A set of basic static predicates, 'in itself, 'existing through itself, 'free', and others are taken to be (at least) extensionally equivalent, and some consequences are drawn in Parts A and? of the paper. Part C introduces adequate causation and adequate conceiving as extensionally equivalent. The dynamism or activism of Spinoza is reflected in the reconstruction by equating action with causing, passion (passive emotion) with being caused. The relation between conceiving (understanding) and causing is narrowed down by introducing grasping (...) (λ μβ?νω) as a basic epistemological term. Part D, 'The road to freedom through active emotion', introduces a system of grading with respect to the distinctions introduced in the foregoing, including 'being in itself, 'freedom', etc. Active emotions are seen to represent transitions to a higher degree of freedom, the stronger and more active ones being the more conducive to rapid increase in degree of freedom. Elementary parts of the calculus of predicates are used in order to facilitate the survey of conceptual relations and to prove some theorems. (shrink)

Emotions play a significant role in human relations, decision-making, and the motivation to act on those decisions. There are ongoing attempts to use artificial intelligence (AI) to read human emotions, and to predict human behavior or actions that may follow those emotions. However, a person’s emotions cannot be easily identified, measured, and evaluated by others, including automated machines and algorithms run by AI. The ethics of emotional AI is under research and this study has examined the emotional variables as (...) well as the perception of emotional AI in two large random groups of college students in an international university in Japan, with a heavy representation of Japanese, Indonesian, Korean, Chinese, Thai, Vietnamese, and other Asian nationalities. Surveys with multiple close-ended questions and an open-ended essay question regarding emotional AI were administered for quantitative and qualitative analysis, respectively. The results demonstrate how ethically questionable results may be obtained through affective computing and by searching for correlations in a variety of factors in collected data to classify individuals into certain categories and thus aggravate bias and discrimination. Nevertheless, the qualitative study of students’ essays shows a rather optimistic view over the use of emotional AI, which helps underscore the need to increase awareness about the ethical pitfalls of AI technologies in the complex field of human emotions. (shrink)

This article explores what ancient Chinese philosophies can teach us about understanding emotions and relating to them. It posits that emotions are fundamental and connected to everything in the universe, that much of their value lies in their sincerity, that they need to be cultivated to avoid excess and imbalance, and that, like everything else, they are permeated by a cosmic force that is at once transcendent and immanent.

This article explores what ancient Chinese philosophies can teach us about understanding emotions and relating to them. It posits that emotions are fundamental and connected to everything in the universe, that much of their value lies in their sincerity, that they need to be cultivated to avoid excess and imbalance, and that, like everything else, they are permeated by a cosmic force that is at once transcendent and immanent.

This study examines factors impacting ethical behavior of 103 hospital nurses. The level of emotional intelligence and ethical behavior of peers had a significant impact on ethical behavior of nurses. Independence climate had a significant impact on ethical behavior of nurses. Other ethical climate types such as professional, caring, rules, instrumental, and efficiency did not impact ethical behavior of respondents. Implications of this study for researchers and practitioners are discussed.

The Marquis de Sade’s work can be considered as one of the inaugural instances of a technique that, within both the philosophical and literary realm, is typical of the nineteenth century: emotional restraint. His disapproval of the rhetoric of empathy and moral sentimentalism assumes particular relevance in that it is an “internal” critique. Availing himself of certain characteristic premises of the sentimentalist philosophy—which are primarily attributable to the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau—Sade completely changes their conclusions, to the point of reaching (...) a conscious form of immoralism. This immoralism can be interpreted as a systematic overturning of the morale larmoyante, exalted in late eighteenth-century... (shrink)

