This essay introduces the concept of deictic abstraction , taking as a point of departure Husserl’s prototypical but insufficient description of the act of ideation in which a shade of color comes to givenness as an ideal object, i.e., a non-individual or abstract object, on the basis of a perceived individual object. This concept comprises not only color-ideation and ideations of universalities of the sensuous sphere , but all acts founded in perceptions in which ideal objects are directly referred to (...) by means of demonstrative expressions . This allows various types of deictic ideations or abstractions, corresponding to the degree of universality and the kind of ideal object concerned, to be brought to light through the analysis of particular cases of everyday acts of deictic abstraction, including deictic abstractions of predicative universals of the lowest level of universality ; deictic abstractions of non-predicative universals, especially of universal ways of doing something ; and deictic abstractions of individual styles of doing something . Deictic abstractions not only turn out to be constitutive for the formation of perceptual concepts of the lower and lowest levels, but also prove to be foundational for all kinds of learning in which schemata of actions are acquired from a model. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Diderot philosopheTimo KaitaroColas Duflo. Diderot philosophe. Paris: Honoré Champion, 2003. Pp. 543. Cloth, € 85,00.Diderot's thought has often been believed to be full of incoherencies and paradoxes, lacking the unity characteristic of philosophical systems. It is true that he preferred the form of a dialogue to that of a systematic treatise and that his ideas on a specific subject tend to be dispersed in a variety of philosophical, (...) literary or epistolary texts. However, the different pieces fit together nicely, if one has the patience to put them together. In his new monograph Colas Duflo manages to show the coherence and unity of Diderot's philosophy, not only by showing the consistency of the philosopher's thought on epistemological, aesthetical and moral subjects separately, but also by showing the close interdependence of different aspects of his philosophical inquiry and their grounding in his biological materialism.Before the author examines Diderot's philosophy proper, he introduces the reader to Diderot's manner of writing and shows how the literary forms in which the encyclopedist presented his philosophy are indistinguishable from its content. Diderot did not write dialogues just in order to present in a palatable and entertaining form a philosophy that could well have been presented in erudite treatises. Dialogue was the original form of Diderot's thought. It helped him to distance himself from his thoughts and to put his ideas in a dialogue with each other, instead of systematizing them. In his dialogues the truth is approached by multiplying perspectives instead of being viewed from a central perspective which unifies the various points of view in one vision. Reminding the reader of this aspect of Diderot's philosophy is important. One would look in vain for the traditional mouthpiece of the truth among the protagonists of his dialogues; and this is true even in cases when he stages himself among them.Colas Duflo starts his discussion of Diderot's philosophy by examining the philosopher's complex and changing relation to metaphysical finalism in his first philosophical works. Duflo also lets this theme of finalism run through the book as the main thread, which provides a coherent framework for the treatement of the different aspects of Diderot's philosophy. The presentation of Diderot's early writings situates these works in their contemporary context and manages to reveal the internal logic of Diderot's development from a finalist deist to an antifinalist atheist in a convincing manner. The chapter dealing with Le rêve de d'Alembert provides a careful and well-thought-out reading of this work and shows the originality of Diderot's biological materialism, which has really nothing to do with the mechanism sometimes falsely attributed to him (and to La Mettrie). Diderot's thought was not so much rooted in the mechanical world-view as it was in the sciences of life of his time. In relation to the problem of unity vs. multiplicity in Diderot's organicistic materialism, Duflo tends to emphasize multiplicity. One could, in fact, with as much reason, argue the opposite and put the emphasis on unity. But this is perhaps a matter of taste, since Diderot's originality lies in fact in his ability to take into account both aspects of the organisms by describing the continuing tensions between unifying and disrupting forces at work within them.The part of the book dealing with aesthetics places the encyclopedist's theory of taste in the context of his materialism. The interpretations proposed are convincing although one has to take account of the fact that Duflo uses the word "spontaneous," not in its usual sense referring to immediate and unreflected reactions, but rather as a synonym of innate [End Page 498] (see 303). Diderot emphasized the former but denied the latter. The juxtaposition of Diderot's aesthetics with that of Kant provides some enlightening insights into both. From taste one passes fluently to Diderot's moral philosophy: according to Diderot moral judgements resemble those of taste in so far as they are often as spontaneous as the latter. And despite this they are not innate but based on experience.The chapters dealing with the moral and political philosophy of... (shrink)

