I have little to say on this passage, where it seems necessary to maintain the vulgate notwith standing its obvious defects. My only reason for discussing it is to call attention to the strangeness of Jebb's proceeding when seeking to support Hermann's conjecture παλλλοιν which he admits into the text. The objection to Hermann's view is that, as he himself admits, there is no evidence that πáλληλος could be used in the sense of λληλιφóνος. For that, I suppose, is the (...) meaning of ‘mutual hands,’ which both Jebb and Campbell suggest as a translation, although ‘mutual violence’ would be better. But the chief purpose of this note is to protest against the mode of interpretation applied to Philo de Mose 3. 36. II. p. 175 M. διà τàς ν δασι καí πνρì γνιμéνας συνχς καì παλλλονς φθορáς Turnebu s rightl yrenders ‘alternas interneciones,’ and why Jebb supposes him to have meant ‘mutual’ I do not know. Anyhow he admits that Philo used the word in its ordinary sense of successive, and proceeds to paraphrase ‘owing to the continuous and rapid succession of calamities by flood and fire’ . All this is quite beside the mark, for the reference is to the alternate destruction of the world at the κπρωσις by fire and at the ξγρωσιςby water. I must take leave to refer to the evidence collected in my book on Zeno and Cleanthes, p. 253, to which should be added a most instructive passage of Origen : περì τν κακν λóγος ο μνóντων ì ν τατᾦ διà τν τοι τηροσαν τà πì γ$$$ς πρóνοιαν κατακλνσμο καì κπνρ03CE;σσι καθαíρονσαν.Add the passages from Lucan quoted by Mr. Heitland in his Introduction, p. xliii. (shrink)

Accounts of spiritual formation which depend overmuch on individualism are likely distorted by that individualism, and this article argues that an account of collective-personhood can provide a necessary corrective to this anthropological distortion. The article begins by diagnosing the problem of individualism in formation, utilizing Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self, and critiquing several common practices of spiritual formation. Following this, we consider Bonhoeffer’s theological vision for the collective-person from his first book, Sanctorum Communio. Next, we examine Murray (...) Bowen’s Family Systems Theory to help us envision, from a social scientific perspective, how such a collective-personhood might look. The article concludes with a provisional model for spiritual formation of collective-persons. (shrink)

In the Sociology of Emotion and Affect Studies, affects are usually regarded as an aspect of human beings alone, or of impersonal or collective atmospheres. However, feelings and emotions are only specific cases of affectivity that require subjective inner selves, while the concept of ‘atmospheres’ fails to explain the singularity of each individual case. This article develops a theory of social affect that does not reduce affect to either personal feelings or collective emotions. First, I use a Spinozist (...) understanding of the ‘body’ to conceptualize the receptivity and mutual constitution of bodies, to show how affects do not ‘belong’ to anybody; they are not solely attributable either to the human or to any kind of body alone, but emerge in situations of the encounter and interaction. Next I build upon Jean-Marie Guyau’s concept of transmissions to show how we can theorize affect as an emerging transmission between and among bodies. Finally, I demonstrate how we now have a complete conceptual frame for theorizing affect in relation to all bodies in any given social scene, the grand composition of which I call affectif. (shrink)

This study analyzes the increasing presence and capabilities of wearable computing devices in the cornucopia of personalized digital data. We argue that the institutional data practices typical of Google Glass will pose policy challenges and herald yet another dramatic shift to personalized data marketing. We also highlight the characteristics of Google’s existing synergetic data practices that will shape the development of not only Google Glass, but also all subsequent wearable mobile devices in light of 360-degree data collection. The key organizing (...) concept of our study is the disjuncture between institutional and policy forces in harnessing dual market mechanism, which frames how the new communication industry operates in the marketplace of ubiquitous personal advertising. We conclude by summarizing the three key areas of political-policy concern and suggest future solutions, with the discussion on the future of wearable computing practices related to the freedom of the human body. (shrink)

