Proper names

In R. M. Sainsbury (ed.), Reference Without Referents. Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press UK (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The sources of the attractiveness of descriptivism and of direct reference theories are identified and shown to be wanting. The intermediate position, RWR, is one in which a proper name may or may not have a bearer, though if it has one it will have it essentially, and if it lacks one this will also be essential. A full development of the view makes use of the notion of the practice of using a name, and a preliminary attempt is made to identify the main components of the concept of a name-using practice and to say something constructive about their character.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,127

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Proper Names and Practices: On Reference without Referents.Mark Textor - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):105-118.
Understanding proper names.Michael McKinsey - 2010 - Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (4):325-354.
Sense and Reference of Proper Names.Emmanuel Perakis - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 53:111-115.
Semantics of Proper Names as a Philosophical Problem.Alexey Chenyak - 2016 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 49 (3):70-87.
In Defense of Donnellan on Proper Names.Antonio Capuano - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1289-1312.
The Predicate View of Proper Names.Kent Bach - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (11):772-784.
Proper names and persons: Peirce's semiotic consideration of proper names.Eric Thomas Weber - 2008 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44 (2):pp. 346-362.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-10-25

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mark Sainsbury
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references