In this paper I analyze the difficult question of the truth of mature scientific theories by tackling the problem of the truth of laws. After introducing the main philosophical positions in the field of scientific realism, I discuss and then counter the two main arguments against realism, namely the pessimistic metainduction and the abstract and idealized character of scientific laws. I conclude by defending the view that well-confirmed physical theories are true only relatively to certain values of the variables that (...) appear in the laws. (shrink)

How do we know that particular answers in bioethical controversies are true, or are at least getting closer to the truth? We gain insight into this question by applying Alasdair MacIntyre’s work on the nature of rationality, rational justification, and tradition. Using MacIntyre’s work and the papers in this issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, I propose a framework for members of particular traditions to judge whether they themselves or other traditions are getting closer to or further away (...) from the truth in particular bioethical questions. Members of different traditions—be it Confucian, Aristotelian, politically liberal, utilitarian, or something else—should look at how they and their theoretical rivals look at empirical data to address bioethical questions, the moral judgments they make, and the laws and regulations they support. Some level of agreement on these issues need not require individual traditions to eschew their foundational premises or values; recognizing the reality of moral pluralism and disagreement should not prevent us from seeing this. Neither, as MacIntyre argues, should pluralism and disagreement obscure that a necessary condition for successful rational exchange and adjudication between competing traditions is granting authority to certain norms and virtues. (shrink)

Cyberspace, a term popularized in the 1984 novel Neuromancer, was used by William Gibson to describe the ‘consensual hallucination’ and interstitial online world that lies between the reality of our world and that of the surreal terrain of dreamscapes. While many attempts have been made to describe this intangible, yet seemingly perceptible space, the digital domain as a metaphor mirrors in many ways our own inadequate understanding of consciousness. Conversely, the physicist Michio Kaku explains that our reality is bounded by (...) hyperspace – a multi-dimensioned space beyond our quotidian 3D existence that runs parallel, or tangential, to us along with the phenomenon of time. Indeed, if space and time (here considered as space–time) are a consolidated whole in the physical sense, perhaps our consciousness, as a structure manifest within this continuum may itself be thought of as a sensorial projection of this amalgam that attempts to observe and make sense, or meaning, of this condition. In truth, what if our need and delight in storytelling is driven by the evolution of our biology, as well as our impulse to locate our place in the universe? This article will attempt to examine and delimit the narrative confines of space–time as an appeal to, and an endeavour at, uncovering the alterity of storytelling as a function of consciousness. It will visit the realms of the holograph, quantum mechanics, virtual and augmented realities, as well as other scientific and philosophical tracts as a means to investigate and explore the physiology of space and our imperative desire to share stories. (shrink)

The question of whether there are laws in ecology is important for a number of reasons. If, as some have suggested, there are no ecological laws, this would seem to distinguish ecology from other branches of science, such as physics. It could also make a difference to the methodology of ecology. If there are no laws to be discovered, ecologists would seem to be in the business of merely supplying a suite of useful models. These models would need to be (...) assessed for their empirical adequacy but not for their ability to capture fundamental truths, or the like. If, on the other hand, ecology does have laws, this prompts further questions about what these laws are and why even the best candidates for ecological laws fall short of what might be expected of laws. (shrink)

This paper presents an extension of Putnam's account of how substance terms such as ‘water’ and ‘gold’ function and of how a posteriori necessary truths concerning the underlying microstructures of such kinds may be derived. The paper has three aims. I aim to refute a familiar criticism of Putnam's account: that it presupposes what Salmon calls an ‘irredeemably metaphysical, and philosophically controversial, theory of essentialism’. I show how all of the details of Putnam's account—including those that Salmon believes smuggle in (...) such essentialist commitments—can be squared with a rejection of any such essentialist metaphysics. I aim to reveal why Steward is wrong to suppose that, by helping himself to the claim that ‘H2O’ is a rigid designator of a substance, Kripke, too, presupposes something controversially ‘metaphysical’. I aim to show how my proposed account also sidesteps a variety of objections raised by Needham and others who argue that Kripke's and Putnam's accounts of how ‘water’ and.. (shrink)

