main argument of the paper is that there are a set of clear empirical issues around the holism-individualism debate that are central problems in current social science research. Those include questions about when we can be holist and how individualist we can be in social explanation.
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  21.  35
    Mechanisms, causal modeling, and the limitations of traditional multiple regression.Harold Kincaid - 2012 - In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science. Oxford University Press. pp. 46.
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  22.  57
    Supervenience Doesn’t Entail Reducibility.Harold Kincaid - 1987 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):343-56.
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  23. What Is Addiction?Don Ross, Harold Kincaid & David Spurrett (eds.) - 2010 - The MIT Press.
    Leading addiction researchers survey the latest findings in addiction science, countering the simplistic cultural stereotypes of the addict.
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  24. Causation in the Social Sciences.Harold Kincaid - 2009 - In Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press.
  25. There are laws in the social sciences.Harold Kincaid - 2004 - In Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Blackwell. pp. 168--186.
  26.  84
    Global arguments and local realism about the social sciences.Harold Kincaid - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):678.
    This paper argues that realism issue in the social sciences is not one that can be decided by general philosophical arguments that evaluate entire domains at once. The realism issue is instead many different empirical issues. To defend these claims, I sort issues that are often run together, explicate and criticize several standard realist and antirealist arguments about the social sciences, and use the example of the productive/nonproductive distinction to illustrate the approach to realism questions that I favor.
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  27.  19
    Supervenience Doesn't Entail Reducibility.Harold Kincaid - 1987 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):343-356.
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  28. Putting philosophy of political science on the map.Harold Kincaid & Jeroen Van Bouwel - 2023 - In Harold Kincaid & Jeroen van Bouwel (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Political Science. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-14.
    Contrary to economics or history, for example, there does not exist an organized field dedicated to the philosophy of political science. Given that the philosophical issues raised by political science research are just as pressing and vibrant as those raised in these more organized fields, fostering a field that labels itself Philosophy of Political Science (PoPS) is important. PoPS is advanced here as a fruitful meeting place where both philosophers and practicing political scientists contribute and discuss—with philosophical discussions that are (...)
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  29. Lab experiments in political science through the lens of experimental economics.Andre Hofmeyr & Harold Kincaid - 2023 - In Harold Kincaid & Jeroen van Bouwel (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Political Science. New York: Oxford University Press.
  30. What makes economics special: orientational paradigms.Paul Hoyningen-Huene & Harold Kincaid - 2023 - Journal of Economic Methodology (2):1-15.
    From the mid-1960s until the late 1980s, the well-known general philosophies of science of the time were applied to economics. The result was disappointing: none seemed to fit. This paper argues that this is due to a special feature of economics: it possesses ‘orientational paradigms’ in high number. Orientational paradigms are similar to Kuhn’s paradigms in that they are shared across scientific communities, but dissimilar to Kuhn’s paradigms in that they are not generally accepted as valid guidelines for further research. (...)
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  31. Contextualism, explanation and the social sciences.Harold Kincaid - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (3):201 – 218.
    Debates about explanation in the social sciences often proceed without any clear idea what an 'account' of explanation should do. In this paper I take a stance - what I will call contextualism - that denies there are purely formal and conceptual constraints on explanation and takes standards of explanation to be substantive empirical claims, paradigmatically claims about causation. I then use this standpoint to argue for position on issues in the philosophy of social science concerning reduction, idealized models, social (...)
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  32. Assessing Functional Explanations in the Social Sciences.Harold Kincaid - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:341-354.
    Functionalism is a dominant but widely criticized perspective in social theory; my goal in this paper is to help clarify what functionalists claim, identify what would count as evidence for those claims and evaluate some standard criticisms. Functionalism relies essentially on functional explanations of the form "A exists in order to B." I point out problems with previous accounts of such explanations, offer an improved account, and discuss in detail evidence that might confirm such explanations and its difficulties. I argue (...)
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  33. Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Volition and Social Context.David Spurrett, Don Ross, Harold Kincaid & Lynn Stephens (eds.) - 2007 - MIT Press.
    Philosophers and behavioral scientists discuss what, if anything, of the traditionalconcept of individual conscious will can survive recent scientific discoveries that humandecision-making is distributed across different brain processes and ...
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  34.  12
    Mechanisms, good and bad.Harold Kincaid - 2021 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 36 (2):173-189.
    The claim that mechanisms are essential good science is widespread. I argue, however, that these claims are ambiguous in multiple ways. I sort out different version of the mechanism idea: (1) mechanisms that are horizontal —between cause and effect— and mechanisms that are vertical —they realize in lower-level terms causal properties—: and (2) different purposes or uses mechanisms may have. I then focus on the claim that various senses of mechanism are necessary for the confirmation of causal claims. The paper (...)
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  35.  28
    Some issues concerning the nature of economic explanation.Harold Kincaid - 2012 - In Uskali Mäki, Dov M. Gabbay, Paul Thagard & John Woods (eds.), Philosophy of Economics. North Holland. pp. 137.
  36.  26
    Measuring the Intentional World: Realism, Naturalism, and Quantitative Methods in the Behavioral Sciences.Harold Kincaid & J. D. Trout - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (1):112.
    Scientific realism is usually a thesis or theses advanced about our best natural science. In contrast, this book defends scientific realism applied to the social and behavioral sciences. It does so, however, by applying the same argument strategy that many have found convincing for the natural sciences, namely, by arguing that we can only explain the success of the sciences by postulating their approximate truth. The particular success that Trout emphasizes for the social sciences is the effective use of statistical (...)
