The first four works written by St. Augustine of Hippo after his conversion to Christianity are the "Cassiciacum dialogues", which have influenced prominent thinkers from Boethius to Bernard Lonergan. In this second, brief dialogue, expertly translated by Michael Foley, Augustine and his mother, brother, son, and friends celebrate his thirty-second birthday by having a "feast of words" on the nature of happiness. They conclude that the truly happy life consists of "having God" through faith, hope, and charity.

In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of Wittgenstein's view of the happy life by sketching out three interconnected themes in his early works. The first theme is the distinction between a science of ethics and the ethical. The second is the idea of the willing subject. And finally, the third is the possibility of the happy life.

_A fresh, new translation of Augustine’s inaugural work as a Christian convert_ The first four works written by St. Augustine of Hippo after his conversion to Christianity are dialogues that have influenced prominent thinkers from Boethius to Bernard Lonergan. Usually called the Cassiciacum dialogues, these four works are a “literary triumph,” combining Ciceronian and neo-Platonic philosophy, Roman comedy and Vergilian poetry, and early Christian theology. They are also, arguably, Augustine’s most charming works, exhibiting his whimsical levity and ironic wryness. In (...) this second, brief dialogue, Augustine and his mother, brother, son, and friends celebrate his thirty-second birthday by having a “feast of words” on the nature of happiness that includes a bittersweet metaphorical birthday cake. Using a process of reasoning that is philosophical as well as theological, Augustine and the group conclude that the truly happy life consists of “having God” through faith, hope, and charity. Michael Foley’s clear, precise and playful translations are accompanied by his brief, illuminating commentaries. (shrink)

Many critics of religion insist that believing in a future life makes us less able to value our present activities and distracts us from accomplishing good in this world. In Augustine's case, this gets things backwards. It is while Augustine seeks to achieve happiness in this life that he is detached from suffering and dismissive of the body. Once Augustine comes to believe happiness is only attainable once the whole city of God is triumphant, he is able to (...) compassionately engage with present suffering and see material and social goods as part of our ultimate good. (shrink)

In my article I am concerned with political life in Aristotle’s philosophy and its’ connection with happiness and theoretical contemplation. I suggest that, although theoretical contemplation is happiness in primary sense, a philosopher can still be happy when he enters political domain and by this is not lesser happy in which I disagree with Richard Kraut. Finally I argue that there are situations in which a philosopher must be a politician, because it is better when the inferior (...) are governed by the noble. (shrink)

본 논문은 헤겔이 제시하는 행복의 기본 조건을 스토아주의와 대비시켜 구체화시키는 것을 목적으로 한다. 헤겔의 스토아주의 비판은 행복의 의미와 조건을 재고할 수 있는 기회를 제공할 것이다. 본 논문의 논의 순서는 다음과 같다. 우선 『철학사 강의』를 중심으로 헤겔이 스토아주의의 행복관을 양가적으로 평가하는 이유를 검토해 볼 것이다. 그리고 『철학사 강의』의 논변은 스토아주의의 반박을 허용한다는 것이 지적될 것이다. 이어서 필자는 『정신현상학』의 문제의식을 전제할 때 『철학사 강의』에서 나타나는 스토아주의 비판이 온전하게 이해될 수 있음을 해명할 것이다. 이 과정에서 스토아주의 행복관에 대한 헤겔 비판의 핵심은 주관적 심리로 (...) 환원될 수 없는 ‘삶의 과정’과 ‘상호인정의 구조’를 행복의 조건으로 고려하지 못한 것에 있음이 드러날 것이다. 그리고 마지막으로 필자는 간략하나마 헤겔의 스토아주의 비판이 일부 현대 행복론의 한계를 지적하는 데 여전히 유효함을 제시해 볼 것이다. (shrink)

This book tells the story of the Scientific Buddha, "born" in Europe in the 1800s but commonly confused with the Buddha born in India 2,500 years ago. The Scientific Buddha was sent into battle against Christian missionaries, who were proclaiming across Asia that Buddhism was a form of superstition. He proved the missionaries wrong, teaching a dharma that was in harmony with modern science. And so his influence continues. Today his teaching of "mindfulness" is heralded as the cure for all (...) manner of maladies, from depression to high blood pressure.In this potent critique, a well-known chronicler of the West's encounter with Buddhism demonstrates how the Scientific Buddha's teachings deviate in crucial ways from those of the far older Buddha of ancient India. Donald Lopez shows that the Western focus on the Scientific Buddha threatens to bleach Buddhism of its vibrancy, complexity, and power, even as the superficial focus on "mindfulness" turns Buddhism into merely the latest self-help movement. The Scientific Buddha has served his purpose, Lopez argues. It is now time for him to pass into nirvana. This is not to say, however, that the teachings of the ancient Buddha must be dismissed as mere cultural artifacts. They continue to present a meaningful challenge, even to our modern world. (shrink)

