In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS The Incarnation of God: An Introduction to Hegel's Theological Thought as Prolegomena to a Future Christology. By HANS Kii'NG. Translated by J. R. Stephenson. New York: Crossroad, 1987. Pp. 601. $37.50 (cloth bound). This is an imposing book (first German edition, 1970), not only in length, but in breadth of presentation. Kiing, in the introduction, outlines the philosophical, theological and cultural milieus out of which Hegel's (...) theology and philosophy emerged. In the next 400 pages (seven chapters), Kiing thoroughly articulates the historical development of Hegel's theological and philosophical thought as expressed in his successive writings, specifically examining and evaluating the christological elements. Kiing's final chapter interprets Hegel's Christology in light of recent biblical historical/critical methodology, by way of a prolegomenon to a future Christology. The book concludes with five integral historical/theological excursus which take up specific questions that arise out of this Hegelian enterprise, for example: "Does God suffer?," "The Dialectic of the Attributes of God," "Immutability of God?". In the preface to this English edition, Kiing states that the purpose of this work is to "provide theologians with an introduction to Hegel's theological and christological thought.... [It will be] a many-leveled 'invitation' into Hegel's life and 'thought, with particular reference to his religious world, and then into his theology and Christology " (p. ix). "Moreover,.this book is an introduction to Hegel's thought by way of 'prolegomena to a future Christology '. In ·these pages we endeavour to return... a provisional reply that will take us some way in the right direction" (p. x). Why did Kiing look to Hegel for the clue to a future Christology? His thesis is that "the biblical message concerning a God who is by no means separated from the world but rather operates within it, and who is by no means stuck immovable and immutable in an unhistorical and suprahistorical realm but rather performs living acts in hi&tory can be better understood [along the lines of Hegelian thought] than in terms of the metaphysics of either classical Greece or the middle ages" (p. xii). Any student of historical or philosophical theology/christology will be captivated by Kiing's treatment of.the development of Hegel's ilhought. Undoubtedly he has mastered Hegel's life, writings and 698 694 BOOK REVIEWS thought, and presents these in a clear, complete and engaging manner. Kiing notes that Hegel, beginning with his student days at Tiihingen, was influenced by three strong cultural and intellectual currents: the Enlightenment as it specifically culminated in the thought of Kant, the French Revolution, and the rise of the Romantic movement. Kiing shows that, while the young Hegel was acquainted with the Bible, and even,though he already displayed an interest in the role of religion (folk religion) as formative of society, nowhere was he "seized in a lively and inward fashion by the Christian faith, by the figure of Christ himself" (p. 54). To rthe contrary, Hegel's early experience of Christianity was lifeless and joyless. During his subsequent time in Bern, Hegel's evaluation of Jesus un· derwent a transformation. Hegel became fascinated with Greek religion, not because it was true, but because it embodied the culture and spirit of the people. Developing this train of thought, he stated that "The supreme end of man is morality, and his religious bent is pre· eminent among his aptitudes for promoting that end" (p. 69). In light of this, Hegel considered Jesus,to lack the humane and universal scope of Socrates, who was " the paradigm of a free, good and humane Hellenism and of harmony with nature, world and state " (p. 63). Jesus' teaching was too much an authoritarian imposition upon people rarther than, like Socrates', a nurturing of their inner spirit and life. Shordy, as reflected in his Life of Jesus, Hegel's view of Jesus was to change. Now he was placed above Socrates, not because he was acknowledged to be the eternal Son of God, nor because he reconciled mankind to God by his death on the cross, but rather because he per· sonified the divine ideal of virtue that is so necessary for social order. " Whart is... (shrink)

Looking back on it, it seems almost incredible that so many equally educated, equally sincere compatriots and contemporaries, all drawing from the same limited stock of evidence, should have reached so many totally different conclusions---and always with complete certainty.

