Purpose The paper aims to analyze the content of the newly published National AI Ethics Guideline in Thailand. Thailand’s ongoing political struggles and transformation has made it a good case to see how a policy document such as a guideline in AI ethics becomes part of the transformations. Looking at how the two are interrelated will help illuminate the political and cultural dynamics of Thailand as well as how governance of ethics itself is conceptualized. Design/methodology/approach The author looks at the (...) history of how the National AI Ethics Guidelines came to be and interprets its content, situating the Guideline within the contemporary history of the country as well as comparing the Guideline with some of the leading existing guidelines. Findings It is found that the Guideline represents an ambivalent and paradoxical nature that characterizes Thailand’s attempt at modernization. On the one hand, there is a desire to join the ranks of the more advanced economies, but, on the other hand, there is also a strong desire to maintain its own traditional values. Thailand has not been successful in resolving this tension yet, and this lack of success is shown in the way that content of the AI Ethics Guideline is presented. Practical implications The findings of the paper could be useful for further attempts in drafting and revising AI ethics guidelines in the future. Originality/value The paper represents the first attempt, so far as the author is aware, to analyze the content of the Thai AI Ethics Guideline critically. (shrink)

Floridi’s ontocentric ethics is compared with Spinoza’s ethical and metaphysical system as found in the Ethics. Floridi’s is a naturalistic ethics where he argues that an action is right or wrong primarily because the action does decrease the ‹entropy’ of the infosphere or not. An action that decreases the amount entropy of the infosphere is a good one, and one that increases it is a bad one. For Floridi, ‹entropy’ refers to destruction or loss of diversity of the infosphere, or (...) the total reality consisting of informational objects. The similarity with Spinoza is that both philosophers refer to basic reality as a foundation for normative judgments. Hence they are both ethical naturalists. An interpretation of both Floridi and Spinoza is offered that might begin to solve the basic problems for any naturalistic ethics. The problems are how a value theory that is based on metaphysics could maintain normative force and how normative force could be justified when there appear to be widely differing metaphysical systems according to the many cultural traditions. I argue that in Spinoza’s and presumably in Floridi’s system, there is no separation between the normative and the natural from the beginning. Normative terms derive their validity from their role in referring to action that leads to a richer and fuller reality. As for the second problem, Spinoza’s God is such that He cannot be fully described by mere finite intellect. What this translates to the contemporary situation of information ethics is that there are always bound to be many different ways of conceptualizing one and the same reality, and it is the people’s needs, goals and desires that often dictate how the conceptualizing is done. However, when different groups of people interact, these systems become calibrated with one another. This is possible because they already belong to the same reality. (shrink)

The emergence of social networking sites has created a problem of how the self is to be understood in the online world. As these sites are social, they relate someone with others in a network. Thus there seems to emerge a new kind of self which exists in the online world. Accounting for the online self here also has implications on how the self in the outside world should be understood. It is argued that, as the use of online social (...) media has become more widespread, the line between the two kinds of self is becoming fuzzier. Furthermore, there seems to be a fusion between the online and the offline selves, which reflects the view that reality itself is informational. Ultimately speaking, both kinds of selves do not have any essence, i.e., any characteristic inherent to them that serves to show that these selves are what they are and none other. Instead an externalist account of the identity of the self is offered that locates the identity in question in the self’s relations with other selves as well as other events and objects. This account can both be used to explain the nature of the self both in the online and the offline worlds. (shrink)

The Disenhancement Problem in Agriculture: A Reply to Thompson Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-8 DOI 10.1007/s11569-012-0138-2 Authors Soraj Hongladarom, Department of Philosophy and Center for Ethics of Science and Technology, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand Journal NanoEthics Online ISSN 1871-4765 Print ISSN 1871-4757.

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to think ahead into the year 2035 and reflect on the ethical implications of brain-to-brain linking. Design/methodology/approach – Philosophical argument. Findings – It is quite likely that the direction of technological research today is heading toward a closer integration of mind and machine in 2035. What is interesting is that the integration also makes mind-mind or brain-brain integration possible too. There is nothing in principle that would prevent hooking up more than one (...) brain to a machine, or connecting two or more brains together to harness their processing power to tackle a very complicated task. If that happens, the whole notion of what it is to be an individual and a self will have to be rethought. I have offered a way in which that can be done: Instead of viewing the self as being contained in a closed space traditionally defined by the skin, the self can expand outside of the skin and merge temporarily with other selves too. This also has profound implications on the notion of privacy, especially on how it is conceptualized and justified. Research limitations/implications – This research is limited to theoretical argumentation only. It relies on the current empirical and scientific investigations that are going on at the moment and provide ethical reflections on them. Practical implications – We need to anticipate technological innovations to be more proactive in deliberating and formulating policy and ethical guidelines; otherwise, ethicists will just muse after the fact, implying that there is nothing further to be done. Social implications – Brain-to-brain linking has tremendous social implications, so is the ethical reflection on the issue. Originality/value – Argument purporting to show the specific content in ethical guidelines on brain-to-brain interlinking based on the metaphysics of the self that is directly implicated by the technology has not been done before, according to the author’s best knowledge. (shrink)