본 논문의 목표는 행복한 인간에 대한 견해를 제시하는 것이다. 논자는 자기충실성(integrity)을 가지고 사는 사람이 행복한 인간이라고 주장할 것이다. 논자의 견해에서 자기충실성을 가지는 사람은 특정한 가치나 원리에 헌신되어 외부의 압박이 있을지라도 그 가치나 원리를 포기하지 않는 사람이다. 자기충실성을 가진다는 것이 무엇인가를 제시하기 전에 우선 기존의 행복론에 대한 비판적 논의를 전개한다. 널리 알려졌듯이, 철학 내에서 행복에 관한 세 가지 주요 이론은 쾌락주의, 욕구만족이론, 객관적 명부 이론 등이다. 논자는 이 세 가지 이론들이 나름대로 매력을 지녔지만 충분히 만족스럽지 못하다고 주장한다. 다음으로 자기충실성을 가지고 살아가는 (...) 것이 무엇인가에 대해 설명한다. 논자의 견해에서 자기충실성을 가지기 위해선 세 가지 조건이 필요하다. 첫째, 어떤 가치나 원리에 헌신되는 것이다. 둘째, 자신의 헌신의 대상인 가치나 원리에 따라 행동하는 것이다. 셋째, 열린 태도로 그 헌신을 유지하는 것이다. 자기충실성의 조건을 설명한 후 논자는 가치나 원리에 관한 제한에 대해서 논의한다. 다양한 가치나 원리가 자기충실성을 위한 대상이 될 수 있지만 그렇다고 해서 아무 것이나 다 그 대상이 될 수 있는 것은 아니다. 첫째, 그 가치나 원리는 자신의 진정한 원함에 의해 선택된 것이어야 한다. 둘째, 그 가치나 원리는 삶에 아무런 영향을 끼치지 않을 만큼 하찮아선 안 된다. 셋째, 그 가치나 원리에 따라 행동하는 것이 자기파괴적인 것이 되어선 안 된다. 넷째, 그 가치나 원리는 사악한 것이어선 안 된다. 이 논의 후 논자의 주장에 대한 가능한 반박 및 그에 대한 대응에 대해 논의한다. (shrink)

Following his retirement from teaching in 1972 J. M. Bocheński entered into a creative phase of his scholarly career characterized by, among other things, a marked shift to ‘naturalism’ to the detriment of philosophical ‘speculation’ of any kind (comprising much of classical metaphysics, ‘world views’, ‘ideologies, ‘moralizing’—for him so many nefarious ‘superstitions’). During this period he examined issues which bear on the human condition in a way that was at once constructive and critical—constructive by virtue of the logical analyses of (...) such concepts as authority, critical by dint of his refusal to take seriously any so-called ‘anthropocentric’/‘humanist’ thinking attempting to secure a special standing for ‘Man’ in the world. These attitudes come to expression in his last work devoted to worldly wisdom, the practical rationality required to ensure a long and happy life. I examine, first, some of the background of this work, with an eye to the naturalism it is based on, provide a schematic overview of the contents of the study, and concentrate on a couple of key issues related to the question as Bocheński understood it. The salient issue concerns his insistence that whatever else it may be the wisdom that is conducive to the long and happy life is not to be confused, conceptually, with any sort of morality: worldly wisdom and the categorical commands of morality stand in no essential relation to each other and may indeed be contradictory … to the detriment of morality, according to Bocheński. Throughout, but especially in the concluding section, I express some doubts about the cogency of this position. (shrink)

Nature & the seasons -- Outdoor pursuits -- The spirit of self-sufficiency -- The joy of fika -- The Nordic kitchen -- Healthy hedonism -- Design & home -- Kinship, conviviality & openness -- How to hygge-at a glance.

