Successful transitions to a sustainable bioeconomy require novel technologies, processes, and practices as well as a general agreement about the overarching normative direction of innovation. Both requirements necessarily involve collective action by those individuals who purchase, use, and co-produce novelties: the consumers. Based on theoretical considerations borrowed from evolutionary innovation economics and consumer social responsibility, we explore to what extent consumers’ scope of action is addressed in the scientific bioeconomy literature. We do so by systematically reviewing bioeconomy-related publications according to (...) the extent to which consumers are regarded as passive vs. active, and different domains of consumer responsibility. We find all aspects of active consumption considered to varying degrees but observe little interconnection between domains. In sum, our paper contributes to the bioeconomy literature by developing a novel coding scheme that allows us to pinpoint different aspects of consumer activity, which have been considered in a rather isolated and undifferentiated manner. Combined with our theoretical considerations, the results of our review reveal a central research gap which should be taken up in future empirical and conceptual bioeconomy research. The system-spanning nature of a sustainable bioeconomy demands an equally holistic exploration of the consumers’ prospective and shared responsibility for contributing to its coming of age, ranging from the procurement of information on bio-based products and services to their disposal. (shrink)

Tracing different kinds of semiotic practices in boxing, in our text we provide a detailed reconstruction of the way athletes and other participants interpret each other’s actions and integrate these interpretations in their own course of motor action. Drawing on an ethnomethodological approach we argue that these interpretations should not be seen as being isolated from their contextual background. This context and the semiotic actions taking place within them mutually elaborate one another. Analyzing several video recordings and their transcripts, we (...) show how the social interaction of boxing fights consists of a “multi-layeredness of semiotic practice.” These layers of semiotic practice are complemented by what we introduce as asemiotic practices. Asemiotic practices exploit semiotic routines that are a part of boxing and attempt at weakening and overcoming the opponent during the fight thus eventually destroying his or her semiotic capacities. (shrink)

In seiner "Psychologie der Weltanschauungen" hat Karl Jaspers erstmals die seelischen Quellen und geistigen Typen der Weltanschauungen und der Philosophie aus psychologischer Sicht dargestellt. Ziel und Aufgabe seiner Untersuchung war es, zu verstehen, welche irreduziblen Grundkräfte die Seele bewegen, um das menschliche Leben auch noch in den Grenzsituationen bewältigen zu können. Dazu unterscheidet Jaspers zwischen Einstellungen, Weltbildern und Geistestypen als Elementen der jeweiligen Weltanschauung. Um das Leben des menschlichen Geistes zu verstehen, muss man nach Jaspers zwischen aktuellen Wertungen, abstrahierten Werten, (...) persönlichen und kollektiven Wertehorizonten, situativen Wertekollisionen und diversen Wertehierachien unterscheiden. An Wertentscheidungen und Werturteilen sind nicht nur Gefühle, sondern auch der Verstand und der Wille beteiligt. Das Leiden ist der gemeinsame Grundzug aller Grenzsituationen, wie z.B. Kampf, Schuld und Tod, ist das Leiden der Menschen an etwas Unabänderlichen des menschlichen Daseins. In den Grenzsituationen kommt es nicht selten zu einem existenziellen Konflikt zwischen Hoffnung und Verzweiflung und verschiedene Geistestypen bedürfen eines existenziellen Haltes und letzten Grundes ihrer Existenz. Nach jaspers gibt es vier Typen der Reaktion auf die Grenzsituationen: Resignation, Weltflucht, Heroismus und Religiosität. Verbreiteter sind heute jedoch Versuche der Bewältigung durch Hedonismus und Konsumismus, die keinen letzten Halt bieten, sondern nur eine tiefere Verzweiflung kaschieren. (shrink)

The discourse on climate politics so far is an expert and elitist discourse in which peoples, societies, citizens, workers, voters and their interests, views and voices are very much neglected. So, in order to turn climate change politics from its head onto its feet you have to take sociology into account. There is an important background assumption which shares in the general ignorance concerning environmental issues and, paradoxically, this is in corporated in the specialism of environmental sociology itself — this (...) is the category of ‘the environment’. If ‘the environment’ only includes everything which is not human, not social, then the concept is sociologically empty. If the concept includes human action and society, then it is scientifically mistaken and politically suicidal. (shrink)