In Reinhart Koselleck's history of concepts, the general orientation that concepts are to be understood in their proper contexts is intertwined with the assumption that they are manifestations of particular political conflicts. The essay shows that the dense compound of context and conflict in Koselleck's thought springs from Carl Schmitt's political theory and also forms an important point of continuity between Koselleck's early work and his later methodological writings. The formalized assumption of conflict, somewhat problematically, binds Koselleckian conceptual history to (...) a particular conception of politics, one that sees politics ultimately as struggle and conflict. Once the historical-theoretical contingency of this conception is recognized, it becomes both possible and necessary to reassess the role of conflict in the methodology of conceptual history. (shrink)

The article analyzes the work of Hanno Kesting, Reinhart Koselleck, Roman Schnur, and Nicolaus Sombart—four young followers of Carl Schmitt in postwar Germany. Their “intellectual Schmittianism” was less than a full commitment to Schmitt’s political positions, yet had more than an arbitrary similarity with them: it pertained to assumptions, categories, and modes of thought. Drawing on Pocock’s terminology, I identify a particular “language” of intellectual Schmittianism, introduce its key components, and analyze their interaction. I focus on six categories derived from (...) Schmitt’s narrative of European political modernity: discrimination, historical parallels, secularization, global civil war, open/latent civil war, and category blurs. The analysis shows that these categories were interlinked argumentative devices rather than mere rhetoric and that they systematically upheld the postwar scholars’ arguments. While the Schmittian language enabled the young scholars to express their political skepticis... (shrink)

Commonly overlooked in the commentaries on Husserl’s conception of the lifeworld is the fact that Husserl conceived his science of the lifeworld as a two-stage science with an empirical as well as a non-empirical (eidetic) stage. At the lower stage, it deals with our factical lifeworld and aims at general propositions about the very world we live in. At the higher stage, i.e., the primary stage for Husserl, it aims at general propositions about the lifeworld as such but not about (...) our factical lifeworld, which now serves only as one possible lifeworld among others. This higher-level science of the lifeworld is a descriptive eidetics made up of pure descriptive concepts and pure descriptive laws (descriptive eidetic laws), in which no factical entity is posited explicitly or implicitly. The present paper analyzes these relationships. In an excursus, it also traces out the elements, principles and methodology of a descriptive eidetics in general to see how they are applied to Husserl’s descriptive eidetics of the lifeworld as it is subsequently developed in his lectures on Phenomenological Psychology from 1925, a text in which Husserl explicitly outlines his science of the lifeworld as a two-stage science. (shrink)

In his formal papers on existential graphs , Peirce tended to obscure the simplicity of EGs with distracting digressions. In MS 514, however, he presented his simplest introduction to the EG syntax, semantics, and rules of inference. This article reproduces Peirce's original words and diagrams with further commentary, explanations, and examples. Unlike the syntax-based approach of most current textbooks, Peirce's method addresses the semantic issues of logic in a way that can be transferred to any notation. The concluding section shows (...) that his rules of inference can clarify the foundations of proof theory and relate diverse methods, such as resolution and natural deduction. To relate EGs to other notations for logic, this article uses the Existential Graph Interchange Format , which is a subset of the CGIF dialect of Common Logic. EGIF is a linear notation that can be mapped to and from the Alpha, Beta, and Gamma variants of EGs. It can also be translated to or from other formalisms, algebraic or geometrical. (shrink)

Die Wittgenstein-Rezeption hat sich in den letzten Jahrzehnten stark auf den Begriff der Regel konzentriert. Wittgenstein selbst betont allerdings immer wieder, dass eine Praxis nicht nur Regeln hat, sondern auch einen Witz, d.h. eine Pointe - er behauptet sogar: "Die Problematik der Philosophie ist die Problematik des Witzes". Demungeachtet gab es bisher keine systematische Studie, die der Bedeutung des Witzes in Wittgensteins Philosophie gerecht wurde. Durch die Berücksichtigung von Regel und Witz wirft die vorliegende Arbeit ein neues Licht auf Mathematik, (...) Sprache und Moral. (shrink)