This paper addresses the questions of whether and, if so, how and to what extent the Internet brings about homogenisation of local cultures in the world. It examines a particular case, that of Thai culture, through an investigation and interpretation of a Usenet newsgroup, soc.culture.thai. Two threads of discussion in the newsgroup are selected. One deals with criticisms of the Thai government and political leaders, and the other focuses on whether the Thai language should be a medium, or perhaps the (...) only medium, of communication in the newsgroup. It is found that, instead of erasing local cultural boundaries, creating a worldwide monolithic culture, the Internet reduplicates the existing cultural boundaries. What the Internet does, on the contrary, is to create an umbrella cosmopolitan culture which is necessary for communication among people from disparate cultures. That culture, however, is devoid of ‘thick’ backgrounds, in Michael Walzer's sense. (shrink)

The paper discusses ubiquitous computing and the conception of the self, especially the question how the self should be understood in the environment pervaded by ubiquitous computing, and how ubiquitous computing makes possible direct empathy where each person or self connected through the network has direct access to others’ thoughts and feelings. Starting from a conception of self, which is essentially distributed, composite and constituted through information, the paper argues that when a number of selves are connected to one another (...) in the ubiquitous computing network, a possibility opens up where the selves can directly communicate with one another. This has a potential finally to solve the problem of other minds, and in fact any philosophical conundrum based on the supposed distinction between self and the world. When selves have direct access to others’ thoughts and feelings, they know the content of others’ mental states directly without having to make inferences or employing some other indirect methods. As they are interconnected through the ubiquitous network, and as they are essentially constituted through information, the selves then are spread out across the network. What this implies is that any boundary between a self and another is not as hard and fast as hitherto may have been understood. Toward the end, the paper also discusses how freedom and autonomy are still possible in this ubiquitously networked world. (shrink)

This book investigates the emerging phenomenon of the self as it exists in the online world. It argues for an externalist conception of self and identity, one that does not depend on the continuity of consciousness of the subject. It also offers an analysis of related phenomenon such as online friendship and games based on this analysis. An outstanding feature of social networking sites such as Facebook and MySpace is that it allows for the user to put forward their “selves” (...) or their identity onto the Internet and use the online self as an anchor to connect with any number of “friends” each of whom also has their own online selves. A number of questions then arise which are deeply conceptual and philosophical in nature: What is the metaphysical nature of this emerging online self? Is it the same or fundamentally different from the “offline” self with which we are already familiar? Since increasing numbers of people are connected to the online world, this world itself seems to be taking on a reality of its own. This much has been appreciated by a number of scholars in the field. However, there seems to be lacking a systematic study of the philosophical and metaphysical nature of the self that has become a key element in cyberspace, a key topic which this volume addresses. Apart from the problem of constitution of the online self, this volume addresses related questions concerning personal identity in the online world and scrutinizes computer games and the characteristics that they share with social networking sites. Unlike the majority of the existing literature, which discusses the topic from a more social scientific perspective, this volume fills the lacuna of a philosophical and theoretical study of the online world.​. (shrink)

This paper argues that information should be made transparent as a means to close the global digital divide problem. The usual conception of the digital divide as a bifurcation between the information rich and poor in fact does a poor job at describing the reality of the situation, which is characterized by multiple dimensions of digital divides in many contexts. Taking the lead from Albert Borgmann, it is recognized that the so-called information poor do possess a rich resource of information (...) which needs to be fully accounted for in order to solve the global digital divide problem. In addition, making information transparent means, following the theory of development of Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, that information should be made available and accessible through a system of representation. Floridis account of information ethics thus needs to be supplemented by the realization that members of infosphere, which in his view consist of information objects, should be made transparent in order that the global digital divide be ameliorated. In other words there should be a system of information about information, namely semantic representation of objective information which enables the locals to make full use of their available informational resources. (shrink)