Over the past several decades the ‘affective revolution’ in cognitive psychology has emphasized the critical role affect and emotion play in human decision-making. Drawing on this affective literature, various commentators have recently proposed strategies for managing therapeutic expectation that use contextual, symbolic, or emotive interventions in the consent process to convey information or enhance comprehension. In this paper, we examine whether affective consent interventions that target affect and emotion can be reconciled with widely accepted standards for autonomous action. (...) More specifically, the ethics of affective consent interventions is assessed in terms of key elements of autonomy, comprehension and voluntariness. While there may appear to be a moral obligation to manage the affective environment to ensure valid informed consent, in circumstances where volunteers may be prone to problematic therapeutic expectancy, this moral obligation needs to be weighed against the potential risks of human instrumentalization. At this point in time we do not have enough information to be able to justify clearly the programmatic manipulation of human subjects' affective states. The lack of knowledge about affective interventions requires corresponding caution in its ethical justification. (shrink)

This study investigates factors impacting perceptions of ethical conduct of peers of 293 students in four US universities. Self-reported ethical behavior and recognition of emotions in others (a dimension of emotional intelligence) impacted perception of ethical behavior of peers. None of the other dimensions of emotional intelligence were significant. Age, Race, Sex, GPA, or type of major (business versus nonbusiness) did not impact perception of ethical behavior of peers. Implications of the results of the study for business schools and industry (...) professionals are discussed. (shrink)

This thesis aims to elucidate an apparent paradox about the role of emotion in moral agency. A number of lines of concern suggest emotion may have serious negative impact on moral agency. On the other hand, there are considerations that suggest emotion also plays a crucial role in motivating, informing and even constituting moral agency. Significantly, there is a strong connection between participant reactive attitudes and ascription of moral status as agent or subject. Nonemotional agents could not (...) hold such attitudes. Also, removing participant reactive attitudes imposes a peculiar and incoherent form of solipsism about moral agency. Given this necessary role for emotion, can we give an account of emotion that will also meet the worries? I examine, as crucial examples, three recurrent lines of concern about emotion - that it threatens our capacities for objectivity, rationality, and autonomy - to tease out the descriptive assumptions about emotion, and the normative assumptions about moral agency, that these objections are based on. I then offer three lines of argument towards resolving these worries. The first addresses the worries directly, and the other two shift blame off emotion. First, then, I argue that the normative concerns can largely be met by a descriptive account that views emotion as cognitive. However, “judgementalist” cognitive accounts that assimilate emotion to belief may make emotion metaethically respectable at the cost of making it meta-ethically redundant. Also, such accounts are descriptively less than plausible. A better approach, I argue, is to allow that belief may play a significant role in emotion but to also allow at least a quasicognitive role to the distinctively affective element in emotion: feeling. I also argue for a hrther revision of cognitive accounts to emphasise that emotions reflect features of those who feel them. If we were different, our emotions would be different. So, secondly, I argue that a number of the features that power worries about emotions have their sources in what those who feel them are like, rather than in emotions as such. However, both human nature and emotion are capable of significant plasticity and diversity. We are also capable of a considerable - but not infinite - degree of self-determination both about what we are like and what our emotions are like. Finally, I argue that the normative assumptions that power the objections to emotion are themselves in need of revision - and in some tension with each other. This leads to a McGufin-theory of emotion in moral agency: Problems with emotion’s place in moral agency serve as indicators of unresolved tensions in our thinking about moral agency, rather than just indicators of problems with emotion as such. In view of this, I also argue for caution in any attempts to change emotion to fit particular ideals of moral agency. (shrink)

Li Zehou 李澤厚, one of the outstanding contemporary thinkers, coins the term “emotio-rational structure” for his ethical theory. Li emphasizes a balanced and integrated structure of emotion and reason, and the core of this structure is an innovative combination of Kantian rationalism and Confucian ethics. Li admires Immanuel Kant’s rational ontology of ethics, but criticizes his exclusion of human emotion and desire. Li advocates complementing Kantian rationalism with the Confucian ethics of emotion, which he (...) calls “emotion as substance”. He believes that such a balanced structure of emotion and reason will offer inspiration to a changing world... (shrink)