Life satisfaction is widely considered to be a central aspect of human welfare. Many have identified happiness with it, and some maintain that well-being consists largely or wholly in being satisfied with one’s life. Empirical research on well-being relies heavily on life satisfaction studies. The paper contends that life satisfaction attitudes are less important, and matter for different reasons, than is widely believed. For such attitudes are appropriately governed by ethical norms and are perspectival in ways (...) that make the relationship between life satisfaction and welfare far more convoluted than we tend to expect. And the common identification of life satisfaction with happiness, as well as widespread views about the centrality of life satisfaction for well-being, are problematical at best. The argument also reveals an unexpected way in which philosophical ethics can inform scientific psychology: specifically, ethical reflection can help explain empirical results insofar as they depend on people’s values. (shrink)

You know you should be staying positive, but how do you get back to your happy place after something sidetracks your thoughts? Whether you're having a bad day, are suddenly faced with a difficult situation, or you've found yourself in a bit of a rut, Whatever You Do, Be Happy is the perfect guide to getting back to a positive mindset. This book includes 400 totally manageable activities that will bring back your smile with ease! Try finding a (...) quiet space to help you reset from a stressful experience or take a few minutes to focus on your breathing when trying to solve a problem. You will discover that it doesn't take months of work or a total life overhaul to live a happy lifestyle. All it takes is the simple, actionable advice in this book to start changing your mindset immediately. Start your journey to optimism and happiness now! (shrink)

Life's Values offers new analyses of the nature of pleasure, happiness, well-being, and meaning in life. Recognizing how individuals have different priorities, Goldman explains what is of ultimate value in our lives and argues that making our desires rational - relevantly informed of what it's like to satisfy them - maximizes well-being.

Considers four apparent problems of eternal life--is heaven a mystical or social reality, is it other-worldly or this-worldly, is it static or dynamic, is it boring?--and shows how the teachings of Thomas Aquinas support more satisfying solutions than many contemporary philosophical and theological approaches.

Undeniably, life is unfair. So, why play fairly in an unfair world? The answer comes from combining the ancient Greek conception of happiness with a modern conception of self-respect. The book is about why it is bad to be bad and good to be good, and what happens in between.

The topic of self-interest raises large and intractable philosophical questions–most obviously, the question “In what does self-interest consist?” The concept, as opposed to the content of self-interest, however, seems clear enough. Self-interest is interest in one's own good. To act self-interestedly is to act on the motive of advancing one's own good. Whether what one does actually is in one's self-interest depends on whether it actually does advance, or at least, minimize the decline of, one's own good. Though it may (...) be difficult to tell whether a person is motivated by self-interest in a particular instance, and difficult also to determine whether a given act or decision really is in one's self-interest, the meaning of the claims in question seems unproblematic. My main concern in this essay is to make a point about the content of self-interest. Specifically I shall put forward the view that meaningfulness, in a sense I shall elaborate, is an important element of a good life. It follows, then, that it is part of an enlightened self-interest that one wants to secure meaning in one's life, or, at any rate, to allow and promote meaningful activity within it. Accepting this substantial conception of self-interest, however, carries with it a curious consequence: the concept of self-interest which formerly seemed so clear begins to grow fuzzy. Fortunately, it comes to seem less important as well. In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit distinguishes three sorts of theories about self-interest–hedonistic theories, preference theories, and what he calls “objective-list theories." Hedonistic theories hold that one's good is a matter of the felt quality of one's experiences. (shrink)

Holland argues that environmental deliberation should return to classical questions about the nature of the good life, understood as the worthwhile life. Holland's proposal contrasts with the revived hedonist conception of the good life which has been influential on environmentalism. The concept of the worthwhile life needs to be carefully distinguished from those of the happy life and the dutiful life. Holland's account of the worthwhile life captures the narrative dimension of human (...) well-being which is revealed but inadequately addressed by hedonic research. Environmental concerns are better understood from a non-hedonist perspective. An Aristotelian version of this perspective also offers the institutional focus which Holland suggests is required in environmental deliberation. (shrink)

