It is a commonplace that social facts are objective in the sense that we cannot change them at will. A further platitude is that in another sense social facts are not objective, since they are fundamentally dependent on human practices. This paper presents a conceptual framework for analysing these seemingly contradictory intuitions. I argue that although John Searle’s distinction between epistemic and ontological objectivity takes us in the right direction, Searle’s discussion is nonetheless insufficient for explaining what it is in (...) the nature of social facts that gives rise to the opposing intuitions. I argue that a Durkheimian account, especially as developed by Uskali Mäki, can fare better. Finally, I show how the Durkheimian account serves as the conceptual basis for distinguishing between methodological individualism and different forms of methodological holism. (shrink)

In this paper I argue, contrary to the modern paradigm of rational choice theory in sociological theorising, that Dürkheim was correct to think that collectivistic notions are required if there is to be sui generis social science. However, Durkheim's anti-individualism must be naturalised to be compatible with modern monistic ontology. I argue that the required naturalisation is offered by the notion of humans as strongly social animals in general and the notion of collective intentionality in particular. I argue that such (...) a collectivistic but ontologically naturalistic notion is (i) a fundamental building block of social reality, (ii) supported by empirical studies, (iii) required by theoretical analyses of social action dilemmas and, finally, (iv) capable of providing the key to the construction of a more humane world of the future. (shrink)

In this paper I argue, contrary to the modern paradigm of rational choice theory in sociological theorising, that Dürkheim was correct to think that collectivistic notions are required if there is to be sui generis social science. However, Durkheim's anti-individualism must be naturalised to be compatible with modern monistic ontology. I argue that the required naturalisation is offered by the notion of humans as strongly social animals in general and the notion of collective intentionality in particular. I argue that such (...) a collectivistic but ontologically naturalistic notion is (i) a fundamental building block of social reality, (ii) supported by empirical studies, (iii) required by theoretical analyses of social action dilemmas and, finally, (iv) capable of providing the key to the construction of a more humane world of the future. (shrink)

This article examines two empirical research traditions—experimental economics and the social identity approach in social psychology—that may be seen as attempts to falsify and verify the theory of collective intentionality, respectively. The article argues that both approaches fail to settle the issue. However, this is not necessarily due to the alleged immaturity of the social sciences but, possibly, to the philosophical nature of intentionality and intentional action. The article shows how broadly Davidsonian action theory, including Hacking’s notion of the looping (...) effect of the human sciences, can be developed into an argument for the view that there is no theory-independent true nature of intentional action. If the Davidsonian line of thought is correct, the theory of collective intentionality is, in a sense, true if we accept the theory. Key Words: collective intentionality • experimental economics • social identity theory • Donald Davidson • Ian Hacking • constructivism • action • agency • philosophy of the social sciences. (shrink)

It is a commonplace that social facts are objective in the sense that we cannot change them at will. A further platitude is that in another sense social facts are not objective, since they are fundamentally dependent on human practices. This paper presents a conceptual framework for analysing these seemingly contradictory intuitions. I argue that although John Searle’s distinction between epistemic and ontological objectivity takes us in the right direction, Searle’s discussion is nonetheless insufficient for explaining what it is in (...) the nature of social facts that gives rise to the opposing intuitions. I argue that a Durkheimian account, especially as developed by Uskali Mäki, can fare better. Finally, I show how the Durkheimian account serves as the conceptual basis for distinguishing between methodological individualism and different forms of methodological holism. (shrink)