In recent years there has been a substantial amount of research on emotional intelligence (EI) across a wide range of disciplines. Also, this term has been receiving increasing attention in the popular business press. This article extends previous research by seeking to determine whether there is a relationship between emotional intelligence and ethical judgment among practicing managers with respect to questions of ethical nature that can arise in their professional activity. It analyzes the results of a survey of 324 managers (...) enrolled in executive MBA programs from five universities in the southeastern and northeastern United States. This study is based on a model presented by Forsyth showing two dimensions that play an important role in ethical evaluation and behavior. Respondents were classified into one of four groups according to their idealism and relativism levels—situationists, subjectivists, absolutists, and exceptionists. The four ideological group’s scores were compared. The results indicate significant differences between the situationists and absolutists on the one hand, and subjectivists and exceptionists on the other. The former’s emotional intelligence scores were significantly higher thus demonstrating a strong relationship between emotional intelligence and ethical ideology. The results raise important implications for practitioners and educators. (shrink)

본 논문은 공맹유학에서 도덕 감정과 평정심이 어떻게 연관돼 있는지에 대해 분석함으로써 그 윤리학적 함의를 밝힌다. 감정 혹은 정념이 마음에 혼란을 일으켜 평정심을 깨트리는 원인으로 작용할 것이라는 우려를 갖고 있는 일부 철학자들이 있다. 스토아 학파의 아파테이아(apatheia)나 도가의 무정(無情) 사상에 의하면 감정은 삶에 혼란을 몰고 오므로 통제하거나 제거 해야할 대상으로 비판받는다. 이러한 입장은 우울, 분노, 두려움 등 부정적 감정이 지나치게 강하면 심리적 안정을 저해할 수 있다는 측면에서 일리가 없는 것은 아니나 감정이 좋은 삶을 얻는데 기여한다는 사실에 대해 소홀하다는 비판을 면하기 어렵다. 이들과 (...) 달리 공맹유학에서는 적절한 감정의 발현을 통해 더욱 안정적인 심신 상태를 유지할 수 있을 뿐만 아니라 인의예지 등의 덕을 증대시킬 수 있다고 보는 도덕 감정에 기초한 윤리학을 추구한다. 공자와 맹자는 효, 공손, 연민, 부끄러움, 미움, 존중심, 양보심 등이 유덕자에게 반드시 요청되는 요소라고 봄으로써 감정과 덕의 상관성에 주목하는 도덕 심리학을 전개한다. 공맹유학의 평정심을 대표하는 불혹(不惑)과 부동심(不動心)은 옳음에 대한 인지뿐만 아니라 옮음과 관련한 느낌이 적절하게 발현됨으로써 얻을 수 있다. 그러한 맥락에서 맹자는 북궁유, 맹시사, 고자 등이 채택한 용기와 부동심에 대해 의(義) 인식이 미흡하다고 비판함과 아울러 유가철학적 관점에서 도덕 감정에 기초한 평정심 이론을 그 대안으로서 제시한다. (shrink)

The present study attempts to investigate the effect of emotional intelligence, corporate ethical values, and ethical climates on the ethical judgment of auditors in Malaysia. The study used a questionnaire survey comprising instruments on emotional intelligence, 483, 2004), corporate ethical values, 339–359, 1985), ethical climate, and ethical vignettes related to the auditors’ job, 287–306, 1971 and Cohen et al. 1994). A total 263 usable responses were obtained and analyzed using statistical tests of mean score, standard deviation, correlation, and multiple regression. (...) The results reveal that emotional intelligence and corporate ethical values significantly influenced the ethical judgment of auditors. Likewise, instrumental and independence ethical climates have significant effect on ethical judgment of auditors in Malaysia. (shrink)

Our understanding of emotional labor, while conceptually and empirically substantial, is normatively impoverished: very little has been said or written expressly about its ethical dimensions or ramifications. Emotional labor refers to efforts undertaken by employees to make their private feelings and/or public emotion displays consistent with job and organizational requirements. We formally define emotional labor, briefly summarize research in organizational behavior and social psychology on the causes and consequences of emotional labor, and present a normative analysis of its moral (...) limits focused on conditional rights and duties of employers and employees. Our focus is on three points of conflict involving rights and duties as they apply to the performance of emotional labor: when employees’ and organizations’ rights conflict, when employees’ rights conflict with their duties, and when organizations’ rights conflict with their duties. We discuss implications for future inquiry as well as managerial practice. (shrink)

