Boredom, like pain, is a subjective experience, but while the sources of pain can be either internal or external to the subject, the causes of boredom are always external. Understanding boredom as a reaction to external influences requires inquiries into the subjective awareness of boredom and into the social and cultural conditions giving rise to boredom. After briefly investigating these areas, I suggest that in the past boredom was seen as a necessary ingredient to creative inspiration and self‐understanding, and as (...) a contributor to autonomy in judgment and taste. I argue for a new form of boredom seen only with recent advances in information technology. Increasingly, individuals spend their work hours involved in electronic mail and on‐line information interaction. The attempt to match the speed and capacity of information technology results in restricted modes of behaviour and cognitive saturation. As a consequence, one is aware of one’s boredom but no cognitive capacity remains to consider realms outside the immediate moment. I conclude with the suggestion that the boredom that accompanies involvement in information technology produces a self‐identity crafted by technological intervention and fashion, yields the false autonomy of a manipulated consumer, and invites superficial social relations. (shrink)

In a well-known paper, Bernard Williams argues that an immortal life would not be worth living, for it would necessarily become boring. I examine the implications for the boredom thesis of three human traits that have received insufficient attention in the literature on Williams’ paper. First, human memory decays, so humans would be entertained and driven by things that they experienced long before but had forgotten. Second, even if memory does not decay to the extent necessary to ward off boredom, (...) once-satisfied desires often return after a sufficient period of time. Eternity would always contain sufficient time for our desires to rejuvenate. Third, even if too many of our desires were satisfied but not yet rejuvenated, we can expect that human ingenuity would continue to invent new pursuits, pastimes, careers, and ways of life that would prevent us from becoming bored as we moved from one to another. Finally, I consider and respond to several objections, including the claims that as much variety as I propose to be put into an eternal life is inconsistent with having one character throughout one’s life and that the sort of character change and memory decay I postulate is inconsistent with personal identity. (shrink)

This paper looks at a passage from the History of England in which Hume says that Edmund Spenser is an excellent but unread writer. This type of remark (the ‘Spenser judgement’) should not be explained away. Hume himself does not show how the Spenser judgement is possible, but a passage in ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ can nevertheless be reinterpreted so as to yield a distinction on which an acceptable account relies.

It seems to be a phenomenon of contemporary life that we consider goodness embarrassing and rather dull. In contrast, the activities and inner lives of villains are deemed more complex and fascinating than those of good people. This paper attempts to understand the conception of goodness that underlies this phenomenon, and I suggest that informing it is the combination of two ideas, in tension with each other: firstly, a distorted understanding of the ancient conception of full virtue as the absence (...) of all inner conflict; and secondly, the intuition that real goodness is only apparent and generated in inner conflict. In response, I offer an alternative picture of goodness as an ongoing, active and progressive relation to value, and conclude that in order to render goodness attractive again we need more adequate portraits of goodness from both philosophy and art. (shrink)

The question Wings of Desire (Wim Wenders, 1987) forces us to answer is whether we too would be willing to renounce immortality? Or, to put it conversely, would we be wise to exchange our current mortal existence for immortality? If a state of senseless, inefficacious existence is undesirable, the question of the value of immortality becomes one of the conceivably of an alternative to the angels' form of existence. By contemplating the existence of the angels in Wings of Desire, we (...) can see that they do not simply exemplify one possible eternal existence, but that the negative aspects of their being are perhaps essential features of the immortal. I begin by exploring another argument for the undesirableness of immortality that has taken center stage in the debate, then turn my attention to the film and present a novel argument against the value of immortality. (shrink)