The first aim of this paper is to prove a topological completeness theorem for a weak version of Stalnaker’s logic KB of knowledge and belief. The weak version of KB is characterized by the assumption that the axioms and rules of KB have to be satisfied with the exception of the axiom (NI) of negative introspection. The proof of a topological completeness theorem for weak KB is based on the fact that nuclei (as defined in the framework of point-free topology) (...) give rise to a profusion of topological belief operators that are compatible with the familiar topological knowledge operator. Thereby a canonical topological model for weak KB can be constructed. For this canonical model a truth lemma for the K and B holds such that a completeness theorem for KB can be proved in the familiar way. The second aim of this paper is to show that the topological interpretation of knowledge K comes along with a complete Heyting algebra of belief operators B that all fit the knowledge operator K in the sense that the pairs (K, B) satisfy all axioms of weak KB. This amounts to a pluralistic relation between knowledge and belief: Knowledge does not fully determine belief, rather it designs a conceptual space for belief operators where different (competing) belief operators coexist. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence research and regulation seek to balance the benefits of innovation against any potential harms and disruption. However, one unintended consequence of the recent surge in AI research is the potential re-orientation of AI technologies to facilitate criminal acts, term in this chapter AI-Crime. AIC is theoretically feasible thanks to published experiments in automating fraud targeted at social media users, as well as demonstrations of AI-driven manipulation of simulated markets. However, because AIC is still a relatively young and inherently (...) interdisciplinary area—spanning socio-legal studies to formal science—there is little certainty of what an AIC future might look like. This chapter offers the first systematic, interdisciplinary literature analysis of the foreseeable threats of AIC, providing ethicists, policy-makers, and law enforcement organisations with a synthesis of the current problems, and a possible solution space. (shrink)

In this chapter, I consider the unity of self-consciousness and objectivity. Starting from the notion that the objective character and the self-conscious character of thought seem in tension, I discuss Sebastian Rödl’s Self-Consciousness and Objectivity and his thesis that this tension is merely apparent. This resolution suggests an immediate route to absolute idealism. I recall two Hegelian objections against such an immediate route. Against this background, it transpires that the dissolution of the apparent opposition of objectivity and self-consciousness can only (...) be a preliminary step, opening our eyes to an actual opposition animating the pursuit of knowledge: the opposition of knowledge of nature and self-knowledge. This actual opposition cannot be removed as merely apparent and instead has to be sublated through articulation of its speculative unity. I consider two paradigms for the exposition of such a speculative unity: Kant’s account of judgments of beauty, and Hegel’s account of the speculative unity of life and self-consciousness. I close by contrasting these two approaches with Rödl’s characterization, which strikes me as one-sided. Absolute idealism, properly understood, requires us to develop the speculative unity of knowledge of nature and self-knowledge from both sides, showing us that knowledge of nature is self-knowledge, but equally: that self-knowledge requires knowledge of ourselves as nature. (shrink)

This book addresses the most important questions asked about higher education: What should its content be? What should we educate for, and why? What constitutes a meaningful liberal education, as distinct from mere training for a vocation? These and many other questions are addressed by Reuben Abel, M.H. Abrams, Robert L. Bartley, Ronald Berman, Also S. Bernardo, Wm. Theodore deBary, Gray Dorsey, Joseph Dunner, Nathan Glazer, Feliks Gross, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Gerald Holton, Sidney Hook, Charles Issawi, Montimer R. Kadish, Paul Oscar (...) Krissteller, paul Kurtz, Herbert I. London, Ernest Nagel, Henry R. Novotny, Frederick A. Olafson, Michael Rabin, Howard B. Radest, Joseph J. Schwab, Robert F. Sexton, Thomas Sowell, John B. Stephenson, and Miro M. Todorovich. (shrink)

Social scientific reasoning (SSR) is essential to social science education and to a democratic society as a whole. Students are challenged to analyze and reason about social problems such as social inequality, crime, and poverty. However, students experience difficulties with SSR. This study addresses the research question: Which design principles can guide teachers in designing lessons that promote social scientific reasoning? In this design-based research, four social science teachers employed a conceptualization of SSR and its levels together with three initial (...) design principles to develop curriculum materials and activities. These design principles and curriculum materials were piloted in two secondary education classes (9th and 10th grades) and evaluated by four social science teachers, four social science teacher educators and 90 students. The study produced six design principles that can promote students’ SSR. In combination with the curriculum materials, those design principles can help develop teachers’ pedagogical content knowledge and guide the design of tasks and units that develop SSR. (shrink)

The conception of property at the basis of Hegel’s conception of abstract right seems committed to a problematic form of “possessive individualism.” It seems to conceive of right as the expression of human mastery over nature and as based upon an irreducible opposition of person and nature, rightful will, and rightless thing. However, this chapter argues that Hegel starts with a form of possessive individualism only to show that it undermines itself. This is evident in the way Hegel unfolds the (...) nature of property as it applies to external things as well as in the way he explains our self-ownership of our own bodies and lives. Hegel develops the idea of property to a point where it reaches a critical limit and encounters the “true right” that life possesses against the “formal” and “abstract right” of property. Ultimately, Hegel’s account suggests that nature should precisely not be treated as a rightless object at our arbitrary disposal but acknowledged as the inorganic body of right. (shrink)