Among many things, Simmel in his Philosophy of Money works out a cultural perspective on money. In reference to socio-historical examples, Simmel differentiates between the »Substanzwert« of those objects, which serve monetary purposes: Whereas the former quality stands for the equalization of material attributes and value, the later describes money's capability for universal exchange. With Ernst Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, we can argue that this a »revolution of the way of thinking«: Drawing a parallel between Simmel's »Sustains-« and »Funktionswert« (...) and Cassirers »Ausdrucks-« und »Darstellungsfunktion« does not only point out characteristics of each thinkers cultural philosophy. It also shows how an argument for a monetary understanding of the world – money as a symbolic form – can be developed. (shrink)

We introduce a framework for a graph-theoretic analysis of the semantic paradoxes. Similar frameworks have been recently developed for infinitary propositional languages by Cook and Rabern, Rabern, and Macauley. Our focus, however, will be on the language of first-order arithmetic augmented with a primitive truth predicate. Using Leitgeb’s notion of semantic dependence, we assign reference graphs (rfgs) to the sentences of this language and define a notion of paradoxicality in terms of acceptable decorations of rfgs with truth values. It is (...) shown that this notion of paradoxicality coincides with that of Kripke. In order to track down the structural components of an rfg that are responsible for paradoxicality, we show that any decoration can be obtained in a three-stage process: first, the rfg is unfolded into a tree, second, the tree is decorated with truth values (yielding a dependence tree in the sense of Yablo), and third, the decorated tree is re-collapsed onto the rfg. We show that paradoxicality enters the picture only at stage three. Due to this we can isolate two basic patterns necessary for paradoxicality. Moreover, we conjecture a solution to the characterization problem for dangerous rfgs that amounts to the claim that basically the Liar- and the Yablo graph are the only paradoxical rfgs. Furthermore, we develop signed rfgs that allow us to distinguish between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ reference and obtain more fine-grained versions of our results for unsigned rfgs. (shrink)

Ricoeur, Culture, and Recognition: A Hermeneutic of Cultural Subjectivity presents Ricoeur’s work from the beginning to its end in form of a cultural theory and proposes a cultural hermeneutic that clarifies the cultural facilitation in a person’s process of attaining a sense of being a human. This exploration of human being as profoundly formed and influenced by the cultural condition also enables a new understanding of intercultural questions by revealing the common human condition that the various cultures manifest.

Abstract According to Habermas' colonization thesis, reification is a social pathology that arises when the communicative infrastructure of the lifeworld is 'colonized' by money and power. In this paper I argue that, thirty years after the publication of the Theory of Communicative Action, this thesis remains compelling. However, while Habermas offers a functionalist explanation of reification, his normative criticism of it remains largely implicit: he never explains what is wrong with reification from the perspective of the people whose social relations (...) are reified. As a result, Habermas cannot explain why only some forms of colonization lead to reification effects. In particular, he suggests that reification effects result from the juridification of communicatively structured domains of action but not from the commodification of labour power. I criticize this argument and suggest that if the normative dimension of the colonization thesis is made explicit, a more nuanced explanation of reification becomes possible. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Axel Honneth’s normative reconstruction of the market as a sphere of social freedom in his 2014 book, Freedom’s Right. Honneth’s position is complex: on the one hand, he acknowledges that modern capitalist societies do not realise social freedom; on the other hand, he insists that the promise of social freedom is implicit in the market sphere. In fact, the latter explains why modern subjects have seen capitalism as legitimate. I will reconstruct Honneth’s conception of social (...) freedom and investigate how it is realised in the sphere in which Honneth sees it most successfully at work, the sphere of interpersonal relations. I then move on to the sphere of the market economy and discuss two related problems of this view that stem from his interpretation of Hegel. Next, I consider Honneth’s method of “normative reconstruction” and his reconstructions of the sphere of consumption and, finally, the labour market. My conclusion will be that market institutions cannot realise social freedom, and that this insight should orient the philosophical direction of critical social theory. (shrink)

In Vagaries of Desire, Timo Airaksinen develops a new philosophical account of desire understood as mental state that focuses on a desirable possible world. Literary and philosophical themes, including sexuality, are discussed in terms of their metaphoric and metonymic features.