This dissertation contends that emotions are subject to ethical assessment, not simply as motives or overt expressions, but in their own right. Emotions, I argue, are subject to assessment because they are aspects of a person's character. Specifically, emotions involve voluntary acts of attention, which are due to habituation. These acts show character by manifesting certain stable, deeply-held desires called 'concerns.' This view, dubbed 'Attentional Voluntarism,' is opposed to the prevalent view, dubbed 'Rationalism,' that emotions are subject to assessment because (...) of their propositional content. Rationalism is unable to account for certain kinds of irrational emotion, where one forms an unwarranted emotion to avoid anxiety and secure pleasure. It exaggerates how mature and adaptive these emotions are. Attentional Voluntarism, by contrast, accounts for the childish and even infantile character behind such emotions, because the relevant habits of attention may simply be the residue from previous developmental stages. (shrink)

Ethical debate about the use of animals in science is argued within different ethical frameworks; mainly utilitarianism, deontology, relativism or emotional ethics, with some debaters preferring particular frameworks. Stakeholders to the debate are veterinarians, scientists using animals, animal welfare groups and the general public. To estimate the balance of ethical frameworks used, we ran a discourse analysis of written texts by each stakeholder . The discourse analysis targeted the description of animals, instances of emotional language and language associated with (...) utilitarianism, deontology and relativism. Frequencies were compared using ANOVAs and Tukey tests. All stakeholders used words associated with all frameworks but emotional language was the most used followed by utilitarian , relativist and deontological language. Emotional language was used in texts from the general public more than in texts from veterinarians and scientists and animal welfare representatives . Animals were mainly described in a utilitarian way , more frequently by scientists than the general public . All stakeholders preferentially used negative emotional language when referring to animals than positive , and all stakeholders prioritised human interests over animals . Not surprisingly, a mixture of ethical frameworks were used to assess the ethics of animal experimentation. However, the language used in texts from animal welfare groups and the general public suggest that those two groups preferentially build arguments with emotion rather than utilitarianism, a framework that is privileged by veterinarians and scientists since they primarily use animals. (shrink)

Der Beitrag diskutiert Möglichkeiten emotionalen Lernens in einzelfallbezogenen Lernarrangements wie etwa klinische Ethikberatungen und Workshops, die mit Einzelfällen arbeiten. Es wird ein didaktisches Rahmenkonzept entwickelt, das vor allem auf die Ermöglichung emotionalen Lernens abzielt. Dabei werden entsprechende Lernziele formuliert, emotionale Themen in diesen Lernarrangements benannt und Methoden dargestellt, wie Erwachsenenbildner diese emotionalen Themen so bearbeiten können, dass ein emotionales Lernen ermöglicht wird. Dabei wird auch ein konzeptueller Rahmen für diese Lernarrangements benannt, der von einem deliberativen Ethikverständnis ausgeht. Emotionales Lernen als (...) Förderung der Sozial- und Selbstkompetenz wird dabei als eine Schlüsselqualifikation verstanden, die gegen die Fach- und Methodenkompetenz abgegrenzt wird. (shrink)

In the rationalist tradition in ethics, the emotions are morally suspect. In a corrective swing of the pendulum, burgeoning philosophical interest is “rehabilitating” the emotions in ethical decisionmaking. The emotions and reason should be mutually correcting resources in moral reflection.

In this paper, we put forward the view that emotions have a legitimate and important role in health professional ethics education. This paper draws upon our experience of running a narrative ethics education programme for ethics educators from a range of healthcare disciplines. It describes the way in which emotions may be elicited in narrative ethics teaching and considers the appropriate role of emotions in ethics education for health professionals. We argue there is a need (...) for a pedagogical framework to productively incorporate the role of emotions in health professional ethics teaching. We suggest a theoretical basis for an ethics pedagogy that integrates health professional emotions in both the experience and the analysis of ethical practice, and identify a range of strategies to support the educator to incorporate emotion within their ethics teaching. (shrink)