Epitomised by tedium and existential vacuity, ennui insidiously permeates the psyche of healthcare professionals, often eluding detection. Its etiological roots extend beyond its salient exploration in French literature, harking back to the early Christian treatises on acedia or spiritual desuetude.1 Throughout the centuries, ennui has undergone a substantive evolution, mirroring the vicissitudes in cultural cognition and existential sentiment. Spanning from the discourse in medieval monasticism to cogitations during the Renaissance and Enlightenment epochs, ennui has metamorphosed into a pivotal motif (...) across the literary, philosophical and theological spectra.2 This intricate concept, embodying a profound and variegated historical lineage, has been meticulously dissected and recontextualised by a cadre of preeminent thinkers and literary connoisseurs. In the contemporary medical ethics landscape, ennui emerges from labyrinthine historical antecedents, manifesting as profound existential drift among healthcare professionals. This state, marked by discord between self and purposive existence, leads to disengagement and disillusionment, challenging practitioners’ resilience and ethical decision-making capacities. Ennui ignites introspection but insidiously undermines their engagement and fervour, casting a shadow over professional zeal and mental fortitude. In their reflections, existential philosophers like Søren Kierkegaard and Albert Camus, diverging from Pascal’s theological exegesis, explored quintessential human experience and essence leitmotifs. Their analyses of despair and the absurd show parallels with ethical dilemmas and complexities in medical practice. …. (shrink)

Introduction : death, metaphysics, and morality / John Martin Fischer Death knocks / Woody Allen Rationality and the fear of death / Jeffrie G. Murphy Death / Thomas Nagel The Makropulos case : reflections on the tedium of immortality / Bernard Williams The evil of death / Harry S. Silverstein How to be dead and not care : a defense of Epicurus / Stephen E. Rosenbaum The dead / Palle Yourgrau The misfortunes of the dead / George Pitcher Harm (...) to others / Joel Feinberg Reasons and persons / Derek Parfit Why is death bad? / Anthony L. Brueckner and John Martin Fischer Death and the value of life / Jeff McMahan Annihilation / Steven Luper-Foy Epicurus and annihilation / Stephen E. Rosenbaum Some puzzles about the evil of death / Fred Feldman Well-being and time / J. David Velleman. (shrink)

Much of the literature on the desirability of immortality (inspired by B. Williams) has considered whether the goods of mortal life would be exhausted in an immortal life (whether, i.e., immortality would necessarily end in tedium). However, there has been very little discussion of whether the bads of mortal life would also be exhausted in an immortal life, and more generally, how good immortal life would be on balance, particularly in comparison to a mortal life. Here I argue that (...) there are compelling reasons to favor a mortal over an immortal life because a mortal life offers a higher ceiling for well-being and assigns our agency a greater role in how our lives turn out. (shrink)

In the past decade, the notion of a neural correlate of consciousness has become a focal point for scientific research on consciousness. A growing number of investigators believe that the first step toward a science of consciousness is to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. Indeed, Francis Crick has gone so far as to proclaim that ‘we need to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. For this task the primate visual system seems especially attractive. No longer need one spend time (...) attempting to endure the tedium of philosophers perpetually disagreeing with each other. Consciousness is now largely a scientific problem’. Yet the question of what it means to be a neural correlate of consciousness is actually far from straightforward, for it involves fundamental empirical, methodological, and philosophical issues about the nature of consciousness and its relationship to the brain. Even if one assumes, as we do, that states of consciousness causally depend on states of the brain, one can nevertheless wonder in what sense there is, or could be, such a thing as a neural correlate of consciousness. (shrink)

Bernard Williams’ discussion of immortality in “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality” has spawned an entire philosophical literature. This literature tends to focus on one of Williams’ central claims: if we were to relinquish our mortality, we would necessarily become alienated from our existence and environment—“bored,” in his terms. Many theorists have defended this claim; many others have challenged it. Even if this claim is false, though, it still isn’t obvious that we should choose to relinquish (...) our mortality, given the option. And this is puzzling. Death is generally regarded as an evil, meriting anxiety, dread, and avoidance. What is it about our mortality that makes us hesitant to relinquish it? In this paper, I aim to explain this hesitancy and to argue in its favor: we should be hesitant to relinquish our mortality. Further, I take my discussion to suggest that most of us probably shouldn’t take this option if we were given it. To make these points, I draw on Williams’ discussion of immortality, developing and extending his thought in order to better understand how mortality shapes the way we relate to our lives, particularly the commitments and values that make them meaningful. Our mortality, it seems, plays a crucial role in our lives standing for something. Relinquishing it thus means risking the loss of this value. (shrink)