In proof-theoretic semantics, meaning is based on inference. It may be seen as the mathematical expression of the inferentialist interpretation of logic. Much recent work has focused on base-extension semantics, in which the validity of formulas is given by an inductive definition generated by provability in a ‘base’ of atomic rules. Base-extension semantics for classical and intuitionistic propositional logic have been explored by several authors. In this paper, we develop base-extension semantics for the classical propositional modal systems K, KT , (...) K4, and S4, with □ as the primary modal operator. We establish appropriate soundness and completeness theorems and establish the duality between □ and a natural presentation of ♢. We also show that our semantics is in its current form not complete with respect to euclidean modal logics. Our formulation makes essential use of relational structures on bases. (shrink)

The theory of the organism-environment system starts with the proposition that in any functional sense organism and environment are inseparable and form only one unitary system. The organism cannot exist without the environment and the environment has descriptive properties only if it is connected to the organism. Although for practical purposes we do separate organism and environment, this common-sense starting point leads in psychological theory to problems which cannot be solved. Therefore, separation of organism and environment cannot be the basis (...) of any scientific explanation of human behavior. The theory leads to a reinterpretation of basic problems in many fields of inquiry and makes possible the definition of mental phenomena without their reduction either to neural or biological activity or to separate mental functions. According to the theory, mental activity is activity of the whole organism-environment system, and the traditional psychological concepts describe only different aspects of organisation of this system. Therefore, mental activity cannot be separated from the nervous system, but the nervous system is only one part of the organism­environment system. This problem will be dealt with in detail in the second part of the article. (shrink)

Jakob von Uexküll’s umwelt theory opens new perspectives for understanding animal extinction. The umwelt is interpreted here as a sum of structural correspondences between an animal’s subjective experience, ecosystem, physiology, and behaviour. The global environmental crisis disturbs these meaning-connections. From the umwelt perspective, we may describe extinction as umwelt collapse: The disintegration of an animal’s umwelt resulting from the cumulative errors in semiotic processes that mediate an organism and ecosystem. The loss of umwelt-ecosystem integration disturbs “ecological memory,” which provides the (...) ecosystem with adaptive modelling and self-design capacities. Making a distinction between core and mediated umwelts, and describing different types of umwelt collapse, are suitable methods for more detailed analysis. The concept of umwelt collapse enables the reinterpretation of extinction, from an internal perspective, as a semiotic breakdown. Such an approach may help us map scenarios of animal extinction, and may lead to successful compensation strategies in adapting to environmental change. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Adorno's metacritique of freedom in Negative Dialectics and related texts remains fruitful today. I begin with some background on Adorno's conception of ‘metacritique’ and on Kant's conception of freedom, as I understand it. Next, I discuss Adorno's analysis of the experiential content of Kantian freedom, according to which Kant has reified the particular social experience of the early modern bourgeoisie in his conception of unconditioned freedom. Adorno argues against this conception of freedom and suggests (...) that freedom is always conditioned by our embodiment and by our social and historical situation. Finally, I turn to Adorno's criticism of Kant's discussion of freedom and determinism in the Critique of Pure Reason and argue that while his philosophical argument against Kant fails, his metacritical argument remains suggestive. Scepticism about freedom arises when the standpoint of theoretical reason encroaches upon the standpoint of practical reason and assimilates persons to things. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Habermas’ conception of the market in The Theory of Communicative Action (TCA). Habermas’ characterization of the market as norm-free has been controversial and I discuss three objections to it: the claims that it (1) conflates of action types, types of action coordination and spheres of action, (2) cannot account for the normative structure of the social organization of labour, and (3) that it makes impossible to make moral judgments about behaviour in the market. I conclude (...) that while some of these objections are unfounded, we have reason to revise Habermas’ substantive claims about the market. I also stress the importance of distinguishing between the TCA’s methodology and its time-diagnostic thrust. Next, I assess the colonization thesis through a case study of the commodification of higher education. I conclude that this thesis remains plausible, but that it needs to be supplemented with a theory of ideology. (shrink)

