Atomic-scale computer simulation has been used to study the thermally activated atomic transport of self-interstitial atoms in the form of planar clusters in pure Cu and f -Fe. There is strong evidence that such clusters are commonly formed in metals during irradiation with high-energy particles and play an important role in accumulation and spatial distribution of surviving defects. An extensive study of the mobility of SIA clusters containing two to 331 interstitials has been carried out using the molecular dynamics simulation (...) technique for the temperature range from 180 to 1200 K. The results obtained show that clusters larger than three to four SIAs are one-dimensionally mobile in both Cu and Fe. Large clusters of more than 100 SIAs in Cu and 300 SIAs in Fe have significantly reduced mobility. The problem of describing one-dimensional motion in three-dimensional space is discussed. An attempt is made to describe the mobility of SIA clusters within the approximation of 1D diffusion. For clusters in both metals the effective migration energy of 1D diffusion as estimated via the jump frequency of the cluster centre of mass is found to be independent of the number of SIAs in the clusters, although the cluster jump frequency decreases with increasing cluster size. Mechanisms of 1D mobility of interstitial clusters are discussed. (shrink)

Background In an increasingly globalized world, legal protocols related to health care that are both effective and culturally sensitive are paramount in providing excellent quality of care as well as protection for physicians tasked with decision making. Here, we analyze the current medicolegal status of brain death diagnosis with regard to end-of-life care in Japan, China, and South Korea from the perspectives of front-line health care workers. Main body Japan has legally wrestled with the concept of brain death for decades. (...) An inability to declare brain death without consent from family coupled with cultural expectations of family involvement in medical care is mirrored in other Confucian-based cultures and may complicate care for patients from these countries when traveling or working overseas. Within Japan, China, and South Korea, medicolegal shortcomings in the diagnosis of brain death act as a great source of stress for physicians and expose them to potential public and legal scorn. Here, we detail the medicolegal status of brain death diagnosis within Japan and compare it to China and South Korea to find common ground and elucidate the impact of legal ambiguity on health care workers. Conclusion The Confucian cultural foundation of multiple Asian countries raises common issues of family involvement with diagnosis and cultural considerations that must be met. Leveraging public education systems may increase awareness of brain death issues and lead to evolving laws that clarify such end-of-life issues while protecting physicians from sociocultural backlash. (shrink)

A common belief is that evolution generally proceeds towards greater complexity at both the organismal and the genomic level, numerous examples of reductive evolution of parasites and symbionts notwithstanding. However, recent evolutionary reconstructions challenge this notion. Two notable examples are the reconstruction of the complex archaeal ancestor and the intron‐rich ancestor of eukaryotes. In both cases, evolution in most of the lineages was apparently dominated by extensive loss of genes and introns, respectively. These and many other cases of reductive evolution (...) are consistent with a general model composed of two distinct evolutionary phases: the short, explosive, innovation phase that leads to an abrupt increase in genome complexity, followed by a much longer reductive phase, which encompasses either a neutral ratchet of genetic material loss or adaptive genome streamlining. Quantitatively, the evolution of genomes appears to be dominated by reduction and simplification, punctuated by episodes of complexification. (shrink)

This chapter explores the relationship between knowing-how and skill, as well other success-in-action notions like dispositions and abilities. I offer a new view of knowledge-how which combines elements of both intellectualism and Ryleanism. According to this view, knowing how to perform an action is both a kind of knowing-that (in accord with intellectualism) and a complex multi-track dispositional state (in accord with Ryle’s view of knowing-how). I argue that this new view—what I call practical attitude intellectualism—offers an attractive set of (...) solutions to various puzzles concerning the connections between knowing-how and abilities and skills to perform intentional actions. (shrink)

Scale-free network models describe many natural and social phenomena. In particular, networks of interacting components of a living cell were shown to possess scale-free properties. A recent study(1) compares the system-level properties of metabolic and information networks in 43 archaeal, bacterial and eukaryal species and claims that the scale-free organization of these networks is more conserved during evolution than their content. BioEssays 24:105–109, 2002. Published 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