In the past decade, the notion of a neural correlate of consciousness (or NCC) has become a focal point for scientific research on consciousness (Metzinger, 2000a). A growing number of investigators believe that the first step toward a science of consciousness is to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. Indeed, Francis Crick has gone so far as to proclaim that ‘we … need to discover the neural correlates of consciousness.… For this task the primate visual system seems especially attractive.… No (...) longer need one spend time attempting … to endure the tedium of philosophers perpetually disagreeing with each other. Con- sciousness is now largely a scientific problem’ (Crick, 1996, p. 486).2 Yet the question of what it means to be a neural correlate of consciousness is actually far from straightforward, for it involves fundamental empirical, methodological, and _philosophical _issues about the nature of consciousness and its relationship to the brain. Even if one assumes, as we do, that states of consciousness causally depend on states of the brain, one can nevertheless wonder in what sense there is, or could be, such a thing as a neural correlate of consciousness. (shrink)

Sex: Nagel, T. Sexual perversion. Ruddick, S. On sexual morality.--Abortion: Ramsey, P. The morality of abortion. Foot, P. The problem of abortion and the doctrine of the double effect. Wertheimer, R. Understanding the abortion argument. Thomson, J. J. A defense of abortion.--Prejudice and discrimination: Wasserstrom, R. Rights, human rights, and racial discrimination. Roszak, B. Women's liberation. Lucas, J. R. Because you are a woman. Thomson, J. J. Preferential hiring. Singer, P. Animal liberation.--Civil disobedience: Rawls, J. The justification of civil disobedience. (...) Singer, P. Rawls on civil disobedience. Dworkin, R. M. Law and civil disobedience.--Punishment: Downie, R. S. The justification of punishment. Kneale, W. The responsibility of criminals. Hart, H. L. A. Murder and the principles of punishment: England and the United States.--War: Anscombe, G. E. M. War and murder. Wasserstrom, R. On the morality of war: a preliminary inquiry. Lackey, D. Ethics and nuclear deterrence. Narveson, J. Pacifism: a philosophical analysis.--Suicide and death: Brandt, R. B. The morality and rationality of suicide. Holland, R. F. Suicide. Nagel, T. Death. Williams, B. The Makropulos case: reflections on the tedium of immortality.--Selected bibliography (p. 432-437). (shrink)

Introduction -- Part I: The meaning of life -- Richard Taylor, The meaning of life -- Thomas Nagel, The absurd -- Richard Hare, Nothing matters -- W.D. Joske, Philosophy and the meaning of life -- Robert Nozick, Philosophy and the meaning of life -- David Schmidtz, The meanings of life -- Part II: Creating people -- Derek Parfit, Whether causing someone to exist can benefit this person -- John Leslie, Why not let life ecome extinct? -- James Lenman, On becoming (...) extinct -- David Benatar, Why it is better never to come into existence -- Part III: Death -- Stephen E. Rosenbaum, How to be dead and not care : a defense of epicurus -- GeorgePpitcher, The misfortunes of the dead -- Steven Luper, Annihilation -- Fred Fldman, Some puzzles about the evil of death -- Frederick Kaufman, Pre-vital and post-mortem non-existence -- David B. Suits, Why death is not bad for the one who died -- Part IV: Suicide -- David Hume, Of suicide -- Immanuel Kant, Suicide and duty -- David Benatar, Suicide : a qualified defence -- Part V: Immortality -- James Lenman, Immortality : a letter -- Bernard Williams, The Makropulos case : reflections on the tedium of immortality -- John Martin Fischer, Why immortality is not so bad -- Christine Overall, from here to eternity : is it good to live forever? -- Part VI: Optimism and pessimism -- Margaret A. Boden, Optimism -- Michaelis Michael and Peter Caldwell, The consolations of optimism -- Bruce N. Waller, The sad truth : optimism, pessimism, and pragmatism -- Arthur Schopenhauer, On the suffering of the world. (shrink)