본 논문은 ‘행복의 역설’을 강조하는 철학상담적 관점에서 인간 의 고통을 치유하고 행복한 삶을 지향하는 ‘전인적 영성치유’에 대 해 논의에 초점을 맞추고자 한다. 얼마 전부터 다양한 분야의 연구 자들이 많은 관심을 가지고 연구에 매진하고 있는 신흥학문이자 융복합 학문인 ‘행복학’(Bonheurologie)은 행복에 대한 정의를 새 로운 관점과 다양한 방식으로 정립시키고자 시도하고 있다. 이러 한 시도와 무관하지 않는 본 논문은 이성적 사유를 넘어서는 전인 적 ‘영성’개념을 행복과 연결시켜 기존에 진행 중인 행복학의 논의 를 좀 더 확장하여 진전시켜 보고자 한다. 특히 본 논문은 다양한 층위를 (...) 가진 인간 정신의 또 다른 차원인 ‘영성’을 통해 인간들이 겪는 일상의 고통을 치유할 수 있는 근거를 마련하고, 이를 철학상 담적 논의와 연결시켜 ‘치유의 행복학’으로 불리는 다양한 쟁점들 을 보다 심화시켜 나가는 데 있다. 이러한 문제의식에서 출발하는 본 논문은 행복한 삶을 전인적 인격을 완성하는 영성 치유의 차원에서 다룰 것이며, 이와 관련하 여 영성 치유의 전제가 되는 영성 개념의 철학적 정립 또한 야스퍼 스(K. Jaspers) 철학을 중심으로 병행하게 될 것이다. ‘영성’개념 은 ‘이성’으로만 모든 것을 파악하고 해결하려는 인간의 정신능력 을 다시 한 번 재고해봐야 한다는 점에서 오늘날의 영성이라는 개 념 자체가 일상생활에서 오는 것이 아니라 이국적이고 색다른 무 엇, 이상한 비법 수행정도로 간단히 치부했던 ‘종교적 영성’에 대 한 기존의 해석을 뛰어 넘어설 것을 요구하고 있다. 이 점을 무엇 보다도 중시하는 본 논문은 불과 얼마 전까지만 하더라도 신학이 나 종교학의 전유물로만 여겨져 왔던 영성 개념이 사실은 이성과 대립되는 모순된 개념이 아니라 어원상 이성과 같은 뿌리를 둔 철 학적이며 인간학적인 기초개념 중 하나라는 사실과 함께 영성이야 말로 인간의 고유한 정신을 설명해 줄 수 있는 매우 유용한 매개체 라는 점을 주장하고 있다. (shrink)

지역학에서 회자되는 ‘지역’의 개념은 상당히 모호한 것으로 알려져 있다. 따라서 본 논문에서는 첫째, 후설의 생활세계의 개념을 ‘지역’이라 간주하고 ‘지역’의 개념을 현상학적으로 그려내면서 그것의 구조를 ‘지평’과 ‘시간성’으로 파악해낸다. 둘째, 긍정심리학자 칙센트미하이의 이론을 끌어들여, 그러한 지역의 구조는 플로우(행복)의 초월론적 조건이라고 해석한다. 마지막으로 이런 논의를 통해 ‘지역’과 ‘행복’은 불가분의 관계에 놓여 있음을 밝히면서, ‘행복한 지역’의 개념을 수립한다. 더군다나 이런 ‘행복지역학’은 어떤 지역이라도 ‘행복한 지역’으로 탈바꿈시킬 수 있는 실제적 가이드라인을 제시하는데, 이것은 기존의 도시계획에서는 찾아볼 수 없는 것이다.

Excerpt from Happiness and Continuous Personality, or Life's Purposive AppearanceOur invasions of the unknown, by admittance, invitation and compulsion.The educational value OF destruction and suffering Struggle. The central requirement of survival. The animal or brute plane of struggle. The human plane and moral evolution. Spurs to human betterment enumerated. Rebuilding change and the meaning of today's tumult. Brutal factors of human progress. Schools and honest political economy. Education, perpetual peace and youthful civiliza tion. Equal rights to all and Special (...) privileges to none, its moral effect.About the PublisherForgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.comThis book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

The topic of self-interest raises large and intractable philosophical questions–most obviously, the question “In what does self-interest consist?” The concept, as opposed to the content of self-interest, however, seems clear enough. Self-interest is interest in one's own good. To act self-interestedly is to act on the motive of advancing one's own good. Whether what one does actually is in one's self-interest depends on whether it actually does advance, or at least, minimize the decline of, one's own good. Though it may (...) be difficult to tell whether a person is motivated by self-interest in a particular instance, and difficult also to determine whether a given act or decision really is in one's self-interest, the meaning of the claims in question seems unproblematic. My main concern in this essay is to make a point about the content of self-interest. Specifically I shall put forward the view that meaningfulness, in a sense I shall elaborate, is an important element of a good life. It follows, then, that it is part of an enlightened self-interest that one wants to secure meaning in one's life, or, at any rate, to allow and promote meaningful activity within it. Accepting this substantial conception of self-interest, however, carries with it a curious consequence: the concept of self-interest which formerly seemed so clear begins to grow fuzzy. Fortunately, it comes to seem less important as well. In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit distinguishes three sorts of theories about self-interest–hedonistic theories, preference theories, and what he calls “objective-list theories." Hedonistic theories hold that one's good is a matter of the felt quality of one's experiences. (shrink)

Inspired by Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas, Happiness and the Christian Moral Life argues that the central question of ethics is the meaning and nature of happiness. In the Christian life, happiness is inseparable from goodness, particularly from a way of life that helps us grow together in the goodness of God. This book attempts to show what such a life might look like and how it might change our understanding of Christian ethics.

