The philosophical analysis of trauma has grown over the last ten years due to our need to elucidate the lived experience endured by an increasing number of human beings undergoing forced migration, abuses, war crimes, and traumatizing situations. The irreducibility of trauma renders the task of care ethics more and more difficult. Yet, this paper argues that a phenomenological analysis of the care relation with traumatized patients can help elucidate the inter-affective dynamics at stake in such encounters. First, I will (...) analyze the phenomenon of compassion fatigue and show how it differs from “emotional contagion” and how it relates to empathy. Relying on phenomenological approaches to empathy, I will assess the kind of “affective sharing” entailed by compassion fatigue. In the second section, I will reframe this conception of empathy by uncovering the existential feeling of vulnerability and the pre-reflective bodily resonance that frames our encounter with others. In the final section, I will argue that vicarious traumatization could be overcome thanks to a “creative kind” of compassion which links the sense of self to the sense of agency, the act of caring with the quest for justice, in a constant effort to restore balance through affective sharing and mutual recognition. (shrink)

The contemporary emphasis on vulnerability and interdependence stresses the ethical necessity of a critical care concept to undermine the individualistic paradigm of autonomy and the modern understanding of well-being regarding individual self-achievement and world mastery. This paper analyzes how the philosophical investigation of vulnerability has led to an existential, social, and ethical reflection that brought to light a fundamental interdependence among living beings. This chapter examines the nature of this interdependence and the type of relations involved in these dynamics. The (...) author argues that caring for the living involves a holistic approach of the human being that considers not only the plurality of her interpersonal relations but also her relation to the environment and her relation to her ‘self’ as a person with rights and responsibility. Moreover, speaking of interdependence also implies examining the philosophical understanding of our modern concepts of nature and culture along the lines of a philosophical critique of the immunity paradigm and cultural biology anew. Drawing on phenomenological ethics, this chapter shows that the concept of responsibility that stems from this renewed understanding of interdependence implies an ethics based on responsiveness and responsibility that articulates the dignity of human beings as persons with the care for the living they demonstrate in the ‘forms of life’ they inhabit with others. It bears consequences for contemporary issues in bioethics, such as caring for vulnerable people or determining the moral standing of our relations. (shrink)

How can one overcome self-centeredness in order to care for and do justice to significant others as well as foreigners? “Establish the right distance,” is the imperative that Ricœur formulates in order to address the paradox of autonomy and vulnerability, and to reintroduce an ethical conception of justice at the heart of political power. This article shows how understanding justice in light of vulnerability leads us to take into account both the violence coextensive with social relations and political conflicts and (...) the restoration of agency required by such circumstances. Whether it is conceived in light of difference, dissimilarity or interval, the “right distance” that Ricœur calls for is based on a symbolic topography of the common good, which establishes a relationship of interdependence between the subject and others. (shrink)

"Dans cette thèse, je démontre que la tradition phénoménologique développe une redéfinition ontologique de l'individuation du sujet fondée sur la notion d'intentionnalité opérante. J'explique comment cette redéfinition offre une nouvelle approche de la vision du monde et des relations intersubjectives qui ne serait ni réflexive ni représentative. Néanmoins, cette configuration montre le développement parallèle de l'individuation du sujet et de ses expressions, grâce à une ontologie relationnelle, aux implications épistémologiques et éthiques. Analysant la phénoménologie de Husserl, je mets au jour (...) le rapport entre individuation et intentionnalité en montrant que cette relation permet de repenser les problèmes de l'ipséité et de la différence (1). A la lumière de l'analyse heideggérienne du Dasein et de la description merleau-pontienne du corps propre, je montre alors que l'individuation doit être conçue comme un processus permanent de différenciation qui ne repose plus sur le schéma hylémorphique ou sur la représentation cartésienne du sujet (2). Je décris le type de mouvement ontologique qui caractérise l'individuation, en m'appuyant sur Patočka et Simondon, afin de montrer la corrélation de la manifestation du monde et de l'individuation du sujet (3). Celle-ci suppose la nécessité paradoxale de la contingence afin de pouvoir penser l'individuation comme ouverture radicale, modelée par une certaine forme d'altérité. En m'appuyant sur l'ontologie tardive de Merleau-Ponty, la psychanalyse et l'herméneutique, je cherche ensuite à dévoiler la structure analogique - mais non représentationaliste - du sensible et à repenser la corrélation à la lumière du processus d'individuation éprouvé par le sujet (4). Rendant compte de la généralité et de la générativité du mouvement charnel, je démontre pour finir que cette structure analogique permet d'élaborer des conceptions de l'individuation et de la réflexivité requérant moins la mort du sujet, comme dans l'optique poststructuraliste, que sa métamorphose et son advenue. Cette thèse conclut en ouvrant des perspectives utiles à la compréhension de la vie, dans les recherches épistémologiques contemporaines (5), et à l'examen éthique de nos visions du monde et de la responsabilité qui incombe au sujet, dans l'épreuve contingente de ses désirs (6). " --. (shrink)