Two models of human perfection proposed by Nietzsche and the Buddha are investigated. Both the overman and the arahant need practice and individual effort as key to their realization, and they share roughly the same conception of the self as a construction. However, there are also a number of salient differences. Though realizing it to be constructed, the overman does proclaim himself through his assertion of the will to power. The realization of the true nature of the self does not (...) lead the overman to seek the way to be released from sa?sara as does the arahant. On the contrary, he rejoices in the eternally recurring situation. The arahant, however, has totally relinquished any attachment to the self, constructed or otherwise. The arahant does not care about the Eternal Recurrence, as he only focuses on the present moment. Finally, they are both beyond good and evil, but in a substantively different way. (shrink)

This paper looks at the situation first described by Dreyfus :369–378, 2002) in his seminal paper, in order to find out whether and, if so, to what extent the use of Internet in education is still characterized by anonymity and commitment in today’s social media and ‘post-truth’ era. Current form of web technology provides an occasion for us to rethink what the Press and the Public, two main Kierkegaardian themes, actually consist in. The very ease and rapidity of how information (...) is shared and the blurring of the line between journalists and consumers have made it very difficult to find where the Public actually is so that one can conform one’s own thoughts and beliefs to it. In addition, an effect of social media is that the Public does not seem to be monolithic, but has splintered into many smaller groups, each one overlapping with one another in a highly complex way. In Kierkegaard’s time the Press consisted of nothing more than a rather small number of newspapers, but now we have countless number of sources of information, so much so that it is almost impossible to see where the Press actually is. This situation has a way of diluting Kierkegaard’s contention that it is the Press that anonymized the people, rending them faceless and eliminating their individuality. Furthermore, the effect of Facebook is such that, not only does one still retain much of one’s commitment, but the commitment can be very passionate. As Petrik et al. have pointed out, it is possible for someone to be passionately committed to something while remaining very active on the Internet. This shows that the direction can go both ways. On the one hand, fragmenting the Public can go along with lack of commitment and other ills that Kierkegaard mentioned. On the other hand, fragmenting the Public, thereby creating many smaller groups existing in the online world can also bring about specific and well-directed commitments than would be possible if the Public remained a single monolithic entity. Furthermore, Kierkegaard’s insistence on lack of commitment by the Public seems to foretell the current malaise of what is known as ‘post-truth’. For Dreyfus the Internet is ultimately responsible for this. Indeed, however, both lack of commitment and too much commitment seem to be both responsible. A way out of this is proposed where a commitment to rational and critical thought is needed. (shrink)

This is a metaphysical and conceptual analysis of the concepts ‘change’ and ‘continuity’. The Buddhists are in agreement with Heraclitus that all are flowing and nothing remains. However, the Buddhists have a much more elaborate theory about change and continuity, and this theory is a key element in the entire Buddhist system of related doctrines, viz., that of karma and rebirth, the possibility of Liberation and others. Simply put, the Buddhist emphasizes that change is there in every aspect of reality. (...) According to a later developed form of the Buddhist teaching, change is absolutely pervasive, and even these particles are subject to change as they are nothing more than putative objects which are conceptualized to be such and such, and without the conceptualization they are ‘nothing’ at all.. Hence it seems that continuity is not possible. But in fact according to the later theory, change is not only possible, it is accepted as part and parcel of everyday life. The fact that nothing at all remains the same does not imply that continuity is not possible, since continuity does not always have to be that of an inherently existing object. A changing object can be continued also, in roughly the same sense as we say that an event, like a drama, continues even though everything in it is changing. The thread that ties the disparate elements of the event together in this case lies within our own conceptual imputation. This does not imply that everything is subjective, since the distinction between subject and object presupposes the idea of an absolutely existing individual self, which all Buddhist schools rejects. So in this later theory, absolute change is not possible because there is, ultimately speaking nothing to change, and when there is no change there is no continuation either. This is not to deny the empirical fact of changes and continuities that are present to us; things are there and they are indeed changing. What is being denied here is the belief that that there are essences to things which endure through all the changes. Since things are empty they can change, and continuity is only possible, not because there is something that exists and endures, but because there is change. A drama that does not move cannot be continued. The foregoing discussions of the Buddhist theories have many implications for the dialog between science and religion. One point is that science still seems to subscribe to the object/subject distinction. But if change and continuity are not real in the ultimate sense, then perhaps the distinction should be reconsidered. Another point concerns how to find continuity amidst all the change. But perhaps in some important sense continuity depends on us. (shrink)

