Background:Moral distress is considered to be the negative feelings that arise when one knows the morally correct response to a situation but cannot act because of institutional or hierarchal constraints.Objectives:To analyze moral distress and its relation with sociodemographic and academic variables in undergraduate students from different universities in Brazil.Method:Quantitative study with a cross-sectional design. Data were collected through the Moral Distress Scale for Nursing Students, with 499 nursing students from three universities in the extreme south of Brazil answering the scale. (...) The data were analyzed in the statistical software SPSS version 22.0, through descriptive statistical analysis, association tests (t-test and analysis of variance), and linear regression models.Ethical considerations:Approval for the study was obtained from the Research Ethics Committee at Universidade Federal do Rio Grande.Findings:The mean intensity of moral distress in the constructs ranged from 1.60 to 2.55. As to the occurrence of situations leading to moral distress in the constructs, the frequencies ranged from 1.21 to 2.43. The intensity level of moral distress showed higher averages in the more advanced grades of the undergraduate nursing course, when compared to the early grades of this course (between 5 and 10 grade, average = 2.60–3.14, p = 0.000).Conclusion:The demographic and academic characteristics of the undergraduate nursing students who referred higher levels of moral distress were being enrolled in the final course semesters, were at a federal university, and had no prior degree as an auxiliary nurse/nursing technician. (shrink)

In this thorough compendium, nineteen accomplished scholars explore, in some manner the values they find inherent in the world, their nature, and revelence through the thought of Frederick Ferré. These essays, informed by the insights of Ferré and coming from manifold perspectives—ethics, philosophy, theology, and environmental studies, advance an ambitious challenge to current intellectual and scholarly fashions.

In this thorough compendium, nineteen accomplished scholars explore, in some manner the values they find inherent in the world, their nature, and revelence through the thought of Frederick FerrZ. These essays, informed by the insights of FerrZ and coming from manifold perspectives—ethics, philosophy, theology, and environmental studies, advance an ambitious challenge to current intellectual and scholarly fashions.

Philosophy courses help students develop logical reasoning and argument skills or so it is widely assumed. To test if this is actually the case, we examined university students’ familiarity with the basic tools for argument. Our findings, based on a sample of 651 students enrolled in philosophy courses at six Greek universities, indicate that students who have prior experience with philosophy are more familiar with the basic tools for argument, and that students who have taken philosophy courses at the university (...) have stronger argument-recognition and argument-evaluation skills compared to university students with no prior experience with philosophy. Moreover, our findings suggest that students get more familiar with the basic tools for argument as their level of engagement with philosophy increases, and that they get significantly better at evaluating arguments when they become graduate students in philosophy. However, our findings also suggest that the majority of students in philosophy classrooms haven’t developed fluency in basic argument-related concepts and skills. To remedy this, we argue that philosophy instructors need to re-think the place that the teaching of argument has in philosophy courses, and the way that they teach students about argument. (shrink)

This chapter argues for the History of England’s importance in Hume’s overall achievement. The chapter describes the History’s genesis, reception, methods, and aims. In the role of historian, Hume shared with the ancients the assumption that history is an elevated genre functioning as the “Mistress of Wisdom.” Yet this long work is more notable for historiographical innovation. Like William Robertson and Edward Gibbon, Hume wrote conjectural or philosophical history. Like Machiavelli, Voltaire, and Montesquieu, Hume wrote civil or cultural history, including (...) detailed information on political events, law, commerce, and manners. In a larger sense, the History demonstrates a great philosopher leaving his study to deal with that practical, sometimes intractable world outside the study. A priori reasoning is tested against that a posteriori reality provided by historical evidence. Thus, in writing the History, Hume became an empiricist in an almost literal sense. (shrink)

In this paper we examine C. I. Lewis's view on the roleof coherence – what he calls ''congruence'' – in thejustification of beliefs based on memory ortestimony. Lewis has two main theses on the subject. His negativethesis states that coherence of independent items ofevidence has no impact on the probability of a conclusionunless each item has some credibility of its own. Thepositive thesis says, roughly speaking, that coherenceof independently obtained items of evidence – such asconverging memories or testimonies – raises (...) the probabilityof a conclusion to the extent sufficient for epistemicjustification, or, to use Lewis's expression, ''rationaland practical reliance''.It turns out that, while thenegative thesis is essentially correct, astrong positive connection between congruence andprobability – a connection of the kind Lewis ultimatelyneeds in his validation of memory – is contingent on thePrinciple of Indifference. In the final section we assess therepercussions of the latter fact for Lewis's theory in particularand for coherence justification in general. (shrink)

Peirce earned his keep making measurements, mainly of gravity but also astronomical, and he made several contributions to the science of measurement. It has been said that his experience measuring had philosophical consequences: his adoption of fallibilism, his argument against necessitarianism, and his conception of inquiry as converging on the truth have all been mentioned. But not much attention has been paid to the curious episode of his making “the study of great men” part of a course in logic: students (...) were asked to rank a long list of men by order of greatness. That was at Johns Hopkins in 1883. I shall argue that that study, together with his reflections on pre-instrumental estimates of stars’ brightness, bears directly on the method of phaneroscopy formulated nearly two decades later. In each case, the problem is to show how objectivity is possible under conditions in which it must seem that objectivity is impossible. (shrink)

abstract This paper examines, from a philosophical point of view, the ethics of the role of the family and the deceased in decisions about organ retrieval. The paper asks: Who, out of the individual and the family, should have the ultimate power to donate or withhold organs? On the side of respecting the wishes of the deceased individual, the paper considers and rejects arguments by analogy with bequest and from posthumous bodily integrity. It develops an argument for posthumous autonomy based (...) on the liberal idea of self‐development and argues that this establishes a right of veto over donation. It claims, however, that whether the family's power to veto would conflict with posthumous autonomy rights depends on how it comes about. On the side of respecting the family's wishes, the paper first considers an argument from family distress. This supports a contingent, non‐rights‐based reason for the family's power that is trumped by the deceased's rights. It then outlines and criticises an argument based on family autonomy. The conclusion is that the individual has the right to veto the family's wish to donate and that, while the family has no right to veto the individual's wishes to donate, it can legitimately acquire this power and has done so in practice. (shrink)

ch. 1. Istorii︠a︡ sot︠s︡iologicheskikh ucheniĭ -- ch. 2. Nauchnai︠a︡ teorii︠a︡ obshchestva.

This paper disputes the widely held view that one cannot establish the reliability of a belief-forming process with the use of belief's that are obtained by that very process since such self-dependent justification is circular. Harold Brown ([1993]) argued in this journal that some cases of self-dependent justification are legitimate despite their circularity. I argue instead that under appropriate construal many cases of self-dependent justification are not truly circular but are instances of ordinary Bayesian confirmation, and hence they can raise (...) the probability of the hypothesis as legitimately as any such confirmation does. I shall argue in particular that despite its dependence on perception we can use naturalized epistemology to confirm the reliability of a perceptual process without circularity. (shrink)