Anthropogenic climate change threatens humanity as a whole, making its mitigation a matter of pressing concern. Mitigation efforts at the institutional level are necessary to successfully change the course of climate change, but thus far governments and industries have been ineffective at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. A point of philosophical contention is whether individuals have a moral responsibility to reduce their own emissions given the lack of institutional action. I argue that they do by redefining climate change as a (...) class='Hi'>collective impact. Individual emitters share collective responsibility for that impact, which translates to an individual duty to reduce their contribution. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Full Collection of Personal NarrativesZohar Lederman, Ola Ziara, Rachel Coghlan, Oksana Sulaieva, Anna Shcherbakova, Oleksandr Dudin, Vladyslava Kachkovska, Iryna Dudchenko, Anna Kovchun, Lyudmyla Prystupa, Yuliya Nogovitsyna, Ghaiath Hussein, Kathryn Fausch, P. P. Kyaw, Ayesha Ahmad, Richard W Sams II, Handreen Mohammed Saeed, Artem Riga, Ryan C. Maves, Elizabeth Dotsenko, Irina Deyneka, Eva V. Regel, and Vita Voloshchuk• An Unsettling Affair• How We Keep Caring While Walking Through Our Pain• (...) Adjusting Laboratory Practices to the Challenges of Wartime• Why We Stay• A Semi-Personal Story from a Ukrainian NGO Professional (or a Semi-Professional Story from a Ukrainian Person) Living through the War• When Ethics Survives Where People Do Not: A Story From Darfur• Burma’s Healthcare Under Fire: My Experience as an Exiled Medical Professional• When a Conflict Collapses on a Child: An (Aborted) Medical Evacuation of a Hazara Toddler During the Kabul Airport Blast and the Taliban Takeover• The Vagaries and Vicissitudes of War• Providing Care to a Potential Aggressor: An Ethical Dilemma• One Surgeon’s Experience During Armed Conflict in Ukraine• The Limits of Our Obligations• A Liberating Breath• Soldiers of the Invisible Front: How Ukrainian Therapists Are Fighting for the Mental Health of the Nation Under Fire• Stories of Families with Chronically Ill Pediatric Patients during the War in UkraineCopyright © 2023 Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

Much debate concerning ‘precedent autonomy’ – that is, the authority of former, competent selves to govern the welfare of later, non-competent selves – has assumed a radical discontinuity between selves, and has overlooked the ‘bridging’ role of intimate proxy decision-makers. I consider a recent proposal by Lynn et al. (1999) that presents a provocative alternative, foregrounding an imagined dialogue between the formerly competent patient and her/his trusted others. I consider what standards must be met for such dialogues to have moral (...) force, appealing to narrative and feminist ethics. I then critique the dualistic construction of selves implicit in much of the advance directive literature, noting the continuities of dependence, character, and body, as well as the social dimension of the construction of selves. (shrink)

Organisational leaders mismanaging business affairs are guided by performance pressures and/or greed while pressurising employees to follow. Unethical activities have led to stakeholder losses, with no accountability by individuals perpetuating the fraud. Corporate governance frameworks and subsequent reforms have been used merely as tick box measures, proving them inefficient in numerous corporate collapses. This study intends to explore and analyse the roles of personal and collective virtues in corporate citizenship. Developing from the virtues theory and using a mixed method (...) of three focus group discussions and a self-administered questionnaire of 119 participants from various organisations, the authors establish that personal virtues are important to portray ethical individualism. However, in a corporate setting, collective virtues are more important to enhance corporate citizenship, through ethical culture and collective accountability. (shrink)

There are a number of controversies surrounding responsibility, but few doubt that there is anything conceptually confused or morally problematic about holding competent adults responsible for their free and informed actions. Thus, we regularly praise (and perhaps reward) people for behaving virtuously or blame (and perhaps punish) them for their vicious deeds. In today's world, though, much of the most important good and evil is done not by solitary individuals, but by groups of people acting in concert. The most spectacular (...) technological advances and the most horrific wars, for instance, are often the work of private corporations and political states. And if humanity regularly achieves its greatest triumphs and commits its most deplorable sins as collectives, it is worth exploring the plausibility of holding groups responsible for their actions. (shrink)

The part of the system of education of academician I. P. Ivanov - the collective organizational activity is studied. Collective organizing activities (COA) is a method of organizing children’s life, when in planning, organizing and analyzing actively participates every child. We prove that the experience of participating in COA provides the development of organizational, prognostic, reflective, communicative skills of children, establishing an ability to work together, to self-regulation, the ability to make decisions. The collective organizing activity accumulates (...) experience of democratic interaction, which forms the democratic culture of the pupil. (shrink)

Studies of workers in health care and the care of older people disclose tensions that emerge partly from their conflicting obligations. They incur some obligations from the personal relationships they have with clients, but these can be at odds with organizational demands and resource constraints. One implication is the need for policies to recognize the importance of allowing workers some discretion in decison making. Another implication may be that sometimes care workers can meet their obligations to clients only by taking (...) collective action. (shrink)

Reconstructing the Personal Library of William James: Markings and Marginalia from the Harvard Library Collection is a much needed resource to facilitate archival and library research on the life and thought of James by providing scholars with the most comprehensive annotated catalog of his personal library.