Until the middle of the present century it was a commonly accepted opinion that theory change in science was the expression of cumulative progress consisting in the acquisition of new truths and the elimination of old errors. Logical empiricists developed this idea through a deductive model, saying that a theory T superseding a theory T must be able logically to explain whatever T explained and something more as well. Popper too shared this model, but stressed that T explains the old (...) known facts in its own new way. The further pursual of this line quickly led to the thesis of the non-comparability or incommensurability of theories: if T and T are different, then the very concepts which have the same denomination in both actually have different meanings; in such a way any sentence whatever has different meanings in T and in T and cannot serve to compare them. owing to this, the deductive model was abandoned as a tool for understanding theory change and scientific progress, and other models were proposed by people such as Lakatos, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Sneed and Stegmüller. The common feature of all these new positions may be seen in the claim that no possibility exists of interpreting theory change in terms of the cumulative acquisition of truth. It seems to us that the older and the newer positions are one-sided, and, in order to eliminate their respective shortcomings, we propose to interpret theory change in a new way.The starting point consists in recognizing that every scientific discipline singles out its specific domain of objects by selecting a few specific predicates for its discourse. Some of these predicates must be operational and they determine the objects of the theory concerned. In the case of a transition from T to T, we must consider whether or not the operational predicates remain unchanged, in the sense of being still related to the same operations. If they do not change in their relation to operations, then T and T are comparable. If the operational predicates are not all identical in T and T, the two theories show a rather high degree of incommensurability, and this happens because they do not refer to the same objects. Theory change means in this case change of objects. But now we can see that even incommensurability is compatible with progress conceived as the accumulation of truth. Indeed, T and T remain true about their respective objects, and the global amount of truth acquired is increased. (shrink)

On one view of ethical development, someone not yet virtuous can reliably progress by engaging in what meaningfully resembles virtuous conduct. However, if the well-intended conduct is psychologically demanding, one's character, precisely because one is not yet virtuous, may worsen rather than improve. This risk of degradation casts doubt on the developmental view. I counter the doubt through one interpretation and one application of the Mengzi. In passage 2A2, invoking the image of a farmer who “helped” the crop grow by (...) pulling the sprouts, MENG Ke cautions, “do not help it grow.” I defend a novel interpretation: do not advance with a naïve negligence about your psycho-physiological constitution. I also show how to advance with realistic care by pointing out an overlooked application of a much-discussed cultivation technique illustrated in Mengzi 1A7: ethical reflection can conciliate one with one’s ongoing or past advanced action, lowering the action’s risk of degradation. (shrink)

This paper analyses the Verlagsanzeige of the humanist, mathematician, astronomer and publisher Johannes Regiomontanus. How is humanism expressed in this famous document from German early printing and what is its relationship to philosophy? The article shows that Regiomontanus advocated a special form of humanism that went beyond the standard humanism that he valued, with ‘truth’ as its most important aspect. From the epistemological perspective of the history of philosophy in Regiomontanus’s publishing programme, the ‘truth’ of mathematics is seen, analogous to (...) some predecessors, as a paradigm of programmatic testimony. The integration of philosophy is evident in this, as in another specified way as well. (shrink)

According to relativists, people who speak simply of what's ‘true’ are naïve. ‘Whose truth?’ asks the relativist. ‘No claim is ever true, period. What's true is always true for someone. It's true relative to a particular person or culture. There's no such thing as the absolute truth on any issue.’ This sort of relativism is certainly popular. For example, many claim that we are wrong to condemn cultures with moral codes different from our own: their moralities are no less valid. (...) Similarly, some claim that while astrology and Feng Shui might be ‘false’ from a Western, scientific viewpoint, they are ‘true’ when viewed from alternative, New Age points of view. What's ‘true’ and what's ‘false’ ultimately depend on where one is standing. Is this sort of relativism about truth tenable? (shrink)