Bioinformatics is a new field of study whose ethical implications involve a combination of bioethics, computer ethics and information ethics. This paper is an attempt to view some of these implications from the perspective of Buddhism. Privacy is a central concern in both computer/information ethics and bioethics, and with information technology being increasingly utilized to process biological and genetic data, the issue has become even more pronounced. Traditionally, privacy presupposes the individual self but as Buddhism does away with the ultimate (...) conception of an individual self, it has to find a way to analyse and justify privacy that does not presuppose such a self. It does this through a pragmatic conception that does not depend on a positing of the substantial self, which is then found to be unnecessary for an effective protection of privacy. As it may be possible one day to link genetic data to individuals, the Buddhist conception perhaps offers a more flexible approach, as what is considered to be integral to an individual person is not fixed in objectivity but depends on convention. (shrink)

In this brief note I continue the discussion that I had with John Searle on the topic of the self and the possibility of continuity of consciousness after death of the body. The gist of Searle's reply to my original paper is that it is logical possible, though extremely unlikely, that consciousness survives destruction of the body. This is a rather startling claim given that Searle famously holds that consciousness is the work of the body. Nonetheless, he claims that such (...) issue is an empirical matter which could perhaps be discovered by future science. Another point concerns identity of the self or the person. Searle claims that the self functions as a unified point of view from which episodes of mental events are presented as a coherent picture. Here the Two Truths position in Buddhism differs from Searle's here. The "point of view" that Searle mentions exists only at the conventional level, but not the ultimate one. (shrink)

This volume is a collection of selected papers presented at the Second Asia-Pacific Computing and Philsosophy Conference, which was held in Bangkok, Thailand in January 2005. The conference was organized by the Center for Ethics of Science and Technology, Chulalongkorn University on behalf of the International Association of Computing and Philosophy (www.ia-cap.org). Computing have had a long relationship with philosophy, starting from the problem of how symbols being manipulated in computing bear a relation to the outside world, to those of (...) artificial intelligence, robotics, computer simulation, and so on. Moreover, as computer technologies have become thoroughly pervasive in today's environment, there are also issues concerning social and ethical impacts brought about by them. The papers in the volume represent a wide variety of concerns and various dimensions within which computing and philosophy are related. Furthermore, it also represents some of the first attempts to highlight cultural dimensions of computing and philosophy, which became prominent when the conference was held for the first time within the milieu of an Asian culture. (The First Asia-Pacific Computing and Philosophy was held in Canberra, Australia.) Hence, many of the papers in the volume address this added dimension. Apart form the usual problems of how computers and human lives are interconnected, the papers here also discuss how computers are related to human lives as lived in a specific culture. Thus the book breaks a new ground and should be of interest to a wide range of scholars and students who are interested, not only on computing and philosophy generally construed, but also on this exciting new dimension of how the cultures of Asia, the West, and others bear upon the traditional issues in computing and philosophy, and on how this dimension raises some new concerns and agenda. Among the topics discussed in this volume are: political online forums in Saudi Arabia, e-democracy and structural transformation of public sphere, the Buddhist informational person, a glance into the lives of computerized generation in Thailand, technology and journalism in the market, local approaches and global potential (?) of information ethics, computer-enhanced good life, computer teaching ethics, and many others. (shrink)

There is a significant information divide between the countries in the North and those in the South. This is detrimental to economic growth as information feeds into knowledge production. The divide is exacerbated by a series of uneven and unjust flows of information between the North and the South. Two related patterns of the unjust flow are explored, namely the flow of biological resources and information and the flow of rare manuscripts and published materials. I argue that the concept of (...) global justice is an appropriate tool to comprehend the situation; this is an addition to those offered in Britz and Lor . Furthermore I discuss the need for increasing intra-South information flow. This will strengthen the Southern countries as a whole, since the flow will link the countries together so they have a stronger voice and chances to learn from one another directly. (shrink)

