Answer Set Programming is a new paradigm based on logic programming. The main component of answer set programming is a system that finds the answer sets of logic programs. During the computation of an answer set, systems are faced with choice points where they have to select a literal and assign it a truth value. Generally, systems utilize some heuristics to choose new literals at the choice points. The heuristic used is one of the key factors for (...) the performance of the system. A new heuristic for answer set programming has been developed. This heuristic is inspired by hierarchical planning. The notion of criticality, which was introduced for generating abstraction hierarchies in hierarchical planning, is used in this heuristic. The resulting system (CSMODELS) uses this new heuristic in a static way. CSMODELS is based on the system SMODELS. The experimental results show that this new heuristic is promising for answer set programming. A comparison of search times with SMODELS demonstrate CSMODELS’ usefulness. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the relation of heuristic search and level of intelligence in cognitive computation systems. The paper begins with a review of the fundamental properties of a cognitive computation system, which is defined generally as a control system that generates goal-directed actions in response to environmental inputs and constraints. An important property of cognitive computations is the need to process local cues in symbol structures to access and integrate distal knowledge to generate a response. To deal with (...) uncertainties involved in this local-to-distal processing, the system needs to perform heuristic search to locate and integrate the right set of distal structures. The level of intelligence of the system depends critically on the efficiency of the heuristic search process. It is argued that, for a bounded rationality system, the level of intelligence does not depend on how much search it needs to do to accomplish a task. Rather, the level of intelligence depends on how much search it does not need to do to achieve the same level of performance. Examples were discussed to illustrate this idea. The first two examples show how machines that play games like tic-tac-toe and chess rely heavily on the efficiency of the heuristic search algorithm to achieve better performance, demonstrating the relation of heuristic search and intelligence in a bounded rationality system. The second example shows how humans adapt to different information ecologies to perform information search on the Internet and how their performance improves over time, demonstrating how heuristic search can be improved in an adaptive rationality system. The two examples demonstrate how better search control knowledge and representations of task environment can improve the efficiency of heuristic search, thereby improving the intelligence of the system. (shrink)

A complex interaction of ideological, financial, social, and moral factors makes the financial sustainability of health care systems a challenge across the world. One difficulty is that some of the moral commitments of some health care systems collide with reality. In particular, commitments to equality in access to health care and to fair equality of opportunity undergird an unachievable promise, namely, to provide all with the best of basic health care. In addition, commitments to fair equality of opportunity (...) are in tension with the existence of families, because families are aimed at advantaging their own members in preference to others. Because the social-democratic state is committed to fair equality of opportunity, it offers a web of publicly funded entitlements that make it easier for persons to exit the family and to have children outside of marriage. In the United States, in 2008, 41% of children were born outside of wedlock, whereas, in 1940, the percentage was only 3.8%, and in 1960, 5%, with the further consequence that the social and financial capital generated through families, which aids in supporting health care in families, is diminished. In order to explore the challenge of creating a sustainable health care system that also supports the traditional family, the claims made for fair equality of opportunity in health care are critically reconsidered. This is done by engaging the expository device of John Rawls’s original position, but with a thin theory of the good that is substantively different from that of Rawls, one that supports a health care system built around significant copayments, financial counseling, and compulsory savings, with a special focus on enhancing the financial and social capital of the family. This radical recasting of Rawls, which draws inspiration from Singapore, is undertaken as a heuristic to aid in articulating an approach to health care allocation that can lead past the difficulties of social-democratic policy. (shrink)

A complex interaction of ideological, financial, social, and moral factors makes the financial sustainability of health care systems a challenge across the world. One difficulty is that some of the moral commitments of some health care systems collide with reality. In particular, commitments to equality in access to health care and to fair equality of opportunity undergird an unachievable promise, namely, to provide all with the best of basic health care. In addition, commitments to fair equality of opportunity (...) are in tension with the existence of families, because families are aimed at advantaging their own members in preference to others. Because the social-democratic state is committed to fair equality of opportunity, it offers a web of publicly funded entitlements that make it easier for persons to exit the family and to have children outside of marriage. In the United States, in 2008, 41% of children were born outside of wedlock, whereas, in 1940, the percentage was only 3.8%, and in 1960, 5%, with the further consequence that the social and financial capital generated through families, which aids in supporting health care in families, is diminished. In order to explore the challenge of creating a sustainable health care system that also supports the traditional family, the claims made for fair equality of opportunity in health care are critically reconsidered. This is done by engaging the expository device of John Rawls's original position, but with a thin theory of the good that is substantively different from that of Rawls, one that supports a health care system built around significant copayments, financial counseling, and compulsory savings, with a special focus on enhancing the financial and social capital of the family. This radical recasting of Rawls, which draws inspiration from Singapore, is undertaken as a heuristic to aid in articulating an approach to health care allocation that can lead past the difficulties of social-democratic policy. (shrink)