In this paper I develop three different arguments against the thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. Knowledge-that is widely thought to be subject to an anti-luck condition, a justified or warranted belief condition, and a belief condition, respectively. The arguments I give suggest that if either of these standard assumptions is correct then knowledge-how is not a kind of knowledge-that. In closing I identify a possible alternative to the standard Rylean and intellectualist accounts of knowledge-how. This alternative view (...) illustrates that even if the arguments given here succeed it might still be reasonable to hold that knowing how to do something is a matter of standing in an intentional relation to a proposition other than the knowledge-that relation. (shrink)

How should intellectualists respond to apparent Gettier-style counterexamples? Stanley offers an orthodox response which rejects the claim that the subjects in such scenarios possess knowledge-how. I argue that intellectualists should embrace a revisionary response according to which knowledge-how is a distinctively practical species of knowledge-that that is compatible with Gettier-style luck.

En Prolegómenos a la lógica pura, Husserl critica al psicologismo lógico. Tal crítica apuntaría a la consecución de una lógica pura. Sin embargo, tras esa lectura, se encuentra una auténtica discusión en torno al problema de la verdad, la que sería malinterpretada por el psicologismo. Así, el psicologismo sostiene que la verdad es una parte integrante del sujeto. Husserl, en cambio, plantea que la verdad es una idea y, como tal, es independiente absolutamente del sujeto. A partir de una revisión (...) de Prolegómenos, el escrito analiza, primero, la crítica al psicologismo; segundo, compara las nociones de verdad en disputa; y, tercero, concluye que los Prolegómenos fungen como una introducción a la teoría de la verdad que se desarrolla en la fenomenología temprana de Husserl. (shrink)

It is often said that ‘what it is like’-knowledge cannot be acquired by consulting testimony or reading books [Lewis 1998; Paul 2014; 2015a]. However, people also routinely consult books like What It Is Like to Go to War [Marlantes 2014], and countless ‘what it is like’ articles and youtube videos, in the apparent hope of gaining knowledge about what it is like to have experiences they have not had themselves. This article examines this puzzle and tries to solve it by (...) appealing to recent work on knowing-wh ascriptions. In closing I indicate the wider significance of these ideas by showing how they can help us to evaluate prominent arguments by Paul [2014; 2015a] concerning transformative experiences. (shrink)

Assume ZFC + "There is a weakly compact cardinal" is consistent. Then: (i) For every $S \subseteq \omega, \mathrm{ZFC} +$ "S and the monadic theory of ω 2 are recursive each in the other" is consistent; and (ii) ZFC + "The full second-order theory of ω 2 is interpretable in the monadic theory of ω 2 " is consistent.

This article examines the method of reflective equilibrium (RE) and its role in philosophical inquiry. It begins with an overview of RE before discussing some of the subtleties involved in its interpretation, including challenges to the standard assumption that RE is a form of coherentism. It then evaluates some of the main objections to RE, in particular, the criticism that this method generates unreasonable beliefs. It concludes by considering how RE relates to recent debates about the role of intuitions in (...) philosophy. (shrink)

This ambitious book looks into the reasons for the exceptional durability of the Chinese empire, which lasted for more than two millennia (221 B.C.E. - 1911 C.E.). Yuri Pines identifies the roots of the empire's longevity in the activities of thinkers of the Warring States period (453-221 B.C.E.), who, in their search for solutions to an ongoing political crisis, developed ideals, values, and perceptions that would become essential for the future imperial polity. In marked distinction to similar empires worldwide, (...) the Chinese empire was envisioned and to a certain extent 'preplanned' long before it came into being. As a result, it was not only a military and administrative construct, but also an intellectual one. Pines makes the argument that it was precisely its ideological appeal that allowed the survival and regeneration of the empire after repeated periods of turmoil. "Envisioning Eternal Empire" presents a panoptic survey of philosophical and social conflicts in Warring States political culture. By examining the extant corpus of preimperial literature, including transmitted texts and manuscripts uncovered at archaeological sites, Pines locates the common ideas of competing thinkers that underlie their ideological controversies. This bold approach allows him to transcend the once fashionable perspective of competing 'schools of thought' and show that beneath the immense pluralism of Warring States thought one may identify common ideological choices that eventually shaped traditional Chinese political culture. The result is a refreshingly novel look at the foundational period in Chinese intellectual history. (shrink)

The article is focused on studying the philosophical and legal nature of fundamental human rights and freedoms, which are interpreted as natural and inherent in a person from birth. It is shown that the “naturalness” of rights and freedoms is a legal fiction. In reality, natural rights and freedoms have a sociocultural, that is, “artificial” character. They strengthen the achieved level of guarantees of individual freedom and humanity in public relations.

