Although Heidegger's philosophical complicity with National Socialism has been the focus of virtually all discussions of his politics, little to no attention has been placed on how the conception of human existence developed in Being and Time might shed light on debates about the self between contemporary liberals and communitarians. By situating Heidegger's early work within these ongoing debates, the author will show how his descriptions of Dasein—especially the descriptions of the relationship between Dasein and its community—are actually more consistent (...) with liberal views of the self than with communitarian interpretations. Heidegger helps to clarify how a thickly constituted, social self may nevertheless stand back from its community in ways that communitarians are hard pressed to explain. In the final section, the author will comment on the compatibility of Heidegger's conception of Dasein with liberalism as a political philosophy, focusing in particular on Heidegger's conception of Mitsein or being-with. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I examine the development of autonomy in the philosophical works of Kant, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. After outlining the centrality of this development to what I call, following Robert Pippin, "philosophical modernity," I show that the figure of genius described in Kant's third Critique becomes the model for the "aesthetic" versions of autonomy articulated by Nietzsche and Heidegger under the names of "sovereignty" and "authenticity" respectively. According to these more recent formulations, autonomy is not understood as rational self-legislation, (...) but as a quasi-artistic "self-creation." Moreover, in each of these versions of aesthetic autonomy, I claim that in spite of a disavowal of mimesis understood in a Platonic sense, an implicit reliance is placed upon the operations of a "higher" sense of mimesis, a mimesis of freedom, that enables autonomy to be exemplified and, paradoxically, "imitated." For Kant, this mimesis of freedom accounts for both the continuity and discontinuity of art-historical traditions. In Nietzsche and Heidegger, however, this covert deployment of mimesis has implications for our understanding of historicity more generally, and the relationship between history and modernity in particular. After showing what these implications are, I comment on the problems and limits of "aesthetic autonomy," especially when it is understood politically or collectively, and utterly decoupled from any moral constraints. (shrink)

This article explores Heidegger’s ambivalent philosophical relationship with Richard Wagner. After showing how Heidegger situates Wagner within his larger critique of aesthetics, I will explain why Heidegger believes that Wagner’s operas, due to the dominance of music, could not attain the status of “great art.” Because music can do no more than stimulate or intensify feelings, it becomes, for Heidegger, the paradigm of what art has become under the influence of aesthetics. Heidegger’s views on music even motivate him to contest (...) Nietzsche’s thesis that music was the origin of Greek tragedy. Heidegger dismisses Nietzsche’s developmental account and argues instead that poetry is the essence of tragic drama. To conclude, I will show that Heidegger’s exclusive focus on Wagner’s theoretical work is too narrow, for his music reveals ontological concerns that cannot be easily assimilated into Heidegger’s history of aesthetics, and in fact suggest possible affinities with Heidegger’s own philosophical insights. (shrink)

In this reading of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, I attempt to account for the gradual transformation of Zarathustra’s politics and pedagogy in light of his confrontation with a Platonic understanding of imitation. I argue that the provisional teaching of the overman is abandoned in the second half of the text because it fails to teach others to become who they are. It only produces bad imitations of Zarathustra himself. I read the thought of the eternal recurrence, however, as Zarathustra’s overcoming of (...) his residual Platonic pedagogy since it challenges the mimetic relationship between master and disciple that Zarathustra originally cultivates but ultimately disavows.Dans cette présente lecture d’Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra, je tente de rendre compte de la transformation graduelle de la politique et de la pédagogie de Zarathoustra à la lumière de sa confrontation à la comprehension platonicienne de l’imitation. Je soutiens que l’enseignement provisoire du surhomme est abandonné dans la seconde partie du texte parce qu’il ne parvient pas à enseigner aux autres àdevenir ce qu’ils sont. Il ne fait que produire des imitations de Zarathoustra lui-même. Par eontre, je comprends la pensée de l’eternel retour comme le dépassement de sa pédagogie platonicienne résiduelle, puisque cette pensée s’oppose à la relation mimétique entre le maître et le disciple que Zarathoustra cultive au départ, mais désavoue à la fin. (shrink)

In this reading of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, I attempt to account for the gradual transformation of Zarathustra’s politics and pedagogy in light of his confrontation with a Platonic understanding of imitation. I argue that the provisional teaching of the overman is abandoned in the second half of the text because it fails to teach others to become who they are. It only produces bad imitations of Zarathustra himself. I read the thought of the eternal recurrence, however, as Zarathustra’s overcoming of (...) his residual Platonic pedagogy since it challenges the mimetic relationship between master and disciple that Zarathustra originally cultivates but ultimately disavows.Dans cette présente lecture d’Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra, je tente de rendre compte de la transformation graduelle de la politique et de la pédagogie de Zarathoustra à la lumière de sa confrontation à la comprehension platonicienne de l’imitation. Je soutiens que l’enseignement provisoire du surhomme est abandonné dans la seconde partie du texte parce qu’il ne parvient pas à enseigner aux autres àdevenir ce qu’ils sont. Il ne fait que produire des imitations de Zarathoustra lui-même. Par eontre, je comprends la pensée de l’eternel retour comme le dépassement de sa pédagogie platonicienne résiduelle, puisque cette pensée s’oppose à la relation mimétique entre le maître et le disciple que Zarathoustra cultive au départ, mais désavoue à la fin. (shrink)

In the general introduction to Routledge’s new “Thinking the Political” series, the editors state that their purpose is “to present the work of the major Continental thinkers... to a wider audience in philosophy and in political, social and cultural theory.” Richard Beardsworth’s book on Derrida does not do this, but that in no way means it is a bad book. My argument, rather, is that Derrida and the Political is a book for specialists, and will likely only frustrate that “wider (...) audience” in the humanities for whom it is ostensibly intended. (shrink)