This article attempts to assess Mario Bunge’s important but widely neglected criticisms of dialectics. It begins by providing a contextualized interpretation of Friedrich Engels’s metaphysics of the dialectics of nature before embarking on a detailed discussion of Leon Trotsky’s and contemporary “dialectical” scientists’ views on materialist dialectics. It argues that while some of Bunge’s criticisms are eminently sensible, the principles underlying the works of dialectical scientists are compatible with Bunge’s emergentist and systemic approach and can shed light on such issues (...) as the levels of organization, the diachronic and synchronic aspects of emergence, and the individualism-holism-systemism trilemma. This article also submits that dialectics is best interpreted as a guideline for a philosophy of change instead of a magical wand that liberates the investigator from study of facts. Understood as something that serves heuristic purposes, dialectics can be sensibly utilized by scientists to shore up or refine their methodological principles and thereby to facilitate empirical research. (shrink)

The “rhetorical incorporation of human rights terminology” into domestic law is the central concern of this article. Over the last 20 years or so, countries have faced international pressure to conform to human rights standards in order to enjoy legitimacy. However, there is a huge gap between what is legalized as “human rights” in domestic laws and what is set forth as “human rights” in international human rights instruments. Based on this presupposition that a proper incorporation of human rights on (...) the books is a prerequisite for putting them into practice, this study by adopting a Systems Thinking approach seeks to show that law as a soft system on the books is more than the name and number of rights. It is a complex whole whose function depends on not only the name and number of rights but also different features of rights and the relationships between them. To this end, law is conceived as a system of rights that has five major features including the “frame of reference,” “scope of rights,” “orientation of rights,” “enforceability of rights,” and “realizability of rights.” The way of codification of human rights with respect to each of these features makes a big difference in implementing human rights in practice. To develop a heuristic devise for evaluating the situation of human rights in current legal systems, the conceptual space of law as a system of rights is depicted in a matrix called a “Rights Fabric Matrix.”. (shrink)

This lecture will deal with the heuristic power of the deductive method and its contributions to the scientific task of finding new knowledge. I will argue for a new reading of the term 'deductive method.' It will be presented as an architectural scheme for the reconstruction of the processes of gaining reliable scientific knowledge. This scheme combines the activities of doing science with the activities of presenting scientific results. It combines the heuristic and the deductive side of science. The heuristic (...) side is represented, e.g., by the creative methods to find the 'best' hypotheses, to design experimental systems for empirical research in order to formulate general laws, or to create axiomatic systems. The other side consists of the production of deductive knowledge. This combination leads to a clear hierarchy: the heuristic side provides the basic presuppositions from which the deductive side takes off. The former is used to make deductions possible. The deductive method can be presented as an analysis-synthesis scheme as it can be found, e.g., in the tradition of Kant, Jakob Friedrich Fries, and Leonard Nelson. Nelson's critical philosophy can be seen as a key for understanding the philosophy behind David Hilbert's early axiomatic method. This axiomatic method is usually restricted to a non-philosophical approach to pure mathematics. But Hilbert was not an exclusive formalist; he proposed a mathesis universalis in the Cartesian-Leibnizian sense according to which mathematics is the syntactical tool for a general philosophy of science, applicable to all scientific disciplines. In this function, mathematics takes its problems from the sciences. Hilbert did not deny that mathematics should play a role in explaining the world. The analysis-synthesis scheme helps to provide a consistent interpretation of these two sides of Hilbert's attitude towards his working field. (shrink)

Bruineberg and colleagues criticisms' have been received but downplayed in the free energy principle (FEP) literature. We strengthen their points, arguing that Friston blanket discovery, even if tractable, requires a full formal description of the system of interest at the outset. Hence, blanket metaphysics is futile, and we postulate that researchers should turn back to heuristic uses of Pearl blankets.

Care ethics as initiated by Gilligan, Held, Tronto and others has from its onset been critical towards ethical concepts established in modernity, like ‘autonomy’, alternatively proposing to think from within relationships and to pay attention to power. In this article the question is raised whether renewal in this same critical vein is necessary and possible as late modern circumstances require rethinking the care ethical inquiry. Two late modern realities that invite to rethink care ethics are complexity and precariousness. (...) Late modern organizations, like the general hospital, codetermined by various systems are characterized by complexity and the need for complexity reduction, both permeating care practices. By means of a heuristic use of the concept of precariousness, taken as the installment of uncertainty, it is shown that relations and power in late modern care organizations have changed, precluding the use of a straightforward domination idea of power. In the final section a proposition is made how to rethink the care ethical inquiry in order to take late modern circumstances into account: inquiry should always be related to the concerns of people and practitioners from within care practices. (shrink)