In the wake of the digital, some have recommended that we abandon the tedium of teaching handwriting to children in service of promoting “more creative” digital literacies. Others worry that an early diet of keyboard and screen may have deleterious effects on children's social, emotional, and cognitive development, as well as their physical well-being. Yet in this debate, the algorithmic scripts and digital surfaces underwriting these new reading, writing, and mathematical practices are, with a few notable exceptions, almost exclusively (...) ignored. In this essay, Catherine Adams asks whether the digital, and the reading and writing spaces it affords, are of consequence to our habits of thinking and ways of being, particularly in light of the possible obsolescence of pen and paper in schools. She shows that writing using a word processor is no mere mechanical pressing of keys, but an intricate ballet of writerly reading eyes and readerly writing hands, caught up in a dynamic environment of algorithmic paratexts and copy-cut-paste thinking. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 30.1 (2006) 289-298 [Access article in PDF] Theory Is Dead— Like a Zombie Brian Boyd University of Auckland Theory's Empire: An Anthology of Dissent, edited by Daphne Patai and Will H. Corral; ix & 725 pp. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. $72.50 cloth, $29.50 paper. Looking for an Argument: Critical Encounters with the New Approaches to the Criticism of Shakespeare and His Contemporaries, by Richard (...) Levin; 309 pp. Teaneck, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2003. $49.50. Are we "after Theory"? And if so, then where are we? Seven years after Post-Theory (1996) came Reading After Theory (2002) and then After Theory (2003).1 Students inducted into the mysteries of Theory by an aging professoriate can no longer feel the zeal their teachers themselves have mostly long since lost. Theory's own leaders point out its failings.2 Like Queen Anne, Theory is surely dead. Or is it?In 1982 Jonathan Culler argued that post-structuralist literary theory should be called just Theory and that Theorists should play the "central role" in intellectual life (TE, pp. 26, 215). What now sounds hubristic seemed heady in the expansionist days of Theory's empire. But less than two decades later it could be pointed out in print that "everyone knows that if you want to locate the laughingstock on your local campus these days, your best bet is to stop by the English department" (TE, p. 315).So was theory dead by this point, five years after the start of the Bad Writing Contest and three years after the Sokal hoax? Not at all. The year of the "laughingstock" remark, David Scott Kastan's Shakespeare After [End Page 289] Theory (1999) claimed that we are "after theory" "not because theory's claims have been shown to be intellectually bankrupt but because its claims have been accepted as both useful and productive." A reviewer could demur: "As formulated the claim may be overstated—it sometimes seems that Shakespeare studies is insufficiently theorized."3But that was seven years ago. Surely things are different now, ten years after the Sokal hoax? Yes and no. After Reading After Theory and After Theory, a literature professor at the top of his field, Louis Menand, can (1) bemoan the sickness of the humanities and (2) deplore the culture of conformity in their Theorized students, and at the same time still (3) offer thanks that Theory "rescued" literature departments from "the literary" and (4) urge that despite their unhealthy state the Theorized humanities should resolve not "to retrench" but "to colonize."4So again, are we after Theory or not, and where are we, if we are? Are reports of the death of Theory exaggerated? Or is Theory dead in a special way, one of the Undead, a zombie or a vampire?There have been many blows driven through the heart of Theory in the last thirty years, but if Theory is at least dying now it is not because of blows from outside but only from its own terminal internal tedium. It has "always already" been immune to criticism because it refused to listen to critical arguments, treating them as so much unfriendly fire, proof of the enemy's perfidy, all the more reason to close ranks.I described Menand as at the top of his field because he belongs to the Harvard English Department, is a star essayist for the New Yorker and a Pulitzer Prize winner, and was speaking to the 2004 MLA convention. There he wished some young Turks would stand up to challenge his generation, and tell them "You got it all wrong." But critics have been doing this cogently for decades. His generation has paid only enough heed to dismiss such criticism as proof that reactionary forces needed to be resolutely resisted.And the potential young Turks are simply too scared to speak up. Among all the many indictments of Theory collected in Theory's Empire, one of the most chilling indices of the betrayal of intellectual freedom and honesty in the Theorized humanities comes from a junior faculty... (shrink)

This paper draws from the recent literature on psychological richness of life, conceptualized as a third dimension of a good life which would be particularly desirable when happiness or meaning in life cannot be satisfactory attained, to investigate whether recovering from a COVID infection could be associated with PRL. We hypothesize that people who have recovered from being infected by the virus rate their PRL higher than those who have not been infected. Two cross-sectional studies support the hypothesis, and also (...) found that people who recovered from a COVID infection were less prone to want to delete the pandemic time period from their life line and reported lower levels of death anxiety. The findings have implications for coping both on a societal and individual level, by changing perspectives and valuing the richness of positive as well as negative experiences, as well as counteracting repetitiveness and tedium and stimulating new experiences and reflection. The findings also have implications for future research on well-being, which could be informed by expanding the perspective from living well to a life well-lived, and future research on PRL and coping in terms of investigating causalities and interaction effects. (shrink)