The vulnerability of the human world is an edited book that collects papers reflecting on the problem of well-being, health, and vulnerability in our current society. The ‘human world’ to which we refer points to the anthropological, environmental, and ecological issues in relation to health and well-being that we propose to discuss. It addresses the need for a critical anthropological concept that overcomes the biases of modern anthropocentrism while addressing the specific responsibility of humans in contemporary world crisis. We do (...) not try to give a final definition for what vulnerability is, but we problematize the notion of well-being as a standard of non-vulnerability that is often imposed on human beings; often well-being becomes a measure within which human beings should fit to not be vulnerable. Consequently, well-being has been implicitly defined as the opposite of vulnerability – especially when vulnerability is conceived as a risk or a threat to oneself or the community, rather than a potential source of growth and transformation. For this reason, we believe that well-being is more the title of a problem rather than its solution. This paradigm initiates, indeed, a “positive” conception of health that aims to push the boundaries of human finitude such as suffering, illness and the recognition of mortality. Usually, we assume that well-being is the final goal of our choices and the gist of a decent life, but we spend more time striving for well-being than asking ourselves what being well means for us, as individuals and societies. This paradox may generate emotional frustration which often worsens our condition rather than helps it reach its optimum. Moreover, it may generate and increase inequalities between people and countries who may suffer from the discrepancies in their access to healthcare or vaccination. Therefore, it also raises questions about collective justice and interdependence. Indeed, the concept of well-being seems to block a critical and epistemological appraisal of the concept of “health,” conflating thereby the impression of being “well,” which is normed by sociological, cultural and moral standards with the lived reality of what it means to be healthy – which itself needs to be questioned in light of the scientific paradigms that built human biology and environmental approaches over the past decades. (shrink)

What are the challenges that Nietzsche's philosophy poses for contemporary phenomenology? Elodie Boublil, Christine Daigle, and an international group of scholars take Nietzsche in new directions and shed light on the sources of phenomenological method in Nietzsche, echoes and influences of Nietzsche within modern phenomenology, and connections between Nietzsche, phenomenology, and ethics. Nietzsche and Phenomenology offers a historical and systematic reconsideration of the scope of Nietzsche’s thought.