Humanists expound the virtues of science and reason. Emphasis is placed on formulating theories and predictions with clarity and precision, focusing wherever possible on phenomena that are mathematically quantifiable and can be objectively and precisely measured. Science and reason offer us truth‐sensitive ways of arriving at beliefs. As a result of scientific investigation, many religious claims, or claims endorsed by religion, have been shown to be false, or at least rather less well founded than previously thought. So science has threatened (...) and indeed established beyond reasonable doubt the falsity of some religious beliefs. Science and reason are able to threaten, and indeed demolish, many religious beliefs. When religious and other woo‐claims are challenged by science and reason, various strategies may be employed in their defence. Some of the strategies are selective scepticism, re‐interpretation and accusation of scientism. (shrink)

It is likely that internal factors play an important role in restricting the possible avenues of evolutionary change from any starting point. Internal selective processes operating on premutational disturbances, on mutations, and on developmental phases may usefully be separated from the adaptive selection of phenotypes. The precise structural and morphological consequences of internal factors should soon become an isolable problem owing to a) the observational correlation of definite changes in hereditary specificity with particular developmental consequences; and b) the progressive theoretical (...) identification of the coordinative conditions in organisms. Increasing clarity regarding the coordinative conditions should throw light on the “mutational selection rules” and on the differentiative mutations which led to the most important steps in the past history of evolution.Die Wege der Evolution können sowohl durch innere Auslese der Genotypen wÄhrend der Entwicklung als auch durch die Äussere Darwinische Auslese der Phenotypen bestimmt werden. Seit 1949 haben sich zumindest fünf Forscher mit dieser Möglichkeit befasst. Es ist zur Zeit möglich, zwischen den beiden Arten von Zuchtwahl theoretisch und experimentell zu unterscheiden.Les chemins de l'évolution peuvent Être déterminés non seulement par la sélection extérieure Darwinienne des phénotypes mais aussi par la sélection intérieure des genotypes pendant le développement. Depuis 1949 aux moins cinq investigateurs en ont considéré la possibilité. Il est possible à présent de faire la distinction entre les deux types de sélection dans la théorie comme dans l'expérience. (shrink)

Background and Objectives: In this research article, the researcher addresses the issue of creating public understanding in a democratic society about the progress of science, with an emphasis on pluralism from philosophers of science. The idea that there is only one truth and that there are just natural laws awaiting discovery by scientists has historically made it difficult to explain scientific progress. This belief motivates science to develop theories that explain the unity of science, and it is thought that diversity (...) in the way different ideas presented by scientists is a problem that results in time being wasted in search of the most accurate theory. Some scientists perceive a benefit in having a range of scientific hypotheses, though. One benefit that is frequently cited is that scientific diversity as a whole contributes to the development of a democratic society that permits the expression of a range of viewpoints. The road to accountable scientific pluralism is fraught with difficulties, though. Therefore, it is crucial to take into account both pluralism's advantages and disadvantages. This research aims at: 1. analyzing in an epistemological way the interpretation of scientific theories and the progress of science from the perspectives of scientific pluralists; 2. analyzing the relationship between science and democracy in explaining scientific significance and progress; and 3. synthesizing new knowledge on epistemic dependentism and to argue that it plays a significant role in evaluating research issues related to scientific pluralism. Methodology: The research methodology involves the application of documentary investigation along with philosophical discourse. The method of philosophical argumentation involves analyzing the lines of arguments found in relevant academic publications in order to assess their validity and soundness. Main Results: One key argument of the pluralists is the use of the concept of theoretical pluralism, which suggests that scientific knowledge is created from a variety of perspectives according to the social and cultural context of knowledge creation. It is found that part of Longino's argument is based on the negation of rational/social dichotomy. Moreover, her theory is a departure from philosopher of science Philip Kitcher, who advocates the creation of scientific knowledge and the evaluation of scientific progress through the means of democratic society. He explains that these procedures will lead to "well-ordered science" in democratic society. Discussions: The researcher examines the underlying ideas accepted by these two philosophers of science and finds that although their opinions differ, they have common ground in the acceptance of consensus. However, the views of both philosophers still lack weight in explaining the knowledge itself. The researcher argues that the acceptance of pluralism as a way of understanding scientific progress necessarily lends itself to dependentism, which points to interdependence in comparisons of superiority/inferiority between scientific theories. It is undeniable that the situation has emerged all the time, even though the success of the scientific theories being compared to each other comes from different social and cultural grounds of thought. Conclusions: Some popular models of scientific pluralism in the philosophy of science still lack a compelling justification, particularly on the epistemic grounds. By elucidating the epistemic significance of the interdependence of these things, scientific pluralism can be strengthened by incorporating the notion of epistemic dependentism into the analysis of scientific progress. (shrink)