Seit der Veröffentlichung von Bernard Williams' Aufsatz Die Sache Makropulos. Reflexionen über die Langeweile der Unsterblichkeit wird die Frage diskutiert, ob Unsterblichkeit für den Menschen wünschenswert sein kann. Im vorliegenden Aufsatz beziehe ich mich auf diese Debatte, möchte aber weniger Stellung beziehen, als vielmehr darauf hinweisen, dass eine entscheidende begriffliche Unterscheidung zwischen zwei verschiedenen möglichen Formen der Unsterblichkeit in der Diskussion bisher vernachlässigt wurde: die Unterscheidung zwischen kontingenter und notwendiger Unsterblichkeit. Während ich diese Unterscheidung im ersten Teil des Aufsatzes herausarbeite, (...) zeige ich im zweiten Teil anhand eines Arguments für den Wert der Sterblichkeit von Martha Nussbaum, welche Konsequenzen es hat, sich nicht eindeutig auf eine der beiden Formen von Unsterblichkeit festzulegen. Ihr Argument ist in der einen Lesart trivial, in der anderen falsch. Die Unterscheidung zwischen beiden Formen der Unsterblichkeit ist also von essentieller Bedeutung für die Makropulos-Debatte.Since the publication of Bernard Williams paper The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality the question is debated, whether human immortality could be desirable. In this paper I apply to this debate not so much focussing on taking a stand but on pointing out that a crucial conceptual distinction between two possible kinds of immortality has been neglected in the discussion thus far: the distinction between contingent and necessary immortality. While I point out this distinction in the first part of the paper, in the second part I proceed to show – using as an example an argument in support of the value of mortality by Martha Nussbaum – what are the consequences of not unambiguously comitting oneself to one of the two kinds of immortality. Her argument being trvial in the one, false in the other reading clearly proves that the distinction between both forms of immortality is of essential significance for the Makropulos Debate. (shrink)

Alliances in the aristocracy of the Republic, that theme has engaged eager and assiduous study in the recent time. Not without the danger of exaggerations and schematism. In consequence, abundant controversy. Moreover, tedium ensues when the method is applied to periods devoid of testimony about persons who can be grasped as persons.

In a paper published recently in this journal, Buben attempted to show the philosophical relevance of Unamuno’s philosophical works when addressing the current debate on whether an endless existence would be something desirable—a debate which is nowadays commonly known as “The Makropulos Debate” since it was Bernard Williams’s “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality” that aroused interest in this question among contemporary analytic philosophers. Unfortunately, Buben’s paper fails to capture or even outline the reasoning behind Unamuno’s (...) claim that we all naturally long for an endless existence —and consequently it also fails to clarify how Unamuno’s position may contribute to the current philosophical debate on the question as to whether an endless existence would be something desirable. In this paper I will point out that Unamuno’s affirmation that we all, without exception, long for an endless existence is grounded in his metaphysical claim that the most basic and natural inclination of all singular things is to increase their own singularity. In doing so, I will also be showing that Unamuno’s proposal is not philosophically relevant when addressing the current debate on the question as to whether living an endless existence would be something desirable. (shrink)

Love plays God -- The foundation of Western love : Hebrew scripture -- From physical desire to paradise : Plato -- Love as perfect friendship : Aristotle -- Love as sexual desire : Lucretius and Ovid -- Love as the supreme virtue : Christianity -- Why Christian love isn't unconditional -- Women on top : love and the troubadours -- How human nature became loveable : from the high Middle Ages to the Renaissance -- Love as joyful understanding of the (...) whole : Spinoza -- Love as enlightened romanticism : Rousseau -- Love as religion : Schlegel and Novalis -- Love as the urge to procreate : Schopenhauer -- Love as affirmation of life : Nietzsche -- Love as a history of loss : Freud -- Love as terror and tedium : Proust -- Love reconsidered. (shrink)