The paper argues that the dynamics of personal and collective individuation could be interrelated and bear ethical significance thanks to an analysis of the Lifeworld and intersubjectivity that link together the genetic and the generative perspectives of phenomenology. The first section of the paper recalls the epistemological and ontological implications of Husserl's and Stein's analysis of personal individuation in relation to what Husserl would call, later, the “Lifeworld” and the intersubjective constitution of communities. The second section of the paper (...) turns to a phenomenology of the Lifeworld through an analysis of refugees' care and the intersubjective dynamics involved in the clinic of exile. Such an example will bring to light the importance of embodiment and intercorporeity to grasp the process through which the genetic constitution of the Lifeworld constitutes itself as a collective process of individuation trying to heal the scars of historicity. Consequently, individuation will appear as a personal and collective task, rather than a static and ego-centered achievement that would be forgetful of our fundamental interdependency. Finally, the last section argues that “healing the Lifeworld” does not amount to conceive of its “horizon” as being itself a predetermined “telos” of transcendental subjectivity, as if this open structure could be itself constituted. Rather, the varieties of the Lifeworld and its paradoxical movement of appropriation and differentiation point to a relational ontology that considers the becoming of a common and meaningful world as a _limit-problem_ of phenomenology and, perhaps, its ethical and critical promise. (shrink)

The results of education in the conditions of collective creative interaction are discussed. The results of research of the self-image, an image of the senior companion, images of the good and the bad man in consciousness of children and adult, present and former members of the children’s organization working by a technique of collective creative education are presented.

Collective memory is thought to be something “more” than a conglomeration of personal memories which compose it. Yet, each of us, each individual in every society, remembers from a personal point of view. And if there is memory beyond personal experience through which collective identities are configured, in what “place” might one legitimately situate it? In addressing this question, this article examines the political significance of the distinction between two levels of what are often lumped together under the (...) term of “collective memory”: memories that are retained through the direct experience of groups or associations of a limited size and those that are rarely the object of direct experience constituting the events marking the identities of mass societies. (shrink)

In complex societies, there will always be situations in which an individual's deeply held beliefs conflict with the collective norms of the society. When only one individual challenges those norms, the norms generally hold. When challenges come from many individuals, the norms themselves may change. The tolerance for different beliefs will depend upon the political structure of the society and the specific beliefs that are being challenged.The Greek tragedy Antigone is an exploration of the choices that rulers can make (...) regarding such conflicts. They can either tolerate the unpopular and subversive views of an individual or punish the individual in a way that attempts to uphold the existing rules, bolster the... (shrink)

Phenomenology has been adapted for use in qualitative health research, where it’s often used as a method for conducting interviews and analyzing interview data. But how can phenomenologists study subjects who cannot accurately reflect upon or report their own experiences, for instance, because of a psychiatric or neurological disorder? For conditions like these, qualitative researchers may gain more insight by conducting observational studies in lieu of, or in conjunction with, interviews. In this article, we introduce a phenomenological approach to conducting (...) this kind of observational research. The approach relies on conceptual grounding to focus a study on specific aspects of the participants’ experiences. Moreover, the approach maintains the openness to novel discoveries that qualitative research requires while also providing a structured framework for data collection and analysis. To illustrate its practical application, we use examples of hemispatial neglect—a neurologic disorder in which patients characteristically lack awareness of their own illness and bodily capacities. However, the approach that we describe can be applied more broadly to the study of complex illness experiences and other experiential alterations. (shrink)

Prior studies have shown that people imagine their personal future to be more positive than their country’s collective future. The present research extends the nascent literature by examining the valence and perceived control of personal and national future events in a new experimental paradigm, the cultural generalizability of the findings, and the relation of future thinking to psychological well-being. US college students (Study 1) and US and Turkish community participants (Study 2) imagined what might happen to them and their (...) country in three time points (i.e., next week, next year, and in 10–15 years). They then rated the emotional valence and perceived control of the events and completed a psychological well-being measure. Both US and Turkish participants imagined their personal future to be more positive than their country’s future, whereas they attributed higher perceived control to their countries for national future events than to themselves for personal future events. The positivity of national (Study 1) and personal future events (Study 2) predicted better psychological well-being, whereas perceived control did not. These original findings enrich our theoretical understanding of future thinking. (shrink)