Sexual and reproductive health is a challenge worldwide, and much progress is needed to reach the relevant UN Sustainable Development Goals. This paper presents cross-sectional data collected in Sierra Leone on sexual and gender-based violence, family planning, child, early and forced marriage, and female genital mutilation using an innovative method of measurement: situational judgment tests, as a subset of questions within a larger survey tool. For the SJTs, respondents saw hypothetical scenarios on these themes and had to indicate how they (...) would react. The objective is to give an impression of beliefs and norms on specific behaviors, which provide insights for social and behavior change interventions. Data was collected by enumerators traveling to villages randomly selected in six districts of the country. The sample is composed of 566 respondents. Results show that FGM in particular seem to be a priority topic, in comparison to the other topics for which the norms seem to be stronger against those practices. Age differences emerged and suggest priority groups to be targeted. In terms of validity of the measurement methods, situational judgment test answers correlated positively with other items in the survey, but the magnitude of the association is often small, and sometimes not significant. Thus, more studies are needed to further explore the validity of this measure by comparing against a reference value. Using SJTs could complement other data collection tools to perform community assessment, and orient the direction of the program in its planning phase. (shrink)

Ms. X is a person with cerebral palsy and schizophrenia. She has intractable bedsores that are a result of her immobility and to poor wound care related to her delusional thinking. Despite intensive community support, the wounds have worsened to the point that she has needed multiple hospitalizations to prevent systemic sepsis, a life‐threatening condition. She is capable of placement decisions and wishes for independence at home but is incapable of making wound care decisions and does not appreciate that immediately (...) returning home from the hospital, instead of going into a special care facility, would likely result in sepsis. The resulting dilemma about discharge planning highlights the complexity involved in weighing concerns around mental illness and capacity for treatment and placement of care. The extent of the care that is required and available in a community or health care system and the slow but relatively certain progression of the symptoms also make the decision challenging. Two commentaries take very different approaches in exploring the question whether Ms. X should be supported to go home or to a special care facility. (shrink)

This monograph presents new ideas in nomic truth approximation. It features original and revised papers from a philosopher of science who has studied the concept for more than 35 years. Over the course of time, the author's initial ideas evolved. He discovered a way to generalize his first theory of nomic truth approximation, viz. by dropping an unnecessarily strong assumption. In particular, he first believed to have to assume that theories were maximally specific in the sense that they did not (...) only exclude certain conceptual possibilities, but also that all non-excluded possibilities were in fact claimed to be nomically possible. Now, he argues that the exclusion claim alone, or for that matter the inclusion claim alone, is sufficient to motivate the formal definition of being closer to the nomic truth. The papers collected here detail this generalized view of nomic truthlikeness or verisimilitude. Besides this, the book presents, in adapted form, the relation with several other topics, such as, domain revision, aesthetic progress, abduction, inference to the best explanation, pragmatic aspects, probabilistic methods, belief revision and epistemological positions, notably constructive realism. Overall, the volume presents profound insight into nomic truth approximation. This idea seeks to determine how one theory can be closer to, or more similar to, the truth about what is nomically, e.g. physically, chemically, biologically, possible than another theory. As a result, it represents the ultimate goal of theory oriented empirical science. Theo Kuipers is the author of Studies in Inductive Probability and Rational Expectation, From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism and Structures in Science. He is the volume-editor of the Handbook on General Philosophy of Science. In 2005 there appeared two volumes of Essays in Debate with Theo Kuipers, entitled Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation and Cognitive Structures in Scientific Inquiry. (shrink)

