Stove argues that Popper and his successors in the philosophy of science, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend, were irrationalists because they were deductivists. That is, they believed all logic is deductive, and thus denied that experimental evidence could make scientific theories logically more probable. The book was reprinted as Anything Goes (1998) and Scientific Irrationalism: Origins of a Postmodern Cult (1998).

Writing on the justification of certain inductive inferences, the author proposes that sometimes induction is justified and that arguments to prove otherwise are not cogent. In the first part he defends the argument of D.C. Williams' The Ground of Induction that induction is justified as a matter of logic by the proportional syllogism: "The vast majority of large samples match the population, therefore (probably) this sample matches the population"). In the second part he deals with such topics as deductive logic (...) (arguing that deductive logic is not formal), the theory of logical probability, and probability and truth. (shrink)

This is a book of philosophy, written by a philosopher and intended for anyone who knows enough philosophy to have been seriously injured, antagonised, mystified or intoxicated by it. Stove is passionately polemical, a philosophical counterpart to Tom Wolfe. Setting out to deflate a few philosophical reputations, he lambastes both the dead and the living. Yet he says things that need to be said, and that others often lack the courage to say.

This book aims to discuss probability and David Hume's inductive scepticism. For the sceptical view which he took of inductive inference, Hume only ever gave one argument. That argument is the sole subject-matter of this book. The book is divided into three parts. Part one presents some remarks on probability. Part two identifies Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. Finally, the third part evaluates Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. Hume's argument that induction must be either deductively valid or circular because based (...) on experience neglects the possibility that it is an argument of non-deductive logic (logical probability, in the sense of Keynes). (shrink)

I BELIEVE THAT the intellectual capacity of women is on the whole inferior to that of men. By "on the whole," I do not mean just "on the average"; though I do mean that much. My belief is, if you take any degree of intellectual capacity which is above the average for the human race, as a whole, then a possessor of that degree of intellectual capacity is a good deal more likely to be man than a woman.

‘There is no opinion so absurd but that some philosopher has held it.’ Cicero wrote this around 44 B.C., and even then he was only repeating a saying already current. The reputation of philosophers for holding absurd opinions is therefore very old. Equally undeniably, it is also a well-founded reputation.

"Deductivism" is the thesis that all logic is deductive. Stove lays out the arguments for the existence of non-deductive logic.

Most educated people nowadays, I believe, think of themselves as Darwinians. If they do, however, it can only be from ignorance: from not knowing enough about what Darwinism says. For Darwinism says many things, especially about our species, which are too obviously false to be believed by any educated person; or at least by an educated person who retains any capacity at all for critical thought on the subject of Darwinism.

It is obvious that two contingent statements, each of which denies the existence of something, can be inconsistent with one another: for example, ‘There are no non-black ravens, and there is at least one raven’, and ‘There are no black ravens’. But it is also obvious that these two statements are inconsistent only because one of them, as well as denying the existence of something, asserts the existence of something. The mere denials of existence, ‘There are no non-black ravens’ and (...) ‘There are no black ravens’, are consistent with one another. Indeed, it must hold quite generally that two contingent statements cannot be inconsistent, where each is a mere denial of existence in the sense that it denies existence and does not also assert existence. For in order to be inconsistent with a mere denial of existence, a second statement must assert existence, whatever else it may do; and if it asserts existence, it is not itself a mere denial of existence. (shrink)

In part ix of "dialogues concerning natural religion", Demea advances an "a priori" argument for the existence of god: an argument of which cleanthes and philo then make a number of trenchant criticisms. These criticisms are acknowledged by all commentators to be hume's own, And they are regarded by almost all commentators as being fatal to demea's argument. I show that, On the contrary, Hume's main criticisms are all worthless, And that they even include an inconsistency of the most glaring (...) kind. (shrink)