Organisational Ethics could be more effectively taught if organisational agency could be better distinguished from activity in other group entities, and defended against criticisms. Some criticisms come from the side of what is called “methodological individualism”. These critics argue that, strictly speaking, only individuals really exist and act, and organisations are not individuals, real things, or agents. Other criticisms come from fear of the possible use of alleged “corporate personhood” to argue for a possible radical expansion of corporate rights e.g. (...) to claim a right to vote. Others say that if corporate businesses were persons, and judged as such, they would be sociopaths (Bakan 2004). Large corporate businesses are one kind of organisation, and if organisations were allowed to claim to be full persons, this would mean that the latter criticisms were valid. The proposed account goes between the horns of the above dilemma: impersonal aggregates or full persons. It avoids both the reductive individualism and expansive, full personhood account. It gives grounds for attributing and distributing praise and blame to organisations as whole complex entities, and to their parts. Primarily, responsibility belongs to Board incumbents within them, on the basis of their goals; their direction of the acts of the other main internal role incumbents, managers and staff, and enablers, in the role structure; their own ethical decision methods; the impact of their acts on external stakeholders like end-users, other players in the practice or local community, and on the state. These factors are picked out on the basis of a theory of meaning Aristotle’s theory of analogy of attribution, some architectonic features of his Philosophical Anthropology; and Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics (NAVE). The paper expounds a quasi-person model of organisations, (QPM), previously described in this journal (Ardagh 2011, 2012, 2013). This model identifies functional similarities at three levels, between capacities within natural persons (NPs) on the one hand and the roles/ incumbents within the structure of organisational artificial/quasi-persons (APs on the other). In each entity, we find an architectonic direction, sub-ordered operational entities, and enablers (a DOE structure) in a communicative structure or reporting chain of authority. The common elements between natural persons (NP) and artificial persons (AP) and their ethically relevant attributes are captured in an acronym –GRAEOS. Both persons and organisations have a “top” entity capable of having/choosing worthwhile ethically permissible goals, G; of architectonically directing the use of capacities/repertoires or incumbents in designed architectonic roles, R, within a DOE-type structure, well or badly; of using ethical decision making procedures, E; of execution of good choices for the person or organisation in action, A, with good or bad impacts on others, or with others, O, in the context practice or domain; and of having good relations with the law and the state, S. Application to the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster, and public sector organisations, is briefly discussed to illustrate the potential to deal with short or long case study narratives. (shrink)

The current study examined the validity of HEXACO personality traits (at the broad trait-level and narrow facet-level) and Self-Control as predictors of counterproductive academic behavior (CAB; at the overall level and specific dimensional level) among college students. We collected data from 483 undergraduate students in South Korea who completed self-report measures of HEXACO personality traits, Self-Control, CAB. Results showed that Conscientiousness (_r_ = −.23) and Honesty-Humility (_r_ = −.25) were significantly correlated with CAB and that Self-Control provided incremental (...) validity over HEXACO personality traits in predicting CAB. The correlations of Conscientiousness and Self-Control with CAB were consistently negative at the facet-level. However, within each HEXACO trait, there was some variability in the strength (and sometimes, the direction) of the relationships between the facet traits and CAB dimensions. Additionally, hierarchical multiple regression analysis results showed that Self-Control provided incremental validity for predicting CAB beyond prediction provided by the HEXACO personality traits. The results provide further support for personality and Self-Control as meaningful predictors of counterproductive academic behavior in college. (shrink)

A person's well‐being consists in his successful pursuit of valuable, willingly embraced goals. Many of these goals have a nested structure, and presuppose the existence of social forms or collective goods. Self‐interest is a narrower notion than that of personal well‐being. Self‐interest is advanced by fulfilment of a person's biologically determined needs and desires, including his feelings of satisfaction or contentment that arise from his pursuit of goals, which he was not biologically determined to have. Unlike the division between (...) morality and self‐interest, there is no deep division between morality and personal well‐being. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Matter and Organisms Organisms and Persons Is There a Criterion of Personal Identity?