Der Beitrag diskutiert Möglichkeiten emotionalen Lernens in einzelfallbezogenen Lernarrangements wie etwa klinische Ethikberatungen und Workshops, die mit Einzelfällen arbeiten. Es wird ein didaktisches Rahmenkonzept entwickelt, das vor allem auf die Ermöglichung emotionalen Lernens abzielt. Dabei werden entsprechende Lernziele formuliert, emotionale Themen in diesen Lernarrangements benannt und Methoden dargestellt, wie Erwachsenenbildner diese emotionalen Themen so bearbeiten können, dass ein emotionales Lernen ermöglicht wird. Dabei wird auch ein konzeptueller Rahmen für diese Lernarrangements benannt, der von einem deliberativen Ethikverständnis ausgeht. Emotionales Lernen als (...) Förderung der Sozial- und Selbstkompetenz wird dabei als eine Schlüsselqualifikation verstanden, die gegen die Fach- und Methodenkompetenz abgegrenzt wird. (shrink)

This study examines the impact of various factors on ethical behavior of 507 employees working for three state-owned Chinese firms. Regulation of one’s emotions had a significant positive impact on ethical behavior of respondents. Organizational commitment also had a significant positive impact on ethical behavior of the respondents. Among various facets of job satisfaction, satisfaction with promotion, coworker, and supervision had a significant positive impact on ethical behavior of respondents. Among control variables, age of the employee had a significant negative (...) impact on ethical behavior, which indicated that the young employees showed a better ethical behavior than the old employees. (shrink)

Recent events and popularized stereotypes call into question the ethics of salesperson behaviors. Although prior research demonstrates that salespeople’s emotional exhaustion can have negative consequences for several job outcomes, little is known about the factors that can mitigate such relationships—particularly the relationship between emotional exhaustion and ethical behavior. To remedy this knowledge gap, we draw from self-control theory to propose a novel theoretical framework and develop hypotheses. These hypotheses are tested on a unique dataset consisting of survey data collected (...) from 123 matched business-to-business salesperson–manager dyads. The findings reveal that emotional exhaustion is negatively associated with sales performance, emotional exhaustion is negatively associated with ethical behaviors, ethical behaviors are positively associated with sales performance, ethical behaviors mediate emotional exhaustion’s negative effect on sales performance, perceived supervisor support attenuates the negative association between emotional exhaustion and ethical behaviors, and contrary to expectations, grit strengthens the negative association between emotional exhaustion and ethical behaviors. As we show here, perceived supervisor support may attenuate the undesirable effects of emotional exhaustion on ethical behaviors and sales performance. The article’s broader contribution thus lies in its suggestion that managers pay special attention to these factors. Moreover, factors such as grit can have unexpected and undesirable influences; therefore, we draw attention to the importance of scrutinizing these interactions, even when the factors involved are almost universally touted as beneficial. Theoretical and practical implications of the research are discussed. (shrink)

This paper attempts to delineate the interaction between trust, emotion, and ethical decision making. The authors first propose that trust can either incite an individual toward ethical decisions or drag him or her away from ethical decisions, depending on different situations. The authors then postulate that the feeling of guilt is central in understanding how trust affects the ethical decision making process. Several propositions based on these assumptions are introduced and implications for practice discussed.

In this paper I propose a thesis in philosophical anthropology that aims to explain the relevance of emotions in ethical discourse. I introduce the concept of Gönül which, in Turkish language, stands primarily for the faculty of love and, generally, for that of emotions. In my analysis, I rely on the etymological connections between certain concepts in Turkish so as to understand the relevance of love in particular and emotions in general for ethical discourse. I argue that it is not (...) the faculty of mind but that of Gönül which distinguishes humans from animals. Based on the distinction between “to understand” and “to know” in Turkish and their etymological relations with other concepts, I argue that understanding pertains to subjects, while knowledge pertains to objects. In other words, I claim that although we can understand subjects, we cannot know them, and that although we can know objects, we cannot understand them. Furthermore, given the familiar distinction between mechanical causation and teleological causation, I propose that “to know” is “to know how something works in terms of mechanical reasons” and that “to understand” is “to understand why someone acts in terms of teleological reasons.” Accordingly, based on the distinction between knowledge and understanding, the distinction between mind and Gönül can be rephrased: through mind we know how an object works based on mechanical reasons and through Gönül we understand why a subject acts based on teleological reasons. This means that we can understand a subject’s reasons for action only if we can sympathise with her emotions. I conclude that the realm of ethical discourse involves understanding through emotions, which is the task of the capacity of Gönül. In this sense, Gönül is a higher capacity than mind, for it presupposes the knowledge of objects but also requires understanding through emotions. (shrink)