This dissertation is devoted to dual-process theories, widely discussed in the recent literature in cognitive science. The author argues for a significantly modified version of the account suggested by Samuels (2009), replacing the distinction between ‘Systems’ with a distinction between ‘Types of processes,’ which allows a critique of both the (only) modularist accounts and the accounts describing a deep difference between two systems each having their specificities (functional, phenomenological and neurological). In the account of dual-process theories developed here, (...) the distinction between ‘Types of processes’ is considered, a priori, only as a heuristic distinction allowing to better understand the mind and to explain some of its properties. The main idea defended in this dissertation is that cognitive processes should be distinguished by their position in a multidimensional conceptual space allowing researchers to consider all of the characteristics and peculiarities attributed to a process, which is preferable to accounts forcing the process into either ‘System’ or either ‘Type’ identified in the most influential approaches (cf. Evans, 2008). Once this research program is in place, it will become possible to revise the concepts used and the categories defined to ground anew some of the notions we find in the literature (‘module,’ ‘System 1 / 2,’ etc.). The argument is made in three steps: -/- 1) The first chapter aims at a clarification of the notion of ‘module’ commonly used in cognitive science. Against the accounts aiming at a weakening of the notion in order to classify all of the mind’s processes as modular, the author – following most notably Faucher and Poirier (2009) and Samuels (2006) – casts doubt on how this notion is used by many influential authors, particularly in evolutionary psychology (e.g. Barrett, Carruthers, Cosmides, Tooby). -/- 2) The objective of the second chapter is to present, examine and criticize many dual-process theories and to suggest that no theory currently discussed is adequate to describe the architecture of mind. The accounts, especially influent or representative, suggested by Stanovich (1999; 2004; 2009), by Evans (2008; 2009), by Lieberman (2007; 2009) and by Carruthers (2006; 2009), are examined. -/- 3) In the third chapter, the author criticizes the framework developed by Samuels (2009) before developing his own account of dual-process theories and discussing some of its advantages. (shrink)

Adaptationism has for decades been the topic of sophisticated debates in philosophy of biology but methodological adaptationism has not received as much attention as the empirical and explanatory issues. In addition, adaptationism has mainly been discussed in the context of evolutionary biology and not in fields such as zoophysiology and systems biology where this heuristic is also used in design analyses of physiological traits and molecular structures. This paper draws on case studies from these fields to discuss the productive (...) and problematic aspects of this heuristic in different research practices, in functional as well as evolutionary studies on different levels of biological organization. Gould and Lewontin’s Spandrels-paper famously criticized adaptationist methodology for implying the risk of generating ‘blind spots’ with respect to non-selective effects on evolution. Some have claimed that this bias can be accommodated through the testing of evolutionary hypotheses. Although this is an important aspect of overcoming naïve adaptationism, I argue that the issue of methodological biases is broader than the question of testability. I demonstrate the productivity of adaptationist heuristics but also discuss the deeper problematic aspects associated with the methodological imperialism that is part of the strong adaptationist position. (shrink)

Historical analysis and policy making often require counterfactual thought experiments that isolate hypothesized causes from a vast array of historical possibilities. However, a core precept of Jervis's “systems thinking” is that causes are so interconnected that the historian can only with great difficulty imagine causation by subtracting all variables but one. Prediction, according to Jervis, is even more problematic: The more sensitive an event is to initial conditions (e.g., butterfly effects), the harder it is to derive accurate forecasts. Nevertheless, (...) if awareness of system effects can help forecasters better calibrate their probability estimates of whether or not certain events will come to pass, systems thinkers who are pessimistic about prediction are diluting their confidence too much. The challenge is a meta-cognitive one: thinking systematically about when to engage in systems thinking; and weighing the costs and benefits of using simple or complex heuristics in policy environments that can shift suddenly from quiescence to turbulence. (shrink)

This article focuses on the methodological basis for the criticism of the computationalism and “computer metaphor” in the philosophy of cognitive sciences. We suppose that the computational paradigm is the direct consequence of the theoretical confusion of phenomenal and cognitive kinds of experience. Cognitive processes, considered as the forms of computational description, are available for computer modelling. That implies the strong position of the computer metaphor in the neuroscience. In our opinion the key problem is the vague ontological nature of (...) the symbols which form the computational operations in the cognitive procedures. Despite the successful development of neuroscience, it is still impossible to explain the meaning of the content of mental states. The article provides the detailed analysis of the critical approaches to the computational models of consciousness. The special attention is given to the comparison of data integration in the artificial intellectual systems with semantic aspects of the phenomenal consciousness. In the first case the foundations of output are the hierarchy of classes, the rules protocols and applying heuristics and strategies. In the second case the knowledge is formed by qualia, metaphorical conceptualization and pragmatic level of communication. Natural principles of knowledge forming are unachievable for machine intellectual procedures. (shrink)

This article critically examines one of the most prevalent metaphors in modern biology, namely the machine conception of the organism (MCO). Although the fundamental differences between organisms and machines make the MCO an inadequate metaphor for conceptualizing living systems, many biologists and philosophers continue to draw upon the MCO or tacitly accept it as the standard model of the organism. This paper analyses the specific difficulties that arise when the MCO is invoked in the study of development and evolution. (...) In developmental biology the MCO underlies a logically incoherent model of ontogeny, the genetic program, which serves to legitimate three problematic theses about development: genetic animism, neo-preformationism, and developmental computability. In evolutionary biology the MCO is responsible for grounding unwarranted theoretical appeals to the concept of design as well as to the interpretation of natural selection as an engineer, which promote a distorted understanding of the process and products of evolutionary change. Overall, it is argued that, despite its heuristic value, the MCO today is impeding rather than enabling further progress in our comprehension of living systems. (shrink)

