Using “big data” from sensors worn continuously outside the lab, researchers have observed patterns of objective physiology that challenge some of the long-standing theoretical concepts of emotion and its measurement. One challenge is that emotional arousal, when measured as sympathetic nervous system activation through electrodermal activity, can sometimes differ significantly across the two halves of the upper body. We show that traditional measures on only one side may lead to misjudgment of arousal. This article presents daily life and controlled study (...) data, as well as existing evidence from neuroscience, supporting the influence of multiple emotional substrates in the brain causing innervation on different sides of the body. We describe how a theory of multiple arousals explains the asymmetric EDA findings. (shrink)

We respond to the commentaries of Critchley and Nagai, Mendes, Norman, Sabatinelli, and Richter. We agree that a theory needs to make predictions and we elaborate on the predictions we made so far. We do not agree that arousal has to have a precise definition in order to present theory about it; however, we do provide concrete answers to questions raised about multiple arousal theory.

The contour of a family of filters along a filter is a set-theoretic lower limit. Topologicity and regularity of convergences can be characterized with the aid of the contour operation. Contour inversion is studied, in particular, for iterated contours of sequential cascades. A related problem of continuous extension of maps between maximal elements of sequential cascades to full subcascades is solved in full generality.

The COVID-19 pandemic caused university education to transition from face-to-face contacts to virtual learning environments. Young adults were forced to live an entirely new life online, without valuable and enjoyable social interaction. We examined subjective perspectives towards life online during the pandemic. We identified four viewpoints about life mediated by computers. Two viewpoints express “struggling”: Viewpoint 1 (Angry, Depressed and Overwhelmed), and Viewpoint 3 (Restricted to and Overwhelmed by Virtuality). A third feeling-state conveys experiences of “surviving”: Viewpoint 4 (Isolated and (...) Powerless in Convenience). Surprisingly, Viewpoint 2 is about “thriving” (Comfortable and Convenient Routine with Computers). The research shows that virtualization, confinement, and anxiety are taking a toll on the mental health of some members of the younger generation, while at the same time other members feel they are thriving in a situation of limited resources, virtuality, and reduced face-to-face human interaction. (shrink)

Stereotype accuracy is a contentious topic. Part of the problem is that typically stereotypes are generic statements whose truth status is unclear due to the fact that they are ill-defined quantitatively. The article focuses on the epistemic aspect of stereotypical beliefs. In the ongoing debate, I side with those who argue against stereotypes being wrong or inaccurate by virtue of definition alone. I propose that, when possible, stereotype accuracy should be assessed in probabilistic terms by inspecting how likely a generic (...) statement is to be true when applied to individual representative of the relevant group. This approach applies equally well to investigating the actual and the perceived accuracy of stereotypes. (shrink)

It is well-known that natural axiomatic theories are well-ordered by consistency strength. However, it is possible to construct descending chains of artificial theories with respect to consistency strength. We provide an explanation of this well-orderedness phenomenon by studying a coarsening of the consistency strength order, namely, the$\Pi ^1_1$reflection strength order. We prove that there are no descending sequences of$\Pi ^1_1$sound extensions of$\mathsf {ACA}_0$in this ordering. Accordingly, we can attach a rank in this order, which we call reflection rank, to any$\Pi (...) ^1_1$sound extension of$\mathsf {ACA}_0$. We prove that for any$\Pi ^1_1$sound theoryTextending$\mathsf {ACA}_0^+$, the reflection rank ofTequals the$\Pi ^1_1$proof-theoretic ordinal ofT. We also prove that the$\Pi ^1_1$proof-theoretic ordinal of$\alpha $iterated$\Pi ^1_1$reflection is$\varepsilon _\alpha $. Finally, we use our results to provide straightforward well-foundedness proofs of ordinal notation systems based on reflection principles. (shrink)

In _Essentialität und Notwendigkeit: Avicenna und die Aristotelische Tradition_ stellt Fedor Benevich Avicennas Theorie der Essenz und der wissenschaftlichen Bestimmung essentieller und notwendiger Attribute in einem historischen Kontext der aristotelischen Tradition. In _Essentialität und Notwendigkeit: Avicenna und die Aristotelische Tradition_ Fedor Benevich presents Avicenna’s theory of essence and the scientific determination of essential and necessary attributes in its historical context of the Aristotelian tradition.