This article constitutes a substantial introduction to the thematic issue “Matters.” After introducing briefly the scattered constellation described by some as “new materialism” or “the material turn,” as well as its main concepts and methods, I offer a deconstructive reflection on “the turn” by challenging a series of theoretical gestures meant to coalesce the turn to materiality in contemporary continental philosophy—starting with the exclusion of the much maligned “linguistic turn” and the opposition to an “old” concept of matter presented as (...) passive, inert, and mechanistic. I analyze how these two exclusions—precarious as they may be—allow for a relative coalescence of the new “scene” while betraying its essential heterogeneity and self-inadequacy. I thus interrogate the conditions that make the position of a “new” materialism possible, giving it force and necessity, while questioning what the production of this so-called novelty potentially obfuscates. After raising a series of questions related to new materialism’s conceptuality, I introduce the contributions that make up the thematic issue. I also provide a substantial bibliography to help the reader navigate the material turn as well as its various critiques from the perspectives of philosophical history, object-oriented ontology, social and ethico-political theory, deconstruction, critical race studies, or other perspectives on materialist theory. (shrink)

Two principal questions lie at the heart of the philosophy of colour perception. First: how do colour experiences represent the world? Second: do colour representations veridically represent the world? This collection of papers closely examines the various ways in which colour experience may represent the world, and the possibilities regarding the veridicality of these representations. As it turns out, close attention to the above two questions illuminates novel ways of approaching the metaphysics of colour and colour experience. Paper one distinguishes (...) different ways in which colour experience can be veridical or erroneous, and uses these distinctions to motivate realist error theories: a new class of theory regarding the perception of colour. Realist error theories say that colour experience is erroneous regarding the location and/or metaphysics of colour, but is generally veridical regarding the instantiation of colour. I argue that realist error theories provide a new approach to certain tensions between our motivated metaphysics for colour and how experience represents the colours. Paper two falls into two parts. In the first part, I argue that extant subject-dependent theories of colour fail to delineate veridical colour experiences from erroneous colour experiences. In part two, I develop novel subject-dependent theories which successfully delineate veridical colour experiences from erroneous colour experiences. I advocate for mono-minimalism: a view which says that colours are subject-dependent properties which range over at least one standard perceiver in at least one standard condition. Paper three focuses on the distinction between steady and unsteady colours. Extant proposals involve positing that steady colours are subject-independent and unsteady colours are subject-dependent. I argue that the subject-dependent theorist can explain the metaphysical difference between steady and unsteady colours in wholly subject-dependent terms. We can say that steady and unsteady colours are both subject-dependent properties, but steady colours range over a broader range of perceptual conditions compared to unsteady colours. I argue that this bifurcation in the scope of the colours is consistent with the mono-minimalist theory of colour proposed in paper two. (shrink)

'The Anthem Companion to Georg Simmel' offers the best contemporary work on Georg Simmel, written by the best scholars currently working in this field. Original, authoritative and wide-ranging, the critical assessments of this volume will make it ideal for Simmel students and scholars alike. 'Anthem Companions to Sociology' offer authoritative and comprehensive assessments of major figures in the development of sociology from the last two centuries. Covering the major advancements in sociological thought, these companions offer critical evaluations of key figures (...) in the American and European sociological tradition, and will provide students and scholars with both an in-depth assessment of the makers of sociology and chart their relevance to modern society. (shrink)

I argue that colleges should include philosophy courses as general-education requirements. I begin by explaining the prima facie case against general-education requirements and the need for philosophers to defend their courses’ place in the general-education curriculum. Next, I present two arguments for philosophy as a general-education requirement. The first is the Argument from Content: that philosophy courses’ content tends to match the intended nature and purposes of general-education courses. The second is the Argument from Outcomes: that even if philosophy courses (...) didn’t match the intended purposes of general-education courses, they would still be appropriate as general-education requirements, because there is empirical evidence that philosophy courses produce valuable skills and knowledge in students. (shrink)

Cephalos and Kant. A conversation on duties Socrates’s first conversational partner in Plato’s Politeia is Cephalos, the host of the dialogue. But the conversation between Cephalos and Socrates does not appear to be very fruitful. It merely seems to function as the setting of the stage. Nonetheless, what Cephalos has to say about life and old age, about justice and doing one’s duty is far from uninteresting. Indeed, if Cephalos had presented his views to Immanuel Kant, they would have been (...) well received. Kant would have agreed with Cephalos’s emphasis on duties: the duty to speak truthfully; the duty of returning what one has borrowed from another and the duty of gratitude for what one has been given. Kant’s fictional conversation with Cephalos even presents us with some unexpected vistas. (shrink)

Written in the European tradition of Kant's philosophical trilogy on critique and Hegel's concept of ethical life it outlines the great traditions in ethical philosophy: Aristotelian virtue ethics, Kantian ethics, and utilitarianism. It presents modern ethics from Nietzsche, Adorno, and Habermas to Kohlberg's stages of moral development.