The systems view on life and its emergence from complex chemistry has remarkably increased the scientific attention on metabolism in the last two decades. However, during this time there has not been much theoretical discussion on what constitutes a metabolism and what role it actually played in biogenesis. A critical and updated review on the topic is here offered, including some references to classical models from last century, but focusing more on current and future research. Metabolism is considered (...) as intrinsically related to the living but not necessarily equivalent to it. More precisely, the idea of “minimal metabolism”, in contrast to previous, top‐down conceptions, is formulated as a heuristic construct, halfway between chemistry and biology. Thus, rather than providing a complete or final characterization of metabolism, our aim is to encourage further investigations on it, particularly in the context of life's origin, for which some concrete methodological suggestions are provided. Also see the video abstract here:https://youtu.be/DP7VMKk2qpA. (shrink)

The global pesticide complex has transformed over the past two decades, but social science research has not kept pace. The rise of an enormous generics sector, shifts in geographies of pesticide production, and dynamics of agrarian change have led to more pesticide use, expanding to farm systems that hitherto used few such inputs. Declining effectiveness due to pesticide resistance and anemic institutional support for non-chemical alternatives also have driven intensification in conventional systems. As an inter-disciplinary network of pesticide (...) scholars, we seek to renew the social science research agenda on pesticides to better understand this suite of contemporary changes. To identify research priorities, challenges, and opportunities, we develop the pesticide complex as a heuristic device to highlight the reciprocal and iterative interactions among agricultural practice, the agrochemical industry, civil society-shaped regulatory actions, and contested knowledge of toxicity. Ultimately, collaborations among social scientists and across the social and biophysical sciences can illuminate recent transformations and their uneven socioecological effects. A reinvigorated critical scholarship that embraces the multifaceted nature of pesticides can identify the social and ecological constraints that drive pesticide use and support alternatives to chemically driven industrial agriculture. (shrink)

This article attempts to assess Mario Bunge’s important but widely neglected criticisms of dialectics. It begins by providing a contextualized interpretation of Friedrich Engels’s metaphysics of the dialectics of nature before embarking on a detailed discussion of Leon Trotsky’s and contemporary “dialectical” scientists’ views on materialist dialectics. It argues that while some of Bunge’s criticisms are eminently sensible, the principles underlying the works of dialectical scientists are compatible with Bunge’s emergentist and systemic approach and can shed light on such issues (...) as the levels of organization, the diachronic and synchronic aspects of emergence, and the individualism-holism-systemism trilemma. This article also submits that dialectics is best interpreted as a guideline for a philosophy of change instead of a magical wand that liberates the investigator from study of facts. Understood as something that serves heuristic purposes, dialectics can be sensibly utilized by scientists to shore up or refine their methodological principles and thereby to facilitate empirical research. (shrink)

When in Africa we speak and dream of and work for, a rebirth of that continent as a full participant in the affairs of the world in the next century, we are deeply conscious of how dependent that is on the mobilisation and strengthening of the continent's resources of learning. Nelson Mandela Address at Harvard University, September, 1998 quoted in East African, September 1-7, 2003 A paradigm can, for that matter, even insulate the community from those socially important problems that (...) are not reducible to the puzzle form, because they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools the paradigm supplies. Thomas Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions p. 37 Africa suffers from a pessimism of description as well as a pessimism of prescription it has suffered for over 500 years from a condescending and often violent gaze from diagnosis to destiny. The usual Eurocentric style in reflecting about Africa has always had an underlying tone of reproach and even moral condemnation. There is a need to protest and resist against this negative projection. We need to start to converse about Africa's problems and challenges with the inclusion of hope as an ontological need for change. Withoug hope, there will be no possibility to struggle on. Hope is an important variable in the way we wish to think, talk, reason, debate and mount intellectual reflection about Africa Re-thinking African development through innovation, social-invention, systems mental images and the logocentric imagination of the productive Africa-nation, and not through market exchange, Smithian or Ricardian comparative advantage can generate a hopeful departure from received approaches to theorising about Africa. The making of African productive power, building the capital of the mind, organising institutions within the progressive imagination of the Africa-nation is a critical launching pad for a new intellectual and research orientation hihgly needed when Africans want to make their history with the revival of the Pan-African ideal and the African renaissance. The article proposes that the national system of innovation provides the metaphor of hope, the heuristics of what is significant data to investigate, and the criticism of conventional and pessimistic theorising and finally the emancipatory knowledge resources for a post-pessimist turn to bring about the cognitive praxis of a post-colonial liberation of Africa as a whole. (shrink)