This paper examines the intersecting of the themes of temporality and truth in Deleuze's philosophy. For the ancients, truth was something eternal: what was true was true in all times and in all places. Temporality (coming to be and passing away) was the realm of the mutable, not the eternal. In the seventeenth century, change began to be seen in a positive light (progress, evolution, and so on), but this change was seen to be possible only because of the immutable (...) laws of nature that govern change. It was not until philosophers such as Bergson, James, Whitehead – and then Deleuze – that time began to be taken seriously on its own account. On the one hand, in Deleuze, time, freed from its subordination to movement, now becomes autonomous: it is the pure form of change (continuous variation) that lies at the basis of Deleuze's metaphysics in Difference and Repetition (and is explored more thematically in The Time-Image). As a result, on the other hand, the false, freed from its subordination to the form of the true, assumes a power of its own (the power of the false), which in turn implies a new ‘analytic of the concept’ that Deleuze develops in What Is Philosophy? (shrink)

What is wealth? -- Looking at the world from God's perspective -- Changing your attitude to bring success -- Suffering caused by desire -- Accumulating beneficial wealth -- Making progress with love and ideals -- Creating "utopian economics" -- The path to progress -- The definition of progress -- The joy of progress -- The driving force of progress -- Realizing hope -- A life filled with light -- Living with optimism -- Living lightheartedly -- Believing tomorrow will be better (...) -- Expanding the circle of happiness -- Walking with God -- A mind that invites happiness -- The laws of the mind -- A mind that brings others happiness -- In tune with God's vibration -- A humble, accepting mind -- The power of prayer -- The true nature of wealth -- Wealth as a foundation -- Wealth and competition -- Good and evil in relation to wealth -- The right way to use wealth -- Accumulating inner wealth -- The study of human nature leads to success -- Gifts and talents -- The quality and period of effort -- Conditions for receiving inspiration -- I) the basis for inspiration -- II) a loving heart -- III) a positive attitude to life -- The person who is admired -- The goal is to soar -- A steady eye -- Making progress with a loving heart -- Confidence and abilities -- The goal is to soar -- The philosophy of progress -- The pledge to God -- The truth from God's perspective -- I) male and female souls -- II) God's ideal -- III) what is death? -- The true right to know -- I) the truth God created -- II) restoring religion -- Wrongdoing without knowing -- Toward the state of Arhat -- Aim for the world of Bodhisattva -- Postscript. (shrink)

Truthlikeness is a property of a theory or a proposition that represents its closeness to the truth. According to Niiniluoto, truthlikeness for quantitative deterministic laws can be defined by the Minkowski metric. I present some counterexamples to the definition and argue that it fails because it considers truthlikeness for quantitative deterministic laws to be just a function of accuracy, but an accurate law can be wrong about the actual ‘structure’ or ‘behaviour’ of the system it intends to describe. I develop (...) a modification of Niiniluoto’s proposal that defines truthlikeness for quantitative deterministic laws according to two parameters: accuracy and nomicity. The presented proposal solves the counterexamples and defines a new way of understanding scientific progress. (shrink)

Convergent scientific realism entails that science will sooner or later arrive at the final theory of the fundamental constituents of matter. At that stage, all fundamental truths about nature will be discovered so that the search for basic principle seems bound to come to a halt. I explore options for a non-convergent scientific realism that allows for sustained progress in basic research. I defend the views that the coherence of non-convergent realism requires an emergence claim and that this claim can (...) be supported. I develop the example of the relation between equivalence classes among biological functions and their physiological realizations. Given strongly emergent laws in the sense elaborated in the paper, progress in basic research may survive the discovery of the laws governing the tinymost parts of matter. (shrink)