The prevalent rule-based perspective on diversity management renders most diversity initiatives more or less uniform, and it therefore also renders the individual in charge of these initiatives replaceable. Against this background, this article argues that an ethical realignment towards a virtue-based perspective, focusing on the diversity manager him- or herself, could help rethink diversity management, and to refashion it into a more impactful shape. The virtue in question is the Aristotelian notion of the virtue of practical wisdom. Making their practical (...) wisdom a selection criterion for the recruitment process is a first step in the direction of upgrading the concept of diversity management. However, it is also important to adjust their working conditions, the design of their role, as well as their autonomy and performance evaluations in a way that allows them to develop, maintain, and practice this phrónēsis. (shrink)

Original publisher: London: Burns, Oates, and Washbourne, 1934.

The paper leans on a movie cult from the 1960s, Blow-Up (1966) by Michelangelo Antonioni, of which a famous sequence is often mentioned, the one in which the protagonist, the photographer Thomas (considered here as a "conceptual character"), repeatedly enlarged the photographs he made in a park, in order to find an answer to the mystery surrounding the murder of a man: magnification which leads, on the one hand, to a gradual loss of definition of images, with the grain (...) of the picture becoming more and more evident, but also, on the other, in the emergence, from the very material of the print, of a fundamental detail that will help solve the mystery. What interests is the link between indicative referentiality and evidence documentary, between degrees of definition and authentication powers. The paper also analyzes the links that intertwine, in the film, between the photographs of Thomas (by Don McCullin) and paintings painted by another character of the movie, Bill (directed by Ian Stephenson), but also, outside the film, with all a series of examples from artistic production and visual culture of the time: very low definition images of the Kennedy assassination in Dallas (the famous Zapruder Film), the portrait of Lee Harvey Oswald directed by Sigmar Polke by simulating the halftone technique, the war photographs of Don McCullin and David Bailey's Fashion Photographs, Random Earths Studies by Mark Boyle and Joan Hills, Materialologies and Texturologies by Jean Dubuffet, as well as Zen for Film by Nam June Paik. Fimiani's text addresses also two contemporary installations which have tried to return to the issues from the photographic sequence of Antonioni's film: Blow-Up Blow-Up (2010) by Joan Fontcuberta and Portrait Landscape (from the Object Classifier series) (2015) by John Houck, an installation in which photograms of Blow-Up are analyzed through facial recognition software. (shrink)

Autism research is increasingly moving to a view centred around sensorimotor atypicalities instead of traditional, ethically problematical, views predicated on social-cognitive deficits. We explore how an enactivist approach to autism illuminates how social differences, stereotypically associated with autism, arise from such sensorimotor atypicalities. Indeed, in a state space description, this can be taken as a skewing of sensorimotor variables that influences social interaction and so also enculturation and habituation. We argue that this construal leads to autism being treated on a (...) par with other sensorimotor atypicalities such as blindness or atypical height. This leads to our conclusion that, insofar there is an ethical call to inclusion in our public sphere regardless of contingent bodily difference, an enactivist take on autism naturally leads to extending such inclusion to autism. Moreover, our analysis suggests a concrete way forward to achieve inclusion of autistics: by being more attentive to autistic sensorimotor specifics. (shrink)

In den drei hier veröffentlichten philosophischen Studien geht es um die Begriffsarbeit des menschlichen Geistes, durch welche er in der Lage ist, die Struktur physischer und geschichtlicher Prozesse zu erfassen.

One defining element of life in any Catholic educational institution, whether it be primary, secondary, or tertiary, is the focus on pastoral care for staff and students. This paper provides a distinctly Catholic definition of the term ‘pastoral care’ and briefly examines the theological foundations that underpin this concept, particularly, in relation to its application in the Catholic university. The paper traces the motif of pastoral care through the Scriptures and, building on insights from St. Pope John Paul II’s Apostolic (...) Constitution on Catholic Universities, Ex Corde Ecclesiae (1990) and the broader theological anthropology of the Vatican II Council. The paper highlights that pastoral care is not something of an extrinsically added offering to students in a Catholic educational institution, but rather something intrinsically built into its fabric. (shrink)

This Element provides an account of Thomas Aquinas's moral philosophy that emphasizes the intrinsic connection between happiness and the human good, human virtue, and the precepts of practical reason. Human beings by nature have an end to which they are directed and concerning which they do not deliberate, namely happiness. Humans achieve this end by performing good human acts, which are produced by the intellect and the will, and perfected by the relevant virtues. These virtuous acts require that the (...) agent grasps the relevant moral principles and uses them in particular cases. (shrink)

In the United States, hate speech sits at the intersection of ethical and legal debates and has a complex relationship with journalism. The First Amendment provides broad legal protections for hate...

