Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism

Oxford, UK: Oxford, Clarendon Press (1973)

Abstract

This book aims to discuss probability and David Hume's inductive scepticism. For the sceptical view which he took of inductive inference, Hume only ever gave one argument. That argument is the sole subject-matter of this book. The book is divided into three parts. Part one presents some remarks on probability. Part two identifies Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. Finally, the third part evaluates Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. Hume's argument that induction must be either deductively valid or circular because based on experience neglects the possibility that it is an argument of non-deductive logic (logical probability, in the sense of Keynes).

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,856

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
158 (#76,585)

6 months
4 (#162,461)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work

What Did Hume Really Show About Induction?Samir Okasha - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):307-327.
Hume's Positive Argument on Induction.Hsueh Qu - 2014 - Noûs 48 (4):595-625.
Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism.D. C. Stove - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 35 (3):646-647.
The Rule of Succession.Sandy L. Zabell - 1989 - Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):283 - 321.

View all 24 citations / Add more citations