An erotetic calculus for a given logic constitutes a sequent-style proof-theoretical formalization of the logic grounded in Inferential Erotetic Logic ). In this paper, a new erotetic calculus for Classical Propositional Logic ), dual with respect to the existing ones, is given. We modify the calculus to obtain complete proof systems for the propositional part of paraconsistent logic CLuN and its extensions CLuNs and mbC. The method is based on dual resolution. Moreover, the resolution rule is non-clausal. According to the (...) authors knowledge, this is the first account of resolution for mbC. Last but not least, as the method is grounded in IEL, it constitutes an important tool for the so-called question-processing. (shrink)

Nāgārjuna’s Middle Way (Madhyamaka) doctrine met with the objection that it is a mere verbal attack (vitaṇḍā) against other philosophical positions. As one of the Madhyamaka critics pointed out: because Nāgārjuna does not hold own position, he is not able to justify his criticism of the essence (svabhāva). The article is an answer to the question whether, in the context of Indian philosophy, it is possible to know things devoid of essences. Theory of knowledge of this kind, i.e. the concept (...) of omniscience (sarvajña) was presented in Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā sutra. Associations between Nāgārjuna’s texts and the sutra suggest that omniscience could be a substrate for epistemological position of the Middle Way. (shrink)

RésuméQuels sont les objets de la perception? Deux réponses célèbres à cette question soutiennent que ce sont soit les images des objets extramentaux, c'est-à-dire la façon dont ils nous apparaissent, soit les objets eux-mêmes. Dans cet article, je présente une analyse de cette question par Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī, un savant post-avicennien dont l'impact sur l'histoire de la philosophie islamique a été largement négligé. Abū l-Barakāt s'est opposé au dualisme épistémologique traditionnel aristotélicien-avicennien, qui établit une distinction entre la perception sensorielle des (...) particuliers matériels et la conception des universaux immatériels, notamment en ce qui concerne le percevant et/ou la structure de la perception. Selon la théorie d'Abū l-Barakāt, tous les actes épistémiques ont la structure unifiée d'une relation directe entre un même percevant et les objets eux-mêmes – matériels et immatériels. Sa thèse principale consiste à dire qu'avoir des organes corporels n'est pas nécessaire pour la perception sensorielle. Dans la dernière section de cet article, je montre que la critique d'Abū l-Barakāt de la tradition aristotélicienne-avicennienne fut considérée comme une innovation révolutionnaire en épistémologie. Cela peut avoir déterminé les théories épistémologiques de deux des philosophes arabes postavicenniens les plus importants : Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī et Šihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī. (shrink)

Dharmakīrti argues that there is no pramāṇa (valid means of cognition or source of knowledge) for a thesis that is a self-contradiction (svavacanavirodha). That is, self-contradictions such as ‘everything said is false’ and ‘my mother is barren’ cannot be known to be true or false. The contemporary scholar Tillemans challenges Dharmakīrti by arguing that we can know that self-contradictions are false by means of a formal logical inference. The aims of the paper are to answer Tillemans’ challenge from what we (...) take to be Dharmakīrti’s or Dharmakīrtian (someone who is like Dharmakīrti) perspective and to demonstrate the unique features of Dharmakīrti’s view of inference. By so doing, we show that the epistemology in relation to the formal conception of logic that underlies Tillemans’ challenge is problematic from Dharmakīrti’s or Dharmakīrtian perspective. The paper, thus, presents Dharmakīrti’s view of inference and logical reasoning as well as a Dharmakīrtian challenge to the formal conception of logic that is the dominant contemporary conception. (shrink)

We define Kripke semantics for propositional intuitionistic logic with Suszko’s identity. We propose sequent calculus for ISCI along with cut-elimination theorem. We sketch a constructive interpretation of Suszko’s propositional identity connective.