When infrastructural technology is functioning correctly, it is often considered to recede from view and become invisible. According to this perspective, visibility is restored in cases of breakdown and malfunction, which for this reason, are often understood to represent important epistemic opportunities for grasping previously hidden aspects of infrastructure. This article seeks to outline the limitations of the idea that infrastructural failure has a positive epistemic function by distinguishing between two fundamentally different ways in which the nature of technological function (...) can be conceptualised; the first understands function as stemming primarily from the way a technology was designed and produced, the second as a process sustained by constant human activities of maintenance and repair. After illustrating how a number of recent studies of infrastructure build upon insights granted by the latter process perspective, this article aims to demonstrate how the experience of breakdown itself does little to facilitate a shift towards understanding infrastructure in this way. For this reason, this article ends with a suggestion for a shift in emphasis in studies of infrastructure, away from breakdown and towards a sustained examination of everyday practices of maintenance, repair and modification of infrastructural technologies. (shrink)

In the first systematic study of the philosophy of Thomas Nagel, Alan Thomas discusses Nagel's contrast between the "subjective" and the "objective" points of view throughout the various areas of his wide ranging philosophy. Nagel's original and distinctive contrast between the subjective view and our aspiration to a "view from nowhere" within metaphysics structures the chapters of the book. A "new Humean" in epistemology, Nagel takes philosophical scepticism to be both irrefutable and yet to indicate a profound truth (...) about our capacity for self-transcendence. The contrast between subjective and objective views is then considered in the case of the mind, where consciousness proves to be the central aspect of mind that contemporary theorising fails to acknowledge adequately. The second half of the book analyses Nagel's work on moral and political philosophy where he has been most deeply influential. Topics covered include the contrast between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons and values, Nagel's distinctive version of a hybrid ethical theory, his discussion of life's meaningfulness and finally his sceptical arguments about whether a liberal society can reconcile the conflicting moral demands of self and other. (shrink)