Previous work suggests that Asians allocate more attention to configuration information than Caucasian Americans do. Yet this cultural variation has been found only with stimuli such as natural scenes and objects that require both feature- and configuration-based processing. Here, we show that the cultural variation also exists in face perception—a domain that is typically viewed as configural in nature. When asked to identify a prototypic face for a set of disparate exemplars, Japanese were more likely than Caucasian Americans to use (...) overall resemblance rather than feature matching. Moreover, in a speeded identity-matching task, Japanese were more accurate than Americans in identifying the spatial configuration of features (e.g., eyes). Together, these findings underscore the robustness of culture’s influences on cognition. (shrink)

O presente artigo tem como objetivo apresentar a filosofia schopenhaueriana como ponto de transgressão (limite) da modernidade e idealismo supremacista de (um certo tipo de) humanidade, em que o descolamento do Homem da natureza constrói um novo tipo de pensar a relação Homem/mundo e suas existências. Assim, tomando como ponto de partida o desencantamento do mundo e do corpo causados pelos procedimentos modernos, conforme delineado por Federici e Starhawk, pretendemos revisitar a filosofia de Schopenhauer e reconhecê-la enquanto ponto de ruptura. (...) A partir da sua metafísica imanente, a vontade, enquanto estrutura transcendental, realiza-se na imanência e a recoloca enquanto parte de um sistema integrado, em que a sua existência é mais uma forma a partir da qual a vontade se objetiva e, principalmente, reanima o corpo, desfazendo a distinção cartesiana entre corpo e alma. (shrink)

The Paper is dedicated to philosophical fundamentals of the Marx’s theory of product value. The author proves that in the Marx’s theory the value of the product of labour and, correspondently, of the commodity is defined inaccurately. He thinks that the concept of labour, presented in the economic theory of K. Marx, undeservedly ignores the role of intellectual activity of an individual in production of material goods. Marx considered mental activity as integral part of physical labour. This Marx’s viewpoint takes (...) in account only the controlling mental activity of an individual in the process of labour. The author thinks that such form of labour existed only in conditions of primitive manufacture, when a worker himself invented the product of labour and then created it with the help of materialactivity. In the period of industrial production of material goods, starting from the late 18th century, the intellectual labour separated from the physical labour and by its status became a sufficient independent stage of public production process. In this connection it is necessary to reconsider a number of such important concepts of philosophical fundamentals of economics as labour, value and wealth. (shrink)

Yuri Balashov sets out major rival views of persistence--endurance, perdurance, and exdurance--in a spacetime framework and proceeds to investigate the implications of Einstein's theory of relativity for the debate about persistence. His overall conclusion--that relativistic considerations favour four-dimensionalism over three-dimensionalism--is hardly surprising. It is, however, anything but trivial. Contrary to a common misconception, there is no straightforward argument from relativity to four-dimensionalism. The issues involved are complex, and the debate is closely entangled with a number of other philosophical disputes, (...) including those about the nature and ontology of time, parts and wholes, material constitution, causation and properties, and vagueness. (shrink)

Hawley introduced the idea of the client's perspective on knowledge, which she used to illuminate knowing-how and cases of epistemic injustice involving knowing-how. In this paper, I explore how Hawley's idea might be used to illuminate not only knowing-how, but other forms of knowledge that, like knowing-how, are often claimed to be distinct from mere knowing-that, focusing on the case studies of moral understanding and ‘what it is like’-knowledge.