A reprint of Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:64. ON HUME'S IS-OUGHT THESIS The famous thesis of Hume about "is" and "ought" I take to be, as I believe it has generally been taken to be: (1) For any factual statement e and any ethical statement h, h is not deducible from e. My object in these brief notes is neither to defend nor to attack (1), but just to point out certain mistakes which have been (...) made, or are apt to be made, about (1), or about what Hume's thesis is. A. Max Black has taken Hume's thesis to be that "only statements of fact can follow- from statements of facti* ¡ a thesis, Black thinks, which Popper and "many other philos c be ; osophers" believe. That is. Black took Hume's thesis to (2)For any factual e and any non-factual h, h is not deducible. from e. It is certain, however, that Popper does not believe (2), and I hope it is untrue that many other philosophers believe it. For (2) is obviously false, and on the contrary, every factual statement has at least one nonfactual consequence; since from any factual statement 'f, the statement *f or not-f, which is not factual, is deducible. But this leaves Hume's thesis (1) untouched, since there is no excuse for confusing it with the foolish thesis (2). B. If a statement h is not deducible from a statement e, then given e, the falsity of h is possible; or in other words, h has less than maximum probability in relation to e. So part at least of the content of Hume's thesis (1) is: (3)For any factual e and ethical h, P(h/e). (shrink)

David Stove reviews Selwyn Grave's History of Philosophy in Australia, and praises philosophers for thinking harder about the bases of science, mathematics and medicine than the practitioners in the field. The review is reprinted as an appendix to James Franklin's Corrupting the Youth: A History of Philosophy in Australia.

Argues that genes, as portrayed by Richard Dawkins and sociobiologists, are gods - hidden entities smarter than humans who design and manipulate humans for their own ends.

Discusses whether Watkins, following Popper, holds a "labour theory of confirmation" (of scientific hypotheses, that is, holds that there is some logical connection between there being evidence for a hypothesis and efforts having been made to test it.

THE FACULTY OF Arts at the University of Sydney is a disaster-area, and not of the merely passive kind, like a bombed building, or an area that has been flooded. It is the active kind, like a badly-leaking nuclear reactor, or an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in cattle.

Stove defends his book, Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism, and claims his critics have "irished", or changed the question.

Collection of essays by the conservative Australian philosopher David Stove, author of Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists and The Rationality of Induction. Some are on philosophy and some not. They include his controversial essays "The intellectual capacity of women" and "Racial and other antagonism", his "Judge's report on the competition to find the worst argument in the world", and an attack on the anti-conservative "Columbus argument" (that "they said Columbus was mad", so let's approve change in general).

Reprint of Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists. In an afterword, James Franklin discusses reactions to Stove's work.

A tribute, originally given at David Armstrong's retirement in 1991 as Challis Professor of Philosophy at Sydney University. Stove recalls Armstrong's role in the "Sydney disturbances" of the 1970s when under attack from Marxists.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HUME, THE CAUSAL PRINCIPLE, AN'D KEMP SMITH When we say of a proposition that it is possible, we sometimes mean no more than that it is logically possible, that is, consistent with itself. A proposition can be possible in stronger senses than this, but not in any weaker one. For a sense of "p is possible" that did not entail "p is self-consistent, "would have to be a sense (...) of "p is possible" which was consistent with "p is self-inconsistent" And it is obvious that there can be no such sense as that. One of the stronger senses in which a proposition can be possible is this: consistent (with itself and in addition) with every observation-statement. (I mean by an observationstatement, a proposition which, if it were true, could in principle be discovered by experience to be true.) If a proposition? is contingent, (that is, neither necessarily true??t necessarily false), then its negation (its contradictory) not-p is contingent too; and since contingent, not necessarily false; and since not necessarily false, consistent with itself. So, given any contingent propositions, its falsity is among those propositions which are possible in the first and weak sense mentioned above. If a proposition? is not only contingent but unverifiable,(that is, not deducible from any observation- statement), then not-p is consistent both with itself and with every observation -statement. So, given any unverifiable contingent proposition, its falsity is among those propositions which are possible in the second and stronger sense mentioned above. Some stock examples. "Whatever is a raven is black" is contingent, and its falsity therefore possible in the first sense; so too is its contradictory "There are such things as non-black ravens" contingent, and its falsity possible in the first sense. But the latter proposition is not unverifiable, since there are observation-statements from which it is deducible. ("There are such things as green ravens", for example; or "A green raven was in captivity at Taronga Park Zoo in January 31st 1975".) The former proposition, on the other hand, is not only contingent but unverifiable; since there are no observation -statements from which it is deducible. Hence, "whatever is a raven is black" is a proposition the falsity of which is possible both in the first and in the second sense noticed above. A third and still stronger sense in which a proposition can be possible is the following:? is possible if and only if (p is consistent with itself,every observation-statement is consistent with p, and in addition)? is neither more nor less probable in relation to the conjunction of e and n, where e is any observation-statement and? any necessary truth, than it is in relation to? alone. The last condition may be expressed, symbolically, as "P(p/n.e) » P(p/n) for all necessarily true? and all observation-statements e"; or in Carnap' s phrase as, "every observation- statement is initially irrelevant to p." Some examples will quickly make the idea of initial irrelevance, and its opposite, more familiar; and hence will make the third sense of "p is possible" more familiar. Let? be any necessary truth and e any observation-statement. Now let? be, for- example,some necessarily false proposition; then, since P(p/n) « o = P(p/n.e), e is initially irrelevant to p. Or let? be necessarily true; then, since P(p/n) ¦ 1 = P(p/n.e), e is again initially irrelevant to p. Again, let? be "Whatever is a raven is black": then some observation- statements e are initially relevant to p. For if e is "This raven is black," for example, P(p/n.e)>P(p/n) ; or at any rate, that is what we think if we are not inductive sceptic?. Again, if? is "The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son", it is at least very plausible to say that every observational e is initially irrelevant to p; since there appears to be no observational e such that P(p/n.e)>P(p/n), or P(p/n.e). (shrink)