Research in sociology and organization studies has consistently documented the tendency for organizations to develop wrongdoing practices that are at odds with the legal and moral frameworks of society. Often, this wrongdoing acquires a degree of normalization where it is endorsed, encouraged, and accepted throughout the organization. Such normalized wrongdoing can have severe negative effects on the whistleblowing opportunities of employees. While these effects are intuitively easy to understand, we still lack an understanding of the significant variation that exists across (...) situations of normalized wrongdoing and how that variation may affect potential whistleblowers. To advance such an agenda, the paper analyzes 14 whistleblower autobiographies. Building on work on normalized wrongdoing within corruption, fraud, and management studies and Niklas Luhmann’s theories on organization, the analysis finds that normalized wrongdoing in the autobiographies appears in different intensities that depend on the role of management, the benefits organizations obtain from wrongdoing, and the extent to which wrongdoing norms are internalized by employees. The paper builds on these distinctions to suggest a continuum of normalized wrongdoing from ‘weak’ to ‘strong.’ Understanding this variation offers a new set of tools to assess the organizational realities that concerned employees must navigate in when they attempt to resist and address situations of normalized wrongdoing. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:146 BOOK REVIEWS Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays. Edited by ROBERT P. GEORGE. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Pp. 371. $39.95 (cloth). As the editor of this volume, Robert P. George points out in his foreword that this hook is yet another manifestation of the renewed and growing interest in natural law theory. But why this recent increased interest in natural law theory? What purpose is this theory supposed to (...) serve, or in what way do its proponents see it as an improvement on existing theories? First of all, it must be noted, as the variety of essays in this volume makes abundantly clear, that natural law theory, as it is presently conceived, most certainly does not represent anything like a unified, single theory of tightly knit principles and conclusions. In the present volume one can easily see a half-dozen or more different approaches to natural law theory. So different in tone and spirit are some of the essays that one can easily wonder if they have enough in common even to classify them as " family resemblances." But if they all in their different ways do indeed evidence, as the editor claims, an increased awareness of and interest in natural law theory, the question immediately arises, why this increased interest? What problems do the advocates of these theories hope to solve by them or what questions do they think their theories will better address than the theories currently in place? First of all, one may make a division which places the theories, however divers~ among themselves, into two general groups. The first of these groups wishes natural law theory to function as a general approach to morality. For this group natural law does the work of a moral theory. In this group I would place the essays of Joseph Boyle, Robert George, Russell Bittinger, John Finnis, and Hadley Arkes (probably). The second group uses natural law theory as a way of determining the connection between moral law and positive law or legal theory. The essays of Jeffrey Stout, Neil MacCormick, Jeremy Waldron, Michael Moore, Lloyd Weinreb, Joseph Raz, and Ernest Weinrib fall into this second category. In all there are twelve essays in this volume. Space will not permit me to give a detailed analysis and critique of each. At most I can only indicate very briefly some of their more salient features. The book is divided into four parts, the first of which is titled "Natural Law, Practical Reasoning and Morality." In the very illuminating first essay of this section, "Natural Law and the Ethics of Traditions," Joseph Boyle undertakes to clarify the question of the relation of natural law theory to tradition. Certain approaches to moral theory currently popular BOOK REVIEWS 147 which are called virtues ethics, of which Alasdair Macintyre would he an example, claim that natural law theory is tradition-dependent. If Macintyre and other virtues ethicists are correct, then since natural law theory is culture-hound, and since the culture in which it was horn and flourished, medieval culture, has irretrievably retreated into the pages of history, then natural law theory is equally dead, of interest, if at all, only in an antiquarian way. Boyle carefully points out that there is more than one sense of being tradition-dependent. It is true that natural law theory is tradition-dependent in the sense that it did indeed come into existence in a particular historic epoch and that its language and thought do indeed express the period of its flourishing, i.e. the medieval period. But this, Boyle is careful to point out, does not mean that its validity and meaning were exhausted with the end of that culture. Rather the tradition is a living tradition so that its rich resources can continue to be exploited as that tradition is enlarged by its application to present day moral problems. Boyle's conclusion then is that in some senses natural law is indeed dependent on an ancient and medieval tradition, hut not so totally dependent that it has lost all validity for contemporary moral theory. In the contribution by Robert George, "Natural Law and Human Nature," George tries to defend Germain Grisez's version of natural law... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 697 Excellent as Sullivan's book is, it has raised a host of questions which, though it cannot be fairly expected to discuss them at length, much less to resolve, are at the heart of ongoing reflections about the possibility of salvation outside the visible Church. Such questions concern the concrete ways in which God works in the lives of peoples of different religions, the unique and normative (...) role of Christ in the history of salvation, the function of non-Christian religions as mediations of salvation, and so on. And the debate on these issues rages on among Catholic as well as non-Catholic theologians! One wishes that Sullivan had given a fuller account of this debate which is central in interreligious dialogue. More directly connected with the method and approach of the book itself are the questions of dogmatic development and the hermeneutics of doctrines. To put it more concretely, was Leonard Feeney, with whose ironic fate the book opens and ends, simply expressing the ancient doctrine of the deposit of the faith concerning salvation in the Church in a negative and imperfect fashion? Or was he (and more importantly, popes and official teachers of the faith) wrong in affirming the exclusiveness implicit in the formula extra ecclesiam nulla salus (which apparently they did)? H the latter, then the issues of infallible magisterium and dogmatic ' development ' raise their ugly heads, and one has to come to terms with them. The Catholic University of America Washington, D.C. PETER c. PHAN Character. By JOEL KUPPERMAN. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. Pp. vi + 193. The two theses of J. Kupperman's Character are "that character is of central importance to ethics and that ethical philosophy will have to be restructured once this is understood " (p. 3). The argument has three stages: the first three chapters explicate the notion of character and its relationship to the notions of the self and of responsibility; the next two consider the dominant, rival theories in contemporary ethics; the last two address the topics of value and the place of character in ethics. In two appendices, Kupperman applies the substantive conclusions of the work to the issues of moral psychology and the education of character. A brief review cannot communicate the many nuances of argument and the precise and lucid style that distinguish the book. While certain parts of the argument seem problematic, or at least in 698 BOOK REVIEWS need of further development, the work deserves the attention of professional ethicists and of inquisitive non-professionals. The opening chapter offers the following definition of character: "X's character is X's normal pattern of thought and action, especially with respect to concerns and commitments in matter affecting the hap· piness of others or of X, and most especially in relation to moral choices" (p. 17). In the second chapter, Kupperman considers three views: Enduring Self (ES), No Self (NS), and Constructed Self (CS). The ES appears to be seH-evidently true. But what exactly is the self and where is it to he found? It is difficult to fix the abiding " I " amid or behind the flux of our self-experience. On the other hand, even Hume's skepticism concerning the self presumes that " we know where to look " for it. The " I " is simultaneously obvious and elusive, stable and unstable (p. 40). Thus, both the ES and the NS are problematic, The third option is the Constructive Self, Kupperman holds that, as children, we begin with a "protoseH." The full-fledged self is often the result of orientations, habits, and traits of character developed before one has even begun deliberating about the kind of character one would like to have. Like the self, character is constructed mostly through unreflective choices. But this raises questions about responsibility, which is the focus of the third chapter. If we have not willed to be the sorts of persons we now are, how can we be held responsible for who we are or what we do? Actions do not " flow from character like water from a pipe " (p, 59). Over long periods of time and through a reorganization of large portions of our life, we can... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS The Love Commandments: Essays in Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy. Edited by EDMUND SANTURRI AND WILLIAM WERPE· HOWSKI. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1992. Pp. xxii + 307. $35.00 (paper). The essays in this volume address numerous philosophic and theological issues surrounding the two commandments of love of God and love of neighbor. A brief review cannot do justice to the careful argumentatation contained in the essays. (...) Forced to make an unhappy choice, I have decided to provide some sense of the main line of argument in each piece and to add a few general comments about the dominant approaches to Christian charity in the volume. Gene Outka's "Universal Love and Impartiality," which sets the stage for many of the other pieces, asks: Should there be " no disparity between our consideration of others and our consideration of ourselves? " (3). On the basis of a sustained comparison of Christian universal love with impartiality, Outka concludes that, " while universal love allies itself with impartiality at certain junctures, it represents an advance over impartiality because it more readily accommodates differences between neighbor-love and self-love" (79-80). Christianity's normative emphasis on regard for others goes beyond impartiality toward altruism. Christian ethics is not, however, identical with altruism if the latter means that the " self does not matter." This would be contrary to the theocentric framework of the commandments, which refer directly to the "self's well-being" (82). In contrast to both impartiality and altruism, universal love accents " inclusiveness " over " comparative measurement." On a descriptive level, impartialists " fall to take seriously enough the power of self-preoccupation." The simple assertions of equal regard do not meet the need for ameliorative strategies to correct our tendencies toward selfishness and pride. There are other disparities between self- and neighbor-love and thus between universal love and impartiality. In contrast to impartiality, universal love includes "legitimate, normative self-regarding considerations." This provides a response to the criticism that Christian love involves selfannihilation. A complete passivity to others can result in a loss of a determinate sense of self; but, as Outka argues, such passivity is not 313 314 BOOK REVIEWS to be confused with Christian humility. Rather, it can be rooted in the sin of sloth, disguised as humility. The theocentric concern with the self avoids both pride and sloth through obedient willing. Finally, there are legitimate and ineradicable self-regarding considerations at the descriptive level: I cannot "promote and protect" the well-being of neighbor and self in " exactly the same way" (87). In "Who is My Neighbor? Love, Equality, and Profoundly Retarded Humans,'' Edmund Santurri contrasts the humanist and inclusive view of equal worth with the rationalist view, which identifies being a person with having a rational capacity to desire, choose, evaluate, and so forth. As a way of clarifying the Christian-humanist view, Santurri considers various interpretations of the scriptural language concerning man as an image of God. He argues that in the biblical narrative all beings born of humankind are created in God's image. He then addresses two rival construals of personhood. The first limits personhood to those who have the capacity to value their existence, while the second accords equal standing to those who can participate in communal deliberation. Both views abstract from historical and social con· nections embedded in species life (124). The argument for inclusion of the severely retarded rests not on reductionist biological principles, hut upon social phenomena: " the retarded are born of us, look like us, and interact with us in a wide assortment of highly distinctive social settings " (126). In "'Agape' and Special Relations," William Werpehowski begins by engaging Gewirth's attempt to justify ethical particularism on the basis of ethical universalism. While his view is not as susceptible to criticism as some have thought, Werpehowski is nonetheless sympathetic with the concerns of Amelie Rorty, who worries that a view like that of Gewirth " locates the focus of moral theory and moral action in the processes and rules for justification " which thus " underdescribe and underdetermine the detailed thoughtfulness required for appropriate action" (146-147). As a corrective, Werpehowski appeals to Christian moral discernment or prudence. In a number of... (shrink)