이 논문은 현대인이 앓고 있는 감정 과잉의 문제에 대한 해결책을 전통적 감정 담론, 특히 풍부한 감수성을 계발하도록 하면서도 감정의 적절한 표출을 위한 조절을 강조했던 선진 시기의 유가 철학에서 참고해보고자 하는 시도이다. 이러한 연구는 덕 윤리로서 유가 윤리가 인격 수양으로 표현되는 덕 획득의 구조 내에서 감정을 어떻게 다루었는지를 체계 적으로 재구성하는 작업이다. 이러한 작업은 당연히 덕 윤리의 일반적 체계 속에서 감정이 어떤 위상을 가지고 있는지, 어떻게 교육(계발)될 수 있는지 혹은 감정의 특성을 고려할 때 교육(계발)이라는 것 자체가 가능한지, 그리고 여러 덕들의 획득 (...) 방식과 어떤 유사성이 나 차이점이 있는지를 먼저 검토하는 것으로 이루어졌다. 그리고 이것을 바탕으로 선진 유 가가 자아 수양의 방식으로 활용한, 대표적인 양식인 예를 중심으로 규칙, 감정과 습관화 라는 큰 틀에서 유가의 감정 수양 방식, 즉 감정의 습관화 방식을 재구성하였다. 이러한 검토는 감정 조절(혹은 감정 교육이나 수양)이 얼마나 복잡한 문제이고 다양한 요소들을 함께 고려하는 문제임을 알 게 해 줄 것이며 유가의 인격 수양 이론을 다시 검토하는 계기 를 제공할 것이다. (shrink)

The paper discusses the intersection between art, imagination, emotions, and ethical education from the perspective of an innovative synthesis of cognitive theory of emotion and Gestalt pedagogy. One of the elements of this synthesis is the cognitive theory of emotion as endorsed by Martha Nussbaum. Emotions are understood as evaluative judgments that are related to our perception of the world around us. Emotions are our attitudes, understandings, and assessments of the world from the perspective of our goals and (...) projects. This proves an excellent starting point from which to address them as an essential part of ethics education. Next, art and imagination are considered as a vehicle by which to address emotions and other domains within ethics education. Here, I introduce the concept of “experiential imagining” and point to the methodologies that sustain it. I have developed this concept as part of my research on the overlap between Gestalt pedagogy, cognitive theory of emotion, and the art of life approaches to ethics. Next, I present the synthesis between cognitive theory of emotion and Gestalt pedagogy. I then illuminate the concept of experiential imagination, emphasise its role in ethics education, and conclude with some reflections on the art of life approach to ethics and ethics education. (shrink)

The twin concepts of ethics and emotions are used in this paper to examine experiences of doing research on the topic of violence. Ethical questions are of significance when carrying out research which is potentially distressing to the research participant. Through field experiences in South Africa the author argues, however, that despite the growing concern among geographers over the ethical dimensions of their work, the implementation of ethically guided research practice is often less simple in reality. The concept of (...) emotions is used to explore the less well examined issue of the impact of distressing research on the researcher and research assistants. The paper concludes that it is often difficult to separate out ethics from emotions. (shrink)