When in Africa we speak and dream of and work for, a rebirth of that continent as a full participant in the affairs of the world in the next century, we are deeply conscious of how dependent that is on the mobilisation and strengthening of the continent’s resources of learning. Nelson Mandela Address at Harvard University, September, 1998 quoted in East African, September 1–7, 2003A paradigm can, for that matter, even insulate the community from those socially important problems that are (...) not reducible to the puzzle form, because they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools the paradigm supplies. Thomas KuhnThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions p. 37Africa suffers from a pessimism of description as well as a pessimism of prescription it has suffered for over 500 years from a condescending and often violent gaze from diagnosis to destiny. The usual Eurocentric style in reflecting about Africa has always had an underlying tone of reproach and even moral condemnation. There is a need to protest and resist against this negative projection. We need to start to converse about Africa’s problems and challenges with the inclusion of hope as an ontological need for change. Withoug hope, there will be no possibility to struggle on. Hope is an important variable in the way we wish to think, talk, reason, debate and mount intellectual reflection about Africa Re‐thinking African development through innovation, social‐invention, systems mental images and the logocentric imagination of the productive Africa‐nation, and not through market exchange, Smithian or Ricardian comparative advantage can generate a hopeful departure from received approaches to theorising about Africa. The making of African productive power, building the capital of the mind, organising institutions within the progressive imagination of the Africa‐nation is a critical launching pad for a new intellectual and research orientation hihgly needed when Africans want to make their history with the revival of the Pan‐African ideal and the African renaissance. The article proposes that the national system of innovation provides the metaphor of hope, the heuristics of what is significant data to investigate, and the criticism of conventional and pessimistic theorising and finally the emancipatory knowledge resources for a post‐pessimist turn to bring about the cognitive praxis of a post‐colonial liberation of Africa as a whole. (shrink)

This article outlines a critical systems theory approach to the study of populism by arguing that populism is an avenue of contestation which assumes a distinct role and function in the existing constitution of the political system. Most notably, it is characterised by the re-entry of a popular sovereignty dimension within regular political procedures. By taking up a critical systems theory perspective, it becomes possible to more precisely distinguish populism from other forms of politics, such as (...) oppositional politics, social movement politics or procedural constitutional politics. Further, populism’s oscillation between democratic and authoritarian dynamics can be elucidated as an inversion which operates from within its political form. Finally, it is argued that the critical systems theory approach provides a more nuanced understanding of populism’s inherent problems and, consequently, moves beyond a blunt defence or rejection of populism as such. (shrink)

Agroecological farming is widely considered to reconcile improved working and living conditions of farmers while promoting social, economic, and ecological sustainability. However, most existing research primarily focuses on relatively narrow trade-offs between workload, economic and ecological outcomes at farm level and overlooks the critical role of contextual factors. This article conducts a critical literature review on the complex nature of agroecological farm work and proposes the holistic concept of sustainable farm work (SFW) in agroecology together with a heuristic (...) evaluation framework. The latter was applied to ten case studies to test its relevance, affirming positive outcomes of agroecology on SFW, such as improved food sovereignty, biodiversity conservation, and social inclusiveness, but also showing trade-offs, including increased workload and potential yield reductions. Further, results show that contextual factors, such as policy support, market regulation, and access to resources, heavily influence the impact of agroecological practices on SFW. This article strongly argues for the importance of a holistic understanding of SFW and its contextualization within multiple socio-ecological system levels. The proposed framework establishes clear relationships between agroecology and SFW. An explicit recognition of these multidimensional relationships is essential for maximizing positive outcomes of agroecology in different contexts and fostering SFW. On a theoretical level, this research concludes that, from a holistic perspective, work is an entry point to studying the potential of agroecology to drive a sustainable agroecological transition in economic, social, and ecological terms. (shrink)

Context: In this empirical and conceptual paper on the historical, philosophical, and epistemological backgrounds of second-order cybernetics, the emergence of a significant pedagogical component to Heinz von Foerster’s work during the last years of the Biological Computer Laboratory is placed against the backdrop of social and intellectual movements on the American landscape. Problem: Previous discussion in this regard has focused largely on the student radicalism of the later 1960s. A wider-angled view of the American intellectual counterculture is needed. However, this (...) historical nexus is complicated and more often dismissed than brought into clear focus. Method: This essay assembles a historical sequence of archival materials for critical analysis, linked to a conceptual argument eliciting from those materials the second-order cybernetic concepts of observation, recursion, and paradox. Results: In this period, von Foerster found the “positive of the negative” in the social and intellectual unrest of that moment and cultivated those insights for the broader constitution of a new cognitive orientation. Implications: As a successful student of his own continuing course on heuristics, von Foerster left the academic mainstream to ally his constructivist epistemology with the systems counterculture. (shrink)

Besides their skepticism about universal reason and universal morality, the Frankfurt Schools of Critical Systems Theory and Critical Theory share basic assumptions: (1) the thinking in societal-systemic, institutional concepts, which transcend simple reciprocal relations by dint of their complexity; (2) the assumption that society is based on fundamental paradoxes, antagonisms, antinomies; (3) the strategy to conceptualize justice as a contingent and transcendental formula; (4) the form of immanent (and not morality-based, external) critique as an attitude of transcendence; (...) (5) the aim of societal (and not only political) emancipation in an ‘association of free individuals’ (Marx). The article focuses on those parallels and aims to conceptualize a critical turn-around of autopoietic systems theory. (shrink)