The website Rotten Tomatoes, located at www.rottentomatoes.com, is primarily an online repository of movie reviews. For each movie review document, the site provides a link to the full review, along with a brief description of its sentiment. The description consists of a rating (“fresh” or “rotten”) and a short quotation from the review. Other research (Pang, Lee, & Vaithyanathan 2002) has predicted a movie review’s rating from its text. In this paper, we focus on the quotation, which is a main (...) attraction to site users. A Rotten Tomatoes quotation is typically about one sentence in length and expresses concisely the reviewer’s opinion of the movie. To illustrate, Curtis Edmonds’s review of the documentary Spellbound is encapsulated, “Hitchcock couldn’t have asked for a more suspenseful situation.” A.O. Scott’s review of Once upon a Time in Mexico is encapsulated, “A noisy, unholy mess, with moments of wit and surprise that ultimately make its brutal tedium all the more disappointing.” A reader can infer from these statements whether or not the overall sentiment is favorable, and get an impression about why. Consequently, we refer to them as sentiment summaries. (shrink)

The hum of a ceiling fan, the mechanical grind of an escalator, Pilates repetitions, treadmills and stationary bicycles, waiting room Muzak and its tedious refrain: such experiences of monotony are ubiquitous. Continuous, unchanging, regular, repetitious: truly predictable, the sameness of monotony is particularly unbearable for it does not stop. Its tedium is an expression of its unbending relationship to time, an excessive duration. Monotony never wavers, never falters, never surprises. Monotony cannot seduce; there is no attraction of fleeting adventure (...) or freedom in monotony, which is absolute prolongation without hesitation or variation, entirely anticipatable.Monotony is often a cause of boredom, yet it is... (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Does Life after Death Make Sense? Time and Eternity Immortality and Resurrection Identity, Continuity and the Soul The Tedium of Immortality The Resurrection World Purgatory, Heaven and Hell Is there Free Will in Heaven Christ and the Consummation.

“It would take a book to work through all the literature in detail,” observes Michael Gorman on the question of how to interpret Thomas Aquinas’s views on whether Christ had a single esse or two, “and it would be one of the most tedious books ever written”. To the nonspecialist, the details of how a medieval theologian thought the divinity and humanity of Christ relate to each other in terms drawn from Aristotelian metaphysics must rank as one of the most (...) obscure, not to mention uninteresting, problems in the history of philosophy. Sometimes it can seem like that to the specialist, too.Luckily, Gorman’s authoritative and engaging book not only avoids the tedium of the volume he imagines, it makes an excellent... (shrink)

Boredom—that inescapable accoutrement of human existence—is more than a common affective encounter. It is an experience of key phenomenological significance. Boredom gives rise to perceptions of meaninglessness, difficulties in effective agency, lapses in attention, an altered perception of the passage of time, and to an impressively diverse array of behavioral outcomes. Above all, it shapes our world and lives. Boredom’s presence demarcates what is engaging, interesting, or meaningful from what is not; it alerts us when we find ourselves in situations (...) that either are lacking in personal significance or cannot properly engage us; and it spurs us into action and thought. Within the phenomenological tradition, the importance of boredom has been highlighted by Martin Heidegger, who in his 1929-30 lecture course, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude (FCM) (Heidegger 1995), makes a case for its ontological significance. Notwithstanding Heidegger’s detailed engagement with it, boredom has not received sustained attention within the phenomenological tradition, even though phenomenology is particularly well suited to explicate the phenomenon of boredom. The aim of this entry is to present three different phenomenological perspectives on boredom. In doing so, it hopes to showcase not just what boredom is, according to phenomenology, but also what a phenomenology of boredom can reveal about human existence. (shrink)

Work is one of the most universal features of human life; virtually everybody spends some part of their life at work. It is often associated with tedium and boredom; in conflict with the things we would otherwise love to do. Thinking of work primarily as a burden - an activity we would rather be without - is a thought that was shared by the philosophers in ancient Greece, who generally regarded work as a terrible curse. And yet, research shows (...) that it prolongs life and is generally good for people's physical and mental health. This is perhaps why work is increasingly recognized as a crucial source of meaning and social identity. And our attitudes to work have been changing significantly in the last decades, with an increased demand for meaning and self-realization in the workplace.In this book, Lars Svendsen argues that we need to complete this reorientation of our feelings about work and collapse the differences between leisure and work. Work, like the poor, is always with us. But to overcome the sense of being burnt out, we must think of work as not only productive but recreative - in other words, a lot more like leisure. (shrink)