We often praise and blame groups of people like companies or governments, just like we praise and blame individual persons. This makes sense. Because some of the most important problems in our society, like climate change or mass surveillance, are not caused by individual people, but by groups. Philosophers have argued that there exists such a thing as group responsibility, which does not boil down to individual responsibility. This type of responsibility can only exist in groups that are organized with (...) joint knowledge, actions and intentions. However, often disorganized groups without joint knowledge, actions and intentions are precisely the kinds of groups that cause problems. Therefore, in such cases, it becomes difficult, according to traditional accounts of collective responsibility to attribute responsibility to such groups. This has problematic implications. Therefore, I propose a new way of seeing collective responsibility, which is able to attribute the vice of irresponsibility to such disorganized groups. This involves seeing responsibility not as a relationship between the group and some action, but rather, as a virtue. In cases where it is difficult to establish whether a group is responsible for something, we should ask ‘is this group responsible, or irresponsible?’ This line of questioning is likely to be a more productive and philosophically legitimate way of holding groups morally responsible in such cases. (shrink)

Background: The current study intends to enrich the content of the relationship between personality, subjective well-being, and narcissism. Previous studies have shown that extroverted individuals have higher subjective well-being. Methodology: In order to study the relationship between personality, subjective well-being, and narcissistic behavior of college students, a convenient sampling method was used to select college students; they were tested by Eysenck personality questionnaire, total well-being scale, and overt narcissism questionnaire. The collected data were analyzed by t-test and (...) correlation analysis. Results: The findings suggest that there is a positive correlation between College Students' personality type and subjective well-being. College students with extraversion personalities have high subjective well-being, while college students with introversion personalities have low subjective well-being. There is a positive correlation between College Students' personality type and narcissistic behavior. College students with extraverted personalities are more narcissistic, and college students with introverted personalities are less likely to be narcissistic. There is a positive correlation between College Students' subjective well-being and narcissistic behavior. College students with high subjective well-being are more narcissistic, and college students with low subjective well-being are less likely to be narcissistic. Contributions of the study: This study provides an important basis and Enlightenment for discussing the relationship between College Students' personalities, subjective well-being, and narcissistic behavior. College students with different personality types will feel different levels of well-being and narcissistic behavior. There is also a close relationship between College Students' overall well-being and narcissistic behavior. (shrink)

Philosophers and economists write about collective action from distinct but related points of view. This paper aims to bridge these perspectives. Economists have been concerned with rationality in a strategic context. There, problems posed by “coordination games” seem to point to a form of rational action, “team thinking,” which is not individualistic. Philosophers’ analyses of collective intention, however, sometimes reduce collective action to a set of individually instrumental actions. They do not, therefore, capture the first person plural (...) perspective characteristic of team thinking. Other analyses, problematically, depict intentions ranging over others’ actions. I offer an analysis of collective intention which avoids these problems. A collective intention aims only at causing an individual action, but its propositional content stipulates its mirroring in other minds. (shrink)

Philosophers constantly discuss Responsibility. Yet in every discussion of which I am aware, a rather obvious point is ignored. The obvious point is that responsibility is ascribed to collectives, as well as to individual persons. Blaming attitudes are held towards collectives as well as towards individuals. Responsibility is often ascribed to nations, towns, clubs, groups, teams, and married couples. ‘Germany was responsible for the Second World War’; ‘The club as a whole is to blame for being relegated’. Such statements are (...) not rare. (shrink)

This chapter will develop standards for assessing individual moral responsibility for collective action. In some cases, these standards expand a person’s responsibility beyond what she or he would be responsible for if performing the same physical behavior outside of a group setting. I will argue that structural differences between two ideal types of groups— organizations and goal- oriented collectives— largely determine the baseline moral responsibility of group members for the group’s collective action. (Group members can be more or (...) less responsible for collective action beyond that baseline due to personal qualities like knowledge of the intended collective outcome.) The same individual physical behavior can make the member of a goal-oriented collective responsible for the entire collective action to an equal degree with her fellow group members, whereas the typical organization member is only responsible for his contributory action. (shrink)

An account of the ontological nature of collectives would be useful for several reasons. A successful theory would help to show us a route through the thicket of views known as “methodological individualism”. It would have a bearing on the plausibility of legal positivism. It would be relevant to the question whether collectives are capable of acting. The debate about the ontology of collectives is therefore important for such fields as the theory of action, social and political philosophy, the philosophy (...) of law and the philosophy of social science. I hope to contribute to the debate by proposing an account of collectives, and by showing its theoretical soundness and utility. In its essentials, my proposal is that collectives are “mereological sums” of “stages” of persons linked by a “unity relation”. The influence on this account of some theories of personal identity will perhaps be obvious. But the motivation is different, for it lies at least as much in the ability of the theory to help us deal with the issues already mentioned as in problems concerning the identity of collectives over time. I acknowledge that my proposal is not commonsensical; however, I believe that no account could be both commonsensical and adequate. I will begin by introducing some constraints on a theory of collectives. (shrink)