The most popular concepts of happiness among psychologists and philosophers nowadays are concepts of happiness according to which happiness is defined as " satisfaction with life as a whole ". Such concepts are " Whole Life Satisfaction " concepts of happiness. I show that there are hundreds of non-equivalent ways in which a WLS conception of happiness can be developed. However, every precise conception either requires actual satisfaction with life as a whole or requires hypothetical satisfaction with (...) life as a whole. I show that a person can be "happy" at a time even though he is not actually satisfied with his life as a whole at that time. I also show that a person can be "happy" at a time even though it is not correct to say that if he were to think about his life at that time, he would be satisfied with it as a whole. My thesis is that if you think that happiness is the Good, you should avoid defining happiness as whole life satisfaction. (shrink)

Despite the enormous growth in happiness research in recent decades, there remains a lack of consistency in the use of the terms happiness, satisfaction, contentment and well-being. In this article I argue for a sociologically grounded distinction between happiness and contentment that defines the former as positive affect and the latter as positive reflection. Contentment is therefore understood as a fulfilling relationship with the self and society and happiness involves pleasurable experiences. There is a history of similar distinctions in philosophy (...) and psychoanalysis, but much of the contemporary discourse fails to distinguish between individual and collective definitions of happiness. This article will argue that happiness and contentment ought not to be treated as competing approaches to the good life, but as complimentary forms of emotional experience. Further, I argue that the current interest in happiness can be linked to larger culture shifts involving neoliberalism and individualism. (shrink)

What is happiness? How is it related to morality and virtue? Does living with illusion promote or diminish happiness? Is it better to pursue happiness with a partner than alone? Philosopher Mike W. Martin addresses these and other questions as he connects the meaning of happiness with the philosophical notion of "the good life." Defining happiness as loving one's life and valuing it in ways manifested by ample enjoyment and a deep sense of meaning, Martin explores the ways (...) in which happiness interacts with all other dimensions of good lives--in particular with moral decency and goodness, authenticity, mental health, self-fulfillment, and meaningfulness. He interweaves a variety of examples from memoirs, novels, and films along the way, connecting his discussion of the philosophical issues to related topics that interest all of us: virtue, love, philanthropy, suffering, simplicity, balancing work and leisure, and much more. Drawing on wide-ranging and robust evidence, Martin also makes the case that we need a "politics of happiness" whereby government would apply the results of recent "happiness studies" in psychology to public policy. (shrink)

There's no shortage of gloom-and-doom viewpoints about humanity: our history of violence and war, environmental profligacy, economic and social injustice, etc. Frank S. Robinson has written this "optimist manifesto" as an antidote to such poisonous pessimism. Here you will find some radical and refreshing assertions: that most people are fundamentally good, that global society is getting better all the time, and that, in the big picture, humankind is not at the end of a brief, tragic existence but, rather, has just (...) embarked on a long, bright future. What started as an extended letter to his daughter, one father's effort to leave an intellectual legacy, grew to comprehensively cover and tie together the big philosophical, political, social, and economic issues. Writing in a highly readable style, Robinson steadfastly emphasizes reason as our best tool for discovering truth and making objective decisions. It is through this consistently rational approach to life that he argues for a positive humanistic vision, based on people being left free to pursue their dreams. Celebrating our human character and achievement as well as American ideals of liberty and opportunity, this compelling work is packed with thought-provoking ideas that engage the mind. Good-humored and entertaining, yet intellectually rigorous, it has a positive, optimistic message: we can live good and happy lives; today's world is the best ever; and tomorrow's will be better still! (shrink)