Work is one of the most universal features of human life; virtually everybody spends some part of their life at work. It is often associated with tedium and boredom; in conflict with the things we would otherwise love to do. Thinking of work primarily as a burden - an activity we would rather be without - is a thought that was shared by the philosophers in ancient Greece, who generally regarded work as a terrible curse. And yet, research shows (...) that it prolongs life and is generally good for people's physical and mental health. This is perhaps why work is increasingly recognized as a crucial source of meaning and social identity. And our attitudes to work have been changing significantly in the last decades, with an increased demand for meaning and self-realization in the workplace.In this book, Lars Svendsen argues that we need to complete this reorientation of our feelings about work and collapse the differences between leisure and work. Work, like the poor, is always with us. But to overcome the sense of being burnt out, we must think of work as not only productive but recreative - in other words, a lot more like leisure. (shrink)

This work overviews the place of Kierkegaard’s thought in the philosophy of Polo. Polo welcomes Kierkegaard’s descriptions of aesthetic lige and his reflections about tedium, but he perceives the inadequacy of appealing to an interior root of the “I”, in view of his proporsal of the character of more [además] of the human person.

The fixation on canonical works that characterizes the disciplines of literary study in Germany is an inheritance of Geistesgeschichte; only literary historical curiosity, however, can secure the epistemological basis of literary study and protect it from disciplinary tedium.

Inscribed in his innermost being, man carries "the mark of nothing", "the empty trace". Since he carries that emptiness, he does everything to fill it up. He creates "imaginary selves" with the qualities which he values and which other people also value, and tries to impose them on others, seeking their admiration. The imaginary self allows him to get rid of the vision of his true self. That self which puts him in front of his emptiness produces in him (...) class='Hi'>tedium and uneasiness.O homem traz inscrito no mais profundo do seu ser "a marca do nada", "o traço vazio". Porque traz esse vazio, ele tudo faz para preenchê-lo. Cria "eus imaginários" formando-os com as qualidades que estima e que os outros também estimam; tenta impô-los aos outros buscando assim a admiração alheia. O eu imaginário permite a ele livrar-se da visão do seu eu verdadeiro. Esse eu que o coloca diante do seu vazio, produz nele o tédio e a inquietude. (shrink)

Although the desire to be free from God springs from humanity’s wish to enjoy pleasure without restraint, Lacan observes that humans remain neurotic and unhappy. That is because the prevailing “dead of God” form of atheism relies on the denial of a father/god, a negation that inadvertently replicates the logic of religion. Lacan, by contrast, grounds his atheism in a theory of pleasure that recognizes the role of “unpleasure” in breaking the tedium of easy, unlimited gratification. Turning to Greek (...) tragedy, Lacan shows how the ancient world used the gods as creators of “unpleasure” to generate human _jouissance_. The figure of Antigone, in particular, shows how the divine function can fulfill “the true formula of atheism,” which is not “God is dead,” but rather, Lacan affirms, that “_God is unconscious_.”. (shrink)

"One of the symptoms of an approaching nervous breakdown is the belief that one's work is terribly important."_ - Bertrand Russell_ Work is one of the most universal features of human life; virtually everybody spends some part of their life at work. It is often associated with tedium and boredom, in conflict with the things we would otherwise love to do. The idea of work primarily as a burden was also shared by the philosophers in ancient Greece, who generally (...) regarded work as a curse. And yet research shows that it prolongs life and is generally good for people’s physical and mental health. Why is this? What is the meaning of work? To what extent does it determine our social identity? Should we expect to find work fulfilling? In this book, Lars Svendsen explores these questions and more. He argues that we need to complete this reorientation of our feelings about work and collapse the differences between leisure and work. Work is always with us. But to overcome the sense of being burnt out, we must think of work as not only productive but recreative – in other words, a lot more like leisure. Revised and updated in light of the global financial crisis, this second edition also includes a new chapter on work and globalization. (shrink)