The liar paradox is still an open philosophical problem. Most contemporary answers to the paradox target the logical principles underlying the reasoning from the liar sentence to the paradoxical conclusion that the liar sentence is both true and false. In contrast to these answers, Buddhist epistemology offers resources to devise a distinctively epistemological approach to the liar paradox. In this paper, I mobilise these resources and argue that the liar sentence is what Buddhist epistemologists call a contradiction with one’s own (...) words. I situate my argument in the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and show how Buddhist epistemology answers the paradox. (shrink)

In this paper, we study finitely axiomatizable conservative extensions of a theoryUin the case whereUis recursively enumerable and not finitely axiomatizable. Stanisław Krajewski posed the question whether there are minimal conservative extensions of this sort. We answer this question negatively.Consider a finite expansion of the signature ofUthat contains at least one predicate symbol of arity ≥ 2. We show that, for any finite extensionαofUin the expanded language that is conservative overU, there is a conservative extensionβofUin the expanded language, such that$\alpha (...) \vdash \beta$and$\beta \not \vdash \alpha$. The result is preserved when we consider eitherextensionsormodel-conservative extensionsofUinstead ofconservative extensions. Moreover, the result is preserved when we replace$\dashv$as ordering on the finitely axiomatized extensions in the expanded language by a relevant kind of interpretability, to witinterpretability that identically translates the symbols of the U-language.We show that the result fails when we consider an expansion with only unary predicate symbols for conservative extensions ofUordered by interpretability that preserves the symbols ofU. (shrink)

Essentialism can be defined as a metaphysical theory according to which things have essential and accidental properties. In this paper, I will address Avicennian essentialism, that is, essentialism...

ABSTRACTScholarship on medieval philosophy has rightfully acknowledged the historical and systematical merit of Avicenna’s thought in all divisions of philosophy. Avicenna however did not...

One of the most widespread claims combining epistemology and metaphysics in post-Avicennian Islamic philosophy was that every object of thought is real. In Muʿtazilite reading, it was endorsed due to a theory of knowledge which states that knowledge is a connection or relation between the knower and the object known. Avicennists accepted it due to the rule that in a proposition “s is p” if p is something positive s has to be positive and real too. Hence, insofar as one (...) can conceptually distinguish between two non-existent items, they have to be real. In this article, the author presents significant consequences of this theory: the acceptance and denial of non-existent yet real extramental objects; the concept of mental existence as an alternative solution; the conceivability of paraconsistent ideas and their reality or reducibility to some real objects. (shrink)

We consider the well-known provability logic GLP. We prove that the GLP-provability problem for polymodal formulas without variables is PSPACE-complete. For a number n, let L0n\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${L^{n}_0}$$\end{document} denote the class of all polymodal variable-free formulas without modalities ⟨n⟩,⟨n+1⟩,...\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\langle n \rangle,\langle n+1\rangle,...}$$\end{document}. We show that, for every number n, the GLP-provability problem for formulas from L0n\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${L^{n}_0}$$\end{document} (...) is in PTIME. (shrink)

In this paper we are applying certain strategy described by Negri and Von Plato :418–435, 1998), allowing construction of sequent calculi for axiomatic theories, to Suszko’s Sentential calculus with identity. We describe two calculi obtained in this way, prove that the cut rule, as well as the other structural rules, are admissible in one of them, and we also present an example which suggests that the cut rule is not admissible in the other.

In this paper we are applying certain strategy described by Negri and Von Plato :418–435, 1998), allowing construction of sequent calculi for axiomatic theories, to Suszko’s Sentential calculus with identity. We describe two calculi obtained in this way, prove that the cut rule, as well as the other structural rules, are admissible in one of them, and we also present an example which suggests that the cut rule is not admissible in the other.

The aim in this paper is to define an Abductive Question-Answer System for the minimal logic of formal inconsistency \. As a proof-theoretical basis we employ the Socratic proofs method. The system produces abductive hypotheses; these are answers to abductive questions concerning derivability of formulas from sets of formulas. We integrated the generation of and the evaluation of hypotheses via constraints of consistency and significance being imposed on the system rules.

A central question in the history of metaphysics concerns the ontological status of such notions as 'redness,' 'humanity,' or 'animality,' which one calls 'universals.' Since one uses these notions to describe objects in the real world, it may seem intuitive that they exist in extramental reality: one says that universals are 'real'. Famously, though, several problems arise from this view. A central problem known both to medieval and contemporary scholars goes as follows: I look at a red rose and recognize (...) that there is 'redness' in it. Then, I look at a red apple and recognize that there is 'redness' in it, too. Does this mean that one and the same 'redness' appears in both the rose and the... (shrink)