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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:332 BOOK REVIEWS toral inventions (such as basic Christian communities), and the religious backgrounds of millions who help to make up the churches, Catholic and Protestant, of the United States. Providence College Providence, RI EDWARD L. CLEARY, O.P. Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior. By ALFRED R. MELE. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. Pp. 272 + ix. $39.95 (cloth). Alfred Mele's overarching aim in this book (...) is to offer an account of the role of intentions in the explanation of intentional action. He works within the familiar terms of causal theories of action, and is particularly indebted to Donald Davidson. In Part I, Mele borrows a set of theses from Davidson's desire/belief model of intentional action, and in the process of addressing problems associated with these theses, he progressively refines an account of action that understands an agent's reasons to have explanatory force by virtue of being among the causes of action. In Part II, Mele argues that desire/belief models are insufficient as they stand and need to be filled out by recognizing that intentions provide a crucial link between reasons and actions. The discussion begins with the vexed question of how the content of mental states can be relevant to the causal explanation of action. We constantly appeal to our desires, beliefs, plans, and so on (i.e., to various propositional, or intentional, attitudes) in explaining our behavior. But how does, say, my appetite for good wine and my belief that the house chardonnay is such a wine figure in the causal order that brings about my act of ordering a glass of it? Presumably, these intentional states supervene upon certain physical states of my body, and the latter do the causal work of producing wine-ordering behavior. However, there are good reasons to think that, with certain sorts of changes in my history and environment (viz., of the sort described in twin earth thought experiments), these physical states could be the realization of different intentional states. So can a causal theory of action actually accord my desires and beliefs any role in explaining my action? Mele argues that even if we hold (with externalists) that the agent's history and environment help to fix the content of her intentional states, we can nonetheless say that unless the agent had intended what she did, she would not have acted as she did. The behavior is intentional action by virtue of issuing (in the right way) from physical processes BOOK REVIEWS 333 that realize the agent's reasons for acting, and these processes realize these reasons only if the processes have an appropriate causal history. The result is that what we desire, believe, and intend does after all make a systematic difference in what we do. Mele makes some helpful refinements in the standard account of the causal role of desire in intentional action. It has typically been claimed that when an agent's wants compete, the "strongest" of them deter· mines the action; if an agent wants to do A more than anything else that she takes herself to be able to do, then if she acts intentionally she will do A. Mele points out that this general claim must be qualified so as to index desires to times, to accommodate both unsuccessful at· tempts and the agent's estimates of the likelihood of success, and to deal with the complex relations between desires. He explores the way in which agents are able to control the motivational strength of their desires, and he works out a definition of irresistible desire. One of the deepest challenges to the claim that action is caused by what we most desire arises in considering "motivational ties." How, on this account, is intentional action possible when we equally desire each of two incompatible alternatives? An arbitrary decision procedure can be adopted (e.g., a coin toss), but this alone does not en· hance the attractiveness of the randomly selected alternative. Here Mele introduces his thesis about intentions: viz., that intentions have an "executive quality that is not reducible to desire-strength" (p. 72), so that even when there is no preponderant motivation to do A... (shrink)