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explore a particular philosophical underpinning for Information Systems (IS) research – critical systemic thinking (CST). Drawing upon previous work, the authors highlight the principal features of CST within the tradition of critical research and attempt to relate it to trends in the Italian school of IS research in recent years, as exemplified by the work of Claudio Ciborra but also evident in work by, e.g. Resca, Jacucci and D'Atri.Design/methodology/approachThis is a (...) conceptual paper which explores CST, characterised by a focus on individual uniqueness, and socially‐constructed, individual worldviews as generators of human knowing.FindingsThe paper draws on work by Heinz Klein in which he elaborated three constitutive stages in critical research: interpretive, genealogical and constructive. The authors introduce a fourth, reflective stage and discuss five categories of critical research, reflecting different perspectives on emancipation, culminating in emergent expressionism, associated with Ciborra and the Italian school more generally.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper discusses approaches to CST and how they might have practical implications in IS development. The distinction between approaches founded in logical empiricism and those founded in hermeneutic dialectics are considered and the development of critical and systems strands are discussed.Practical implicationsThe paper addresses CST as an approach to development of information systems. Such approaches enable users to explore their individually unique understandings and create a constructive dialogue with one another, which emancipates and empowers users to own and control their own development processes and hence build more productive and usable systems.Social implicationsA focus on research which is oriented towards emancipation in the tradition of critical social theory.Originality/valueThe paper draws on extensive theoretical research carried out by the authors over a period of more than ten years in CST and synthesises the practical implications. (shrink)

Just as a stream of genetically modifiedcrops looked set to be approved for commercialproduction in the European Union, the approvalprocedure appears to have become bogged down onceagain by disagreements among and within member states.Old controversies have resurfaced in new forms. Theintractability of the issues suggests that theregulatory procedure has had too narrow a focus,leaving outside its boundary many of the morefundamental aspects that cause people in the EuropeanUnion most concern. Regulators have come underconsiderable pressure to ensure their risk assessmentdecisions are (...) soundly science-based. Ethical issueshave been deemed to lie beyond the scope of theregulatory procedure, as a matter to be consideredseparately by professional ethicists. Yet it has beensuggested that all environmental controversies at rootinvolve disputes about fundamental ethical principles.This paper examines how the ethical issues arecurrently suppressed or sidelined. It discusses how anappreciation of systems thinking and a check on thevalues that underpin decisions, using boundary testingquestions, might contribute to a more constructiveregulatory dialogue, with ethical issues considered asintegral in a way that takes better account ofpeople's concerns. (shrink)

Biological boundaries are important because of what they reveal about the evolution of a lineage, the relationship between organisms of different lineages, the structure and function of particular subsystems of the organism, the interconnection between an organism and its environment, and a myriad of other important issues related to individuality, development, and evolution. Since there is no single unifying theory for all biological sciences, there are various possible theoretical characterizations of what counts as a biological boundary. Theoretical specificity is crucial (...) for the full characterization of a boundary; to this end, it is useful to begin with general properties and then to compare these to those properties specific to a particular biological boundary. This dual heuristic approach—top-down and bottom-up—can then be repeated to increase the robustness of the boundary characterization. In what follows, I explore both the general structural and functional aspects of biological boundaries and those specific to a biological subsystem, which itself is critical to boundary formation, maintenance, and evolution—the vertebrate immune system. It is a remarkable and sobering regularity of nature that organisms remain whole because their parts are constantly being built up and broken down, and this is no less true of their boundaries. The vertebrate immune system is at the center of this process of biological boundary maintenance and breakdown. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment: Critical EssaysTed KinnamanPaul Guyer, editor. Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment: Critical Essays. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. Pp. xxiii + 253. Cloth, $75.95. Paper, $27.95.The volume under review is a collection of essays on a wide range of topics concerning Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment. All the papers included here have been published previously, (...) although many of them in places where they might not be easily accessible to English-speaking philosophers. While some of the articles will be familiar to Kant scholars, this collection should be useful to specialists and valuable to students first delving into the third Critique.One essay in the volume, Guyer's own piece on "Kant's Principles of Reflecting Judgment," will be of particular interest to Kant scholars. Guyer's thesis here is that the account of reflecting judgment Kant offers in the Critique of the Power of Judgment is both continuous with the account of regulative principles of reason in the Critique of Pure Reason and the basis of the unity of the third Critique as a whole. He supports this by demonstrating how each of the sorts of judgment discussed in the work can be seen as an application of the broader account of reflecting judgment in general. Guyer identifies five such applications, and shows that each of them has three features central to regulative principles: they set a goal of constructing a system within a certain specific range of cognitions; they require the suitability of objects for attainment of the goal in question, and thus are transcendental [End Page 499] and not merely logical principles; and they supply heuristic advice for the investigation of nature. Thus every form of judgment can with justice be considered as an instance of the general activity of reflecting, that is, finding a universal for a given particular.Several of the essays included here concern the most prominent issues relating to the Analytic of the Beautiful. Nick Zangwill's piece deals with the disinterestedness of aesthetic judgment, while Christopher Janaway's "Kant's Aesthetics and the Empty Cognitive Stock" debunks what he sees as misguided readings of the role of concepts in judgments of taste. In "The Idealism of Purposiveness," an excerpt from his 1993 book Kantian Aesthetics Pursued (Edinburgh, 1993), Anthony Savile criticizes what he calls the "established reading" of Kant's claim that beautiful objects exhibit "purposiveness without purpose." On this reading, to say that a thing is purposive without purpose is to say that it appears to be designed, but to no particular purpose. Savile argues instead that we should take purposiveness without purpose to indicate that an object is suitable for a function, but not as a result of conscious design. Articles by Eva Schaper (from her well-known book on Kant's aesthetics) and Malcolm Budd discuss the distinction between free and dependent beauty and the account of the sublime, respectively.Some of the other selections in the volume are interesting for their focus on somewhat neglected aspects of the third Critique. One such aspect is the role of the imagination in Kant's account of aesthetic appreciation, and by extension in cognition more generally. In "Imaginative Freedom and the German Enlightenment," Jane Kneller argues that appreciation of the role of imaginative freedom in Kant's account of aesthetic judgment helps to connect Kant to the Enlightenment rationalist tradition that saw the value of art in its ability to educate and improve those who appreciate it. This education cannot, of course, be of the most straightforward nature, since Kant emphatically argues that to judge a thing beautiful is altogether different from judging it morally good. Instead, Kneller argues, our awareness of our own imaginative freedom provides us with evidence of our ability to realize the "highest good" on earth, evidence otherwise denied us in Kant's philosophy. Also addressing the theme of imagination is Donald Crawford's "Kant's Theory of Creative Imagination," in which he points out striking parallels between Kant's account of the imagination's role in mathematics and in the creation of fine art.Another aspect of Kant... (shrink)