E. T. A. Hoffmann is one of the most famous representatives of early German horror literature. He has been both, inspired by its predecessors, as well as having influenced the work of many of his successors, and hence the development of the whole genre. The present article examines a story by E. T. A. Hoffmann, “Vampirismus” from the collection of short stories “Serapions Brüder”. Emphases are, on the one hand, on the mechanisms that cause readers’ fear and uncertainty and, on (...) the other hand, the peculiarity of the vampire or Nachzehrer figure and their function in the story. Firstly, it will be shown that the vampire depicted in the work is not actually a vampire. We find here a ghoul; that is a demon from Arab culture. However, the ghoul has more to do with the monster outlined by Antoine Galland in his translation of the “One Thousand and One Nights” than with traditional folk beliefs. Secondly, the author comes to the conclusion that Hoffmann has functionalized the Horrible. This element does not work by itself, but serves the author as the background of the action. And he is using this background to let the characters reveal all their weaknesses and dark sides. The violation of the order ruling in the world as it is represented engages the reader and at the same time raises his fear. The resulting excited feelings and general alienation are further reinforced for the figure of the Nachzehrer that occurs instead of a formerly innocent, graceful girl. The emergence of the supernatural – the final confirmation of the breach of order – is responsible for the effect just described. (shrink)

The concept of retroactive apparent occurrence, the main ingredient of Wheeler's delayed-choice thought experiments, is systematically incorporated into the quantum theory of measurement (in the framework of the recent review of Busch, Lahti, and Mittelstaedt). Besides, the (general) notion of individual-system measurement is introduced, and, due to it, premeasurement is defined by a truly minimal condition. Finally, retroactive apparent occurrence is made use of to derive apparent objectification in measurement. The derivation is discussed in the framework of the quantum mechanical (...) approach to the objectification problem. (shrink)

Avicenna's analysis of the definition of substance and accident repeatedly emphasizes two points: one and the same essence cannot be substance in one instance and accident in another; whetherxis extrinsic or intrinsic for an underlying subject,ydoes not tell us anything as to whetherxis substance or not. Both points are development in an argument against certain unnamed people who claimed the opposite. In this article I will show that Avicenna's opponents are to be identified with the mainstream Baghdad Peripatetic School which (...) based itself on the Late Antique rule that “parts of substances are substances”. As for Avicenna's own position, it was developed on the basis of the heterodox position of Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, who anticipated Avicenna's first point. This is a further piece of evidence for something that has only recently begun to be appreciated: the influence of Ibn ʿAdī on Avicenna.RésuméL’analyse d’Avicenne portant sur les définitions de la substance et de l’accident met en exergue les deux propositions suivantes: 1) la même essence ne peut être à la fois une substance dans un cas et un accident dans un autre; 2) le fait quexsoit extrinsèque ou intrinsèque à unysous-jacent ne nous permet pas de conclure quexest une substance. Ces deux propositions sont articulées dans un débat avec d’autres personnes ayant un point de vue opposé dont on ne connaît pas l’identité. Dans cet article, nous verrons que ces adversaires font partie de l’école péripatétique de Bagdad, qui elle-même s’appuie sur une proposition datant de l’Antiquité tardive et selon laquelle les parties de substances sont elles-mêmes des substances. La position d’Avicenne fut développée à partir de celle de Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī. Cet article apporte ainsi un argument nouveau qui met en évidence l’influence, remarquée seulement depuis peu, d’Ibn ʿAdī sur Avicenne. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to present two natural deduction systems for Intuitionistic Sentential Calculus with Identity ( ISCI ); a syntactically motivated \(\mathsf {ND}^1_{\mathsf {ISCI}}\) and a semantically motivated \(\mathsf {ND}^2_{\mathsf {ISCI}}\). The formulation of \(\mathsf {ND}^1_{\mathsf {ISCI}}\) is based on the axiomatic formulation of ISCI. Its rules cannot be straightforwardly classified as introduction or elimination rules; ISCI -specific rules are based on axioms characterizing the identity connective. The system does not enjoy the standard subformula property, but due (...) to the normalization procedure non-subformulas can label only leaves of proofs. In \(\mathsf {ND}^2_{\mathsf {ISCI}}\), we propose only two general identity-related rules, in reference to the treatment of the identity connective in First-Order Logic. (shrink)

This is a translation of an article which appeared in 1928 in the journal Red Virgin Soil (Krasnaya nov) founded by Aleksandr Voronsky. Its author, the Russian Marxist Fedor Kapelusz, makes use of the now largely-ignored book of Algie Simons, Social Forces in American History (1911). In comparing America’s past to its present, Kapelusz offers a sharp political assessment and at the same time a contribution to the materialist conception of American history.