This volume complements two highly successful previously published volumes of Richard Rorty's philosophical papers: Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, and Essays on Heidegger and Others. The essays in the volume engage with the work of many of today's most innovative thinkers including Robert Brandom, Donald Davidson, Daniel Dennett, Jacques Derrida, Jürgen Habermas, John McDowell, Hilary Putnam, John Searle, and Charles Taylor. The collection also touches on problems in contemporary feminism raised by Annette Baier, Marilyn Frye, and Catherine MacKinnon, and considers issues (...) connected with human rights and cultural differences. Anyone with a serious interest in contemporary philosophy and what it can do for us in the modern world will enjoy this invaluable collection. (shrink)

The backdrop for this thesis is provided by Troeltsch's far more detailed and extensive studies of the social doctrines of various Christian churches and groups. According to Troeltsch's interpretation, the reception of the Stoic concept of natural law is as crucial to Christian ethics as the reception of the concept of logos is to Christian dogmatics. Just as the concept of logos mediates between the truth of revelation and the truth of reason, so the concept of natural law mediates between (...) the moral demands of the gospel and the principles of a worldly ethos. Since there is a distinction between an absolute natural law, which is identical with the radical ideal of the Sermon on the Mount, and a relative natural law, substantially corresponding to the Ten Commandments and to political and social reality, such a mediation--which must be oriented on the relative natural law--must qualify the original radical Christian claim. Whereas the old church allowed both forms of the natural law to stand alongside each other without mediation and was therefore unable to overcome their estrangement within the surrounding social reality, the Christian Middle Ages succeeded in uniting both forms by replacing the distinction between the gospel and the world with a distinction between the natural and the supernatural, interpreting each as a level of a metaphysical whole. When this idea of a metaphysical hierarchy of reality, attached to the concept of natural law, became linked to the notion of society as a structured organism, as taught by Aristotle and Paul, the concept of natural law assumed a virtually fundamental status: it grounded both moral and social philosophy and enabled the rise of the "unified culture" characteristic of the Christian Middle Ages, from which the Reformation later departed in order to regain the radicalism of the gospel. By linking the concept of natural law to the organic interpretation of-the social, the Christian Middle Ages could also assign a central role to the church: just as the divine law is the bracket that binds together the levels of moral laws, so the church is the bracket that holds together the members of the social organism. Its interpretation as the "boundless, comprehensive, and guiding institution of salvation," together with the strong attachment of natural law to eternal and immutable principles, must, in the last consequence, lead to a "conservative, organically patriarchal natural law." Consequently, those elements that were already contained in the medieval form of the natural law but not in the Platonic interpretation of the social order, and which in its later secular form gave it its progressive, even revolutionary, power, remain repressed: the idea of the dignity of the person, the associated freedom and autonomy of individual reason, the-resulting responsibility of personal conscience, and the significance of one's vocation, which stems from the place of the individual within the whole. (shrink)

Western society is steadily inundated by technology. Pope Benedict XVI has presented a positive but cautious analysis of biotechnological development. Within the context of man’s yearning for love and truth, Benedict explicates a vision of authentic human progress that recognizes that the telos of technical progress in biomedicine is the good of the human person. He criticizes the “consensus model” of bioethics, which is prevalent in our cultural technopoly, because it leaves science unfettered and emphasizes arbitrary consensus at the cost (...) of an ethical evaluation, which honors the dignity of the person and the rights of man. Benedict XVI proposes a bioethical model which is open to God, is consistent with natural law, and views the human person as its telos. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.4 (Winter 2011): 669–678. (shrink)

What is it for something to have a nature? And what is it for law to have a nature? Analysis of the concept of law has often been taken to be a search for the essential features of law, but it is not clear that the nature of a phenomenon or artifact is better explained by its essential features than by its common ones. And it is not clear that necessary truths have more explanatory value than typical truths. Especially -- (...) but not necessarily - if we recognize the possibility that law is a cluster concept, the value of explaining the widespread but not strictly necessary features of law in explaining law itself becomes more apparent. The jurisprudential project of differentiating law from other social phenomena is an important one, but the distinction may be a fuzzy one and not susceptible either to sharp demarcation or to specification of essential features of law that will assist in differentiation. But if we inquire into what typically or usually or almost always characterizes law rather than what necessarily characterizes it, we may make genuine progress in distinguishing law from the social phenomena to which it is adjacent but with which it is not congruent. (shrink)