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  37. Explaining growth.Harold Kincaid - 2009 - In Harold Kincaid & Don Ross (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics. Oxford University Press. pp. 455--475.
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  38. Introduction: The New Philosophy of Economics.Don Ross & Harold Kincaid - 2009 - In Harold Kincaid & Don Ross (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics. Oxford University Press. pp. 3--54.
  39. Medical Models of Addiction.Harold Kincaid & Jacqueline Anne Sullivan - 2010 - In Kincaid Ross (ed.), What is Addiction?
    Biomedical science has been remarkably successful in explaining illness by categorizing diseases and then by identifying localizable lesions such as a virus and neoplasm in the body that cause those diseases. Not surprisingly, researchers have aspired to apply this powerful paradigm to addiction. So, for example, in a review of the neuroscience of addiction literature, Hyman and Malenka (2001, p. 695) acknowledge a general consensus among addiction researchers that “[a]ddiction can appropriately be considered as a chronic medical illness.” Like other (...)
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  40.  48
    Confirmation, Complexity and Social Laws.Harold Kincaid - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:299-307.
    I defend the prospect of good science in the social sciences by looking at the obstacles to social laws. I criticize traditional approaches, which rule for or against social laws on primarily conceptual grounds, and argue that only a close analysis of actual empirical research can decide the issue. To that end, I focus on problems caused by the ceteris paribus nature of social generalizations, outline a variety of ways those problems might be handled, and then examine in detail the (...)
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  41.  30
    Introduction: doing philosophy of social science.Harold Kincaid - 2012 - In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science. Oxford University Press. pp. 1.
  42.  16
    A naturalist approach to social ontology.Harold Kincaid - 2024 - Synthese 203 (1):1-18.
    I argue that a certain kind of naturalist approach to social ontology is likely to be both philosophically fruitful and relevant to empirical social science. The kind of naturalism I employ might be called contextualism, which emphasizes the constant presence of assumed background knowledge, is suspicious of general inference rules and all or nothing claims about the ontology of the social sciences, and argues that Quine’s quantificational criterion for ontological commitment has to be supplemented with local interpretations and arguments about (...)
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  43.  62
    A more sophisticated Merton.Harold Kincaid - 2009 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (2):266-271.
    An alternative account of Merton to that provided by Turner is sketched. It shows strong similarities to some quite plausible contemporary understandings of science in general. Given this reading, it would seem that Merton did not drastically change his position nor does it suffer from the ambiguities that Turner describes. Key Words: theory • naturalism • causation • functional explanation.
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  44. Eliminativism and methodological individualism.Harold Kincaid - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (1):141-148.
    Tuomela (this issue, pp. 96-103) raises several objections to the analysis and critique of methodological individualism in my (1986). In what follows I reply to those criticisms, arguing, among other things, that: (1) the alleged reductions provided by Tuomela and others fail, because they either presuppose rather than eliminate social predicates or do not avoid the problem of multiple realizations; (2) supervenience does not guarantee that the social sciences are reducible, because merely describing supervenieence bases leaves numerous questions unanswered, and (...)
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  45.  53
    Formal rationality and its pernicious effects on the social sciences.Harold Kincaid - 2000 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 30 (1):67-88.
    This article argues that a particular notion of rationality, more exactly a specific notion of legitimate inference, is presupposed by much work in the social sciences to their detriment. The author describes the notion of rationality he has in mind, explains why it is misguided, identifies where and how it affects social research, and illustrates why that research is weaker as a result. The notion of legitimate inference the author has in mind is one that believes inferences are guided by (...)
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  46.  41
    Evolutionary social science beyond culture.Harold Kincaid - 2006 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (4):356-356.
    Mesoudi et al.'s case can be improved by expanding to compelling selectionist explanations elsewhere in the social sciences and by seeing that natural selection is an instance of general selectionist process. Obstacles include the common use of extreme idealizations and optimality evidence, the copresence of nonselectionist social processes, and the fact that selectionist explanations often presuppose other kinds of social explanations. (Published Online November 9 2006).
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  47. How should philosophy of social science proceed?: Chrysostomos Mantzavinos : Philosophy of the social sciences: Philosophical theory and scientific practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 344pp, £18.99 PB.Harold Kincaid - 2011 - Metascience 21 (2):391-394.
    How should philosophy of social science proceed? Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9592-7 Authors Harold Kincaid, Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama at Birmingham, 900 13th Street South, Birmingham, AL 35294-1260, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
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  48.  2
    Assessing Functional Explanations in the Social Sciences.Harold Kincaid - 1990 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990 (1):341-354.
    Despite decades of controversy, functionalism continues to be a lively research tradition in the social sciences. Furthermore, social scientists who reject Parsonian functionalism and its variants frequently make liberal use of functional explanations. Yet, neither social scientists nor philosophers have reached any consensus on when and where functional accounts are legitimate. Critics doubt that functionalism is really explanatory or testable; advocates are unfortunately vague on their claims and the evidence for them. In what follows I try to clarify what functionalism (...)
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  49. 15 Methodological individualism and economics.Harold Kincaid - 2004 - In John Bryan Davis & Alain Marciano (eds.), The Elgar companion to economics and philosophy. Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar. pp. 299.
  50.  14
    Social Sciences.Harold Kincaid - 2002 - In Peter Machamer & Michael Silberstein (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 290–311.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Survey of the Past Literature Current State of the Debates Problems to Come.
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