There should not be a material/mental methodological division in the frameworks used by social historians, but rather, a structure/action heuristic division. A survey of methodological approaches to social history becomes possible after clearing confusion between philosophical questions, methodological questions, and theories, as well as presenting a preliminary discussion of philosophical issues pertaining to the study of social history. The five general categories of approaches according to their philosophical foundations are: the empiricist and individualist, the systemic- functionalist, the interpretist, the structuralist (...) and poststructuralist, and relational structurist. All those approaches that adopt methodological structurism are able to overcome fundamental epistemological problems in explaining social history; and so they are able to support a sufficiently powerful methodology for studying how action and structure causally interrelate over time. Social history gains an increasing degree of plausibility and can be labelled "scientific" when it is based on a realist ontology of structures and a commitment to discovering the complex, multileveled, structural reality of the world. (shrink)

This essay considers Kant’s concept of the highest good from a systematic point of view. The two spheres of freedom and nature—of the practical and theoretical—need to be brought into a causal relation for the highest good to be achieved. Kant seems to offer numerous possibilities for how human beings are able to think that it is possible for the highest good to be attainable. I argue that it is only in the third Critique, however, that Kant articulates an answer (...) that also establishes freedom and nature within a larger system. The third Critique does this by positing a third, independent and mediating sphere of human experience that allows a transition between freedom and nature to be effected. This answer to the problem of the highest good is distinctive because the causal efficacy of reason in attaining its own demands is preserved. I examine Kant’s view by way of an analysis of his discussion of ‘territory’ and ‘domain’ in the Introduction to the text. (shrink)

In this book, Lara Ostaric argues that Kant’s seminal Critique of Judgment is properly understood as completing his Critical system. The two seemingly disparate halves of the text are unified under this larger project insofar as both aesthetic and teleological judgment indirectly exhibit the final end of reason, the Ideas of the highest good and the postulates, as if obtaining in nature. She relates Kant’s discussion of aesthetic and teleological judgment to important yet under-explored concepts in his philosophy, and (...) helps the reader to recognize the relevance of his aesthetics and teleology for our understanding of fine arts and genius, the possibility of pure judgments of ugliness, Kant’s philosophy of history, his philosophy of religion, and his conception of autonomy. Ostaric’s novel and thoroughly integrative presentation of Kant’s system will be of interest not only to Kant scholars but also to those working in religious studies, art history, political theory, and intellectual history. (shrink)

Prediction and control sufficient for reliable medical and other interventions are prominent aims of modeling in systems biology. The short-term attainment of these goals has played a strong role in projecting the importance and value of the field. In this paper I identify the standard models must meet to achieve these objectives as predictive robustness—predictive reliability over large domains. Drawing on the results of an ethnographic investigation and various studies in the systems biology literature, I explore four current (...) obstacles to achieving predictive robustness; data constraints, parameter uncertainty, collaborative constraints and system-scale requirements. I use a case study and the commentary of systems biologists themselves to show that current practices in the field, rather than pursuing these goals, frequently use models heuristically to investigate and build understanding of biological systems that do not meet standards of predictive robustness but are nonetheless effective uses of computation. A more heuristic conception of modeling allows us to interpret current practices as ways that manage these obstacles more effectively, particularly collaborative constraints, such that modelers can in the long-run at least work towards prediction and control. (shrink)