The philosopher’s task, Richard Rorty writes, is "to clear the road for prophets and poets, to make intellectual life a bit simpler and safer for those who have visions of new communities." The essays collected in Truth and Progress show that Rorty is more than up to the challenge. His pragmatic approach is as well suited to brokering peace between "coworkers" Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida as it is to addressing more violent disputes. As Rorty sees it, part of the (...) reason feminis.. (shrink)

This volume complements two highly successful previously published volumes of Richard Rorty's philosophical papers: Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, and Essays on Heidegger and Others. The essays in the volume engage with the work of many of today's most innovative thinkers including Robert Brandom, Donald Davidson, Daniel Dennett, Jacques Derrida, Jürgen Habermas, John McDowell, Hilary Putnam, John Searle, and Charles Taylor. The collection also touches on problems in contemporary feminism raised by Annette Baier, Marilyn Frye, and Catherine MacKinnon, and considers issues (...) connected with human rights and cultural differences. Anyone with a serious interest in contemporary philosophy and what it can do for us in the modern world will enjoy this invaluable collection. (shrink)

Following directly upon an account of the author's personal experiences as a young soldier in Gaza during the course of the first intifada in 1987, this essay is an attempt to “cash in” rabbinic statements that present the entire Torah as a path to peace. The essay suggests that the genre of rabbinic debate—rather than the specific content of rabbinic statements—can be understood as peaceful. The study of halakhic literature, which is generally understood either as designed to clarify and quantify (...) explicit legal demands or as a setting for pluralistic and progressive legal debate, is reevaluated with the purpose of limiting the potential of religious law to justify acts of violence. This reevaluation is founded upon an implicit critique of the “liberal” strategies that have sought to control the dangerous potential of religious law. The author proposes an irenic understanding of the halakha built upon partial and limited evaluations of the law's truth-claims. It argues that rabbinic debating generates multiple understandings for every detail of the law that entangle and conceal any ultimate sense of the law from view. The result is a legal system that is modest about its conclusions—and content to implement them partially—hypocritically. The religious value of such a system is that the truth claims of the law are thus modeled upon—and duplicate—the paradoxical opaqueness of prophetic revelation. Ultimately, this essay argues that this conception of the halakha is inherently tentative and hence peaceful. (shrink)

Aristotle’s Metaphysics Λ.7 features an argumentative progression from the unwavering actuality of the unmoved mover through its necessity to its goodness, which goodness in turn grounds the manner in which it serves as the ultimate principle of motion, namely, by being an object of love and desire (1072b4-12). One link in this progression is especially brief and startling, namely the second of two inferences in this short sentence: “It is a being of necessity, therefore, and in so far as [it (...) exists] necessarily, [it exists] finely, and it is in this way a principle” (1072b10-11). Aristotle slides smoothly from: x exists necessarily (ex anagkēs) to x exists finely (kalōs), without any intervening step. The seamless speed of this step is bound to give us pause—we naturally read it as enthymematic and start casting about for an intervening premise set. Still more arresting is its apparent move from a descriptive to a normative proposition. From our post-Humean vantage point we may be likely to presume that whatever the missing premise set of this inference turns out to be, somewhere buried in that set will need to be something of the form: if descriptive proposition (DP), then normative proposition (NP). Otherwise, Aristotle’s conclusion will have illicitly inferred a normative proposition from a descriptive premise set, in violation of the Humean edict that one cannot infer an ought from an is. Yet, if we smuggle the norm into our premise set along the way, we have merely relocated our problem. For then we will have asserted, or assumed, that the truth of some descriptive proposition is sufficient for the truth of some normative proposition, namely the consequent of the conditional: if DP, then NP. At any rate, this obtains unless necessity itself is already a normative notion, a questionable assumption, but one we will consider in due course. In either case, though, we need some explication of the route Aristotle follows when he moves, without comment, from necessity to goodness. (shrink)