I argue that Theodor W. Adorno’s philosophy articulates a radical conception of hope. According to Lear, radical hope is ‘directed toward a future goodness that transcends the current ability to understand what it is’. Given Adorno’s claim that the current world is radically evil, and that we cannot know or even imagine what the good is, it is plausible that his conception of hope must be radical in this sense. I develop this argument through an analysis of Adorno’s engagement with (...) Kant’s conception of hope, Adorno’s references to hope and his critical diagnosis of a metaphysical need for hope. Having demonstrated that Adorno must reject both ordinary and Kantian hope, I examine why Adorno thinks that we still may have reasons for hope. I also show that Adorno’s conception of hope differs from Lear’s in one important respect. (shrink)

Intonation plays an integral role in comprehending spoken language. Listeners can rapidly integrate intonational information to predictively map a given pitch accent onto the speaker's likely referential intentions. We use mouse tracking to investigate two questions: (a) how listeners draw predictive inferences based on information from intonation? and (b) how listeners adapt their online interpretation of intonational cues when these are reliable or unreliable? We formulate a novel Bayesian model of rational predictive cue integration and explore predictions derived under a (...) concrete linking hypothesis relating a quantitative notion of evidential strength of a cue to the moment in time, relative to the unfolding speech signal, at which mouse trajectories turn towards the eventually selected option. In order to capture rational belief updates after concrete observations of a speaker's behavior, we formulate and explore an extension of this model that includes the listener's hierarchical beliefs about the speaker's likely production behavior. Our results are compatible with the assumption that listeners rapidly and rationally integrate all available intonational information, that they expect reliable intonational information initially, and that they adapt these initial expectations gradually during exposition to unreliable input. All materials, data, and scripts can be retrieved here: https://osf.io/dnbuk/. (shrink)

In this paper I criticise Axel Honneth's reactualization of reification as a concept in critical theory in his 2005 Tanner Lectures and argue that he ultimately fails on his own terms. His account is based on two premises: (1) reification is to be taken literally rather than metaphorically, and (2) it is not conceived of as a moral injury but as a social pathology. Honneth concludes that reification is “forgetfulness of recognition”, more specifically, of antecedent recognition, an emphatic and engaged (...) relationship with oneself, others and the world, which precedes any more concrete relationship both genetically and categorially. I argue against this conception of reification on two grounds. (1) The two premises of Honneth's account cannot be squared with one another. It is not possible to literally take a person as a thing without this being a recognisable moral injury, and, therefore, I suggest that there are no cases of literal reification. (2) Honneth's account is essentially ahistorical, because it is based on an anthropological model of recognition that tacitly equates reification with autism. In conclusion, I suggest that any successful account of reification must (i) take reification metaphorically and (ii) offer a social-historical account of the origin(s) of reification. (shrink)

Psychoanalytische Konzeptionen psychosomatischer Erkrankungen treffen sich mit Grundelementen psychoanalytischer Verstehens- und Bedeutungstheorie in der Kategorie der Negativität. Anschließend daran kann Freuds Bemerkung, das aktualneurotische (bzw. das somatisierte) Symptom trage »keinen Sinn, keine psychische Bedeutung«, anders gefolgt werden. Anhand einer Forschungs-Fallvignette einer teilstationären Behandlung wird aufgezeigt, inwiefern psychoanalytisch zu verstehen bedeutet, sich mit der nächsten, anderen Bedeutung auseinanderzusetzen. Ferner zeigen sich im Fall zwei Leitdimensionen zeitgenössischer psychoanalytischer Psychosomatik: die Psyche-Soma-Diskonnexion und die Selbst-Objekt-Organ-Verschmolzenheit. Dies wird zunächst im Hinblick auf psychoanalytische Krankheitslehre aufgearbeitet (...) und dann in Relation zu psychoanalytischer Hermeneutik als negative Hermeneutik gesetzt. Entscheidend ist die Annahme, dass der Anschluss an zeitgenössische philosophische Hermeneutiken für die Psychoanalyse insofern ertragreich ist, als eine Thematisierung der Negativität Bezugnahmen auf das dynamische Unbewusste erlaubt. (shrink)