Robots equipped with artificial intelligence pose a huge challenge to traditional ontological differentiations between the spheres of the human and the non-human. Drawing mainly from neo-animistic and perspectivist approaches in anthropology and science and technology studies, the paper explores the potential of new forms of interconnectedness and rhizomatic entanglements between humans and a world transcending the boundaries between species and material spheres. We argue that intelligent robots meet virtually all criteria Western biology came up with to define ‘life’ and that (...) it ultimately makes sense to recognize them as a new species that is part of our social universe. Contrasting dualistic concepts of man and nature with a monistic approach, we show that traditional properties of life (agency, self-replication, etc.) may apply to artefacts and that, once we accept the idea that social relationships are ultimately open connections to matter of any kind, the seemingly strict boundaries between species and material spheres can no longer be sustained. Instead, we propose to include ‘matter’ and ideas into the sphere of the social as agents in their own right to form a _relational ontology of multi-species assemblages_ (ROMA). (shrink)

The ethical theories employed in health care today assume, in the main, a modern Western philosophical framework. Yet the diversity of cultural and religious assumptions regarding human nature, health and illness, life and death, and the status of the individual suggest that a cross-cultural study of health care ethics is needed. A Cross-Cultural Dialogue on Health Care Ethics provides this study. It shows that ethical questions can be resolved by examining the ethical principles present in each culture, critically assessing each (...) value, and identifying common values found within all traditions, It encourages the development of global awareness and sensitivity to and respect for the diversity of peoples and their values and will advance understanding as well as help to foster a greater balance and a fuller truth in consideration of the human condition and what makes for health and wholeness. (shrink)