This paper examines the perceived ethical values of Malaysian managers. It is based on the opinions of 15 hypothetical ethical/unethical business situations from the 81 managers who agreed to participate in the survey. The findings of this study showed that these Malaysian managers have high ethical values. However 53% of the respondents believed that the ethical standards of today are lower than that of 15 years ago. Apparently, this is related to the existence of many unethical business practices prevalent in (...) the modern business world. The behavior of one's immediate superior is the most important factor in influencing managers to commit unethical practices. The results also indicate only a slight variation among the managers in terms of perceived ethical values by virtue of job position, job specialization, type of business activity or the size of the business organization. (shrink)

In A Priori Justification, Albert Casullo argues that extant attempts to explicate experiential justification—by stipulation, introspection, conceptual analysis, thought experimentation, and/or appeal to intuitions about hypothetical cases—are unsuccessful. He draws the following conclusion: “armchair methods” such as these are inadequate to the task. Instead, empirical methods should be used to investigate the distinction between experiential and non-experiential justification and to address questions concerning the nature, extent, and existence of the a priori. In this essay, I show that Casullo has not (...) refuted armchair explications of experiential justification, in particular those that appeal to introspectively accessible phenomenology. I do this by presenting a phenomenal theory of experiential justification that (a) has a significant degree of initial plausibility and (b) survives Casullo’s general attack on such theories. As a result, a premise in the central argument for Casullo’s signature proposal concerning the a priori is undermined. (shrink)

The author critiques the progressive approach of two contemporary educational philosophers on the topic of fear and learning. Using a postmodern integral approach, this article examines the tendency of reductionism, individualism, and psychologism as part of a hegemonoic liberalism and modernism in discourses on fear and learning commonly adopted by educators....

First Edition 1995, Second Edition 2012.

The two main purposes of this paper are: to document the history of my own philosophical thinking about fear and fearlessness in regards to existential philosophy.... to lay the groundwork for a genealogy of Fear Management System-5.

Further examines the sense in which moral judgements are universalizable. Distinguishes between moral and logical theses of universalizability and shows how the moral does not follow from the logical. Universalizability, in the form maintained in this book, is a logical, not a moral, thesis; furthermore, nothing substantially moral follows from the logical thesis. The chapter presents the exact import of the thesis and considers the role of moral principles.

Discusses an important objection to the view that moral judgements are prescriptive: the existence of cases in which people act in ways that they know to be wrong. The objection is that if moral judgements are prescriptive, it is impossible to accept a moral judgement and yet act contrary to it; therefore prescriptivism must be wrong. It is argued that cases of moral weakness do not constitute a counterexample to prescriptivism.

We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...) Mates cases, and we believe that there are many additional applications. (shrink)

Examines the nature of moral argument and how arguments might be brought to a conclusion. It is argued that moral reasoning is a kind of exploration akin to Karl Popper's concept of deduction; the only inferences that take place are deductive. This approach allows for the defence of the neutrality of ethics, which appears to be ruled out by its practical relevance. It lays the ground for the possibility of moral reasoning in terms of moral rules, corresponding to prescriptivity and (...) universalizability. These are taken to task in the context of a concrete example of a moral conflict. (shrink)

An important moral problem of the sort that confronts us in real life serves as the recapitulation of the main themes of the book. This is the question of race.

Outlines the features of descriptive terms and judgements. The role played by descriptive meaning in moral statements is elucidated by examining the general nature of descriptivist statements and the connection with universalizability. It is argued that any singular descriptive judgement is universalizable in the sense that it commits the speaker to making the same judgement about relevantly similar subjects. Value judgements and generally descriptive judgements share descriptive content and are therefore universalizable in the same way. But in the case of (...) moral judgements, the universal rules that determine the descriptive meaning are not mere meaning‐rules, but rules of substance. The logical connections between descriptivism, prescriptivism, naturalism, and the thesis of universalizability are explored. (shrink)

Introduces the main themes of the book and expresses the basic conflict between freedom and reason.

Establishes that aesthetic judgements are universalizable and addresses the problem of delimiting moral from aesthetic and evaluative questions. It is argued that there are at least two kinds of grounds on which someone might claim to know what the best thing to do is: interests and ideals. The question of ideals is elaborated in the subsequent discussion. It is argued that when interests are not concerned, conflicts between ideals are not susceptible to much in the way of argument; conflicts between (...) interests, if ideals are not involved, can be reconciled by means of the moral reasoning generated by the logic of moral terms. (shrink)

Revisits the question of the relation between ethics, considered as a study of the logical character of moral concepts, and substantive moral questions. It covers much of the ground of previous chapters in an attempt to forestall confusion and clarify the theses embraced in the course of the book. The naturalist theory of ethics is contrasted at length with the thesis on moral argument outlined in this book.