Scheler developed the fundamentals of his theory of emotions and values wanting to overcome the common-sensical empiricist and the critical rationalist approaches to ethics. Both refused that there are laws of essence as regards the character, deployment, evolution, and interconnection/opposition of the emotions and their relatedness to values. Scheler distinguished between mere feeling states and the intentional feelings of something (principally of values). Moreover, he claimed that a normative inner organization of intentional emotive phenomena can be discovered. Thus, a (...) corresponding phenomenological ethics of values, based on the ‘rationality’ of the emotive life itself, appears possible for the first time. After a comprehensive elucidation of Scheler’s and phenomenology’s approach to the matter, I critically reconstruct in some detail Scheler’s analysis of emotions as intentional experiences. I examine the way in which Scheler understands intentionality and the way in which he silently applied it in the case of emotive experiences. He articulates three relevant proposals. Intentional feeling functions are turned toward feeling states as their intentional objects. He also suggests that, e.g., a snow-covered mountain, whose beauty has amazed someone, is also an intentional correlate of this amazement as intentional feeling. Scheler finally maintains his fundamental thesis that values are the intentional objects of intentional emotive phenomena. However, he does not develop a clear and coherent analysis of how the three candidates for the place of the intentional object of an emotion intermingle or are otherwise interconnected. In the end, I survey some other closely related problems, regarding his understanding of reduction and of the status of values, and attempt to trace them all back to Scheler’s phenomenological realism. This examination, however, shows that we can use the latter’s analyses as preparation for a demythologized, this time, concrete phenomenological theory of emotions and values, in the direction of a future critical transcendental and persuasive phenomenological praxeology. (shrink)

In this paper we address the ethics of adopting delusional beliefs and we apply consequentialist and deontological considerations to the epistemic evaluation of delusions. Delusions are characterised by their epistemic shortcomings and they are often defined as false and irrational beliefs. Despite this, when agents are overwhelmed by negative emotions due to the effects of trauma or previous adversities, or when they are subject to anxiety and stress as a result of hypersalient experience, the adoption of a delusional belief (...) can prevent a serious epistemic harm from occurring. For instance, delusions can allow agents to remain in touch with their environment overcoming the disruptive effect of negative emotions and anxiety. Moreover, agents are not blameworthy for adopting their delusions if their ability to believe otherwise is compromised. There is evidence suggesting that no evidence-related action that would counterfactually lead them to believe otherwise is typically available to them. The lack of ability to believe otherwise, together with some other conditions, implies that the agents are not blameworthy for their delusions. The examination of the epistemic status of delusions prompts us to acknowledge the complexity and contextual nature of epistemic evaluation, establish connections between consequentialist and deontological frameworks in epistemology, and introduce the notion of epistemic innocence into the vocabulary of epistemic evaluation. (shrink)

My paper explores contemporary socio-political aspects of love-as-power within the newly emerging context of feminist ethics of love, as well as in a broader sense of neoliberal commodification of self-centrism and philosophical urgency for articulating love as togetherness, responsibility and solidarity with others. My theoretical analysis begins with the tensions between the early 20th century collective consciousness represented by the feminist socialist formulations of love as responsibility for the outside world and the existentialist anxiety as related to individual alienation. (...) My analysis culminates in the re-emergence of non-monogamous bonding in Europe as a trope for a new precariousness of family enactments extending beyond the nuclear heteronormativity in the 21st century. (shrink)