The author claims to prove by example that, Contrary to what is generally maintained, A singular preposition of an observational kind is in some cases deducible from a natural law alone. On this basis he raises the question whether the universe might not be deterministic in a 'hyper-Laplacean' sense: that is, Whether the laws of nature might not be logically sufficient on their own to determine every actual state of the universe.

Bing Crosby and Louis Armstrong, at a time when they were both millionaires many times over, recorded a song called "Gone Fishin'". Its theme was as familiar as it was implausible: how they would much rather sit by "some shady, wady pool", etc., than be enmeshed, as they were, in the feverish pursuit of money and fame. The record was a huge success, making the singers even richer and more famous than they had been before: which was, after all, their (...) intention in making it. It will hardly need saying that neither singer ever did in fact renounce show business and "go fishin'" instead; or that this experiment, if it had been tried, would have been an ignominious failure. It has been tried often enough. (shrink)

The idea of enlightenment entails liberty, equality, rationalism, secularism, and the connection between knowledge and human well being. In spite of the setbacks of revolutionary violence, political mass murder, and two world wars, the spread of enlightenment values has become the yardstick by which moral, political, and even scientific advances are measured. Indeed, most critiques of the enlightenment ideal point to failure in implementation rather than principle. By contrast, David Stove, in On Enlightenment, attacks the intellectual roots of enlightenment thought, (...) to define the limitations of its successes and the areas of its likely failures. Stove is not insensitive to the many valuable aspects of enlightenment thought. He champions the use of reason and rationality, and recognizes the falsity of religious claims as well as the importance of individual liberty. What he rejects is the enlightenment's uncritical optimism regarding social progress and its willingness to embrace revolutionary change. What evidence is there that the elimination of superstition will lead to happiness? Or that it is possible to accept Darwinism without Social Darwinism? Or that the enlightenment's liberal, rationalistic outlook will ever lead to the kind of social progress envisioned by its advocates. Despite their best intentions, social reformers who attempt to improve the world as a whole inevitably make things worse. He advocates a conservative "go slow" approach to change, pointing out that today's social structures are so large and complex that any widespread social reform will have innumerable unforeseen consequences. For example, the welfare state may diminish individual initiative, the use of pesticides may increase the food supply while polluting the water supply, the popularizing of university education may lead to a decline in academic standards. Since government has a virtual monopoly on large-scale change, it follows, in Stove's view, that its powers must be limited in order to prevent large-scale damage. Instead, he argues that reforms, when they are to be made at all, must be realistic, local, necessary and never coercive. Writing in the conservative tradition of Edmund Burke with the same passion for clarity and intellectual honesty as George Orwell, David Stove was one of the most precise, articulate, and insightful philosophers of his day. "Never just an academic, Stove was also a prominent, often crotchety, public intellectual of a conservative and, all too often, reactionary bent, many of whose views were extremist on any account, and his targets were many.... For Stove the important question about a belief is not whether it is extreme or mainstream, but whether it is true, or probable, or has sound evidentiary and/or rational credentials. In this he was surely right." -D. D. Todd, Philosophy in Review David Stove taught philosophy at the University of New South Wales and the University of Sydney. He is the author of Against the Idols of the Age and Scientific Irrationalism, both available from Transaction. Andrew Irvine is professor of philosophy at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver. Roger Kimball is managing editor of the New Criterion. (shrink)