Professor Foot's Hart Lecture, now published (1995), is largely devoted to an attack on people she calls ‘subjectivists’ and ‘noncognitivists', among whom she includes myself, although she is so good as to allow me, in a footnote, to reject thenames.She seems to imply thereby that this is a mere matter of nomenclature or terminology. But in truth her use of these terms makes one suspect that she has not fully understood either the issues or what I have said about them.It (...) may therefore be useful to explain yet again why I reject these descriptions. I have done so already in a paper to a conference in Moscow which she heard, and to which she kindly refers (Hare 1993a). These explanations would not be important if she were the only person to be confused about this matter; but the confusions are so widespread, even among professional philosophers who should know better, and are so often taught to succeeding generations of students, that it is worth while to make yet another attempt to clear them up - though the confusions are so insidious that I have not much hope that they will ever be eradicated. (shrink)

In the broader sense, morality includes the pursuit of ideals as well as the reconciliation of interests. This chapter examines the arguments needed to be brought against people who, in pursuit of their ideals, trample on other people's interests. The differences between ideals and interests are set out, and the relations between the two investigated. The discussion presents the case against a paramount example of untrammelled idealism—fanatic fascism—as argued by a liberal, and in doing so shows the scope and limits (...) of moral reasoning. (shrink)

Through consideration of another practical case, this chapter opens the way to a generalization of the method of argument outlined previously. Multilateral cases raise the question of how the interests of all parties can be resolved into a determinate moral conclusion, which brings the discussion to a standpoint that has affinities with classical utilitarianism. Like the principle of universalizability, the form of the utilitarian principle espoused is purely logical. In both cases, the moral substance comes from fleshing out the parties’ (...) actual inclinations and interests. The chapter embarks on a short survey of the challenges faced by a utilitarian system of this kind, before considering the concept of happiness, act‐utilitarianism, and rule‐utilitarianism. (shrink)

Sets out a short history of proper names, those paradigms of referring expressions. The starting point is Mill, and the history is traced through Frege, Russell, Kripke, and McDowell. In the final section, the theory to be defended in the book is briefly stated.

Starts by showing that semantic complexity is not as such a barrier to being a referring expression, using the example of compound names. Goes on to consider whether definite descriptions, at least in some uses, should be counted as referring expressions and concludes that they should be, even if one endorses Russellian truth conditions for sentences containing definite descriptions.

Shows how well the book’s theory applies to existential statements, providing a very straightforward account of true negative ones. The theory also applies reasonably well to fiction, and the remaining problems are problematic for all theories.

Sets out the framework within which Reference without referents theory is developed. Truth theoretic semantics, though it certainly cannot tell us everything we wish to know, is accorded a significant role; the impact of the idea of a Russellian proposition is noted and deplored, negative free logic is described and endorsed, a methodology of maximizing ontological conservatism is stated, and the notion of rigidity is explained and shown to be intuitively consistent with lack of a referent.

Discusses two main uses of pronouns—anaphoric and demonstrative. These pronouns can belong to an intelligible sentence even if they have no referent, so they vindicate the thesis of RWR. A test for intelligibility is that we can correctly report indirect speech in which such a pronoun is used, replacing the original speaker’s demonstrative pronoun by an anaphoric one. For example, a hallucinator’s utterance of ’That little green man is bald’ can be reported as ‘Hallucinating a little green man, she said (...) that he was bald’. (shrink)

The sources of the attractiveness of descriptivism and of direct reference theories are identified and shown to be wanting. The intermediate position, RWR, is one in which a proper name may or may not have a bearer, though if it has one it will have it essentially, and if it lacks one this will also be essential. A full development of the view makes use of the notion of the practice of using a name, and a preliminary attempt is made (...) to identify the main components of the concept of a name-using practice and to say something constructive about their character. (shrink)

I had a strange dream, or half-waking vision, not long ago. I found myself at the top of a mountain in the mist, feeling very pleased with myself, not just for having climbed the mountain, but for having achieved my life's ambition, to find a way of answering moral questions rationally. But as I was preening myself on this achievement, the mist began to clear, and I saw that I was surrounded on the mountain top by the graves of all (...) those other philosophers, great and small, who had had the same ambition, and thought they had achieved it. And I have come to see, reflecting on my dream, that, ever since, the hard-working philosophical worms have been nibbling away at their systems and showing that the achievement was an illusion. True, their skeletons, indigestible to worms, remained, and were surprisingly similar to one another. But I was led to think again about what one can, and what one cannot, achieve in this direction. (shrink)

In this work, the author has fashioned out of the logical and linguistic theses of his earlier books a full-scale but readily intelligible account of moral argument.

Are fictional characters such as Sherlock Holmes real? What can fiction tell us about the nature of truth and reality? In this excellent introduction to the problem of fictionalism R. M. Sainsbury covers the following key topics: what is fiction? realism about fictional objects, including the arguments that fictional objects are real but non-existent; real but non-factual; real but non-concrete the relationship between fictional characters and non-actual worlds fictional entities as abstract artefacts fiction and intentionality and the problem of irrealism (...) fictionalism about possible worlds moral fictionalism. R. M. Sainsbury makes extensive use of examples from fiction, such as Sherlock Holmes, Anna Karenina and Madame Bovary and examines the work of philosophers who have made significant contributions to the topic, including Meinong, David Lewis, and Bas Van Fraassen. Additional features include chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary of technical terms, making _Fiction and Fictionalism_ ideal for those coming to the issue for the first time. (shrink)