How can one distinguish the concept of second modernity from the concept of postmodernity? Postmodernists are interested in deconstruction without reconstruction, second modernity is about deconstruction and reconstruction. Social sciences need to construct new concepts to understand the world dynamics at the beginning of the 21st century. Modernity has not vanished, we are not post it. Radical social change has always been part of modernity. What is new is that modernity has begun to modernize its own foundations. This is what (...) it means to say modernity has become reflexive. It has become directed at itself. This causes huge new problems both in reality and in theory. There has been a pluralization of the boundaries within and between societies, between society and nature, between Us and Other, between life and death. This pluralization also changes the inherent nature of boundaries. They become not so much boundaries as a variety of attempts to draw of boundaries. Border conflicts become transformed into conflicts over the drawing of boundaries. Where postmodernism simply celebrates this multiplication of boundaries, the theory of second modernity starts with the problem this new reality poses for individual and collective decisions, and with the problem that the continued existence of such decisions poses for theory. Institutions that are capable of such conscious boundary drawing are enabled in a way that those of the first modernity were not. But this process also generates qualitatively new kinds of trouble and crises. To investigate those troubles is to unveil the emergence of the second modernity. (shrink)

Obwohl Jaspers in seiner Philosophie Methoden und Motive der Phänomenologie Husserls und der Hermeneutik Diltheys aufgenommen hatte, hat er sich nicht besonders für die Leibphilosophie interessiert. Das bedeutet jedoch nicht, dass der menschliche Leib in seinem Denken gar nicht vorkommt. Aber es handelt sich bei ihm jedoch nicht um ein Schlüsselthema, sondern um ein randständiges Phänomen. Der menschliche Leib ist bei Jaspers die vitale Basis der überlieferten Trias von Leib, Seele und Geist. Damit steht Jaspers in der klassischen Traditionslinie des (...) europäischen Denkens von Platon und Aristoteles bis zu Descartes und Kant. Anders als beim platonischen Sokrates gibt es bei Jaspers jedoch keine Herabsetzung des Körpers oder Abwertung des Leiblichen. Und anders als in der subversiven Tradition der empiristischen Skepsis gibt es bei ihm aber auch keine Vernachlässigung des Geistes. Im Vergleich des Menschen mit den Tieren ist der Geist nicht nur irgendein beliebiges, auf Sprache, Denken und Vernunft basierendes Merkmal, das den Menschen zufällig von den Tieren unterscheidet, sondern die wesentliche menschliche Eigenart, die es zu verstehen gilt, wenn man die spezifisch menschliche Art und Weise des Daseins in der Welt verstehen möchte, die Jaspers 'Existenz' nennt. Existenz zu verstehen ist die eigentliche Aufgabe der Philosophie, zumal die Wissenschaften dies nicht leisten können. (shrink)

At the beginning of the 21st century the conditio humana cannot be understood nationally or locally but only globally. This constitutes a revolution in the social sciences. The `sociological imagination' so far has basically been a nation state imagination. The main problem is how to redefine the sociological frame of reference in the horizon of a cosmopolitan imagination. For the purpose of empirical research I distinguish between three concepts: interconnectedness , liquid modernity and cosmopolitization from within. The latter is a (...) kind of class analysis after class analysis, which takes on board globalization internalized. For the purposes of social analysis, therefore, it is necessary to distinguish systematically between the national manifestation on the one hand and cosmopolitan reality of `global flows', currents of information, symbols, money, risks, people, social inequalities, on the other. This internal involuntary and often unseen cosmopolitanization from below of the national sphere of experience is occurring, however, with the power of economic globalization. So what does inner `cosmopolitanization' mean? The key concepts and questions of a way of life, such as nourishment, production, identity, fear, memory, pleasure, fate, power and politics, can no longer be located and understood nationally, but only globally whether in the shape of globally shared collective futures, capital flows, impending ecological or economic catastrophes, global foodstuff chains, transnational power games, or the `Esperanto' of pop music. In this article I look at transformation in the understanding of space-time, of identity, of the production paradigms, as well as at the resulting consequences for key sociological concepts like class and power and, within this frame, point to certain dilemmas of cosmopolitanism. (shrink)