Ovaj rad bavi se presjekom umjetnosti, imaginacije, emocija i etičkog obrazovanja iz perspektive inovativne sinteze kognitivne teorije emocija i Gestalt pedagogije. Jedan od elemenata ove sinteze kognitivna je teorija emocija kakvu podržava Martha Nussbaum. Emocije se shvaćaju kao procjene koje se odnose na percepciju svijeta oko nas. Emocije su naši stavovi, razumijevanja i evaluacije svijeta iz perspektive naših ciljeva i projekata. To se pokazalo kao odlična polazišna točka za proučavanje emocija i drugih domena unutar etike obrazovanja. U ovom radu uvodim (...) pojam ‘iskustvene imaginacije’ i ukazujem na njezine metodologije koje smo razvili kao dio istraživanja preklapanja Gestalt pedagogije, kognitivne teorije emocija i pristupa etici iz perspektive umijeća življenja. Potom predstavljam sintezu kognitivne teorije emocija i Gestalt pedagogije, nakon čega razjašnjavam koncept iskustvene imaginacije, naglašavam njezinu ulogu u etičkom obrazovanju te zaključujem s nekolicinom osvrta na pristup umijeća življenja etici i etičkom obrazovanju. The paper discusses the intersection between art, imagination, emotions, and ethical education from the perspective of an innovative synthesis of cognitive theory of emotion and Gestalt pedagogy. One of the elements of this synthesis is the cognitive theory of emotion as endorsed by Martha Nussbaum. Emotions are understood as evaluative judgments that are related to our perception of the world around us. Emotions are our attitudes, understandings, and assessments of the world from the perspective of our goals and projects. This proves an excellent starting point from which to address them as an essential part of ethics education. Next, art and imagination are considered as a vehicle by which to address emotions and other domains within ethics education. Here, I introduce the concept of “experiential imagining” and point to the methodologies that sustain it. I have developed this concept as part of my research on the overlap between Gestalt pedagogy, cognitive theory of emotion, and the art of life approaches to ethics. Next, I present the synthesis between cognitive theory of emotion and Gestalt pedagogy. I then illuminate the concept of experiential imagination, emphasise its role in ethics education, and conclude with some reflections on the art of life approach to ethics and ethics education. (shrink)

The concept of “ethical research” holds considerable sway over the ways in which contemporary biomedical, natural, and social science investigations are funded, regulated, and practiced within a variety of countries. Some commentators have viewed this “new” means of governance positively; others, however, have been resoundingly critical, regarding it as restrictive and ethics bodies and regulations unfit for the task they have been set. Regardless, it is clear that science today is an “ethical” business. The ways in which formal and (...) informal ethical discourses and practices—what might be called “regimes of normativity”—structure scientific work and the meanings it is ascribed with have, however, been underexplored. This article attends to how science and ethics articulate; how they are, in many ways, co-produced. Exploring these processes of co-production casts into sharp relief the essential emotionality of science; the relationships investigators have with their colleagues, work, and research participants pulse with emotion, potentially shaping in important ways the very kinds of knowledge that laboratories produce. (shrink)

In this paper I continue to probe the roles of philosophy and psychology in moral education. In a previous article published in this journal, I criticized the moral views of various schools of psychotherapy, and argued that philosophers are the sole professionals equipped to teach normative morality in a pluralistic, critical, and reasoned way . In this paper, I argue that effective moral education involves emotional education; that philosophers’ views of emotions tend to be reductive, and when they are not, (...) they point to an irreducibility of affectivity which is not amenable to philosophical investigation. While emotional and moral education should go hand in hand, philosophers seem poorly equipped for the former. Psychotherapists are trained in educating emotions and in attending the irreducible affectivity of individual emotions. Interested as we might be in psychotherapists’ specialization in emotional education, we cannot dissociate it from moral education, as emotional education is not value-free. Recalling that psychological theories involve views of morality which do not withstand critical examination , we are reluctant to entrust psychotherapists with moral education. Turning once again to psychology, we realize that we have added a new complexity to the initial problematic status of psychological moral education. While emotional and moral education should go hand in hand, the untenable situation that obtains is that philosophers educate us morally while psychologists educate us emotionally. Moral education is impaired whether it is left to psychotherapists or to philosophers. I conclude by sharing some thoughts on the possibilities of amending this situation. (shrink)

This paper explores the character of emotion and its value in understanding ethical dilemmas in work organisations. Specifically, we examine the emotional labour of human resource professionals. Through in-depth interviews and diary study, we uncover the emotional and ethical struggles of HRPs as they search for the ‘right thing to do’ in situated interaction. Through the lens of emotion, we chart the process of how the very framing of what is deemed ‘right’ can move from the social to (...) the moral order and vice versa. Based on our findings, we contribute to understanding the linkages between emotional and ethical dilemmas, and how expectations of multiple ‘others’ at the individual, interpersonal and organisational level shape and constrain ethical choices. (shrink)