Aristotle is indebted to the more precise distinction and elaboration of the concepts of theory and practice. He made philosophy a theoretical knowledge, coining the notion of theory as speculative knowledge of given realities in the world.However, this theory is no longer a contemplation of Ideas, but of essential and universal realities, arising from an intellectual abstraction of nature. The theoretical knowledge turns to the nature of things to observe their causes and developments.Alongside theory and in opposition to it, he (...) develops the notion of practice (praxis). In general, it can be said that praxis dominates everything that is operable by man, that is, it concerns properly human action insofar as it is immanent and voluntary. Although theory and practice most often present themselves as completely opposite and independent, it is possible to verify that the Aristotelian system presupposes a certain degree of coherence involving some key concepts of his philosophy. In this sense, the main objective of this seminar is to investigate the ways in which it is possible to think about the relationship between theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge in Aristotle’s philosophy, taking into account excerpts from two of hismain works of maturity, namely, Metaphysics and Nicomachean Ethics. (shrink)

This book offers a new argument for the ancient claim that well-being as the highest prudential good -- eudaimonia -- consists of happiness in a life according to virtue. Virtue is a source of happiness, but happiness also requires external goods.

This paper treats of Husserl’s phenomenology of happiness or eudaimonia in five parts. In the first part, we argue that phenomenology of happiness is an important albeit relatively neglected area of research, and we show that Husserl engages in it. In the second part, we examine the relationship between phenomenological ethics and virtue ethics. In the third part, we identify and clarify essential aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology of happiness, namely, the nature of the question concerning happiness and the possibility of (...) a phenomenological answer, the power of the will, the role of vocation, the place of obligation, the significance of habituation, the necessity of selfreflection and self-criticism, the importance of sociability and solidarity, the impact of chance and destiny, and the specter of regret. In the fourth part, we establish the inextricable linkage between Husserl’s metaethics and his metaphysics. In the fi ft h part, we provide a provisional exploration of his conception of the connection between happiness and blessedness. We acknowledge that there is an extensive literature on Husserl’s phenomenological ethics, and our study has benefitted greatly from it, but we also suggest that our holistic approach critically clarifies his description of happiness, virtue, and blessedness by fully recognizing that his phenomenological metaethics is embedded in his phenomenological metaphysics. (shrink)

This book offers an original account of the good life in late modernity through a uniquely sociological lens. It considers the various ways that social and cultural factors can encourage or impede genuine efforts to live a good life by deconstructing the concepts of happiness and contentment within cultural narratives of the good life. Although empirical studies have dominated the discourse on happiness in recent decades, the emphasis on finding causal and correlational relationships has led to a (...) field of research that arguably lacks a reliable theoretical foundation. 'Deconstructing Happiness' offers a step toward developing that foundation by offering characteristically sociological perspectives on the contemporary fascination with happiness and well-being. In doing so, it seeks to understand the good life as a socially mediated experience rather than a purely personal or individually defined way of living. The outcome is a book on happiness, contentment and the good life that considers the influence of democracy, capitalism and progress while also focusing on the more theoretical challenges of self-knowledge, reason and interaction. (shrink)

The paper starts with a presentation of the pure happiness theory, i.e. the idea that the quality a person’s life is dependent on one thing only, viz. how happy that person is. To find out whether this type of theory is plausible or not, I examine the standard arguments for and against this theory, including Nozick’s experience machine argument. I then investigate how the theory can be modified in order to avoid the most serious objections. I first examine (...) different types of epistemic modifications of the theory (e.g. the idea that a person’s happiness is more valuable for her if it is based on a correct perception of her own life), and then turn to a number of modifications which all make the value of a person’s happiness depend on whether the evaluative standard on which her happiness is based satisfies certain requirements. In connection with this, I present and defend my own modified version of the happiness theory. (shrink)

This essay examines the classical Confucian perspective on the topic of happiness through the lens of three Western theories: hedonism, desire satisfaction theory, and objective list theory. My analysis of the two classical texts—the Analects and the Mencius —reveals that three salient aspects of the Confucian conception of happiness, namely ethical pleasure, ethical desire, and moral innocence, play the fundamental role in the guidance and evaluation of an individual’s life. According to Confucius and Mencius, happiness consists primarily not in (...) pleasure, but in ethical pleasure; the good life is not a life in which all or most of one’s desires are fulfilled, but a life in which the satisfaction of prudential desires is subject to the constraint of ethical desire; the source of the greatest happiness lies not in the attainment of the greatest political power, but rather in the cognizance of one’s moral innocence. For classical Confucian thinkers, the relationship between happiness and the good life is that happiness is a critically important constituent of the good life. However, happiness—defined in terms of pleasure, desire satisfaction, or a list of goods—needs to be tempered by moral constraints. In light of their views on happiness and the good life, I conclude that Confucius and Mencius each lived a good life that exemplified the three salient features of happiness, and to that extent they were happy. (shrink)