Der lebendige Mensch befindet sich immer zwischen Erfahrung und Metaphysik, er ist Natur und Freiheit zugleich. Anders gesagt erfährt sich der von Welt umgebende Mensch als ein freiheitliches Wesen, das unter einem bedingungslosen moralischen Sollensanspruch steht, der an keine Kontingenz geknüpft ist. Betrachten wir die moralische Dimension genauer, so erkennen wir moralischen Pflichten gegenüber uns selbst und anderen als Gebote Gottes.1 Das bewusste Leben selbst gibt uns Zwecke, die wir weder theoretisch noch praktisch auf den Begriff bringen können.2 Kant spricht (...) vom Leben als ein Vermögen, dass einen inneren selbst-bestimmten Anstoß zum praktischen Handeln im Sinne einer inneren Kausalität darstellt. Wir müssen ein naturgemäßes Leben von einem guten Leben unterscheiden. Idealiter gesehen oder im Zustand der Glückseligkeit ist das natürliche und das moralisch gute Leben ein und das selbe.3 Ein natürliches und ein gutes Leben soll der Mensch führen, denn die Natur ermöglicht sittliches Handeln und sittliches Handeln macht natürliches Leben lebenswerter. Kant hat in seiner epochalen Kritik der Urteilkraft ein für alle mal gezeigt, dass nur der Mensch unbedingter Endzweck der Schöpfung ist, nicht als natürliches sondern als ein moralisches Wesen betrachtet, denn »im Menschen, aber auch in diesem nur als Subjekte der Moralität, ist die unbedingte Gesetzgebung in Ansehung der Zwecke anzutreffen, welche ihn also allein fähig macht, ein Endzweck zu sein, dem die ganze Natur teleologisch untergeordnet ist.4« So gesehen ist der Mensch sich eines physikotheologischen Verhältnisses bewusst und muss es aushalten, und es fragt sich wie der Hiatus zwischen Natur und Freiheit zu denken ist. (shrink)

Platónov Sókratés v záverečnom príhovore pred hlasovaním o svojej vine či nevine sudcom pripomína, že má rodinu, ktorá zahŕňa dospievajúceho syna a dvoch malých chlapcov. Pritom odkazuje na verše z Homérovej Odyssey, aby poukázal na skutočnosť, že sa nenarodil „ani z duba ani zo skaly“ (34d). Cieľom článku bude analyzovať a interpretovať zmysel uvedenej citácie v rámci Sókratovej argumentácie. V prvej časti sa autor sústredí na komparáciu Homérovho verša s jeho podobou v Platónovej Apológii. V druhej časti bude skúmať, akú (...) stratégiu Sókratés sledoval tým, keď sa odvolal na uvedený verš. V záverečnej časti sa zameria na otázku, z akého dôvodu Platónov Sókratés cituje Homéra napriek svojmu predchádzajúcemu vyhláseniu, že básnici nedisponujú múdrosťou. (shrink)

This article differentiates between three different axes of conflict in world risk society. The first axis is that of ecological conflicts, which are by their very essence global. The second is global financial crises, which, in a first stage, can be individualized and nationalized. And the third, which suddenly broke upon us on September 11th, is the threat of transnational terror networks, which empowers governments and states. Two sets of implications are drawn: first, there are the political dynamics of world (...) risk society. In an age where trust and faith in God, class and progress have largely disappeared, humanity's common fear has proved the last - ambivalent - resource for making new bonds. Second, the methodological nationalism that preoccupies the sociological imagination has to be overcome and a `methodological cosmopolitism' has to be created. (shrink)

Das Projekt Weltethos von Hans Küng, dem Tübinger katholischen Theologen für Ökumenische Theologie, ist ein religionswissenschaftliches Forschungsprojekt über den gegenwärtigen Stand der großen Weltreligionen und zugleich ein Beitrag zum Frieden stiftenden Dialog der Weltreligionen über gemeinsame ethische Grundlagen ihres jeweils religiös fundierten Ethos. Es geht also um Aufklärung über die aktuelle Lage der Religionen, um Erinnerung an ihre gemeinsamen Werte und Normen und um eine Kritik an den Religionen, insofern sie selbst gegen ihre gemeinsamen ethischen Werte und Normen verstoßen.