The role and nature of imagination in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is intensively examined. In addition, the text of Kant's Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View will also be considered because it helps illustrate this issue. Imagination is the fundamental power of the mind responsible for any act of forming and putting together representations. A new interpretation of imagination in Kant is given which recognizes its necessary roles as the factor responsible for producing space and time, as an (...) essential component in perception, as the mediator of concepts and intuitions, and as the synthesizing agent which groups together representations into categories. ;The work is divided basically into two parts. The first part looks at the imagination in the Transcendental Aesthetic. It will be shown that space and time themselves are products of imagination. As pure and a priori intuitions space and time are objects of thought and thus are conditioned by the synthetic power of imagination. Moreover, as forms of intuitions space and time are also conditioned by imagination; hence, imagination is a necessary factor in spatial and temporal perception. ;The second part of the thesis concerns the role of imagination in the Transcendental Analytic. Here the role of the imagination is more pervasive. In the Metaphysical Deduction the thesis argues that the imagination is responsible for uniting representations into twelve categories which are the conditions of thinking in general. Therefore the categories themselves owe their origins to imagination. This interpretation hinges on Kant's distinction between transcendental and general logic, which the thesis will discuss in detail. In the Transcendental Deduction the imagination is responsible for taking up representations in such a way that results in their belonging to a single framework of consciousness, thus showing that the categories apply to a posteriori representations. In the Schematism the imagination is necessary in forming the schemata, which join together concepts and intuitions so that both empirical and transcendental judgments are produced. Finally, a critique of Heidegger's idea on imagination as the "common root" of sensibility and understanding will be offered. (shrink)

This collection brings together different philosophical points of view discussing two important aspects of human life, namely love and friendship, within the broad context of comparative philosophy. These points of view differ in terms of their cultural orientations - East or West, ancient or modern; philosophical methodologies - analytical, historical, experimental, or phenomenological, broadly construed; and motivation - explanatory, revisionary, or argumentative. The volume is a comparative treatment of how diverse philosophical cultures view love and friendship, such as how Aristotle (...) and Confucius’ views on friendship are similar and different, how the ancient Greeks and the Buddhists view friendship and happiness, and how posthumous love is possible. With contributions from a diverse set of scholars, this book presents the emerging views of Southeast Asian philosophers compared with those of philosophers from other regions, including Europe and North America. The volume thus provides a multi-faceted way of understanding love and friendship across cultures, and will be relevant to scholars interested in philosophy, the history of ideas, Asian Studies, and religious studies. (shrink)

The sharing economy and peer-to-peer business relationships using information technology has become moreimportant in today’s world. For the sharing economy to work, however, trust and reputation are cruciallyimportant. I argue that the gathering of personal data needs to be accompanied by safeguards providing aguarantee of privacy rights. This argument will be based on a sketch of a theory called ‘peer-to-peer ethics.’Basically, the idea is that what constitutes the ground for normativity is something that is agreed upon byeveryone involved. In short, (...) what is considered to be ‘good’ is whatever contributes to bringing about thedesired goal of the community. This is a very familiar and ancient view on normative concepts, but, as I argue,one that deserves to be taken seriously especially as we enter into an intricately globalized world of ethicswhere worldviews clash with one another. (shrink)

Nanotechnology has been proclaimed as a new technology that could bridge the gap between the rich and the poor countries. Indeed many countries in Asia are fast developing their nanotechnological capabilities. However, one needs to take into consideration the role that culture and values play in adoption of nanotechnological policies, keeping in mind that technology and culture are deeply dependent on each other. I offer a criticism of the dependency theory in economic development, which says that there is an unbridgeable (...) divide that the poorer countries cannot cross. As with other powerful technologies, nanotechnology can create as many problems as solutions. I concentrate how insights from the Buddhist tradition, prevalent in Thailand, could illuminate how nanotechnology could be introduced into the lifeworld of a people. (shrink)

In this brief note I continue the discussion that I had with John Searle on the topic of the self and the possibility of continuity of consciousness after death of the body. The gist of Searle's reply to my original paper is that it is logical possible, though extremely unlikely, that consciousness survives destruction of the body. This is a rather startling claim given that Searle famously holds that consciousness is the work of the body. Nonetheless, he claims that such (...) issue is an empirical matter which could perhaps be discovered by future science. Another point concerns identity of the self or the person. Searle claims that the self functions as a unified point of view from which episodes of mental events are presented as a coherent picture. Here the Two Truths position in Buddhism differs from Searle's here. The "point of view" that Searle mentions exists only at the conventional level, but not the ultimate one. (shrink)

Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of the Will bears many striking similarities with Buddhist philosophy. The denial of the Will, which is the only route to salvation and true happiness for Schopenhauer, results in nothing. Schopenhauer also recommends us to face this nothingness squarely, so to speak, and not to flee from it or put it under myths or “meaningless words” such as “Brahma” or “Nirvana.” This is completely different from the Buddhist point of view. The Will, for the Buddhist, is not there (...) from the beginning. Nothing escapes Emptiness, including the Schopenhauerian Will itself. (shrink)