The paper argues that the dynamics of personal and collective individuation could be interrelated and bear ethical significance thanks to an analysis of the Lifeworld and intersubjectivity that link together the genetic and the generative perspectives of phenomenology. The first section of the paper recalls the epistemological and ontological implications of Husserl's and Stein's analysis of personal individuation in relation to what Husserl would call, later, the “Lifeworld” and the intersubjective constitution of communities. The second section of the paper turns (...) to a phenomenology of the Lifeworld through an analysis of refugees' care and the intersubjective dynamics involved in the clinic of exile. Such an example will bring to light the importance of embodiment and intercorporeity to grasp the process through which the genetic constitution of the Lifeworld constitutes itself as a collective process of individuation trying to heal the scars of historicity. Consequently, individuation will appear as a personal and collective task, rather than a static and ego-centered achievement that would be forgetful of our fundamental interdependency. Finally, the last section argues that “healing the Lifeworld” does not amount to conceive of its “horizon” as being itself a predetermined “telos” of transcendental subjectivity, as if this open structure could be itself constituted. Rather, the varieties of the Lifeworld and its paradoxical movement of appropriation and differentiation point to a relational ontology that considers the becoming of a common and meaningful world as a _limit-problem_ of phenomenology and, perhaps, its ethical and critical promise. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Deleuze, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty: The Logics and Pragmatics of Creation, Affective Life, and Perception by Dorothea E. OlkowskiElodie BoublilOLKOWSKI, Dorothea E. Deleuze, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty: The Logics and Pragmatics of Creation, Affective Life, and Perception. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2021. 180 pp. Cloth, $63.00; paper, $28.00[End Page 152]Dorothea E. Olkowski's latest book carefully examines "the relationship between the creation of ideas and their actualization in relation to semiology, logic and (...) the cosmos in the philosophies of Deleuze, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty." However, this work is neither an extensive or historical account of Deleuze's, Bergson's, and Merleau-Ponty's philosophies, nor an attempt to homogenize their views on space, time, or perception. Instead, it subtly compares their differences and similarities to move beyond metaphysical dualism, and fruitfully rethinks the relations between formal logic and ontology. Indeed, the author aims to draw a "theory of form," based on the logic of sensation, ultimately designed "to take the place of a theory of the real, of material physical forces."Chapter 1 retraces the history of postmodernist claims and their philosophical legacy. Olkowski explains that postmodernism is not first and foremost a political worldview or a debunking of objectivity in natural sciences. Instead, "it begins as a formal system or series of formal systems." Olkowski explores how Deleuze draws on the knowledge of modern science and logic (Bolzano, Cavaillès) and on Bergson's critical analysis of it to elaborate his logic of sensation. Bergson's conception of affectivity impacted Deleuze's and Merleau-Ponty's theories of corporeality and sensation, and their understanding of perception. Bergson's concept of "body image" specifically influenced Deleuze's elaboration of the concept of "movement-image," through which he tried to overcome the dichotomy set up by mind–body dualism.Chapter 2 focuses on Deleuze and Guattari's critique of logic as an attempt to find a third way between idealism and materialism and to overcome the disconnection between formal logic and lived experience. It reviews their critique of Euclidean geometry, their objections to formal logic as set out by Frege and Russell, and their assessment of phenomenology in order to eventually show Deleuze's affinity with Peirce's pragmatist approach. Then, the author aims to determine if Deleuze's attempt could be compatible with the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Bergson's understanding of quality and multiplicity.Chapter 3 focuses on Bergson. Recalling the controversy with Russell, Einstein, and Langevin, Olkowski refers to Merleau-Ponty's defense of Bergson's concept of intuition to prove the accuracy of his reflection on creative forces and pure duration. As she explains, "[T]he intent here is to clarify the relations between these different aspects of Bergson's thought and draw out how Deleuze makes use of these structures derived from Bergson's philosophy." This leads her to explore, more specifically, how Deleuze reworks the concept of "multiplicity" along the lines of Bergson's analysis of the élan vital.In chapter 4 the author focuses on Deleuze's work on cinema to deepen the philosophical correlation between Bergson's concepts, Deleuze's analysis, and the influences of Merleau-Ponty and Pierce. It aims to rethink the relation between movement and time, notably through the notions of time-image and movement-image. Olkowski notably showcases Deleuze's concept of destiny, "which is the pure power of time that [End Page 153] overflows all possible reaction. It defeats, immobilizes, and petrifies figures in their own affectivity; it sends them to their fate, destroying conventions along the way. For Merleau-Ponty, as for Bergson, acts are still possible in a network of temporal relations so that motion and time are destiny but differently than for Deleuze."Chapter 5 addresses the Phenomenology of Perception and how Merleau-Ponty provides an opportunity to rethink perception. In this book and his Courses on Nature, Merleau-Ponty "does not dismiss either position—that of objective science or that of the natural attitude—but argues that although each contains an element of truth, it is perception and only perception that allows us to bridge the gap between physical reality and behavior/comportment." Deleuze will depart from... (shrink)

In Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence, Merleau-Ponty draws on Malraux’s theory, developed in Le Musée Imaginaire and Les Voix du Silence, according to which modern art is the achievement of subjectivity’s creative powers in its ability to achieve the metamorphosis of the world through her works. This essay aims to show that the idea of “coherent deformation” illustrates Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to rethink subjectivity’s individuation as a creative yet ontological pattern that recasts the dynamics of operative intentionality and its (...) expressions. I show that in response to Malraux, Merleau-Ponty works out a diacritical sense of individuation as style that conveys existential possibilities. This conception proposes a “phenomenology from within” that relies on literary, psychoanalytic and artistic works to exhibit the metamorphosis of the subject in and through her world. (shrink)

La Weltanschauung est perçue comme la résultante de l’idéalisme philosophique qui consacre la toute puissance du sujet et de ses représentations tout en révélant paradoxalement sa finitude, car il ne peut sortir du cadre de ces dernières. A partir des interprétations de Jaspers et de Heidegger, la Weltanschauung n’apparaît plus que comme un symptôme, voire un qualificatif, qui permet de disqualifier l’époque et ses systèmes intellectuels et politiques. Mais plutôt qu’une typologie des différentes manifestations de la conception du monde moderne, (...) nous souhaiterions dresser une topologie de ses implications dans les champs de la philosophie et de l’existence afin de renouveler l'analyse de cette notion et d'en saisir les répercussions sur les définitions de la subjectivité. Notre travail vise à circonscrire la double nature problématique de la Weltanschauung , en tant qu’elle renvoie à la fois à un concept mais aussi à un processus formateur de ce qu’on pourrait appeler provisoirement un cadre d’existence. Dès lors, l’étude de la notion de Weltanschauung peut permettre de mettre au jour sa prééminence et son actualité, pour penser autant la modernité en tant que telle, que les configurations qui s’y déploient et se définissent par rapport à elle, notamment en tant que postmodernité. (shrink)

Bien que, cela étant, un abîme incommensurable soit installé entre le domaine du concept de la nature – le sensible – et le domaine du concept de la liberté – le suprasensible – au point que, du premier au second (donc par l’intermédiaire de l’usage théorique de la raison), nul passage n’est possible, tout à fait comme s’il s’agissait de mondes différents, dont le premier ne peut avoir sur le second aucune influence, celui-ci doit pourtant avoir une influence sur celui-là, (...) autrement dit, le c... (shrink)

A philosophical investigation of the concept of interiority, presenting readers with its unmined aspects and senses.

This collection renews contemporary debates in phenomenology, ethics, social ontology, aesthetics, and metaphysics and broadens the scope of twentieth-century French philosophy by analyzing the works and key concepts of authors who left their marks on its genesis.

Cet article analyse les éléments constitutifs de ce que Strasser nomme lui-même une « phénoménologie du dialogue », laquelle repose sur une double tentative : il s’agit, premièrement, de restaurer une phénoménologie de l’intériorité, après la critique husserlienne puis merleau-pontienne du cogito cartésien ; deuxièmement, de prendre en compte la primordialité de l’affectivité dans la constitution de l’éthique, au moyen d’une archéologie du sujet qui place la rencontre de l’autre, sous la forme d’un « Tu », au premier plan du (...) surgissement du monde commun. Pour mener à bien cette entreprise, Strasser refonde l’anthropologie philosophique en réintroduisant la notion de « coeur », véritable zone intermédiaire et lieu de métabolisation et de métaphorisation du réel qui rend la visée descriptive de la phénoménologie, sous la forme d’une explicitation des différentes couches de la réalité, compatible avec la visée normative et universelle de l’éthique. (shrink)

This book contains the most recent papers problematizing the notions of health, vulnerability, and well-being for individuals and their environment. Organized in 5 sections the book takes into consideration the critical and phenomenological history of well-being and health, their technological manipulation, how these notions connect with the body and the specific vulnerability of the human being, and what responsible direction we can take to improve people's relation to themselves, to other living beings and their environment. In order to address the (...) issue of the vulnerability of the human world and how to respond to its specific challenges, the contributions in this book discuss the topic from a broad range of perspectives, including anthropological, psychological, sociological, philosophical, and environmental. (shrink)