In this article I want to outline an argument for a New Critical Theory with a cosmopolitan intent. Its main purpose is to undermine one of the most powerful beliefs of our time concerning society and politics. This belief is the notion that “modern society” and “modern politics” are to be understood as society and politics organized around the nation‐state, equating society with the national imagination of society. There are two aspects to this body of beliefs: what I call the (...) “national perspective” of social actors, and the “methodological nationalism” of scientific observers. The distinction between these two perspectives is important because there is no logical co‐implication between them, only an interconnected genesis and history. (shrink)

An original analysis of the parallels between the arrested moment in photography and in the traumatized psyche.

The debate around the notions of a priori knowledge and a posteriori knowledge has proven crucial for the development of many fields in philosophy, such as metaphysics, epistemology, metametaphysics etc. We advocate that the recent debate on the two notions is also fruitful for man-made distributed computing systems and for the epistemic analysis thereof. Following a recently proposed modal and fallibilistic account of a priori knowledge, we elaborate the corresponding concept of a priori belief: We propose a rich taxonomy of (...) types of a priori beliefs and their role for the different agents that participate in the system engineering process, which match the existing view exceedingly well and are particularly promising for explaining and dealing with unexpected behaviors in fault-tolerant distributed systems. Developing such a philosophical foundation will provide a sound basis for eventually implementing our ideas in a suitable epistemic reasoning and analysis framework and, hence, constitutes a mandatory first step for developing methods and tools to cope with the various challenges that emerge in such systems. (shrink)

The paper presents a refined method of extracting reasonable and sometimes unexpected programs from classical proofs of formulas of the form ∀x∃yB . We also generalize previously known results, since B no longer needs to be quantifier-free, but only has to belong to a strictly larger class of so-called “goal formulas”. Furthermore we allow unproven lemmas D in the proof of ∀x∃yB , where D is a so-called “definite” formula.

The concept of the national is often perceived, both in public and academic discourse as the central obstacle for the realization of cosmopolitan orientations. Consequently, debates about the nation tend to revolve around its persistence or its demise. We depart from this either-or perspective by investigating the formation of the ‘cosmopolitan nation’ as a facet of world risk society. Modern collectivities are increasingly preoccupied with debating, preventing and managing risks. However, unlike earlier manifestations of risk characterized by daring actions or (...) predictability models, global risks can no longer be calculated or forecast. Accordingly, more influence accrues to the perception of risk, largely constructed by media representations. Cosmopolitanized risk collectivities are engendered through the anticipation of endangered futures which are, for the most part, communicated through an increasingly global media scape. While global media events produce shared exposure, risk conceptions retain distinctive political-cultural features as their respective meanings are prefigured by path-dependent pasts. Nevertheless, the promulgation of risk societies, we argue, results in a reimagination of nationhood which takes place in the context of: global norms (e.g. human rights); globalized markets; transnational migrations; global generations and their embeddedness in civil society movements; and the local interpenetration of world religions to name but a few of the global backdrops shaping new associational intersections. We develop our argument in four interrelated steps. Contrary to essentialized notions of nationalism or universal versions of cosmopolitanism, we address the cosmopolitan reconfiguration of nationhood by differentiating between presumptions of thick belonging and the actual proliferation of cosmopolitan affiliations. In a second step we overcome the territorial fixation of the social sciences by shifting our attention to temporal dimensions, with a particular focus on competing conceptions of the future. In a third step we demonstrate how these cosmopolitan transformations of nationhood are taking place in the context of a world risk society regime that marshals a set of cosmopolitan imperatives situating the global other in our midst. In a fourth step we illustrate these developments by exploring how the mediatization of risk, and concomitant notions of the future, contribute to the reimagination of cosmopolitan risk collectivities. (shrink)