The theory of essential definitions is a fundamental anti‐sceptic element of the Aristotelian‐Avicennian epistemology. In this theory, when we distinguish the genus and the specific differentia of a given essence we thereby acquire a scientific understanding of it. The aim of this article is to analyse systematically the sceptical reasons, arguments and conclusions against real definitions of three major authorities of twelfth‐century Arabic philosophy: Faḫr al‐Dīn al‐Rāzī, Šihāb al‐Dīn al‐Suhrawardī and Abū l‐Barakāt al‐Baġdādī. I focus on showing how their refutation (...) of our capacity to provide essential definitions of things is rooted in their semantic theory: we only know things under certain descriptions which are identical to the meanings of the words that we use to refer to them, yet these descriptions do not capture the essences of things in themselves. The best result one can achieve with Aristotelian‐Avicennian scientific definitions is a “nominal definition”. With this, Rāzī, Suhrawardī and Abū l‐Barakāt will put some serious epistemic limitations on our capacity to attain scientific knowledge of things, at least as Aristotle and Avicenna would have it. (shrink)

We introduce a notion of ideal type such that any two ideals with the same ideal type are isomorphic. From this we infer, under the axiom t = h, that each ideal which consists of all nowhere Ramsey sets contained in some family of infinite subsets of natural numbers is isomorphic with the ideal of all nowhere Ramsey sets.

In the article the author rejects traditional, logical interpretation of the famous “Is-Ought Paragraph” from David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature. He argues that most of the interpreters failed to grasp the wide philosophical background of the IsOP, which is, generally speaking, a passionate discussion between ethical rationalists and ethical anti-rationalists in the 17th and 18th century British philosophy. The author shows that the Hume’s main aim in the IsOP is to strengthen his previous arguments against ethical rationalism and (...) to reinforce (and not subvert at all) the common-sense (vulgar) systems of morality, likewise he did in the first book of the Treatise… in case of the theory of knowledge. The author argues that there is no putative thesis of logic in the IsOP, which some scholars call “Hume’s Law”. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to describe the myth of femme fatale. Starting from popular culture and ending with the representatives of archaic cultures, the author tries to indicate the women who are described in patriarchal narratives as those who bring men to defeat and ruin. An important figure for the whole argument is Lilith, who, according to Jewish legends, was the first wife of Adam. Lilith was erased from the biblical tradition because she opposed her partner and turned (...) away from God. She has become the female archetype of sin, the symbol of sexual vampirism and the rejection of motherhood. All these features make up the femme fatale syndrome. (shrink)

In my paper I present David Hume's philosophy from the perspective of Charles Sanders Peirce's theory of signs. I argue that by interpreting impressions and ideas as iconic signs it is possible to avoid many inconsistencies in Hume's philosophy. Apart from that it makes possible to avoid Hume's scepticism about the existence of the external world by introducing Peirce's concept of the dynamic and immediate object. What is more, the generative structure of signs helps us to deal with the "gmissing (...) shade of blue" problem. (shrink)

Wittgenstein introduced his claim about colour incompatibility originally in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , where he stated that there could be only one colour in one place and time. It is commonly believed that Wittgenstein abandoned his conception of logical atomism when he realized the consequences of this claim. The aim of this article is to provide an interpretation of the colour incompatibility claim in terms of Wittgenstein’s phenomenology. I will focus on two works of great significance for the claim: Some (...) Remarks on Logical Form and Philosophical Remarks . These two works were written between 1929 and 1930, which is the beginning of the “middle period” in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I will focus not only on Wittgenstein’s formulation of the colour incompatibility claim, but also on how this claim was justified. The explanation of Wittgenstein’s justification of this claim will help to understand his phenomenology and theory of philosophical grammar. (shrink)

Freedom of contract and corrective justice are considered to be the basic principles governing contract law. However, many contemporary legal orders implement various policy goals into private law. The regulatory private law of the European Union is the most striking example of such a trend. This article aims at reconciling the corrective justice theory of private law and the principle of freedom of contract with the regulatory dimension of the EU law. The main argument is that the meaning of the (...) concept of harm, one that is crucial to the principle of corrective justice, should be understood broadly so that it can transform the corrective justice theory from a monistic one into a pluralistic one. (shrink)