‘Substance’ (substantia, zelfstandigheid) is a key term of Spinoza’s philosophy. Like almost all of Spinoza’s philosophical vocabulary, Spinoza did not invent this term, which has a long history that can be traced back at least to Aristotle. Yet, Spinoza radicalized the traditional notion of substance and made a very powerful use of it by demonstrating – or at least attempting to demonstrate -- that there is only one, unique substance -- God (or Nature) -- and that all other things are (...) merely modes or states of God. Some of Spinoza’s readers understood these claims as committing him to the view that only God truly exists, and while this interpretation is not groundless, we will later see that this enticing and bold reading of Spinoza as an ‘acosmist’ comes at the expense of another audacious claim Spinoza advances, i.e., that God/Nature is absolutely and actually infinite. But before we reach this last conclusion, we have a long way to go. So, let me first provide an overview of our plan. In the first section of this paper we will examine Spinoza’s definitions of ‘substance’ and ‘God’ at the opening of his magnum opus, the Ethics. Following a preliminary clarification of these two terms and their relations to the other key terms defined at the beginning of the Ethics, we will briefly address the Aristotelian and Cartesian background of Spinoza’s discussion of substance. In the second section, we will study the properties of the fundamental binary relations pertaining to Spinoza’s substance: inherence, conception, and causation. The third section will be dedicated to a clarification of Spinoza’s claim that God, the unique substance, is absolutely infinite. This essential feature of Spinoza’s substance has been largely neglected in recent Anglo-American scholarship, a neglect which has brought about an unfortunate tendency to domesticate Spinoza’s metaphysics to more contemporary views. The fourth section will study the nature of Spinoza’s monism. It will discuss and criticize the interesting yet controversial views of the eminent Spinoza scholar, Martial Gueroult, about the plurality of substances in the beginning of the Ethics; address Spinoza’s claim in Letter 50 that, strictly speaking, it is improper to describe God as “one”; and, finally, evaluate Spinoza’s kind of monism against the distinction between existence and priority monism recently introduced into the contemporary philosophical literature. The fifth and final section will explain the nature, reality, and manner of existence of modes. We therefore have an ambitious plan; let’s get down to business. (shrink)

Maquiavelo y su tiempo.--Reacción de algunos escritores españoles de los siglos XVII y XVIII ante la doctrina de Maquiavelo.--El maquiavelismo y las prácticas de gobierno.

Planteamiento de la naturaleza, de la filosof a y de su raz n hist rica, al contemplar panor micamente la totalidad de su pasado e intentar reconstruir el dram tico suceso de su origen.

The potential to collect brain data more directly, with higher resolution, and in greater amounts has heightened worries about mental and brain privacy. In order to manage the risks to individuals posed by these privacy challenges, some have suggested codifying new privacy rights, including a right to “mental privacy.” In this paper, we consider these arguments and conclude that while neurotechnologies do raise significant privacy concerns, such concerns are—at least for now—no different from those raised by other well-understood data collection (...) technologies, such as gene sequencing tools and online surveillance. To better understand the privacy stakes of brain data, we suggest the use of a conceptual framework from information ethics, Helen Nissenbaum’s “contextual integrity” theory. To illustrate the importance of context, we examine neurotechnologies and the information flows they produce in three familiar contexts—healthcare and medical research, criminal justice, and consumer marketing. We argue that by emphasizing what is distinct about brain privacy issues, rather than what they share with other data privacy concerns, risks weakening broader efforts to enact more robust privacy law and policy. (shrink)

José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) es, sin duda, el mayor filósofo hispánico y uno de los más importantes del siglo XX. Su obra desvela un pensamiento circunstancial que va hilvanando temas y preocupaciones de varia índole y carácter en el complejo entramado teórico y metodológico de la "razón vital". Obras como "Meditaciones del Quijote", "El tema de nuestro tiempo" o los ensayos contenidos en "El espectador" son perfectamente representativas de ese peculiar estilo filosófico suyo en el que la fuerza expresiva (...) de la frase nace animada por una tensión insoluble entre la metáfora y el concepto. Esa tensión es Ortega y en ella reside el mayor valor de su legado como contribución principal a la construcción del espacio hispánico de reflexión. "Meditación de la técnica" es un claro ejemplo del quehacer filosófico orteguiano, atento siempre a los problemas reales del hombre contemporáneo y pronto a denunciar las falsedades del culturalismo. (shrink)

DICTIONARY OF SPANISH VERBS WITH THEIR ENGLISH EQUIVALENTS AND MODELS OF CONJUGATION/DICCIONARIO CON LOS VERBOS EN ESPAÑOL, SU TRADUCCIÓN AL INGLÉS Y CONJUGACIONES.

1. pte. Ideología elemental o lógica.--2. pte. Ideología abstractiva o metafísica.--3. pte. Ideología oratoria o retórica y Apéndice de documentos.

Appearing in English for the first time, this book comprises two of Ortega’s most important works, ¿Qué es conocimiento? and the essay “Ideas y creencias.” This is Ortega’s attempt to systematically present the foundations of his metaphysics of human life and, on that basis, to provide a radical philosophical account of knowledge. In so doing, he criticizes idealism and overcomes it. Accordingly, this book goes well beyond a treatise on epistemology; in fact, as understood in modern philosophy, this discipline and (...) its questions are shown to be derivative and, in that sense, they are transcended here by Ortega’s systematic effort. -/- Written during the time of his maturity, these works are representative of his fruitful and radical period. Both ¿Qué es conocimiento? and “Ideas y creencias” are equally decisive not only for the understanding and radical completion of Ortega’s work, but also for their relevance to the work of continental philosophers during the same period and for years to come (e.g., Husserl, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre, and others). (shrink)

Pidiendo un Ortega y Gasset desde dentro, por J.D. García Bacca.--El sistema de Ortega, por M. Granell.--Las fundaciones de Ortega y Gasset, por L. Luzuriaga.--Ortega y su ideología universitaria, por E. Mayz Vallenilla.--Ortega y Gasset: lengua y estilo, por A. Rosenblat.

Sosyal bilimsel yaklaşımlar önemli ölçüde kültürel ayrımlara ve varsayımlara, kültürel ayrımlar ise örtük bir zaman tasavvuruna bağlıdır. Kültürün bir bileşeni olan zaman, gerçekliğin toplumsal ve tarihsel inşası sürecine dahildir. Toplumsal/tarihsel gerçekliğin incelenmesi adeta toplumun kurumsallaşmış unsurlarından biri olan zamanın da incelenmesini gerekli kılar. Kültürelci yaklaşımlarda zaman konusu bilhassa tarihselcilik ve eleştirisi bağlamında ele alınmaktadır. Tarihselciliği eleştiren ve buna alternatif teşkil eden yaklaşımlar da zaman tasavvuru ve bunun seçilen yönteme etkisi bakımından tarihselciliğin bazı ön kabullerini paylaşmaktadır. Bu alternatifler modernist sosyal bilimlerin (...) zaman algısına yönelik esaslı bir sorgulamadan uzaktır. Postmodernist sosyal bilimlerdeki mekân vurgusu ise ötekini ortak bir insanlık zamanının dışında konumlandırmaya dönük modernist varsayımın izlerini taşımaktadır. Bu çalışma zaman tasavvurunun sosyal bilimsel yönteme yansımalarına ve kültürel taksonominin zamanla ilişkisine dair eleştirel/anlayıcı bir perspektif sunmak ve yöntembilim tartışmalarında eksik kalan bu boyuta katkı sağlamak amacındadır. (shrink)