In 1991 Jonathan Demme's The Silence of the Lambs made off with five Academy Awards, including the coveted "Best Picture." Merely to introduce this fact I have already had to ignore several potentially relevant questions. [1] But I will spare you the tedium of endlessly qualifying my choice of subject matter; both existentialism and psychoanalysis teach us that the attempt to get behind our own starting points or render our pasts completely transparent to ourselves is an impossible task. Rather, (...) let me lay my Heideggerian cards on the table up front, briefly outlining the methodological understanding from which I will be working in the rest of this paper. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Evil and Contemporary Philosophical Orthodoxy Defense versus Theodicy The Free Will Defense Life's Purpose and Perfect Happiness Developing a Theodicy Adams and Horrendous Evil Plantinga's “ O Felix Culpa ” Theodicy Beasts and the Problem of Evil References.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:BoredomWalter E. BromanBoredom, by Patricia Meyer Spacks; xii & 289 pp. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, $24.95 paper.Scholars who have been immersed in the eighteenth century are often imbued with a penchant for common sense and develop a rich, lucid style. Professor Spacks exemplifies these qualities admirably. In spite of the sludgy title, this is a stimulating and rewarding book. Until now my only thinking about boredom (...) has happened while watching goldfish or cows and wondering if they were slowly perishing of boredom. Otherwise, boredom has been a gray experience accompanying committee meetings or reading insurance prose, but scarcely a matter for philosophy. Professor Spacks shows that there is much here for serious thought. She traces the history of boredom, mainly as manifested in novels. “This book’s project is to investigate boredom’s imaginative functions during the past two and a half centuries, mainly in England, where speakers first labeled the condition early in the second half of the eighteenth century” (p. 6). In this period the idea of boredom was still influenced by Christian thought. Thus, Johnson saw Boswell’s boredom in Scotland as a lapse in Christian morality, a lack of personal resources. Johnson felt the universal power of boredom; it invaded even “the Happy Valley of Rasselas,” but he insisted on the moral duty of opposing it with spirited effort. Women writers of the period are pictured as doing just that—heroically defeating a boredom imposed upon women by society through the vivacity and energy of language in their epistles and narration. Professor Spacks depicts the early nineteenth century as afflicting later decades with sensibility and didactic tedium and developing complex new aspects of boredom as a mode of aggression that could shrivel people, arts, and society. “To real aristocrats belongs the repudiation of feeling—passion and compassion—that constitutes boredom” (p. 201). In the twentieth century boredom becomes ubiquitous and has “enormous and essentially unalterable power” (p. ix). This century is like a fulfillment of Pope’s vision of universal dullness at the end of The Dunciad.During the course of this history we become almost convinced that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries women hunkered in a cotton-wrapped male-dominated world which went to great lengths to normalize female boredom. “Often tedium attends compliant virtue” (p. 78). This idea of [End Page 506] oppressed and suffering women is repeated in the text to the point of—well—boring the reader. From my reading in general and from this book I garnered the impression that eighteenth-century women were for the most part tough, alive, and intelligent masters of boredom. I can almost hear their spirits crying, “save the pity!”Professor Spacks fulfills the older mission of criticism to promote interest and attention, and provide insight. Like literature, this mission aims to defeat boredom. We are rewarded with a brilliant discussion of Sense and Sensibility, showing us how Austen’s subtle rhetoric guides the reader’s perception of what is interesting—to learn to find seemingly dull Elinor and Edward actually interesting, to thwart our shallower driftings. In a similar vein with moral bearings Professor Spacks manages to stir interest in a discussion of Wordsworth’s “The Idiot Boy.” We recall how Wordsworth militated against the human inclination to depend upon gross and violent stimulants. He proposed that we ought to be interested in what is moral and thereby genuinely interesting. In “The Idiot Boy” he aimed to enlarge our moral attention span to embrace the lowly and unlikely. I began to feel much less like a moral derelict when Professor Spacks admitted that she too finds “The Idiot Boy” boring.This is such a rewarding book that I feel uncomfortably churlish in pointing out that aspects of the book are irksome. In general, her sentences are beautiful, but in large tracts of the book we find an Emersonian discursiveness where the discussions are crumbly and anfractuous, tacking from this to that. We don’t get enough sustained driving down a clear track. She suggests in passing that Hannah More’s Coelebs is boring to the later nineteenth century when people become more concerned with inner conflicts and... (shrink)