I offer an argument in defense of four-dimensionalism, the view that objects are temporally, as well as spatially extended. The argument is of the inference-to-the-best-explanation variety and is based on relativistic considerations. It deals with the situation in which one and the same object has different three-dimensional shapes at the same time and proceeds by asking what sort of thing it must be in order to present itself in such different ways in various "perspectives" (associated with moving reference frames) without (...) being different from itself. I argue that the best answer is that the object must be four-dimensional. It will then have differing 3D shapes in different perspectives because such shapes are intrinsic properties of its 3D parts. (shrink)

Knowledge-how often appears to be more difficult to transmit by testimony than knowledge-that and knowledge-wh. Some philosophers have argued that this difference provides us with an important objection to intellectualism—the view that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. This article defends intellectualism against these testimony-based objections.

Paul (2014, 2015a) argues that one cannot rationally decide whether to have a transformative experience by trying to form judgments, in advance, about (i) what it would feel like to have that experience, and (ii) the subjective value of having such an experience. The problem is if you haven’t had the experience then you cannot know what it is like, and you need to know what it is like to assess its value. However, in earlier work I argued that ‘what (...) it is like’-knowledge comes in degrees, and I briefly suggested that, consequently, some instances of Paul’s argument schema might commit a fallacy of equivocation. The aim of this paper is to further explore and strengthen this objection by, first, offering a new argument—the modelling argument—in support of it, and then by evaluating a range of replies that might be given to this objection on Paul’s behalf. I conclude that each reply either fails or, at best, only partially succeeds in defending some but not all instances of Paul’s argument schema. In closing, I consider how we might revise Paul’s concepts of transformative experiences and choices in response to this conclusion. (shrink)

To state an important fact about the photon, physicists use such expressions as (1) “the photon has zero (null, vanishing) mass” and (2) “the photon is (a) massless (particle)” interchangeably. Both (1) and (2) express the fact that the photon has no non-zero mass. However, statements (1) and (2) disagree about a further fact: (1) attributes to the photon the property of zero-masshood whereas (2) denies that the photon has any mass at all. But is there really a difference between (...) saying that something has zero mass (charge, spin, etc.) and saying that it has no mass (charge, spin, etc.)? Does the distinction cut any physical or philosophical ice? I argue that the answer to these questions is yes. Put briefly, the claim of this paper is that some zero-value physical quantities are not mere “privations”, “absences” or “holes in being”. They are respectable properties in the same sense in which their non-zero partners are. This, I will show, has implications for the debate between two rival views of the nature of property, dispositionalism and categoricalism. (shrink)

This paper is a reaction to the following remark by grzegorczyk: "the compound sentences are not a product of experiment. they arise from reasoning. this concerns also negations; we see that the lemon is yellow, we do not see that it is not blue." generally, in science the truth is ascertained as indirectly as falsehood. an example: a litmus-paper is used to verify the sentence "the solution is acid." this approach gives rise to a (very intuitionistic indeed) conservative extension of (...) the heyting logic satisfying natural duality laws. (shrink)

This article discusses the chapter “Objection to Positional Power” (Nan shi 難勢) of Han Feizi 韓非子. It provides a full translation cum analysis of the text and explores systematically the chapter’s structure, rhetoric, and its political message. The discussion, which contextualizes the chapter’s message within broader trends of the Warring States-period political debates, demonstrates that beneath the surface of debates about “positional power” (shi 勢) versus “worth” (xian 賢), the chapter addresses one of the touchiest issues in Chinese political thought: (...) that of the intrinsic weakness of hereditary monarchy. Furthermore, “Objection to Positional Power” also addresses problems of the meritocratic system of rule and elucidates some of the reasons for Han Fei’s dislike of meritocratic discourse. By highlighting some of the chapter’s intellectual gems I hope to attract further attention to the immense richness of Han Feizi as one of the most sophisticated products of China’s political thought. (shrink)