This book provides a comprehensive account of Kant’s development from the 1755/56 metaphysics to the cosmological antinomy of 1781. With the Theory of the Heavens (1755) and the Physical Monadology (1756), the young Kant had presented an ambitious approach to physical cosmology based on an atomistic theory of matter, which contributed to the foundations of an all-encompassing system of metaphysics. Why did he abandon this system in favor of his critical view that cosmology runs into an antinomy, according to (...) the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR)? This book answers this question by focusing on Kant’s methodology and the internal problems of his 1755/56 theory of nature. A decisive role for Kant’s critical turn plays the argument from incongruent counterparts (1768), which drew much attention among philosophers of science, though not sufficiently in Kant research. Furthermore, the book analyses the genesis of the cosmological antinomy in the 1770s, the logical structure of the antinomy in the CPR, its relation to transcendental idealism, as explained in the “experiment of pure reason” (1787), and its role for the teleology of human reason. The book is addressed to Kant scholars, philosophers of science, and students of Kant’s philosophy. (shrink)

Yugoslavia was the site of unorthodox thinking on multiple fronts during the postwar period. In addition to the geopolitical innovation of the “non-aligned movement” and its domestic attempt at “self-management socialism,” the intellectual environment in the country after Tito’s 1948 break with Stalin also allowed for the development of theoretical work that departed from the Marxism-Leninism of the rest of the communist bloc. One of the most important attempts to blend Marxism with decidedly non-Leninist elements comes from the Slovenian politician (...) and intellectual, France Bučar. In the postwar period, Bučar sought to link his political activity to his intellectual work by developing his own critical systems theory. Unlike the thinkers within the Soviet Union, he was able to explore theoretical resources beyond Karl Marx, focusing in particular the groundbreaking work of Max Weber. This resulted in an agent-centric approach to systems theory that highlights the importance of the individual and geopolitical ethics. This paper aims to situate Bučar’s work in the context of postwar Yugoslavia. In so doing, I bring Bučar into conversation with the most important movement that sought to bring Marx together with Weber from the Western side of the Iron Curtain, i.e. the Frankfurt School of critical theory. I argue that certain aspects of Bučar’s critical systems theory bear a striking resemblance to Habermas’s own attempts to integrate Weberian insights into his own version of critical theory. I conclude by reflecting on how Bučar’s work can be understood as a combination of Eastern praxis with Western critique. (shrink)

A large body of the literature on sustainability indicators, assessments and reporting is currently available. However, sustainability performance measurement systems have an insubstantial presence in the literature. Invariably, a sustainability performance measurement system presents the potential for certain trade-offs or opportunity costs for organizations. Extant sustainability platforms and standards are largely silent about how to deal with trade-offs. Utilizing evidence from the literature, as well as contingency factors, this paper seeks to present a heuristic model for establishing trade-offs in (...) corporate sustainability performance measurement systems. Trade-offs in this area revolve around performance measurement, stakeholder management, competitive advantage, as well as the vertical and horizontal integration of the performance platform. This is particularly important for organizations seeking to establish, integrate or expand their environmental management systems into the area of sustainability. As yet, formalistic attempts to deal with trade-offs in sustainability performance measurement systems are infrequent and vague. (shrink)

Two lines of argument with which kant defends the distinction between thought and intuition are examined. It is argued that attempts to establish thought and intuition as separate faculties on the basis of the immediacy and singularity of intuitions and the mediacy and generality of concepts fail. Kant's second way of making out the distinction is a transcendental account of the possibility of an intellect like ours. He argues that it is a fundamental characteristic of the human intellect that it (...) is not intuitive and that we can be brought into relation with objects only through an intuitive faculty distinct from the faculty of conceptual representation. This line of argument is reconstructed from kant's correspondence and the "critique of judgment", And it is argued that it represents "a" plausible kantian response to criticisms of his distinction. (shrink)

The essay examines kant's treatment of mechanisms and mechanical science in the major works of kant's critical period. it is argued that kant's conception of mechanism as a science must be understood through the distinctive elements the critical idea of nature developed in the "critique of pure reason" and the "critique of judgement". rather than appearing as a champion of the sufficiency of classical mechanics, kant emerges as one puzzled about the very intelligibility of the basic concepts of (...) a mechanical science. he ultimately maintains that the coherence of mechanical science derives from the regulative idea of systematic unity. (shrink)

Systems biology is sometimes presented as providing a superior approach to the problem of biological complexity. Its use of ‘unbiased’ methods and formal quantitative tools might lead to the impression that the human factor is effectively eliminated. However, a closer look reveals that this impression is misguided. Systems biologists cannot simply assemble molecular information and compute biological behavior. Instead, systems biology’s main contribution is to accelerate the discovery of mechanisms by applying models as heuristic tools. These models (...) rely on a variety of idealizing and simplifying assumptions in order to be efficient for this purpose. The strategies of systems biologists are similar to those of experimentalists in that they attempt to reduce the complexity of the discovery process. Analyzing and comparing these strategies, or ‘heuristics’, reveals the importance of the human factor in computational approaches and helps to situate systems biology within the epistemic landscape of the life sciences. (shrink)