Approaches to animal communication have for the most part been quite different in semiotics and evolutionary biology. In this context the writings of a leading evolutionary biologist who has also been attracted to semiotics — John Maynard Smith — are an interesting exception and object of study. The present article focuses on the use and adaptation of semiotic terminology in Maynard Smith’s works with reference to general theoretical premises both in semiotics and evolutionary biology. In developing a typology of animal (...) signals, Maynard Smith employs the concepts of icon, index and symbol to denote distinct signal classes.He uses “indices” or “indexes” to express a signal type where the relation between signal properties and meaning is restricted because of physical characteristics. Such approach also points out the issue of the motivatedness of signs, which has had a long history in semiotics. In the final part of the article the usage and content of the concepts of signal form and meaning in Maynard Smith’s writings are analysed. It appears that in evolutionary biology, the “signal” is a vague concept that may denote a variety of things from an animal’s specific physiological status to artificial theoretical constructs. It also becomes evident that in actual usage the concept of signal often includes references to the receiver’s activity and interpretation, which belong rather to the characteristics of sign process. The positive influence of Maynard Smith’s works on semiotics could lie in paying attention to the role of physical necessities in animal communication. Physicalconstraints and relations also seem to have a significant role in semiotic processes although this is not always sufficiently studied or understood in semiotics. (shrink)

According to Martha Nussbaum, objectification is essentially a form of instrumentalization or use. I argue that this instrumentalization account fails to capture the distinctive harms and wrongs of sexual objectification, because it does not explain the relationship between instrumentalization and the processes of social stereotyping that make it possible. I develop an imposition account of sexual objectification that provides such an explanation and, therefore, should be preferred over the instrumentalization account. It draws on a contrast between imposition and self-presentation and (...) explains why sexual objectification, understood as the imposition of sex object status on women, is harmful and wrong. (shrink)

In proof-theoretic semantics, meaning is based on inference. It may seen as the mathematical expression of the inferentialist interpretation of logic. Much recent work has focused on base-extension semantics, in which the validity of formulas is given by an inductive definition generated by provability in a ‘base’ of atomic rules. Base-extension semantics for classical and intuitionistic propositional logic have been explored by several authors. In this paper, we develop base-extension semantics for the classical propositional modal systems |$K$|⁠, |$KT$|⁠, |$K4$| and (...) |$S4$|⁠, with |$\square $| as the primary modal operator. We establish appropriate soundness and completeness theorems and establish the duality between |$\square $| and a natural presentation of |$\lozenge $|⁠. We also show that our semantics is in its current form not complete with respect to euclidean modal logics. Our formulation makes essential use of relational structures on bases. (shrink)

This paper develops a recognition-theoretical analysis of human dignity. I argue that a life with dignity requires social esteem (recognition for one’s contribution to socially shared goals) as well as respect (recognition of one’s equal status). I illustrate this through an empirically informed discussion of three aspects of the current social organization of labour which threaten human dignity: unemployment, precarity and low pay. I also argue that in class societies the assertion of dignity as a positional good can undermine its (...) general progressive appeal. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article provides the first comprehensive and chronological analysis of Carl Schmitt’s reception of Carl von Clausewitz. While earlier scholarship has mostly stressed Schmitt’s shift from Clausewitzian ‘instrumentality’ to an ‘existential’ view of war, I note some inherent difficulties in this dichotomy and instead promote the parallel distinction between two argument types: those of containment and intensification. Schmitt theorized both limited political war and the intensification of war out of traditional bounds, and focusing on one should not eclipse the other. (...) Further, both elements are identifiable already in Clausewitz. I analyse Schmitt’s oscillation between containment and intensification arguments chronologically from the mid-1920s to the 1960s. Despite sometimes nominally rejecting Clausewitz’s famous thesis of war as the continuation of politics, Schmitt nevertheless affirmed the idea of war’s political nature. I conclude that Schmitt’s view can be read as a radicalized version of the Clausewitzian political theory of war rather than a strict deviation from it. This becomes evident as soon as we place Schmitt’s partly incoherent observations on Clausewitz in their argumentative contexts. (shrink)