What follows for the ability hypothesis reply to the knowledge argument if knowledge-how is just a form of knowledge-that? The obvious answer is that the ability hypothesis is false. For the ability hypothesis says that, when Mary sees red for the first time, Frank Jackson’s super-scientist gains only knowledge-how and not knowledge-that. In this paper I argue that this obvious answer is wrong: a version of the ability hypothesis might be true even if knowledge-how is a form of knowledge-that. To (...) establish this conclusion I utilize Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson’s well-known account of knowledge-how as “simply a species of propositional knowledge” . I demonstrate that we can restate the core claims of the ability hypothesis – that Mary only gains new knowledge-how and not knowledge-that – within their account of knowledge-how as a species of knowledge-that. I examine the implications of this result for both critics and proponents of the ability hypothesis. (shrink)

Philosophical considerations have been essentially involved in the origin and development of the steady-state cosmological theory. These considerations include an explicit uniformitarian methodology and implicit metaphysical views concerning the status of natural laws in a changing universe. I shall examine the foundations of SST by reconstructing its early history. Whereas the strong uniformitarian methodology of SST found no support in the subsequent development of cosmology, the idea of a possible influence the global structure of the universe may have on the (...) laws of physics operative in it has been assimilated by the standard big bang theory as it made its remarkable progress in recent decades. (shrink)

The information-hierarchical approach is used to analyze the evolutionary developed organization of mankind. This organization is shown to be hierarchical, from molecular hierarchical levels to the religious ones. Time cycles of each level operation are included in the greater cycle of the next level according to the specific schemes defined by the common information principle of natural system development. Time cycles of levels have duration of 1 second, 6 seconds, 42 seconds, 24 hours, 11 days, 1 years, 33 year, 1,000 (...) years, 3,000 years or 6,000 years and all together make up the mankind clock that is similar to the formerly ascertained biosphere clock. The cycles of duration from 1 second to 33 years form the human biological clock, so the information-hierarchical organization of cell metabolism manifests itself as the key mechanism of the clock. The new scientific field has been characterized. It is the management of sustainable development of the states as evolutionary developed systems with the use of information relationships of their functioning. In the case of Christianity adoption by any large ethnos the next 1,000-year cycle of the Christianity-Judaism system will start. (shrink)

Is there a successful regress argument against intellectualism? In this article I defend the negative answer. I begin by defending Stanley and Williamson's (2001) critique of the contemplation regress against Noë (2005). I then identify a new argument – the employment regress – that is designed to succeed where the contemplation regress fails, and which I take to be the most basic and plausible form of a regress argument against intellectualism. However, I argue that the employment regress still fails. Drawing (...) on the previous discussion, I criticise further regress arguments given by Hetherington (2006) and Noë (2005). (shrink)

In this thesis I examine the view—known as intellectualism—that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that, or propositional knowledge. I examine issues concerning both the status of this view of knowledge-how and the philosophical implications if it is true. The ability hypothesis is an important position in the philosophy of mind that appeals to Gilbert Ryle’s famous idea that there is a fundamental distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that. This position appears to be inconsistent with the truth of intellectualism. However, I demonstrate (...) in this thesis that the ability hypothesis can be restated using the intellectualist view of knowledge-how. With regards to the status of intellectualism, I argue that the two main traditional arguments against intellectualism do not succeed. I also provide new and, I claim, successful arguments against intellectualism. These arguments point to a new view of knowledge-how that is distinct from both the standard intellectualist and Rylean views of knowledge-how. (shrink)

(2010). Information-Hierarchical Organization of Natural Systems II: Futures of Man–Biosphere Interactions and Climate Control. World Futures: Vol. 66, No. 8, pp. 537-556.

This comprehensive anthology draws together writings by leading philosophers on the philosophy of science. Each section is prefaced by an introductory essay from the editors, guiding students gently into the topic. Accessible and wide-ranging, the text draws on both contemporary and twentieth century sources. The readings are designed to complement Alex Rosenberg's textbook, _Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction_, but can also serve as a stand-alone volume in any philosophy of science course. Includes readings from the following leading philosophers: Achinstein, (...) Anderson, Bloor, Earman, Feyerabend, Gutting, Hanson, Hempel, Kitcher, Kuhn, Laudan, Leplin, Mackie, McMullin, Nagel, Popper, Quine, Rosenberg, Russell, Salmon, Schlick, Shapere, Van Fraassen. (shrink)