Contemporary proponents of modern Buddhism argue that the Buddha’s teaching, in contrast to later Buddhist-inspired philosophies and folklore, is of a fundamentally therapeutic or experiential character. In response, other scholars have objected that this amounts to an inadequate protestantization that neglects soteriology and the broader religious or cultural context. In this paper, by critically engaging with therapeutic readings (as proposed by Stephen Batchelor) and experiential readings (as proposed by Alan Wallace and D. T. Suzuki) and by drawing from a few (...) significant early Pāli discourses, I reconstruct the Buddha’s teaching in a way that, like many modern interpretations, does not rely on belief in magical powers and spirits but that, unlike many modern interpretations, does not exhaust itself in mere therapeutics or experiential knowledge. My interpretation is grounded in a notion of negative self-knowledge that takes two distinct forms. On the one hand, there is the self-knowledge of not-self as an antecedent recognition of the possibility of awakening that defines the Buddhist seeker. On the other hand, there is the acquired self-knowledge of not-self of the awakened. The latter—that is, the completed insight into what we are not—is not just one experience among others but the transformation of any possible experience. Thus, the Buddha speaks to us of his self-knowledge that exceeds experiential knowledge. This imbalance between the Buddha and his real or potential interlocutors explains why his teaching remains inaccessible to many, in spite of modern attempts to rationalize it. (shrink)

Growing ecological problems have raised the need for conceptual tools dedicated to studying semiotic processes in cultural-ecological systems. Departing from both ecosemiotics and cultural semiotics, the concept of an ecosemiosphere is proposed to denote the entire complex of semiosis in an ecosystem, including the involvement of human cultural semiosis. More specifically, the ecosemiosphere is a semiotic system comprising all species and their umwelts, alongside the diverse semiotic relations (including humans with their culture) that they have in the given ecosystem, and (...) also the material supporting structures that enable the ecosemiosphere to thrive. Drawing parallels with Juri Lotman’s semiosphere concept, the ecosemiosphere is characterized by its heterogeneity, asymmetry, and boundedness. But unlike Lotman’s concept, the ecosemiosphere is not characterized by an overall boundedness, that is, by the presence of external binary boundaries and the shared identity arising from this unity. The involvement of human culture in the ecosemiosphere manifests in interspecies dialogues and semiotic engagements. We need to scrutinize what affordances and semiotic resources culture could offer to nonhuman species and how culture could, by semiotic means, raise the integrity, stability, and resiliency of the ecosystem. The ecosemiosphere is a grounded semiosphere. (shrink)

Volume 17, Issue 5, November 2020, Page 494-509.

ABSTRACTKeeping an eye on Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology in particular, this essay maps out Ricoeur’s explicit references to Kierkegaard in the corpus of his major works. Even though many of...

This essay explores social forces which contributed to regaining independence by the Polish people and sovereignty by the Polish state after 45 years of Soviet domination There were four major factors or forces of historical change: workers' resistance (big-industry working class); intellectual opposition (dissidents); grass-roots movement (families, households and their microeconmuc activity); and the Catholic Church (in the late phase of the Polish People's Republic). The preliminary thesis is that Poland succeeded in transcending communism and Soviet domination as quickly as (...) it did thanks to its civil society traditions. In particular, universities and their intellectual influence on the young generations of Poles helped nurture the political opposition Equally, the grass-roots movement of Polish family households undermined the unrealistic, strange system of national (planned) economy, which otherwise could have lasted much longer in Poland, as it did in all of Eastem Europe. The conclusion follows that the historically formed cultural capital of the Polish people was the decisive factor in the nation's liberation from totalitarian rule. (shrink)